University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1995

Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal
Law
Paul H. Robinson
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

John M. Darley
Princeton University-Department of Psychology

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons,
Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Psychology
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons,
Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
Robinson, Paul H. and Darley, John M., "Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal
Law" (1995). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1634.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1634

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Justice, Liability, and Blame

About the Book and Authors
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dards. To what extent have they succeeded? This book examines shared intuitive notions of
justice among laypersons and compares the discovered principles to those instantiated in
current American criminal codes. After discussion of the proper role of community views
in formulating legal doctrine, Robinson and Darley report eighteen original studies on a
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and code provisions on such questions as the justified use of force, insanity, causation,
complicity, risk-creation, omission liability, culpability requirements, duress, entrapment,
multiple offenses, and criminalization matters such as felony-murder and sexual offenses.
Many important differences between the legal code and community views are found, and
the authors discuss the implications of those differences. One implication is the possibility
that such conflicts could lead to reduced compliance as the code loses its moral authority
with the community.
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Preface

Members of the criminal law community regularly make assertions about «the
community's sense of justice" on a particular issue and claim that, therefore, to be
true to this sense of justice, a particular formulation or interpretation of a crimi 
nal code provision is required. Such claims typically express the speaker's own in 
tuitions, which the speaker believes are shared by other people of common sense.
Such thoughtful speculation commonly is the basis upon which formulations of
criminal law are proposed, adopted, and interpreted.
A social scientist may cringe at hearing this. T he community's intuitions on
blame and punishment are not matters that one need speculate about. Modern
behavioral science is well equipped to determine with some reliability the rules
that laypersons use in assessing blame and deserved punishment. Basing criminal
law formulation on speculation rather than fact suggests that the criminal law
community is out of touch with modern science in an important and damaging
way.
In this book we report eighteen original studies on a wide range of issues that
are central to criminal law formulation, including issues relating to the justified
use of force, insanity, causation, complicity, risk-creation, omission liability, cul
pability requirements, duress, entrapment, multiple offenses, and criminalization
matters such as felony murder and sexual offenses. T he questions selected for in
vestigation are those for which the community's intuition would be of impor
tance to the legal decision-makers. In addition to reporting the community's
views, we compare those views to the rules instantiated in current criminal codes.
Many important differences between code and community are found, and we dis
cuss the implications of those differences.
Social scientists may look at these studies and wonder: What is it that makes
these authors think the world breathlessly awaits yet another series of studies on
"the law and social science"? There already exist a number of studies that trace re
lationships between various legal concerns and the findings of social and psycho
logical science. How do the studies reported in this book differ from other stud
ies? What sorts of new contributions do they make?
First, our studies differ fro m others in the specific questions we investigate. As
noted, we test the views of ordinary people on the issues that govern the formula
tion of criminal codes. An example may make this clearer. Criminal codes are
quite strict about what actions can be committed in self-defense. Roughly, the de-
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fender can use only force sufficient to defend against the attack and can use
deadly force only if serious harm is threatened and safe retreat from the attacker is
not possible. One of our studies demonstrates that ordinary people hold consid
erably looser standards for acceptable force in self-defense. We then say what we
can about the possible meanings of this code-community difference and, some
what gingerly, discuss possible implications for code modification.
Our second claim to rareness, if not uniqueness, lies in this: the accuracy of our
understandings of the legal codes. Frequently, when social scientists set out to do
research relevant to legal concerns, they do so without a careful examination of
the structure of the legal system that generates the issues to be examined. This has
meant, much more than has been generally realized, that the studies do not make
contact with the concerns of the legal system or make contact in a way that flaws
the extrapolations that the social scientists wish to make. Thus, their intended au
dience-legal professionals-is not reached or is not moved by their arguments.
For example, an empirical study investigating lay intuitions on the blamewor
thiness of "recklessness" and "negligence" may give interesting results. Yet, if the
definitions of "recklessness" and «negligence" used in the study are different from
those used in criminal codes-where the t �o terms typically are given detailed
definitions-the results will be of little or no use to criminal l aw decision-makers.
Those familiar with social science research on insanity will be able to supply
many examples of a similar sort; studies in which the questions that were raised
with the study respondents were not in the form required to give answers to ques
tions of interest to the legal decision-makers and scholars.
All too often, social scientists have aimed to collide with legal concerns-but
missed their target. No doubt we make mistakes in this book, but this is not one
of them. One of us has extensively studied criminal codes and has been involved
in code-drafting efforts. Throughout the book, we discuss what weight should be
given to a code-community discrepancy. That turns out to be a complex question.
However, when our research demonstrates a discrepancy between code and com
munity, we have confidence that it is a real one, rather than one that can be ex
plained away by some misunderstanding of the code.
Aside from our deep conviction that any human being with pretensions to live
the "life of the mind" would benefit from a copy of this book-or perhaps two
copies-we can specify sets of readers to whom we address the book. First, and
most obvious, our audience includes those who are involved in the processes of
code drafting and interpretation-those legislators, committee staffers, and
think-tank and university scholars who participate in creating criminal codes as
well as those judges who must interpret code provisions and explain them to ju
rors. Second, our audience includes those research scholars and legal philoso
phers who do empirical and theoretical work on criminal j ustice issues or, more
broadly, who work on issues of society and morality. By extension then, we also
think that social scientists who study various issues of contact between law and
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social science might find at least some of our findings and perhaps our research
methods to be of interest. Instructors of seminars or courses on law and social sci
ence might want to explore at least some of the issues we raise and examine our
research methods.
Many people have helped us carry out the research we report in this book, and
we gratefully acknowledge their assistance. The studies were conceived, designed,
and executed during the fall of 1 990 and the spring of 1 99 1 in seminars at Rutgers
University School of Law, where Paul Robinson then taught. Our greatest debt is
to the students in those seminars who enthusiastically did more than any seminar
student could be expected to do: Cynthia Adler, Blake Bolinger, Amy Bosacco,
Alison Brown, Kara Bruge-Holland, Michelle Carter, Ron Fisher, Gary Gallant,
Geoff Garner, Tim Hartigan, William Horan, Kimm Lacken, Alfred Low-Beer,
James Passantino, Eric Riso, Linda Thomas, Liz Varki, Ann Waybourn, and John
Young. They learned more about research methodology than they wanted to
learn, out of a conviction that criminal law ought to be based on more than spec
ulation.
Anne Marie Carosella, while a graduate student at Princeton, was the teaching
assistant for the Rutgers seminars and labored long and gallantly for experimental
designs that would test the hypotheses set forth herein and provide analytically
tractable data. Dan Bailis did much in analyzing the data after Ms. Carosella's
graduation. The law-psychology research group at Princeton University, includ
ing at various times Dan Bailis, Marisa Reddy, Kathryn Oleson, Beth Bennett,
Robert Harlow, and Holly Sukel, helped interpret the data patterns. Emily Reber
helped prepare the data tables and figures that are presented throughout the text.
Deborah Prentice tactfully coped with a number of data-analytic questions, some
of a regrettably elementary sort, and accurately identified various incoherences in
manuscript drafts. Natasha Goldstein, a law student at Northwestern University,
did valiant work of every sort o n the final manuscript. The willingness of Profes
sors Stephen Morse, Tom Tyler, and Nelson Polsby to provide wise advice on as
pects of the project also is gratefully acknowledged.
Rutgers University School of Law financed the data-collection and related ac
tivities. Deans Roger Dennis at Rutgers and Robert Bennett at Northwestern pro
vided Paul Robinson with financial and moral support for the many years of this
work. The National Science Foundation, the Center for Advanced Study in the
Behavioral Sciences, the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of
California at Berkeley, and Princeton University provided research support to
John Darley during the period.
We have benefited from the discussions we have held with those we acknowl
edge and others, but the views that we express, of course, are our own.

Paul H. Robinson
John M. Darley

1
Community Standards and the
Criminal Law

A common form of argument and analysis when discussing legal liability is to
claim that "justice" requires one result or another. The "justice" argument is used
most often and with greatest conviction when analyzing criminal liability, because
criminal law, more than any other, is thought to be premised on principles of
blameworthiness and desert. Various conceptions of justice have been proposed
by moral philosophers, but when laypersons claim that justice requires a particu
lar criminal liability or punishment in a case, rarely are they referring to concep
tualizations derived from moral philosophy. Instead, they see the proper result as
one that is in accord with their intuitive notions. Persons can articulate reasons
for their intuitive judgments, of course, and importantly they often believe that
those reasons are not idiosyncratic to themselves but are held by a broad commu
nity of moral persons. Thus, the argument that "justice would be served if ... " is
a claim not only of the speaker's personal view but of an intuitive but grounded
notion of justice that the speaker believes is shared by the community of moral
individuals.
It is these notions of just results held by ordinary people that we set out to in
vestigate. Since we collected the moral intuitions of more than thirty people about
each set of cases, we were also able to determine the degree to which these intu
itions actually were shared among individuals, thus testing the belief of many in
dividuals that their moral intuitions reflect a community consensus. Thus, one
focus of our investigation has been on the following questions: What are the
moral intuitions of individuals about the sorts of blameworthiness and just-de
serts issues that arise in criminal cases? To what extent are these intuitions shared
( that is, do shared standards of justice exist)? In this book, we report the results of
several of our investigations into these and related questions. By empirical proce
dures, we determine at least the beginnings of the outlines of "community stan
dards"-those views that are held by ordinary members of our communities
about criminal liability and punishment.
Rather than addressing this "moral intuitions" question across the spectrum of
possible issues-all criminal activities-we allowed the specific cases we exam
ined to be dictated by our second focus. Professor Robinson is knowledgeable
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about criminal law as it is represented in the legal codes that govern the criminal
justice system's determinations of trial outcomes and assignments of criminal lia
bility. Those individuals versed in criminal law often are struck by the thought
that the results dictated by criminal codes are at variance with our notions of the
moral intuitions of individuals in our culture. Are these "secondhand intuitions;'
these intuitions of legal scholars about code-community discrepancies, correct?
This became the second focus of our investigation. We strategically aimed our in
vestigations of community standards at areas in which we suspected that such dis
crepancies existed or in which a discrepancy might be of particular interest. Are
there really times when community standards are importantly different from the
liability and punishment provided by legal codes?
Our studies follow a set form: We contrast the empirical judgments made by
community members with those liability judgments determined by current ver
sions of the legal code-particularly, those assigned by the Model Penal Code (the
Code) but also those assigned by other codes or proposed codes that have some
claim on the attention of legal scholars and code drafters. Our purpose is to cause
a particular sort of controversy. We seek to bring the legal community to consider
the consequences of discovered discrepancies between the moral intuitions of or
dinary people and legal codes. Additionally, we will discuss what rides on the an
swers to the previous questions and what such discrepancies might imply for the
criminal j ustice system.
In our investigations we discover that often the legal codes and the community
standards reflect similar rules in assigning liability to a case of wrongdoing; but
also often they do not. For each instance of a discovered similarity or discrepancy,
we discuss the possible implications of the similarity or the difference. To signal
our conclusions, we will argue that a discrepancy between code and community is
by no means always an argument for changing the legal code, but it is an argu
ment for careful examination of the possible roots of the discrepancy. At certain
times, one would choose to "go with the code;' to retain the code's formulation of
an offense and the range of punishment for the offense that the code prescribes.
At other times, the weight of the argument lies with the community standards;
the code drafters should consider reformulating the legal codes to come into har
mony with the moral j udgments that our subjects provide. In still other cases, we
see multiple possible directions that a code-community standard could take and
are genuinely puzzled about what to recommend.
In summary, this book investigates the existence, nature, and implications of
community views on the rules and principles of criminal liability and punish
ment by contrasting those views to the rules and principles embedded in legal
codes. By doing so, we frankly hope to generate controversy-to generate debate
on criminal codes.
But haven't the social sciences charted the moral intuitions of ordinary individ
uals? One might expect that a vast research literature on this subject already ex-
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ists. Certainly we expected this. We expected our contribution to be an examina
tion of current legal code principles in the light of existing social science research.
But for reasons that we do not fully understand, there has been little previous
work in this area. Social scientists have not mapped the contours of the moral in
tuitions of our culture; psychologists-who one would expect to be particularly
keen on carrying out this mapping-have not done so. ( For a more detailed dis
cussion of why this might be so, see Darley and Schultz, 1 990.) There are only a
scattered set of studies that examine the issue of code-community discrepancies,
which we will cite as they become relevant to the particular elements of the code
that we are examining.
This is not to say that there are not a good many studies about ordinary peo
ple's perceptions of various "law-psychology" issues. Much empirical work has
been done on criminal justice issues, especially those that relate to the causes of
crime and its effective treatment or control ( Fox, 1 98 5 ) . Public attitudes toward
crime and fear of it have been examined (Eitzen and Timmer, 1 985, pp. 86-1 1 1 ) ,
as well as attitudes toward particular aspects of the criminal justice system, such
as the police and the death penalty. ( See, e.g., Cowan, Thompson, and Ellsworth,
1 984. ) One aspect of this work that may be useful to substantive criminal law re
form is the investigation of people's assessment of the relative seriousness of dif
ferent offenses (Wolfgang and Weiner, 1 982). Many procedural aspects of the sys
tem also have been investigated. Empirical research has proved useful in learning
about the effect of the physical appearance of litigants ( Dane and Wrightsman,
1 982; Baumeister and Darley, 1 982; and Kulka and Kessler, 1 978), the reliability of
eyewitness testimony (Wells and Loftus, 1 984), the group decision-making pro
cesses of juries (Kassin and Wrightsman, 1 988), strategies for biasing jurors dur
ing voir dire ( Blunk and Sales, 1 977), the effect of jury instructions (Kassin and
Wrightsman, 1 979 ) , and sentencing disparity among judges ( Hogarth, 1 9 7 1 ).
There also is a vast literature on the relationships between-or more accurately
the contradictions between-legal and psychiatric definitions of mental illness.
Little has been done, however, in assessing lay views on what some might argue is
the one subject on which the community view is the final authority-the assess
ment of deserved liability and punishment.1
In light of the social science interest in a wide range of criminal justice issues,
the absence of liability and punishment studies puzzles us. Especially in a system
such as ours-which ultimately relies upon layperson juries for the final liability
judgment2 and often empowers them to grade the seriousness of the violation
one would expect that public conceptions of liability and punishment would be
matters of keen interest. As a practical matter, given the evidence of the limited ef
fect of jury instructions in the jury decision-making process ( Elwork, Sales, and
Alfini, 1 982), one might guess that litigants on both sides would want empirical
evidence of the intuitive liability rules that juries are likely to follow. Yet, for what
ever reason, examination of community views on the substantive rules for assign-
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ing criminal liability and punishment does not appear to be high o n the social
science agenda. A primary theme of this book is to argue that it should be.
Social scientists have little reason to undertake this work, however, unless the
criminal law community is persuaded that studies of community views are im
portant to the development of criminal law and policy. If criminal law drafters see
such information as important to their work, social psychologists will be moti 
vated to undertake such studies, and their legal counterparts will b e encouraged
to participate. Toward this end, much of the argument in this work is directed at
lawyers, j udges, legal scholars, and legislators. We attempt to show that commu
nity standards are of relev ance to the legal community and also what that rele
vance consists of in specific cases.
AN OV ERV IEW
An overview of the book will be helpful to the reader. In our previous discussion
we seemed to imply that the liability and punishment principles instantiated in
legal codes ought to match, in large measure, those that would be employed to
j udge cases according to community standards. It may seem natural to some that
the legal doctrine ought to track the community's views, especially in a democ
racy and in a system that relies upon the lay j ury. But, like any other proposed
principle for the distribution of criminal liability, this principle requires explicit
j ustification. Why, exactly, should the community's views of liability and punish
ment be taken into account? The next section of this chapter examines that ques
tion. It concludes that community views are an essential consideration and ought
to be an infl uential factor in the policy-making and code-drafting process but
that such views ought not to be taken as determinative.
Even in those circumstances in which community views have a legitimate role
to play, there may be hesitation in looking to them because of the existing difficul
ties and uncertainties of such empirical research. A brief description of the re
search methodology of the pilot projects presented in this book appears at the end
of this chapter. Appendix A contains a more detailed description o f methodology,
as well as a discussion of the significant limitations inherent in all research of this
kind. The pilot projects described hereinafter do not always provide complete,
comprehensive, or definitive conclusions, but we maintain that research using so
cial science methods similar to the o nes we have used for our pilot projects can
provide reliable data for criminal law code-drafters and policy-makers.
In Chapters 2 through 6, we present a number of studies that examine the com
muni ty's views on a variety of criminal liability and punishment issues. We also
examine whether, if such shared community views exist, they match the rules and
principles embodied in the legal codes that currently dictate criminal liability and
punishment. The results of our studies suggest that shared notions of appropriate
liability and punishment do exist on some issues. The comparisons to current law
show that the subjects' views frequently do support the codes' positions, some-
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times even for provisions that commentators have assumed have little public sup
port. Often, however, the subjects' views are markedly different from those of the
codes. I n each instance, we discuss the implications of the results for the legal
codes and for future research.
Our discussion of the studies is divided into three sets of chapters to address
separately each of the three major functions of criminal law doctrine. First, the
doctrine must define the conduct that is prohibited (or required) by the criminal
law. Such "rules of conduct;' as they have been called, provide ex-ante direction
to the members of the community as to the conduct that must be avoided ( or that
must be performed) upon pain of criminal sanction. This may be termed the rule
articulation function of the legal doctrine. When a violation of the rules of con
duct occurs, the criminal law must take on another role. It must decide whether
the violation is sufficiently blameworthy to merit criminal liability. This second
function, the liability assignmentfunction, sets the minimum conditions for liabil
ity. It is the initial step of the adjudication process. Here the law assesses ex post
whether a person who violates a rule of conduct is blameworthy for the violation
and therefore ought to be held criminally liable for it. Finally, in those instances in
which liability is to be imposed, the criminal law must assess the seriousness of
the violation and blameworthiness of the offender in order to determine the gen
eral amount of punishment that is appropriate. While the liability function re
quires a simple yes or no decision as to whether the minimum conditions for lia
bility are satisfied, this third function, the grading function, requires judgments of
degree. For a general discussion of these three functions of criminal law doctrine,
see Robinson ( 1 990) and Robinson ( 1 994) .
WHY COMMUNITY V IEWS SHOULD MATTER
Next we take up the question we previously raised. What relevance should the
community's views of liability have for formulations of criminal codes? The ques
tion of relevance is central to the value of the studies that we propose, so we need
to give a general defense of the proposition here.
The claim that a community's shared notions of condemnation and punish
ment should guide the formulation of criminal law may be criticized for several
reasons. For example, desert theorists argue that criminal law doctrine should be
formulated to punish blameworthy offenders; the distribution of just punish
ments ought to be the ultimate goal of criminal law. A distribution of punishment
according to community views would be immoral, they might argue, because the
members of the community may well express views about proper punishment
that they would find unfair if they themselves were to be judged by such views or
that are in some other way unfair when examined from some rational moral per
spective.
Utilitarians generate punishment rules from a quite different perspective. Utili
tarians argue that doctrine should be formulated in a way that efficiently mini-
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mizes future criminal v iolations; efficient crime prevention ought to be the goal.
A distribution according to community v iews, they might argue, would be detri
mental to society because it would not maximize the efficient crime-prevention
potential of criminal liability and punishment. T hat is, avoidable offenses (under
efficient minimization practices) would be committed if such a distribution were
adopted. To summarize and conjoin the arguments of the desert and utilitarian
groups, it would be both immoral (from a deserts-theory perspective) and detri
mental to society ( from a utilitarian perspective) to distribute liability and pun
ishment according to such community notions.
We would suggest that, if desert is the governing distributive principle, the
community's v iew is relevant, because it is one source of determining what counts
as the just desert. Admittedly, a moral philosopher might be reluctant to defer to
the community for an assessment of what is morally deserved. Desert is not a
matter of intuition, the philosopher might argue, but is to be logically derived
from principles of fairness and good. At the very least though, the community's
v iews may play a role in testing the derived rules. That is, if a rule derived by de
sert theorists is judged overwhelmingly by the community to be unjust, such dis
agreement may cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the rule in assessing a per
son's moral blameworthiness, at least suggesting that closer scrutiny of the
reasoning behind the rule is required.
Under a utilitarian rationale for distributing liability, the community's views
are of somewhat more direct importance. First, moral condemnation is an inex
pensive yet powerful form of deterrent threat. It demands none of the costs that
attend imprisonment or even supervised probation; yet, for many persons, it is a
sanction to be very much avoided. T he more importance a person places upon
social acceptance, the more terrible (ergo efficient) this threatened sanction be
comes. This marvelously cost-efficient sanction is available, however, only if the
system retains its moral credibility. Each time the system is seen to convict in
cases in which no community condemnation is appropriate, the system weakens
the underlying force of the moral sanction.
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence suggests that criminal law's most effec
tive mechanism of compliance is not the deterrent threat of sanction; it is its ca
pacity to authoritatively describe the moral and proper rules of conduct. People
will follow those rules not because they fear punishment for violating them but
because they see themselves as good and law-abiding people who are inclined to
obey the law because it is the right thing to do. Most important, the compliance
power of criminal law is directly proportional to its moral credibility (see, e.g., Ty
ler, 1 990). If the criminal law is seen as unjust in one instance, its moral credibility
and its concomitant compliance power are, accordingly, incrementally reduced.
In addition to these effects, the perceived "justice" of the system is crucial to
gaining the cooperation and acquiescence of those persons involved in.the process
( offenders, potential offenders, witnesses, j urors, and so on) . Greatest coopera-
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tion will be elicited when the criminal law's liability rules correspond with the
community's views of justice. Conflict between the two undercuts the moral cred
ibility of the system and thereby engenders resistance and subversion ( see, e.g.,
Kassin and Wrightsman, 1988, pp. 1 58-1 59; Scheflin and Van Dyke, 1 980; and
Kadish and Kadish, 1973 ).
The legal system that the community perceives as unj ustly criminalizing cer
tain conduct is one that is likely to cause the society governed by those laws to lose
faith in the system-not only in the specific laws that lead to the unjust result, but
in the entire code and criminal justice system enforcing that code.3 The reverse is
also true. A rule that is strongly and persistently supported by the community as
accurately reflecting moral blameworthiness but that is not followed by the crimi
nal justice system raises similar destructive possibilities. The community is likely
to engage in extralegal vigilante actions, with all of the dangers that that suggests.4
Empirical research suggests that a tension or contradiction between the legal
code and a community standard does have some of the consequences we suggest.
Studies show that the degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law
in the past and plan to obey it in the future correlates with the degree to which
they judge that law to be morally valid (Grasmick and Green, 1980; Jacob, 1 980;
Meier and Johnson, 1 977; Silberman, 1976; and Tittle, 1 980) . Tyler's more recent
Chicago panel study ( 1990) draws similar conclusions. The degree to which his
subjects saw the legal authorities as having legitimate power predicted their will
ingness to obey various laws promulgated by those authorities.
Note that it is not the moral accuracy of the criminal law-as moral philoso
phers would define it-that is important for the utilitarian value of doing justice.
Rather, it is the community's perception of the law's moral correctness that assists
the law's effectiveness in gaining compliance. That is, the community's view of
justice provides the standard by which the system's perceived moral credibility is
judged. For these reasons then, an understanding of the community's notions of
justke is needed for informed analysis of legal systems.
RESEARCH METHODS
We will now briefly overview the procedures we used for examining the commu
nity's views on appropriate liability and punishments for various conduct. We
contacted people to participate in our studies and had them give us their views on
the appropriate liability to assign to perpetrators of various criminal episodes that
we described to them. Each individual read about a particular crime case-a "sce
nario'' in our vocabulary-and decided whether to assign criminal liability and, if
so, the general range of appropriate punishment. Individuals, "subjects" or "re
spondents" as we will call them, then read another crime scenario, which differed
in certain critical ways from the first scenario, and made similar determinations
as to liability and punishment. The text of the scenarios is reproduced in Appen
dix B.
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In recruiting our subjects, we sought to involve persons from many walks of
life. We did not test those familiar samples of convenience, such as college sopho
mores; and we also did not test persons involved in the criminal justice system,
such as j udges, law students, or police officers, figuring that those people would
have opinions that were to some extent formed by their contact with the system.
Instead we tried to recruit "ordinary citizens." In Appendix A, we report on the
demographic distributions of our subjects; we found them sufficiently broad that
we feel we have the beginnings of a set of demonstrations of the judgment pat
terns of typical citizens of the United States on liability and punishment issues.
In all the studies we conducted, we presented subjects with a scale on which to
indicate their assignments of liability for the persons in the scenarios. As shown
here, that scale consisted of a choice of N ( no criminal liability); 0 ( criminal liabil
ity but no punishment); or 1 through ll on a scale that corresponded to prison
sentences of from one day (1) to the death penalty (11). 5
Criminal liability and sentence
N

0

no liab.

liab.

2

I day

for

2 wks

___

3

2 mo

4
6 mo

5
I yr

6
3 yr

7
7 yr

8

9

10

11

ISyr

30yr

life

death

no

imprison-

punish.

ment

The table used to translate liability scores into terms of imprisonment appears in
Appendix C.
As the reader will notice, the length of the prison sentences increases differen
tially as the scale advances. For instance, the difference between scale value 5 ( a
sentence o f one year) and scale value 6 ( a sentence o f three years) i s only two
years. However, the difference between scale value 8 ( a sentence of fifteen years)
and scale value 9 ( thirty years) is much greater. We set up the scale in this way for
two reasons. First, it corresponds, at least approximately, to the psychological per
spectives on equal distances between punishments ( Erikson and Gibbs, 1979;
Gescheider, Catlin, and Fontana, 1982). Second, the scale's punishment differ
ences also correspond to the grading categories that are used in the typical Ameri
can criminal code. (Given the psychological perspectives on equal distances be
tween punishments, it should come as no surprise that legislators use these
distinctions in creating the punishment categories for criminal codes.) This
means that the punishment choices we presented to our subjects are similar to
those available to legislators when they decide how to grade an offense.
The several scenarios given to each respondent usually were identical in a set of
core elements and differed only on the dimensions that we thought would make a
difference in the subjects' liability judgments (or are held by criminal codes to
make such a difference). By examining the differing sentences assigned to closely
related cases (scenarios), we sought to determine whether shared community no
tions of justice exist, and, if so, on what issues they exist and how those notions
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compared to current law. An example will help to make this clear. Criminal codes
sometimes treat the crime of forcible sexual intercourse differently if it is commit
ted between individuals who have had a previous sexual relationship. Is this in ac
cord with the way people currently think about rape? To determine this, we first
wrote a core story in which an incident of rape was described. We then built that
core story into a number of different scenarios. So in scenario variations, the inci
dent was described as occurring between two individuals who had had a previous
sexual relationship or two who had not had such a relationship. As we will show
you in Chapter 6, our subjects assigned liability judgments to those cases in ways
that differ in some respects from judgments instantiated in criminal codes.
Each subject read one version of a scenario, then another. Sometimes a subject
judged as many as seven or more versions of a scenario. Obviously then, they were
aware of the differences that were built into the different versions of the scenarios,
and their attention was focused on those differences. The danger here is that the
subjects would feel that we ( the researchers) thought that the differences were im
portant and that they should change the liability they assigned, even if they them
selves did not think it appropriate. To avoid this problem, we instructed subjects
that they should not read the differences in this way (as requiring them to assign
different liabilities) . As the reader will see as we progress through the study dis
cussions, the subjects often judged different cases alike in the liabilities that they
assigned to the perpetrator of the crimes. In other words, they were not unduly
influenced by thoughts that the researchers wanted them to see differences be
tween cases that they (the subjects) reasoned should be treated similarly.
T his experimental design, in which each subject responds to every version of
the scenario (called a "within-subjects design" in the vocabulary of experimental
research) is a very powerful one, in that it is highly likely to find statistically reli
able differences in the subjects' responses, even when those differences are
comparativley smalL Particularly for the initial investigations in the field, we
thought that this property of the research design was an important one to employ.
As we said, different scenarios were variant versions of each other. Sometimes
the differences were obvious and direct, such as the variations between the sexual
offense studies just described. (In one scenario the rapist had a prior relationship
with the victim; in another, he was a stranger.) In some of the other scenarios, the
differences were both less direct and more subtle. For instance, in another case we
described one set of actions that we thought would suggest that a perpetrator's
conduct was necessary but not sufficient in causing another's death, and in a re
lated scenario, conduct that was sufficient but not necessary in causing the death.
It is a genuine question whether subjects perceived the concrete descriptions as
being necessary in one instance and sufficient in another. T he standard solution
to this (in scenario research) is to ask the subjects questions that not only measure
the punishments they want to assign but also probe for their psychological per
ceptions of the circumstances of the scenario. So we asked subjects in the cases
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described whether they thought that the actions were, for instance, sufficient in
themselves to have produced the death and necessary to produce the death. As we
will see, we were sometimes successful in producing the perceptions of the situa
tions that we wished to produce and sometimes less successful. When we were less
successful-and we have noted these instances-more complicated and more
tentative interpretations of our results are necessary.
We have conducted upward of twenty different studies ( not all of which are re
ported herein). The studies were designed and executed in seminars at Rutgers
University School of Law at Camden in the fall of 1990 and spring of 1991, with
the help of faculty and graduate students from the Princeton University Depart
ment of Psychology.
I n the following chapters, we discuss the results of our studies and attempt to
draw out the implications of our findings for the criminal law. In those discus
sions, we will be fairly bold; we will sometimes make suggestions for code alter
ations or other modifications of criminal justice procedures. This seems to us to
be the best way that we can contribute to what we hope will become a debate. But
we need to be dear that we do not regard our empirical studies as the last word.
This is true for two sets of reasons.
First, our studies have various general and specific imperfections. We have not
tested the large and randomly selected sets of subjects that would provide an en
tirely convincing mapping of community standards at the state or national level.
Because we did not do this, we also have not given the question of what exactly
constitutes a community standard the full consideration that it warrants before
one would want to consider code alteration based on a conflict with community
standards. Simply to signal how this community-standard consideration would
go, we now provide a brief sketch: Whenever one polls a community about an
opinion on some issue, whether politics, preferences, or legal codes, one can de
rive an "average opinion:' But to say that the average opinion is a "community
standard" is to claim more. It has sometimes occurred in presidential elections
that some states voted for A by a 51 percent to 49 percent majority, others for B by
a similar margin. Obviously, it would be absurd to say that A was the "community
standard" in the states that he carried, and B likewise in the states that he carried.
What needs to be recognized is that there was nothing that we should be comfort
able in calling a community standard in either state. Therefore, in our studies, we
need to require that some substantial majority holds a view before it begins to ful
fill the requirements for being a community standard.
Actually, we need to require more. If we find some subgroup in sharp disagree
ment with the majority, this challenges the idea of a community standard more
than would be the case if their disagreement was a matter of degree rather than of
kind. For example, a majority of people may think that the existence of a previous
relationship between two people does not affect the gravity of the offense if one of
the individuals rapes the other. However, a minority does think that the existence
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of a previous relationship matters. If that minority thinks that it only slightly mit
igates the offense, then it would be possible to make the case, on the one hand,
that there is a community standard about the seriousness of such an offense. If,
on the other hand, the minority thinks that a rape that takes place within a mar
riage is no offense at all, the case for a community standard is at a minimum con
siderably harder to make. These are the sorts of considerations that need to take
place when the existence of a community standard is asserted. In our discussions
of the studies that follow, we will recognize this task by signaling the reader when
we see evidence of sharp disagreements on legal standards among our subjects.
Interestingly, sharp disagreements occurred rarely. (In technical terms, we rarely
saw signs of a bimodal distribution of responses. )
These are the general problems with our studies. Specific studies can also have
specific flaws and problems. In some of our studies, in which we intended sub
jects to read the cases we presented them in a particular way (as perhaps establish
ing a particular state of mind on the part of the perpetrator) , our subjects read
them in importantly different ways; because of this, some of our conclusions re
quire complex qualifications. In other studies, the set of scenarios that we pre
sented turned out to represent a spectrum of possibilities that was more restricted
than was adequate to test the legal code provisions. In other studies, still other dif
ficulties came up that will require correction in future studies.6 Again, the func
tion of these studies-and this book-is to begin a discussion of the interplay be
tween law and social science on issues of criminal liability; and to both illustrate
the kinds of important information that social scientists should be asked to pro
vide to the legal community generally, and code drafters specifically, and to stim
ulate the kinds of empirical and philosophical considerations that will need to be
addressed in future discussions on these matters. A contradiction between the le
gal code and community standards by no means automatically argues for the al
teration of the code in the direction of the standards. There may be good reasons
why the legal codes should deviate from community standards. The discovery of a
contradiction simply points to a tension that is worthy of analysis.
Do such tensions exist? Are there, in fact, important differences and conflicts
between the legal codes that prevail in our country and the community standards
of those governed by the code? Are there shared moral intuitions about when
punishment is deserved and about how much is deserved? We address these ques
tions empirically in the research reported in the following chapters of the book.

2

Doctrines of Criminalization: What
Conduct Should Be Criminal?
What conduct should be criminal? Most people would agree that homicide, rape,
and theft, for example, ought to be criminalized. Some current offenses, like
price-fixing, are less intuitively improper conduct. The common law distin
guished the former kind of offense, called "malum in se" offenses, from the latter
kind, called "malum prohibitum" offenses. Malum prohibitum offenses may
seem somewhat artificial in what they prohibit; however, there is likely to be some
consensus, at least within a jurisdiction, on their ultimate objectives-in this in
stance increasing the competitiveness of the market. Some people might disagree
that the particular offense formulation is the best means of achieving the ends,
but few would dispute that the offense helps toward the goal and that the goal is
desirable. 1
However, a significant potential for disagreement exists between code and
community with regard to "victimless crimes;' such as prostitution, gambling, or
distribution of certain drugs. The criminalization of such conduct is designed in
part to enforce the community's conceptions of morality. However, as the 1 920s
«Prohibition" and its failure illustrate, different groups may have different con
ceptions of what constitutes immoral conduct. As the community consensus on a
morality issue fades, so can consensus on the laws that enforce it. As one would
expect, in current American culture, there is lack of consensus on the enforce
ment of laws against victimless crimes such as prostitution (Levi and Jones, 1 985;
Chilton and DeAmicis, 1 975; Newman and Trilling, 1 975) .
A related question is the degree o f seriousness that the community assigns to
different crimes-victimless or otherwise-and whether there is consensus on the
degree of seriousness. These are issues of offense grading, and we will take them
up in Chapter 6.
A second area of potential disagreement between code and community is what
we examine in this chapter. It concerns what might be called the code's "second
ary prohibitions." These rules extend each primary prohibition to include certain
variations of it. For example, if the primary prohibition is killing another person,
secondary prohibitions broaden that offense to include attempting to kill another,
creating a risk of death to another, assisting in the killing of another, or causing
death by omission.
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Another group of doctrines-called "justifications"-creates general excep
tions to the primary prohibitions. Doctrines of j ustification define the circum
stances under which the law permits a person to cause the harm or evil of an of
fense without liability. Self-defense, defense of property, and authorized use of
force during arrest by law enforcement officials are examples of common justifi
cations offered as defenses.
There appears to be little or no empirical work on such secondary prohibitions
and justifications, and it is in this area that we focus much of our research. In this
chapter, we examine views on secondary prohibitions. In Chapter 3 , we will deal
with j ustifications.
STUDY 1 : OBJECTIV E REQUIREMENTS OF ATTEMPT
Consider the intriguing case that arises when an individual takes steps toward
committing a crime but does not actually commit it. Thinking about committing
a crime is not itself a crime. However, at some point in a person's course of con
duct, after the initial thought but before actual commission of the offense, the
person becomes criminally liable. The history of Anglo-American criminal law
reveals that at one time or another the law has used several remarkably different
definitions of the point at which a person's preparation becomes a criminal at
tempt. State laws still disagree on this issue. The underlying practical consider
ations are twofold. On the one hand, the law does not want to assign liability to a
person who has not committed a crime and, in the final event, would not do so.
On the other hand, the law wishes to be able to "head off" crimes before they are
committed and to punish those who have manifested their intention to commit a
crime. On a m ore theoretical level, there generally is thought to be insufficient
moral blameworthiness in thoughts alone to support criminal conviction and
condemnation, but at some point between the thought and the completed offense
sufficient blameworthiness comes to exist. Thus, there is the need to define a cate
gory of "criminal attempt."
In such cases, because the harm or evil of the actual offense has not occurred,
the liability assigned to the attempt is termed "inchoate liability:' In most current
legal codes, inchoate liability leads to less punishment than would be given if the
same offense had been completed, but there is some controversy on this point. In
deed, the Model Penal C ode, the provisions of which have served as a model for
code reform, generally grades an attempt on equal footing with the completed of
fense.2 Most-but not all-j urisdictions, however, have been reluctant to adopt
the Code's inchoate grading provision.
The older ( common law) legal tests for determining when a person's conduct
reaches the point of criminal attempt tend to be quite demanding, in the sense
that such tests require the person to come close to committing the crime before
attempt liability is imposed. Under the "dangerous proximity" test ( a common
formulation) , a person typically has to reach a p oint where the offense is likely to
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b e successfully completed-arrest before this point does not result in liability. As
an example of dangerous proximity, consider a locksmith who decides to rob a
coin shop safe he recently worked on. He goes back to the shop and confirms that
the safe is still there. He then tells a friend of his plan to rob the coin shop the next
day. Unbeknownst to the locksmith, his friend notifies the police. The next day,
the locksmith goes to the coin shop and begins to crack the safe. Suddenly, two
police officers burst in and arrest him. Although the locksmith has not completed
the robbery, he has come dangerously close to its completion; his conduct satisfies
the requirements of the dangerous proximity test, thus making him liable for at
tempt. The test reflects a view that the moral blameworthiness sufficient for crim
inal condemnation does not arise until a point where commission of the offense
is a danger. This test seeks to balance the two practical considerations governing
dangerous proximity cases in a specific way-to allow some opportunity for suc
cessful intervention by those who would prevent the crime but also to delay the
point of liability until the time when completion is a real danger.3 The dangerous
proximity test is somewhat pragmatic in that it does not ask complex questions
about what can be inferred about the person and his intentions. It simply requires
citizens to avoid bringing plans for criminal activities to a point at which they
could be successfully completed.
The most common test in modern American codes, however, is the "substantial
step" test, as formulated in Model Penal Code § S.O l ( l ) (c). Rather than focusing
on how close the person has come to completion of the offense, as does the dan
gerous proximity test, the substantial step test focuses on how far the person has
gone after forming the intention to commit the offense. Any "substantial step" in
the direction of commission is adequate ( assuming the person's intention to com
mit the offense is clear and unequivocal) . This substantial step test (1) typically·
imposes liability at an earlier point in the steps toward commission than does the
dangerous proximity test; (2) reflects a claim that the moral blameworthiness re
quired for criminal condemnation comes into play earlier; and (3) alters the bal
ance of interests between the individual and society toward the interests of soci
ety, by reducing an individual's opportunity to desist on his own, in favor of
allowing earlier intervention.
Other tests for determining attempt focus on criteria other than whether the
person has come dangerously close or whether he has externalized his intention in
performing a substantial step toward commission. The "probable desistance" test
focuses on whether the person, without intervention by others, would have been
likely to continue in the actions necessary to complete the offense. The
"unequivocality" test attaches liability at the point where an observer, knowing
only of the person's actions toward committing the offense without knowing the
person's state of mind, would believe that the person intended to commit the of
fense. The warning to members of society in this case is clear: Do not carry out a
series of actions that would lead a reasonable observer to believe that you intend
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to commit a crime. Each of the four tests represents not only a different point at
which attempt liability attaches and relies on different criteria, but each has a dis
tinct rationale and uses attempt liability for a somewhat different purpose.4
The effect of a person's voluntary desistance also has received different treat
ment at different times and in different jurisdictions. The older common law
treated an attempt no differently than a substantive offense in this regard; once
the elements of the offense were satisfied, there was no "undoing" the offense. At
tempt liability was imposed no matter what the person did after passing the point
where his preparation became a criminal attempt. Model Penal Code § 5.01 ( 4) in
troduced a renunciation defense for attempt and other forms of inchoate liability,
which provides a complete defense if the actor's desistance is complete and volun
tary. (The defense is not available if the actor renounces out of fear or delays the
planned attempt until a later date.) The defense is provided in part because the
Code's substantial step test advances the point of criminalization considerably in
the chain of events. Combined with the Model Penal Code's grading of an attempt
as equal to the completed offense, the substantial step test would mean that once
anyone takes a substantial step toward commission, that person has no incentive
to stop; the person's liability will be that of the completed offense-whether the
offense was completed or not. The common law and modern codes that maintain
a grading difference, in contrast, have a built-in incentive for the perpetrator to
desist at any point before completion of the offense. Thus, such codes have no
practical need for a renunciation defense. It has been retained in most jurisdic
tions, however, including those that grade inchoate offenses less seriously than
completed offenses, perhaps because voluntary renunciation is thought to reduce
a person's blameworthiness.
We designed a study that sought to examine the community's views on these
conduct requirements for attempt liability. To study these views, we presented
subjects with a core scenario. Subjects were told that a locksmith, who is called to
repair a safe in a coin dealer's store, notices that valuable coins are always kept in
the safe. The locksmith decides to break in and rob the coin dealer by opening the
safe and taking its contents. We then added to the core story various elements that
created combinations of circumstances to which some common law and modern
tests would assign attempt liability and to which others would not. For instance,
in another scenario, we added the fact that the locksmith returns to the coin shop
to make sure that the safe is still there, whereupon the locksmith is arrested and
charged with attempted robbery. This variation satisfies the Model Penal Code's
requirement, relied on in many jurisdictions, that the attempter need only take
some "substantial step" in the direction of committing the offense. Our intent, by
introducing these variations, was to determine under which circumstances our
respondents would assign liability and how this pattern of liability matched the
various tests.
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Therefore, i n the design o f the present study, each subject read eleven versions
of the same core scenario to which various alterations had been made. Each sce
nario is identical to every other one except for the facts describing how far the
person progresses after forming the criminal intention. Each scenario corre
sponds to one of the current legal tests. Table 2. 1 outlines the eleven versions of
the scenario and the legal test to which each version corresponds. The initial core
scenario, in which the person only forms the intent to commit the crime, is shown
in the first row. The substantial step scenario, in which the person returns to the
shop to see if the safe is still there, is shown in the second row. Brief characteriza
tions of the other scenarios are given in the "description" column of the table. The
«summary" column of Table 2. 1 gives a summary description of each scenario,
and these are used to identify each scenario in subsequent tables. The "comment"
column gives further explanation of the legal treatment of the case.
After reading each scenario, subjects indicated what criminal liability, if any,
they would assign to the locksmith. The liability results of the study are reported
in Table 2.2. Columns d and e summarize the liability that would be assigned to
the scenario by the common law and the Model Penal Code.
We will first consider the different liabilities assigned to the various attempt
scenarios and later turn to examine the effects of renunciation of the crime and
the related act of desisting out of fear of being apprehended.
Table 2.2 arrays the various scenarios from top to bottom in terms of the gen
eral progression of how close the locksmith comes in each version to the actual
commission of the crime. In the first scenario, the individual develops an inten
tion to commit the crime and goes no farther. In the last scenario (row 6), the in
dividual actually commits the crime.
As we will use many similar tables throughout this book to report our research
results, we will briefly comment on the composition of the tables to facilitate their
interpretation. Adjacent to the scenario descriptions are three columns indicating
related but different ways of analyzing the degree of liability that our respondents
assigned to the perpetrator whose actions were described in the specific case un
der discussion. Column a reports the average amount of liability assigned to the
perpetrator on the eleven-point scale we discussed in Chapter 1 . Subjects who as
sign no liability or liability without punishment are included in this calculation as
assigning a liability of zero. Column b reports the percentage of the respondents
who chose "No Liability" for the locksmith, roughly equivalent to a jury verdict of
"not guilty." Column c reports the percentage of respondents who chose either
the "No Liability" or "Liability But No Punishment" options of the scale: This in
dicates the percentage of subjects who would impose no punishment on the de
fendant. This percentage will always be higher than the percentage shown in col
umn b, because column c includes the subjects reported in column b and adds to
that the percentage of subjects who report that they judge that the perpetrator de-

TABLE 2. 1

Attempt Scenarios

Core Story: A locksmith, Ray, recalls working on a safe i n a coin shop. The safe
was kept in the back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray thinks
about how easy it would be to "crack" the safe. Ray decides he will rob the safe
in the coin shop.
Scenario Number, Description
(and Abbreviation)

Summary

Comment

1 . The actor only thinks about robbing
the safe and decides to do so. He
takes no action toward committing the
crime. (TH)

Only thinks
about offense

No test would assign
liability.

2. After deciding to rob the shop, the
actor goes to the coin shop to make
sure the safe is still there. (SS)

Substantial
step test
satisfied

Actor is liable under
this test, because
"reconnoitering"
(casing) the shop is a
substantial step.

3. After deciding to rob the shop, the
actor makes a special tool to crack
the safe with. (EQ)

Unequivocality
test satisfied

The actor is liable
under this test because action manifasts criminal intent.

3a. The actor cases the shop and
meets the owner while he does so.
Out of pity for the owner, he gives up
his plan to rob the safe. (EQR)

Renounces
after reaching
point of
unequivoca/ity

The Model Penal Code
(MPC) allows a
defense H an actor's
renunciation of criminal
intent is "complete and
voluntary." No liability
if this defense is
available.

4. Having told a friend he intends to
rob the shop, the actor drives there.
Before he can get to the shop he is
stopped by police, who were informed
of his intent by the actor's friend. (PO)

Probable
Without outside interdesistance test ruption the actor would
satisfied
have completed the
offense. Actor is
liable under this test.

5.

The actor is in the process of
cracking the safe in the coin shop
when he is stopped by two undercover
policemen. (PX)

Dangerous
proximity test
satisfied

Actor is liable because
the offense is nearly
completed.

Sa. When he is in the shop and about
to crack the safe, the actor feels pity
for the shopowner and decides not
to rob the safe. (PXR)

Renounces
after reaching
point of
dangerous
proximity

MPC allows a defense
when actor renounces
his criminal intent
"completely and voluntarily." No liability if this
defense is available.
(continues)
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(Continued)

Scenario Number, Description
(and Abbreviation)

Summary

Comment

5b. When he is in the shop and about

Desists out of

Actor is allowed no

to c rack the safe, the actor stops

fear after

renunciation defense

because he sees a policeman in the

dangerous
proximity

was not voluntary.

front of the store and he fears getting
caught.

because renunciation
Actor is liable for full

(FA)

attempt.
6. The actor completes the robbery

Offense com

The acto r is liable for

and returns home with the coins. (CP)

plete, no

the completed

renunciation

offense.

6a. The actor completes the robbery

Renounces

Actor is liable for com

and returns home. On the way home,

after offense is

pleted offense be

he feels pity for the shopowner and

complete

cause renunciation
defense not available.

returns the coins to the safe. (CPR)
6b. The actor completes the offense,

Renounces,

Actor is liable for com

feels pity for the shopowner, tries

but is unsuc

pleted offense because

to return the coins to the safe, but

cessful at
"undoing"

renunciation defense

is caught by police.

(UNA)

u navailable.

serves criminal liability but does not deserve any punishment. As you will see as
the reports of our studies cumulate, the "Liability But No Punishment" category
proves an interesting judgment to track.
Finally, and again, we usually attempt to remind the reader of the legal code
treatments that are given to the various cases. In this table, columns d and

e

char

acterize the treatment of the offense given by various legal formulations. When
different legal codes differ in their treatments of the scenarios, as do the common
law and the Model Penal Code in this case, we provide several columns-one for
each of the different legal treatments.
Many people find tables hard to scan and comprehend. ( So, frankly, do we.)
Therefore, we often provide graphs or figures that compare liability ratings
among cases ( as in our next presentation). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present a visual
representation of the liability means and percentage of respondents choosing "No
Liability" or "Liability But No Punishment" that are presented in columns
and

c

a,

b,

of Table 2.2. In these two figures, only a subset of the cases is included ( ex

eluding scenarios with renunciation or desistance) because we want to highlight
specific important conclusions to be extracted from these results. The two-letter
descriptions along the horizontal axis of each figure correspond to the abbrevia-
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TABLE 2.2

Liability for Various Degrees of Conduct Toward a

Completed Theft Offense

(d)
(c)
% No
Liability
or No
% No
Liability Punishment Common
Law Result
(N+O)
Liability
(N)
(a)

Attempt
Scenarios

(b)

(e)

Model Penal
Code Result

1 . Thought only
(TH)

1 .46

65

77

No liability

No liabil ity

1 .54

50

73

No liability

Attempt liability8-

1 .8 1

42

65

b

Attempt liability8-

0.38

85

92

No defense

Complete

2. Substantial
step (SS)
3. Unequivocality
(EO)
3a. Renounces

defense
4. Probable
desistance (PO)

1 .88

27

62

b

Attempt l iabil ity8-

5. Dangerous
proximity (PX)

5.35

0

0

5a. Renounces

0.69

46

85

Attempt liability Attempt liability8No defense

Complete
defense

5b. Desists
out of fear

1 .58

35

65

6. 1 2

0

0

No defense

No defense

6. Completed
offense (CP)

Full offense

Full offe nse

liability

liability

Sa. Renounces
and "undoes" 3.23

12

27

No defense

No defense

0

4

No defense

No defense

6b. Renounces
but u nable
to "undo"

5.35

Liability Scale: N = No criminal l iability, O = Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2 = 2 weeks, 3 = 2 months, 4 = 6 months, 5 = 1 year, 6 = 3 years, 7 = 7 years,
8 = 1 5 years, 9 = 30 years, 1 0 = 1ife, and 1 1 = death.
8An attempted theft under the Model Penal Code is graded the same as a
completed theft.
bThis depends upon which of the common-law tests is applicable in the
jurisdiction .
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FIGURE 2.3 Liability for Various Degrees of Conduct Toward Theft
7
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3
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1 �------�--r---��---,
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(4) PO
(5) PX
(3) EQ
(2) ss
(1) TH

Scenarios

tions assigned to each scenario in Table 2.2. In Figure 2.3, the vertical axis repre
sents the subjects' judgment as to the actor's amount of liability. The higher the
number, the more severe the sentence. In Figure 2.4, the vertical axis represents
the percentage of respondents who assign either no liability or liability but no
punishment to the attempter; the higher the percentage, therefore, the fewer the
respondents who would impose liability or punishment for the attempt.
With that explanation, let us turn to the results of this study. Look at the result
for the "thought-only scenario (TH) '' in Figure 2.3. It appears that even thinking
about committing an offense generates some assignment of liability from our av
erage subject. Recall that this is the case in which the locksmith forms a settled in
tention to rob the coin dealer's safe but takes no further steps to do so. Looking at
the same scenario in Figure 2.4, we notice that 65 percent of the subjects assign no
liability, and therefore 35 percent of the subjects impose liability in this thought
only scenario. ( However, about one-third of those imposing liability-1 3 percent
of all subjects-assign no punishment.)
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FIGURE 2.4

Percentage of Subjects Assigning No Liability or Liability But No

Punishment
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% No liability
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Scenarios

·son to commit an offense has been shown to be a powerv in other contexts. It should be no surprise to see that
iui Je1
e , has some effect in generating judgments of liability
the p(
ubJ(,;'-ts.
Here a usually unnoticed property of scenario reby a m11.
se..,rch may create a . Jerence between our result and the result that would likely
emerge from an actual court process. Our scenarios were written "from the eye of
God;' as it were, and gave the readers access to the inner workings of the person's
mind. Thus, in this case o ur subjects were able to believe unequivocally that a per
son had formed a settled intent to commit a crime. In the real world, it would be
extraordinarily difficult to establish intention with such certainty in the absence
of any conduct and, as a result, more difficult to successfully prosecute the indi
vidual.
The scenarios in which the dangerous proximity test criteria are not met are
scenarios 1 through 4. Notice that they get very low assignments of liability, and
the line connecting them in Figure 2.3 is essentially flat, which suggests that re
spondents are seeing these cases as alike in the degree of liability they generate. In
scenario 5, in which the criteria for "dangerous proximity" are met, the liability
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ratings of our subjects become correspondingly much higher. This suggests that
dangerous proximity best reflects what our respondents perceive to be the critical
point after which attempt liability should be assigned. Figure 2 .4 indicates that
between 27 percent and 65 percent of our subj ects indicate no liability in the first
four scenarios, where the defendant does not reach the point of dangerous prox
imity. However, this percentage drops universally to zero in the scenarios where
the dangerous proximity test criteria

are

met ( scenarios 5 and 6 ) , a difference that

is statistically significant (p < .0 1 ). (To say that a result, in this case a difference in
the percentages, is "statistically significant" is to say that it is highly unlikely to
have occurred due to some chance fluctuation. Thus, it is appropriate to interpret
it as a "real" difference in subjects' responses, caused by the differences between
the scenarios. The term

"
p < .05" means that there are only five chances out of

one hundred that the result could have occurred by chance; "p < .0 1 " indicates
one chance out of a hundred.) Even more strikingly, the percentage of subjects
who would impose no liability or no punishment ranges between 62 percent and
77 percent for scenarios 1 through 4 but drops to zero for the latter two scenarios
5 and 6 (p < .0 1 ) . These results reveal a relatively dramatic difference in the sub
jects' view of the scenarios where the dangerous proximity test is not met ( sce
narios 1 through 4 ) , and those where it is, ( scenarios 5 and 6). This suggests that,
of the available tests, the common law's dangerous proximity test, as applied to
this case, seems to best reflect the views of a majority of the subjects.
Our respondents assign different liabilities for attempts than for completed
crimes: the liability mean for the dangerous proximity scenario in Table 2.2 ( row
5-5 .3 5, or 1 . 8 years5 ) is significantly lower than the completed offense scenario's
liability mean of 6. 1 2 , or 3.4 years ( row 6 ) . This result is consistent with the tradi
tional grading of attempt as less serious and is inconsistent with the Model Penal
Code's grading of attempt as being on an equal footing with the completed of
fense.6 The Code's grading of attempt seems all the more incongruous when the
liability for a completed offense, 6. 1 2 ( 3 .4 years) , is compared to that for the
Code's test for attempt, the substantial step test, of 1 .54 ( 7.5 days) . While the
Code dictates that a person held for attempt is liable at a grade equal to that for
the full offense, a majority of our research subjects ( 73 percent-see row 2 of col
umn c) think that no liability or punishment is appropriate for a mere "substan
tial step:' In Chapter 6, we further examine these matters of proper grading.
We turn our attention next to the effects of an individual's voluntary desistance
from committing the crime or the renunciation of it after its completion ( Table
2 . 2 , scenarios 3a, Sa, and 6a) . Figure 2.5 presents the data for these scenarios. In
that figure, bar graphs are presented, with each scenario involving renunciation
shown

paired

with

its

nonrenunciation

equivalent.

(The

data

for

the

nonrenunciation equivalents are found in scenarios 3, 5, and 6.
We call your attention first to the leftmost pair of scenarios, which are the cases
in which the individual takes an unequivocal step in the direction of the crime.
Clearly, renunciation reduces the assigned penalty; but notice again that our re-
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FIGUR E 2.5

Effect of Renunciation in Reducing Liability

8

£21 Does not renounce
0 Renounces

(3) Unequivocality

(5) Dangerous Proximity

(6) Completed Offe nse

Degree of Attempt

spondents assign very little penalty in the first place to that case ( 1 .8 1 ; 1 1 .4 days) ,
so we do not want to make much of this result. Looking next at the case where re
nunciation comes after dangerous proximity (case Sa, the middle pair ofbars) , we
note that the judgments of our subjects conflict with aspects of both the common
law doctrine and the Model Penal Code. While the common law does not provide
a defense when a person renounces after satisfying the dangerous proximity test,
our results indicate a sharp (and statistically reliable, p < .05 ) decrease in punish
ment assigned. Referring again to Table 2.2, 85 percent of the subjects think either
no liability or no punishment is appropriate in this renunciation case while no
subject thinks no punishment is appropriate for the individual who reaches the
level of dangerous proximity and does not renounce the attempt; that is, it seems
that the majority of subjects view renunciation even after taking the dangerous
proximity step-the step that they think generally created an attempt offense-as
a legitimate defense. Unlike the common law, the Model Penal Code does provide
a defense in such a case-if the renunciation is complete and voluntary-and this
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seems to fit our subjects' intuitions; if the locksmith decides not to commit the
crime fo r his own reasons, very low liability is incurred.
This result is somewhat ironic. As noted previously, the common law recog
nized no renunciation defense. However, the Model Penal Code introduced the
renunciation defense. Why? The drafters realized that they were essentially re
quired to create it to avoid a problem created by their other planned changes. Spe
cifically, the early intervention authorized by their substantial step test means that
a person who is in the early stages of committing a crime is liable. This factor,
combined with the Model Penal Code drafters' grading of attempts as equal to the
substantive offense, means that a person who has taken a substantial step toward
a crime is liable for the full p enalties for the commission of that crime. Thus,
there is no incentive for the «rational criminal" who has taken a substantial step
to stop before commission of the crime; surely a socially undesirable reinforce
ment contingency! Here, again, is the problem: If the person who begins a crime
is liable at a level equal to the full substantive offense, he or she has little reason to
stop once his or her conduct constitutes an offense. Because the substantial step
test for commission is satisfied early in the process, this incentive to continue
kicks in early. Thus, the renunciation defense is provided to give attempters a rea
son to stop-right up until the moment before the offense is complete. If one re
jects the Code's equal grading p rovision and substantial step provision, as our test
subjects appear to do, the reasons that led to the creation of the renunciation de
fense in the Model Penal Code disappear. Yet the data suggest that the subjects
would keep such a defense. Thus the Code's defense is supported by the subjects
but apparently for reasons other than those given by the Code.
Note that the effect of renunciation on liability according to our subjects is sig
nificantly less after completion of the offense ( as illustrated by the rightmost pair
of bars) than before completion ( as with the two other example pairings). The as
signed liability drops fro m 6. 1 2 (3.4 years) for the unrenoun ced completed of
fense (case 6 ) to 3.23 ( 2 . 8 months) for the completed but renounced and "un
done" offense ( case 6a) . The Code also gives significance to the point of
completion-even more so than our subjects-it denies a defense for renuncia
tion after the offense is complete. That our subjects give a significant mitigation
even after the offense is complete may reflect a view that such renunciation un
dercuts the resoluteness of the offender's original intent and, therefore, retroac
tively alters their assessment of the offender's original culpability. As discussed be
low, an alternative explanation arises from the absence of the harm of the offense.
In comparing the case in which the person desists (our of fear of being caught)
after satisfaction of the dangerous p roximity test to the case in which the person
renounces due to a change of heart about the misdeed, we find that the liability
assigned by our subjects decreases from 1 .58 (8.8 days) to 0.69 ( less than 1 day) .
( Please again refer to Table 2.2 for these comparisons-scenarios Sa and Sb, col-

26

Doctrines of Criminalization

umn a.) A good majority of the subjects (65 percent) still think no punishment is
appropriate (column c) , although 65 percent would assign liability (column b).
The Model Penal Code j oins the common law, however, in barring a defense
based on these facts. The absence of the harm or evil of the completed offense ap
p ears to have a greater effect on our subjects than it has in the legal doctrine.
Our subjects' focus on the occurrence of the harm or evil of the offense also is
highlighted by their collective response to the case of the offender's renunciation
after completion of the offense. That the offender "undoes" the harm (returns the
stolen goods) does not exempt him from liability according to our subjects (see
the rightmost pair of bars in Figure 2.5) but significantly reduces the offender's
punishment from 6. 1 2 (3.4 years; 1 00 percent imposing punishment) to 3.23 ( 2.8
months; 73 percent imposing punishment) . Notice also that when the offender, as
above, renounces after completion but is unable to "undo" the offense, liability is
much closer to the unrenounced completed offense than it is to the renounced
completed offense. The renouncing thief who cannot "undo" the offense is given
an average score of 5 .3 5 ( 1 .8 years; 96 percent imposing punishment).
Further results suggest that occurrence of the harm or evil is not the only influ
ential factor; remorse counts as well. The two may be equally influential. (Again,
please refer to Table 2.2 for these comparisons.) Note that the liability means are
the same in the dangerous proximity attempt scenario (scenario 5) and the com
pleted offense scenario in which the offender would like to but is unable to
"undo" the offense (scenario 6b--5 .35; 1 .8 years) . In the former case, the person
has the evil desire to commit the offense but has not caused the harm of the of
fense. The latter scenario has the harm of the offense but a change of heart leading
the offender to want to "undo" the offense. These liability means differ signifi
cantly from other scenarios in crucial ways: They are each significantly lower (p <
.OS) than the liability assigned to the successful, unrepentant offender (scenario
6-6. 1 2 ; 3.4 years) , in which the harm exists in the absence of any remorse; and
both means are higher than in the scenarios in which ( 1 ) renunciation occurs be
fore completion (scenarios 3a and Sa-0.38 and 0.69, respectively; both less than
1 day) and (2) renunciation occurs after completion (scenario 6a-3.23; 2.4
months) . This patterning of results suggests that both the occurrence of the harm
and the perpetrator's remorse about that occurrence figure in our respondents'
assessments of punishment.
Finally, it is important to note that our respondents frequently selected the "li
ability but no punishment" option in this study (as is effectively shown in Figure
2.4}. This option w�s used not only in the case of renunciation and desistance im
mediately after the point of dangerous proximity but also in those scenarios in
which the p erson satisfies an attempt test short of dangerous proximity. (Com
pare columns b and c for scenarios 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.2.) These results may sug
gest that our subjects think it important to disapprove of the person's conduct
(and thus a majority would impose liability in each case-50 percent, 58 percent,
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and 73 percent, respectively; these percentages are obtained by subtracting the
no-liability percentages from 1 00 percent) but are hesitant to impose punishment
in the absence of sufficient proximity to the harm or evil of the offense. The sub
jects may want to disapprove of the person's conduct and intention but, because
they ultimately see insufficient blameworthiness, are hesitant to impose punish
ment. The interesting implications of the use of the " liability but no punishment"
option, and what our respondents are attempting to communicate by it, are dis
cussed further in Chapter 7. We note here, though, that the use of this option il
lustrates the distinctly dual nature of the law's function: rule articulation (an
nouncing ex ante the rules of proper conduct) and liability assignment and
grading (ex post adjudication of violations of the rules).7
Study

1:

Summary

The liability results of the objective requirements of attempt study might be sum
marized in psychological terms as follows. In the view of our subjects, punish
ment ought not to be imposed until a person has reached a point of dangerous
proximity to completion of the offense.8 Further, the level of punishment for at
tempt ought tv be significantly less than that for the completed offense. Once the
point of dangerous proximity is reached, punishment still may be avoided by
complete and voluntary renunciation. Finally, when an offense is completed, a
change of heart will only mitigate punishment, although undoing the offense will
mitigate punishment still further.
With respect to legal implications, this study sought to determine which of the
tests for the objective requirement of attempt best reflects the community's view.
In the scenarios in which the person has gone just far enough to satisfy the sub
stantial step test, the unequivocality test, or the probable desistance test, a strong
majority of subjects would impose either no liability or no punishment. But, in
the scenarios in which the person satisfies the common law's dangerous proximity
test, a dramatic shift in opinion occurs: All of the subjects would impose both lia
bility and punishment. This would seem to suggest that, if the community's view
were to be the guiding principle in the definition of the offense, criminal codes
should revert to the common law's dangerous proximity test. If early intervention
by law enforcement is desired to increase the effectiveness of crime prevention,
legislation could create authority for enforcement officials to intervene without
holding the person liable for an attempt to commit the substantive offense or to
intervene by holding the person liable only at a low level. Liability might be im
posed at a fixed misdemeanor level, for example, for an offense of "Preparing to
Commit an Offense" or something of such nature.
While preferring the common law's dangerous proximity test for determining
when attempt liability should attach, our subjects also recognize a defense for vol
untary and complete renunciation, as does the Model Penal Code. Indeed, many
subjects indicate that they would permit a defense-and a majority would impose
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no punishment-if the person desists out of fear of being caught rather than sim
ply from a change of heart. This confirms what we will present in several other
studies: Unlike the Model Penal Code, which downplays the significance of result
ing harm, our subjects' liability and punishment judgments are highly influenced
by whether harm or evil occurs. Indeed, a significant minority of subjects impose
no punishment on the person who completes the offense but soon thereafter re
nounces and undoes the primary effects of his offense. Chapter 6 discusses fur
ther the community's and the law's treatment of resulting harm in grading of
fenses.
STUDY 2: CREATING A CRIMINAL RISK
Just as someone may be liable for attempting to cause a prohibited harm, so too
may one be liable for creating a risk of causing a prohibited harm, even if the
harm does not come about. Not every risk created is a criminal risk. Current
codes typically limit liability to substantial risks of harm. Legal codes set a mini
mum standard of criminal risk to distinguish those risks to be regarded as crimi
nal from those that are not. Where to set the minimum standard is a complex
question for legal code drafters, but most are in agreement that the ultimate judg
ment of criminality of the risk is a product of, among other things, the serious
ness of the harm risked, the probability of the harm occurring, and the purpose of
the conduct.9 For example, one may create a high risk of getting a passerby wet in
the way one sets a lawn sprinkler, but the seriousness of the harm risked may be
sufficiently low so as not to make this a criminal matter. Whenever one drives a
car, one risks causing death to pedestrians; but the likelihood of killing one is low
enough, and the purpose of the conduct is valuable enough, that the simple act of
driving is not considered a criminal risk.
Thus, an assessment of whether someone creates a criminal risk depends in
large measure on the degree of harm and the probability of the harm occurring.
In this criminal risk study, we sought to determine both the minimum level of po
tential harm and the degree of risk that the community believes are necessary for
assignment of criminal liability. In addition, we tried to determine what interac
tion, if any, may exist between these two factors.
In particular, we set out to determine whether these two elements of risk af
fected liability independent of what the respondents believed to be the person's
"culpable state of mind" as to causing the prohibited result. To do this, we needed
to counter a common psychological tendency of individuals reading descriptions
of cases. I f a person is described as creating only a slight risk of harm, it might
commonly be thought that he or she is at most simply aware of such risk. By com
parison, observers may think that a person who creates a great risk of harm is
more than just «aware" of that risk; the person may be seen as at least knowing
and perhaps in some sense intending that such harm will come about (Karlovac
and Darley, 1 988; Fischoff, 1 975) . Thus, if one compares a case in which a person
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creates only a small risk to a case in which a person creates a high risk, greater lia
bility assigned in the latter case may be a function of a belief that that person has a
more culpable state of mind.
In the following study, we attempted to hold constant the person's culpable
state of mind in order to determine whether increased degree of risk and in
creased potential harm would, according to our subjects, carry the same increases
in liability and punishment that the code suggests, without the possibility that
subjects would infer a higher culpable state of mind of the person when that per
son took greater risks. To accomplish this, we created a scenario in which we spec
ified the person's state of mind, and we set the person's state of mind at "purpose
ful." This means that our conclusions will be limited to cases in which some
degree of harm was intended.
The design of this study-and almost all other studies in this book-is identi
cal in overview to that described in Study 1 : Respondents read several versions of
the same core scenario and responded to questions including judgments of liabil
ity and punishment. In this risk study, we presented the respondents with the fol
lowing core case: A wife, wishing to kill her spouse, puts poison into his breakfast
food. In different versions of the case, the poison (unbeknownst to the wife), if in
gested, would cause only minor stomach cramps (slight injury) , material and
substantial damage to the digestive tract (moderate injurx) , or alternatively, and
as planned, death (high injury) . We varied the risk of harm by altering the likeli
hood that the husband would actually eat the poisoned food. Our results are pre
sented in two tables later in this section.
We hoped that our subjects would interpret the scenarios in the ways we in
tended. For instance, in this study, we hoped that it would be clear to our subjects
that the wife intended to kill her husband. However, in research of this sort, it is
always wise to check to see how the subjects actually did perceive the stories. To
do this, we asked our subjects to report their perceptions of the case, as well as the
liability they would assign to the perpetrator. These check questions are called
"checks on the manipulations." In this risk study, we asked such questions. Before
discussing liability j udgments, let us first look at whether the respondents per
ceived the various facts of the case as we intended them to. This is determined by
examining the respondents' answers to the various questions shown in columns a
through c of Table 2.6. (The exact version of the questions and the numerical
scales on which the subjects responded to those questions are included in the
footnotes to the table. ) We note that we were reasonably successful in setting the
readers' perceptions of the offender's state of mind ( column c) . Their ratings were
between 3, which would be agreement with the statement that "she knew or was
practically certain that the victim would die;' and 4, "it was her purpose to cause
the victim to die;' with the average rating falling considerably closer to 4, or "pur
poseful." 10 Second, the respondents perceived the variations of risk as we hoped
they would, with the slight-risk scenarios providing an average risk rating of 3.59
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Subjects' Perceptions of the Creation of Risk

Scenarios
Slight risk
1 . Slight injury
2 . Moderate injury
3. High injury
Medium risk
4. Slight' injury
5. Moderate injury
6. H igh injury
H igh risk
7. Slight injury
8. Moderate injury
9. High injury
Accompl ished
1 0. Slight injury
1 1 . Moderate injury
1 2. High injury

(a)
Degree of
Risk

(b)

Severity of
Outcome

(c)
Actor's State
of Mind

3.21
3.62
3.95

3.29
5.39
8. 1 5

3.63
3.76
3.76

5.1 7
5.27
5.67

3.29
5.61
8.46

3.74
3.69
3.71

9.90 '
9.1 7
9.30

3.48
5.86
8.76

3.81
3.79
3.88

3.02
5.55
8.79

3.80
3.81
3.88

9.90
1 0.02
1 0.46

Key to column heads:
(a) The chances that the attempt will succeed and the victim will suffer from
its effects on this occasion are approximately: O=doesn't occur, 1 = 1 0% chance,
2=20% chance, . . . 1 O=near 1 00%, 1 1 =the event occurs.
(b) If the attempt does succeed, the result will likely be: 1 =no effect,
5=Significant or substantial injury, 9=death.
(c) Pick one or more of the following to describe the actor's state of mind:
1 . The actor did not realize that there was a risk that the victim would die.
2. The actor realized that there was a risk that the victim would die, but did
not care.
3. The actor knew or was practically certain that the victim would die.
4. It was the actor's purpose to cause the victim to die.

( column a of Table 2.6), the moderate-risk cases an average rating of 5.37, and the
high-risk cases an average rating of 9.46. In the "accomplished" cases, in which
the risked harm actually occurred and the husband either suffered stomach
cramps, digestive-tract damage, or died, the risk ratings were higher ( 10. 1 3 on av
erage) but only slightly higher than the ratings in the high-risk cases. Our respon
dents also perceived the severity of the outcome ( column b of Table 2.6) as we had
intended, with the slight injury receiving an average severity rating of 3 . 27, the
moderate injury an average of 5 .60, and the high injury an average of 8.54
[F(2,78) = 260.54, p = .00 1 ] . (The F test is another way of testing the statistical
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TABLE 2. 7

Liability for the Creation of Risk

(a)

Scenarios
Slight risk
1 . Slight injury
2. Moderate injury
3. High injury
Medium risk
4. Slight injury
5. Moderate injury
6. High injury
High risk
7. Slight injury
8. Moderate injury
9. High injury
Accomplished
1 0. Slight injury
1 1 . Moderate injury
1 2. High injury

Liability

(b)

(c)
% No Liability or
% No Liability No Punishment
(N+O)
(N)

6.81
7.48
8.24

0
0
0

10
2
0

6.93
7.71
\
8.51

0
0
0

10
0
0

7.39
8.00
8.95

0
0
0

7
2
0

7.33
8. 1 7
9.81

0
0
0

7
0
0

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.

"
significance of the obtained differences between groups. The p < .00 1 " element
of the statistic tells us that the result obtained would have occurred by chance only
once in a thousand times. )
Now that we have established that our subjects saw the case a s we had hoped,
we can turn to an examination of the liability results. Table 2. 7 reports liability
ratings assigned in each scenario, along with percentages of respondents who
chose "No Liability" and percentages of those who chose either "No Liability" or
"Liability But No Punishment."
Note that in all variations of the scenario, our subjects assign some liability; no
respondents recommend "No Liability" in any of the scenarios. This suggests
that, while the extent of harm risked and the probability of its occurrence may be
relevant to grading, no minimum level of potential harm or minimum probabil
ity is required before liability can be assigned. Or, if there is such a minimum, it is
below even the lowest levels of harm and probability tested here. Presumably, the
person's intention here to commit the offense and the poisoning of the cereal,
without more, are sufficient for criminal liability. This is consistent with the re
sults of the attempt study discussed previously.
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FIGURE 2.8 Liability as a Function of Risk and Injury
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Because of this, most of the results of this study concern issues of grading,
which is the subject of Chapter 6, but we will review those issues here in
preparation for a more complete discussion in Chapter 6. Figure 2.8 suggests that
as either the probability of injury or the severity of the risked injury increases, the
liability assigned to the risk-taker increases. [ Risk: F(3, 1 1 7) = 1 1 .28, p = .00 1 ; Se
verity: F( 2,78) = 24.96, p = .00 1 . ]
Interestingly, the interaction between these two factors is statistically signifi
cant [F(6,234) = 7.53, p = 0.00 1 ] . This result suggests that the probability and
harm variables, taken together, have effects on judgments of liability that are not
equivalent to the sum of their independent effects. Specifically, Figure 2.8 shows
that the accomplished, high-injury scenario draws an assignment of liability that
is considerably more severe than the others (and thus may be the liability score
that makes the interaction significant) . There is a distinct tendency for respon
dents to be particularly severe in assigning liability to the case in which the wife
intends to kill her husband and actually does so. In this planned and successful
murder, our subjects assign her a sentence that corresponds to nearly life impris
onment.

Doctrines of Criminalization

33

With the exception of this particular case, however, one is struck by the general
continuity of the respondents' judgments. As either the probability or the severity
of the harm risked increases incrementally, so too does the liability j udgment in
an essentially corresponding fashion.
Are our respondents' reactions consistent with the criminal codes? Only in a
broad sense. Because all of our scenarios described an individual who was pur
poseful as to committing the crime, the Code would treat all of our scenarios as
ones of attempted murder, without making distinctions depending on the prob
ability of the harm or the severity of the harm risked. Our respondents, in con
trast, alter their sentences depending on these factors-and do so in a nontrivial
way. First, they assign greater liabilities as a function of the degree of risk. (This is
shown by the consistent differences in elevation of the high, moderate, and slight
risk lines of Figure 2.8.) In other words, our respondents judge that the actual risk
created is relevant to their liability j udgments. This is consistent with their ten
dency to be more harm-oriented than the Code, with the present harm being in
the creation of risk. Second, as the quite steep slopes of the four lines of Figure 2.8
show, our respondents also base their liability judgments on the amount of injury
that is actually intended or "risked." Again, we see their judgments based on the
extent of the risk actually created; not just that intended. We will return to this is
sue in Chapter 7 for a fuller discussion of its implications.
What remains to be investigated are those cases in which an individual creates a
risk of a serious harm with a high probability of success-but does so at a much
lower level of culpability (for instance, recklessly or even negligently). How would
research subjects assign liability to those cases? Another useful study would test
scenarios in which the person intentionally creates only a risk of harm and in
which the extent of harm risked varied. This would reveal whether the subjects
punished intentional risk creation of different extents of harm differently. Much
remains to be studied in this area.
STUDY 3: OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLICITY
One can be held accountable for another person's conduct if one is j udged to be
"an accomplice" of that other person. In this study, we examine the objective re
quirements of "complicity"-that is, what a person actually must do in order to
be liable as an accomplice. ( In study 9-in Chapter 4-we consider the culpabil
ity requirements for complicity: that is, the culpable state-of-mind require
ments.)
What sorts of actions has the law treated as sufficient for complicity? To be an
accomplice under common law a person has to encourage or assist the perpetra
tor in some way. Two general ways of behaving complicitously were thereby rec
ognized: First, by encouraging another to commit a crime, one may cause or rein
force another's settled intention to commit the crime; second, by assisting
another to commit a crime, one not only implies encouragement but more
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strongly and causally contributes to the commission of the offense. Note that the
common law did not require that the action of the accomplice be necessary for
commission of the offense-one could be an accomplice by standing watch even
though those who would commit the crime do not show up or by being ready to
drive a backup getaway car even though it is not needed. Similarly under common
law, encouraging a principal to commit a crime engenders liability whether or not
that encouragement was necessary for the commission of the crime.
It was not enough under common law (for liability) , however, that a person
merely tries to assist or encourage the perpetrator if such attempts by the person
are unsuccessful. If the person provides neither actual assistance nor actual en
couragement (because his unsuccessful attempt to assist was unknown to the per
petrator, for example), he is not liable as an accomplice.
The Model Penal Code drafters found this common-law exemption for an un
successful attempt to encourage or assist inappropriate; they broaden the scope of
complicity by assigning liability to an actor's unsuccessful attempt to encourage
or assist-A person need simply "aid or agree or attempt to aid" the perpetrator to
be held liable as an accomplice.
Where complicity liability is established, the actor is held liable for the full of
fense. Unlike inchoate offenses, such as attempt, in which the actor commonly is
accountable for a lesser grade ofliability than the offense attempted, complicity is
a means of establishing full-offense liability. Thus, from the law's view, an accom
plice has the same liability as the perpetrator.
In this study, we tested our subjects' views on the minimum amount that a per
son could contribute in encouraging or assisting an offense to be held criminally
liable for it. We also tested whether our subjects would alter the degree of liability
that they would impose according to the person's degree of contribution to the of
fense. Few codes take degree of contribution into account in setting the grade of
an accomplice's liability, but such a scheme has been introduced, albeit with rela
tively broad categories, by the United States Sentencing Commission.1 1
I n this study, we presented our subjects with a series o f scenarios, each of which
presented a different degree of contribution to a killing, including scenarios in
which the person attempts to assist but fails. In order to test whether our subjects'
assessment of liability depended on the actual occurrence of a resulting harm,
such as causing a death (we have demonstrated in other studies-for instance,
Study 1-that resulting harm is a powerful determinant of liability and punish
ment), several of the scenarios presented our respondents with instances in which
the principal actor-the "perpetrator"-was not successful in his attempt to kill.
The core of these scenarios involves an unhappily married woman who "longs
for her husband's death, which would make her a rich widow:' A friend of the wife
is aware of her feelings and assists or tries to assist her in various ways to bring
about her husband's death, and these various methods form the variation in the
scenarios. The wife alternatively kills her husband or attempts to do so and fails.

Doctrines of Criminalization

35

In Table 2.9, the three "murder fails" cases are scenarios 2a, 4a, and 6a, and their
scores are boldfaced.
The variations in the actions of the friend of the wife constitute the different
scenarios in Table 2.9. Column a shows the liability assigned to the wife for her
actions-she is assigned a liability of 1 0 or above (the equivalent of a life sen
tence) when the murder succeeds. When her actions fail to kill her husband, her
liability drops to about 7.5 ( 1 1 years, p < .05). We see again the pattern of our
subjects giving lesser sentences for an attempt than for a completed crime. In the
specific description of the failed attempt, it is reported that the wife "shot at her
husband but missed"-therefore, no wound is inflicted. The respondents could
have interpreted the miss as signaling that the wife is irresolute in her purpose.
These two facts (no injury/possible lack of res�lve) may help explain the consid
erable reduction in sentence for the wife in the three no-death scenarios.
Let us next examine the central question of this third study, which is the liabil
ity assigned to the accomplice. In scenario 1 , the male friend is described as realiz
ing that "if she did decide to do it, he would be willing to help her," but before he
can communicate this to her, "she shoots her husband dead!' Look at columns b,
c, and d for scenario 1 , in which the liability assignments for the complicit friend
of the wife are given. In this scenario, no liability is assigned to the friend. As we
have done before, we asked our subjects various questions about how they per
ceived the case. The exact questions are given in the footnotes to the table, and
our subjects' numerical responses make up columns e and f As column e of sce
nario 1 indicates, our respondents agree that the accomplice approved of the
wife's murderous actions, with average ratings of between 8 and 9 on a scale in
which 7 indicates agreement and 9 indicates strong agreement. (Notice, too, that
in all cases the respondents agree that the friend approves of the wife's actions;
thus, that fact can be taken as established for our discussion of all of these sce
narios.) As column fof scenario 1 indicates, the respondents agree that the friend
"does not help (the wife) at all!'
In various of our other scenarios described in this and other chapters, the re
spondents assign some liability if they decide that the individual has formed a set
tled intention to commit a crime and acts upon that intention. But here they as
sign no liability to the accomplice who decides he would be willing to help. What
might cause this difference? We submit two possible explanations: ( 1 ) Deciding
that one is willing to help in the commission of a crime is one step more removed
than deciding to commit the crime, and that step might have been sufficient to
make a difference to our subjects; and (2) Alternatively, "realizing that one would
be willing to help" may be read as a less-settled and -formed intention than, for
instance, the intention formed in the attempt case of Study 1 , in which the person
plans to rob the safe.
Look next at scenarios 2 and 2a, in which the friend attempts to help the wife
kill her husband but fails to do so even though the murder is accomplished (2) or

TABLE 2.9

Liability as Related to Objective Requirements of Complicity

Wife

Accomplice

--

(c)

(a)

(b)

Scenarios

Liability

Liability

1.
2.

1 0. 1 5a
1 0. 1 5a

o.ooe
1 .1 56

1 00
68

7.79b

0.826

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

Only thinks of helping
Failed attempi-toil-elp
2a. Failed attempt to help/
Murder fails
Encourages/No help
Minimal help
4a. Minimal help/
Murder fails
Substantial help
Necessary help
Ga. Necessary help/
Murder fails
Unique and necessary help
Masterminds

9.59a
1 0.03a

7.47b
1 0. 1 2a
1 0.06a

7.71 b
1 0. 1 5a
9.97a

(e)
Accomplic'e
Approves
Killing

Accomplice's
Role

1 00
85

8.24
8.71

1 .00
1 .44

65

88

12
6

38
21

8.61
8.75
8.74

1 .56
2.59
4.71

4.88c,d
9. 1 8a
9.32a

6

24

0
0

0
0

8.64
8.94
8.94

4.21
5.44
6.41

7.29b

0

8.94
8.21
8.88

6.00
5.03
7.47

(d)
% No Liability

% No Liability or No Punishment
(N)

4.1 5d
6. 1 5c

5.44c,d
9. 1 8a

(N+O)

9
0

o
32
3

(f)

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:

(e)

The accomplice approves of the wife killing her husband: 1 =strongly disagree, 3=disagree, 5=unsure, 7=agree, 9=strongly

agree.

(f)

The accomplice's role in the crime can best be described by which of the following statements?
1.
The accomplice does not help the wife at all.
2.

The accomplice attempts to help the w ife but is unsuccessful in the effort.

3.

The accomplice and the wife reach an agreement that she is going to kill her h usband.

4.

The accomplice provides minimal help to the wife.

5.

The accomplice provides substantial h e lp to the wife.

6.

The accomplice's assistance is necessary if the wife is going to kill her h usband.

7.

The accomplice provides unique help that is necessary for the wife to kil l h er h usband.

8.

The accomplice masterminds the cri m e.

Note: Superscript l etters i ndicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means a re compared within columns only.

(JJ
0\
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not accomplished ( 2a) . (The attempt to help is unknown to the wife.) These are
examples of cases in which the accomplice provides no real assistance or encour
agement of any kind. That individual incurs very little liability-next lowest to
the liability assigned to the individual who only thinks about helping. This result
is dramatically different from the Code's imposition of full offense liability for
such a failed attempt to assist.
In the "encourages" scenario ( row 3 ) , the person has agreed with the wife that
she should go ahead with her plan to murder her husband. Note from column f
that respondents tend to agree that the two of them have reached an agreement
that she will kill her husband. This "giving of encouragement" is recognized by
both the common law and the Model Penal Code as filling one of the tests for ac
complice liability and is seen by our subjects as requiring the assignment of some
liability, although not a large amountY (Such agreement also would satisfy the
test for conspiracy liability, which the Model Penal Code sets at the same grade as
the substantive offense but which most j urisdictions grade as less than the full of
fense. )
The liability assigned to the friend, 4. 1 5, is equivalent to a sentence of about 7
months. But notice that about 38 percent of the respondents think that, whether
they find the person guilty or not, the person does not deserve any time in jail.
Again, this seems significantly less severe than the punishment provided by the
Code. (However, the extent of the code-community difference may not be as great
in other "agreement'' cases. In this scenario, the wife is described as already hav
ing decided to murder her husband-so the agreement of the friend is probably
not seen as necessary to the wife's decision, although her decision is undeniably
reinforced by the agreement. The contrast case to this, that might have caused
subjects to assign more liability to the accomplice, would occur when he gave en
couragement before the wife decided to kill her husband. )
With this general introduction to the results, let us look at the patterning of the
liability judgments. The eight murder scenarios describe what we hoped would be
seen as an increasing degree of help and encouragement to the wife in her plan to
kill her husband. The checks-on-the-manipulations questions help us determine
if the subjects perceived the scenarios in the way that we had hoped. In the "failed
attempt to help" scenarios ( rows 2 and 2a), the friend overhears the wife tell her
plan to her sister, and he then attempts to meet the wife to supply the necessary
gun. However, before he reaches her, she has already shot at her husband. Respon
dents see this as midway between providing no help and an attempt to provide
help that is unsuccessful ( ratings of 1 .44 and 1 .56, respectively, in column f) . In
the minimal help scenarios (rows 4 and 4a), the wife has formed the plan to shoot
her husband, and the friend tells her where to buy the gun. Obviously, his agree
ment with the plan is implicit in that action. Respondents see this as providing
somewhere between minimal and substantial help ( ratings of 4.7 1 and 4.2 1 , re
spectively, in which 4 = minimal help and 5 substantial help) . In scenario 5, the
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friend gives the wife his gun with which to shoot the husband, thus providing
substantial help, and she uses the gun to kill her husband. (We did not run the
scenario in which the friend gives substantial help, and she shoots at her husband
and misses.) The respondents agree that he in fact provides substantial help (col
umn f, a rating of 5.44, where 5 substantial help). In scenarios 6 and 6a, the
friend provides necessary help. The wife has been unable to obtain a firearm and
is given one by the friend. She then confesses that she does not know how to shoot
it, and he teaches her how. The respondents saw this as we had hoped, giving rat
ings of 6.4 1 and 6 respectively (where 6 necessary help).
In scenario 7, the friend provides what we considered to be unique and neces
sary help; he alerts the wife to the fact that her husband, suspicious of her inten
tions, is fleeing town, and she goes home and kills him before he can leave. But
column /indicates that our subjects did not see the case the way we had hoped
instead, they see the accomplice as providing only substantial help. We will come
back to a discussion of this shortly.
In scenario 8, the friend is described as a business partner of the husband and
as a person who will be relieved of debt if the husband dies. Knowing that the wife
is unhappy with her husband, he p rovides her with a plan in which she can shoot
her husband and make it look like an accident. She follows the plan and kills her
husband. While we labeled this the "mastermind" scenario, about half of the re
spondents agree ( column f) that he "masterminds the crime;' while the other half
respond that he "provides unique help that is necessary for the wife to kill her
husband.''
So with the rather important exception of scenario 7, our subjects see the role
of the accomplice approximately as we had hoped. What differences did this make
in their liability assignments? Comparing the liability ratings of eleven cases is not
an easy matter-but we believe that Figures 2. 1 0 and 2. 1 1 will help.
Figure 2. 1 0 is designed to facilitate examination of the effects of increasing de
grees of accomplice complicity on the liability he is assigned.In this figure, all of
the cases in which the wife successfully kills her husband are charted (except sce
nario 7, the one that our subjects see so differently), and all of the cases in which
the wife fails to kill her husband are eliminated; we will consider them later. As
the involvement of the friend moves from ((thought only" to failed attempt, and
so on, up through masterminding of the crime, the liability ratings of the respon
dents increase; that is, the liability assignments to the friend increase as his causal
involvement in the incident increases [ F (2,66) 85.90, p < .00 1 ] . Notice, inter
estingly, that the liability assignments level off once the complicit individual has
reached the level of substantial involvement in the killing: To the cases of substan
tial involvement, necessary involvement, and masterminding the crime, our re
spondents assign a sentence of about thirty years in prison. This suggests that
substantial assistance is something of a threshold after which greater assistance is
oflittle consequence to liability. 13 The flattening of the accomplice's liability graph
=

=

=
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FIGURE 2. 1 0 Liability Assigned to the Accomplice as a Function of His Involvement
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Scenarios

at a level lower than the liability assigned to the perpetrator (9. 1 8, 9.32, and 9. 1 8
for the accomplice versus 10. 1 2 , 1 0.06, and 9.97 for the perpetrator) also confirms
that our subjects see reduced liability as appropriate for the accomplice (as com
pared to the perpetrator) , apparently without regard to how active a role the ac
complice played in the three most serious scenarios.
The "mastermind" scenario hints at the possibility of a limit of the liability
grade reduction for accomplices. The liability assigned to the masterminding
friend is high, above thirty years in prison, but still below that assigned to the
wife. Yet, as a glance at Table 2.9 will confirm, the liability assigned to the wife is
lower than it is in cases in which she acts more independently. It is interesting to
note that some of the responsibility for the crime might be beginning to be
shifted away from the wife here; this is the only succesful scenario in which she re
ceives less than a life sentence for her actions. As her accountability for the death
is reduced, one might expect the mastermind's to increase, perhaps eventually
eliminating the usual accomplice grade reduction.
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FIGURE 2. 1 1

Effects of Success or Failure of Killing on liability for the Accomplice
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We now say what we can about scenario 7, which we have labeled "unique and
necessary help:' Recall that this case was not perceived by our subjects as provid
ing unique and necessary help; such would have entailed an average rating of 7 in
column f. Instead, in this case the accomplice is perceived as simply providing
substantial help to the wife (5.03 rating, where 5 substantial help). Future re
search will need to create a case in which respondents perceive that unique and
necessary help is given by a complicit individual in order to see if the liability
scores associated with such a case approach the liability given a mastermind, as we
would predict. However, it is interesting to contrast the liability assignment of
case 7 with that of case 5, in which the respondents did perceive that (as we had
hoped) substantial help was given. The accomplice in case 5 draws a significantly
higher liability assignment (a sentence of more than thirty years) than does the
accomplice in case 7 ( a sentence of only about two years) , even though both are
roughly matched on what we know of the nature of our respondents' perceptions
of the complicit individual's involvement in the case. This suggests that our re
spondents may be considering some as yet undiscovered factors that are influenc=
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ing their decisions, and future research should attempt to discover what these fac
tors are.
Next, what difference does it make to the accomplice's liability whether the wife
successfully kills her husband or shoots and misses? This is answered in Figure
2. 1 1 , in which we examine the three pairs of cases in which the friend fails in his
attempt to help, provides minimal help, or provides necessary help, and the
woman succeeds in killing her husband or fails. (See Table 2.9, scenarios 2 and 2a,
4 and 4a, and 6 and 6a. ) As the figure shows, the respondents consistently give a
somewhat reduced liability to the accomplice friend in the cases in which the per
petrator wife fails to kill her husband (F( l ,33) = 3 9.68, p < .00 1 ] . (That is, the
"failed'' line is consistently lower on the liability axis than the "succeeded" line. )
We have commented previously on the general tendency of our respondents to
follow this pattern-to give reduced sentences when the harm of the offense does
not actually occur. This is-on first glance-consistent with the Model Penal
Code's treatment of such cases. While the accomplice's failed attempt to assist is
treated the same as successful assistance, the perpetrator's failure to commit the
crime does affect at least the label that is given to the accomplice's liability: His li
ability is only that of complicity in an attempt rather than complicity in the full
offense. Recall, though, that what the Code gives with one hand, it takes away
with the other. While most jurisdictions give a somewhat reduced grade for at
tempt liability, the Code grades attempts the same as the substantive offense, so
that no reduction in accomplice liability would be achieved.
Study 3: Summary

The results of this complicity study are generally what intuition would have led us
to expect. The greater the degree of help provided by the accomplice-where help
is conceived of on a rough continuum beginning with encouragement and ending
with criminal master minding-the greater the liability assigned to the accom
plice. The significance of these results for various code formulations is, first, sup
port for the common-law rule and against the Model Penal Code in the debate
between the two ( respectively) on whether actual assistance is required for ac
complice liability or whether an unsuccessful attempt is sufficient. Our subjects
tend to agree with the common-law formulation that requires actual encourage
ment or assistance.
Second, the gradations in liability assigned by our respondents to the person,
depending on his degree of assistance in the crime, represent a pattern that we
will see repeatedly in our data and one that frequently contradicts the legal sys
tem's tendency to treat various actors who play "supporting roles" in the commis
sion of a crime as equally liable with the individual who commits the crime.
Complicity, in the eyes of our respondents, is a matter of degree. Within legal
codes, it is often treated as an ali-or-nothing issue. If one fails to qualify as an ac-
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complice, there is no liability; if one is an accomplice, full liability for the offense
is imposed, equal to that assigned the principal in the crime. Our respondents
p ersist in making finely graduated liability distinctions. This gradation of liability
is what the sentencing guidelines (see note 1 1 ) are attempting to provide, at the
level of actual sentences assigned to accomplices. Note the similarity of this grad
uated pattern to the pattern assigned by respondents in our study of causation
( Study 1 7) , again a continuum of liability in a situation treated within legal codes
as a dichotomous cutoff.
Finally, our subjects seem to disagree with the codes' view that an accomplice's
liability ought to be the same grade as the perpetrator's. This is true even in those
cases in which the degree of assistance is very high--even essential to the success
ful commission of the offense. Our subjects would give a minimum of one grade
reduction to accomplices, much as most jurisdictions now do for attempt liability.
STUDY 4: OMISSION LIABILITY
The definitions of substantive offenses, together with the secondary prohibitions
of attempt, risk creation, and complicity, give a complete account of what a per
son must not do. But the rules of conduct enforced by the criminal law occasion
ally require that a person perform specific conduct. People must pay taxes, regis
ter for the draft, obtain a license to engage in certain regulated activities, and so
forth. While we do not fully address it here, a subsequent study might examine
whether current codes accurately map the conduct that the law ought to require
upon pain of criminal liability for failure to act. Are some failures ( omissions)
currently punished by legal codes perceived by the community as of insufficient
seriousness for liability? Should the criminal law create duties to act in situations
not now required?
In one aspect of this study, we focus on the practice of current codes in impos
ing the same degree of liability on a person who commits an offense through
commission as through omission. The codes see as equivalent, for example, af
firmative conduct causing a death and an omission to perform a legal duty that
results in a death, all other things being equal.
In another aspect of this study, we focus on the most controversial instance of
the law's failure to create a legal duty to help-in the case in which another per
son is in danger of serious injury or death. Anglo-American law has generally re
sisted imposing liability for a person's failure to act to help a stranger in distress.
Under current doctrine, liability may be imposed for an omission to help only if
the p erson has a specific duty to act [ see Model Penal Code § 2.01 ( 1 ) ] , and such
duties are relatively rare and narrowly defined. For example, consider the case of a
p erson who comes upon a drowning person whose life could be saved by the wit
ness merely throwing the victim a nearby life preserver. The law imposes a duty
for the witness to assist the drowning person-and thus imposes liability if such
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assistance is o mitted-only if the witness has one of several defined relationships
to the endangered person. The most common sources of a duty to rescue are the
duty of a parent to protect his or her child and a duty created by virtue of contrac
tual agreement between parties-for instance, when a swimming club hires a per
son to serve as a lifeguard. A duty to rescue also may be created if one undertakes
to help a person in distress, which may signal to others that the situation is under
control, and then the volunteer fails to help, thereby leaving the person less likely
to be assisted by another. Once one assumes the responsibility to rescue, even vol
untarily, one has a legal duty to carry it to completion. 14
However, if none of these relationships exist, the law holds that the person is
under no obligation to help. Thus, in the case of the drowning individual, the wit
ness who knows of the danger and can avert it generally has no duty to do so. This
is so even if the act of helping, such as throwing the life preserver, presents no
danger or even inconvenience to the person-even if the witness knows that the
imperiled person otherwise will drown without the life preserver. Because the
person has no duty to act, there is no criminal liability for failing to act.
The debate on this issue has an old and distinguished history. Several commen
tators have criticized the restrictive view of omission liability. Livingston, for ex
ample, argues that one should have a legal duty to act to save a stranger if such
can be done without personal danger or pecuniary loss ( Livingston, 1 833, chp. II,
articles 1 2- 1 3 ) . Such proposals to create a general duty to rescue have been criti
cized, in turn, as being too broad ( Macauley, 1 837, Note M, pp. 5 3-54) . Macauley
argues in the foregoing cite that "there may be extreme inconvenience without the
smallest personal danger or the smallest risk of pecuniary loss." More generally,
proposals to create a general duty to rescue are thought by many to go beyond the
appropriate realm of criminal liability and into the sphere of moral accountabil
ity:
It is, indeed, most highly desirable that men should not merely abstain from doing
harm to their neighbors, but should render active services to their neighbors. In gen
eral however the penal law must content itself with keeping men from doing positive
harm, and must leave to public opinion, and to the teachers of morality and religion,
the office of furnishing men with motives for doing positive good. It is evident that to
attempt to punish men by law for not rendering to others all the service which it is
their [ moral] duty to render to others would be preposterous. We must grant impu
nity to the vast majority of those omissions which a benevolent morality would pro
nounce reprehensible, and must content ourselves with punishing such omissions
only when they are distinguished from the rest by some circumstance which marks
them out as peculiarly fit objects of penal legislation (Macauley,

1 837, pp. 55-56).

While an omission to act may not be morally correct, the argument goes, it is not
the sort of thing that ought to generate criminal liability other than in exceptional
circumstances.
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This is the prevailing view that is instantiated in the laws of our society, al
though there are occasional exceptions. Despite such general reluctance to create
omission liability, a few states have enacted a limited general duty to rescue, typi
cally limiting the duty to cases of serious danger to the victim in which the rescuer
need not endanger him or herself. [ See, e.g., Rhode Island General Laws § 1 1 -561 ; Wisconsin Statutes Annotated § 940.34(2) ] . The statutes also tend to provide
only minor penalties in case of conviction.
Our omission study sought to test the community's views on whether criminal
liability and punishment are appropriate for a failure to rescue a stranger and, if
so, to determine how the assignment of liability and punishment may vary with
different levels of danger or inconvenience. This study also examined the commu
nity's views of the comparative liability for a commission and an omission under
each of the existing traditional sources of duty-parental or contractual relation
ship or assumption of responsibility to rescue. Subjects were given a series of sce
narios involving one actor pushing another into the water in circumstances in
which it is apparent that the victim will likely drown if not rescued; another actor
observes this, but fails to act to rescue the victim. For the first subset of scenarios
( 1 through 4 in Table 2 . 1 2), a flotation device is present; all that is necessary for
the bystander to do is to throw it to the victim. For the second subset (scenarios 5
through 8), since we were interested in whether the respondents would require
bystander action of a more major sort, it is necessary for the bystander to swim to
the aid of the victim. (The bystander is described as a strong swimmer.) We asked
our respondents to rate the liability that they would assign both to the perpetrator
(who affirmatively pushes the victim into the water) and to the nonacting by
stander. The scenarios differed in the relationship between the bystander and the
victim and in the degree of danger or inconvenience that rescuing the victim
would impose on the bystander.
The first point of interest is a global one: When compared with the liability
judgments for the person who created the danger, the liability judgments for the
bystander's failure to act are greatly mitigated. Liability and punishment for the
person who pushes the victim into the water and thereby causes the death
through commission, column a, is constant in all scenarios, at approximately 8.6
(24.4 years). For the bystander who does not help, liability and punishment for
failing to rescue is consistently significantly less. This is most easily seen by scan
ning column d, which lists the liability scores assigned to the person who fails to
help; at no point does bystander liability even approach that assigned to the per
son who commits the act.
Mitigation from full liability is given even in those cases in which the bystander
has a legal duty to act, as in scenarios 2 through 4. ( In scenario 2, the bystander is
a parent of the victim; in scenario 3, he has a contractual obligation to rescue the
victim because he is a security guard at the site; and in scenario 4, the actor tells
another that he will rescue the victim, thus assuming the obligation.) Even in

TABLE 2 . 1 2

Liability for Commission and Omission

Omission

Commission

Scenarios
1.
2.

Stranger
Parent

3.

Contract

4.

Assumption

5.

Stranger-high
danger

6.

Stranger-low
danger

7.

Stranger-high
inconvenience

8.

(a)

(b)

Liability

% No
Liability

(c)
% No Liability
or
No Punishment

Liability

(e)

(f)
% No Liability
or
% No
Liability No Punishment

(g)
Model Penal
Code Result
(for omission)

52
31

No l iability
Same liability a s commission

0

10

Same liability as commission

3

24

Same liability as commission

0.97a

55

86

No l iability

0

2.4 1 a

21

62

N o l iability

0

0

3. 64a

14

43

N o l iability

0

0

3.79a

14

41

N o liability

8.55

0

0

8.66

0

0

8.62

0

0

8.62

0

8.66

2. 93a
5 . 1 ob

21

0

6.2 1 b
5.55b

0

0

8.61

0

8.66
8.59

Stranger-low
inconvenience

(d)

7

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but n o punishment, 1 = 1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death .
N ote: S uperscript l etters indicate significance at the p < . 05 l evel by a Newman·Keuls test. Match ing superscripts indicate
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. M eans are compared within col u mn s only.
�
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these duty scenarios, omission liability-5. 1 0 ( 1 .2 years) to 6.21 ( 3.8 years)-is
significantly lower than commission liability for the same death-8.6 (24.4
years).
Table 2. 1 3 reports, among other things, the respondents' perceptions ofvarious
aspects of the state of mind of the person who fails to rescue the victim; these per
ceptions suggest that part of the difference in liability that our subjects assign to
the perpetrator and the bystander might be partially due to perceptions that the
two actors have different culpable states of mind as to causing the death. Our re
spondents j udge that the individual who pushes the victim into the water wants
him to drown, while the individual who fails to help him is not seen as wanting
the victim to drown. (For the omission actor, these ratings range between 3.38
and 4.76, with a rating of 3 meaning the respondents "disagreed" with the state
ment that the individual wanted the victim to drown and a rating of 5 indicating
"unsure:')Still, as column c shows, the respondents agreed that the potential res
cuer is practically certain that the victim would drown. This suggests that the re
spondents give a liability discount to the person who fails to help, as compared to
the person whose act of commission created the situation in the first place, even
though they do regard the omission as blameworthy.
Returning to considerations affecting the level of liability assigned to the ob
server who fails to act, as Table 2. 1 2 shows, our subjects clearly do distinguish be
tween the stranger ( no-duty) scenarios ( I and 5 through 8) and the duty
scenarios (2 through 4). In the latter set of cases, a large majority of our subjects
impose liability and punishment (93 percent to 1 00 percent) . 15 These results con
firm the importance of the legal doctrine's consideration of whether a legal duty
exists and suggest that the community sees the same sorts of relationships as cre
ating this duty to rescue as does the Code. Thus the study results suggest that vio
lation of a duty is recognized by the community as grounds for assigning a person
criminal liability. However, the liability scores assigned in the duty cases are by no
means as severe as those that the Code would assign in the same cases. The Code's
penalties for omission would be the same as those assigned for commission of the
act, which in our scenarios would be punishment levels of approXimately 8.6
( 24.4 years). Consistently, our subjects assign liability levels well below 8.6, rang
ing from 5. 1 to 6.2 ( 1 .2 years to 3.8 years) .
I t is not the case that our subjects are lenient in all o f their judgments. I n con
trast to the legal duty scenarios, subjects appear to be stricter than the Code in
cases where no legal duty exists. In all scenarios where a bystander fails to rescue a
stranger, except the one involving high danger to the rescuer, a majority of the
subjects would impose criminal liability in such cases ( from 79 percent to 86 per
cent). 16 Even in the high-danger scenario, 45 percent would impose liability. Yet,
the legal doctrine imposes no liability where no duty to rescue exists. In the eyes
of our respondents, absence of a duty does not exempt a person from liability for
failing to save a stranger's life. As the responses to scenarios 5 through 8 show, our

TABLE 2. 1 3

Respondents' Perceptions of Commission and Omission Cases

Omission

Commission
Scenarios
1.

Stranger

2.

Parent

3.

Contract

(a)
Knowledge

(b)
Purpose

(c)
Knowledge

(d)
Purpose

(e)
Inconvenience

(f)
Danger

6.48

5.86

6.71

3.45

1 .48

1 . 45

6.41

6. 1 0

7.28

4. 1 7

1 .2 1

1 .28

6.45

6.03

6.90

4.28

1 .48

1 .24

6.55

5 . 97

6.66

4.76

1 .2 1

1 .31

5.21

6.93

4.

Assumption

5.

Stranger-h igh danger

6.48

6.03

6.72

3.38

6.

Stranger-low danger

6.45

6.00

6.79

4. 1 0

4.03

4.55

7.
8.

Stranger-high i nconvenience

6.48

5.83

4.59

6.62

5.86

6.79
6.69

4.28

Stranger-low inconvenience

4.21

3.21

2.45
2.34

Key to column heads:
Statements
agree.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(a) through (d) were

responded to on a scale where 1 =strongly disagree, 3=disagree, 5=unsure , and 9=strongly

The actor is practically certain that the victim will drown.
The actor wanted the victim to drown.
The potential rescuer is practically certain that the victim will drown .
The potential rescuer wanted the victim to drown .

To what extent would it have been inconvenient for the potential rescuer to help the victim? 1 =not at all inconvenient and
9=extremely inconven ient.
(f) To what extent would it have been dangerous for the potential rescuer to help the victim? 1 =not at all dangerous and
9=extremely dangerous.
*'"
'-J
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respondents think that a bystander who can swim should swim to the rescue of a
drowning individual and should be criminally liable for failing to do so.
In saying this, we do not overlook that our subjects make some carefully nu
anced qualifications of the duty to rescue a stranger. The results of these four
nonduty scenarios are illustrated in Figure 2. 14. In this figure, we have arrayed
the four scenarios in terms of the degree of sacrifice required of the possible
helper, with the inconvenience cases assumed to require less sacrifice. Notice that
the respondents lower their liability judgments as the inconvenience and particu
larly the danger to the potential rescuer increases; the less the inconvenience or
danger to the bystander in attempting a rescue, the more the liability he incurs for
not doing so. {An analysis of variance indicates that the degree of either danger or
inconvenience makes a reliable difference in the respondents' assignment of lia
bility [ F( 1 ,27) = 1 1 .23, p < .002] . As the figure also indicates, the degree of dan
ger that exists for the potential helper mitigates the respondents' condemnation
of him for not intervening-more so than does the degree of inconvenience
[ F( l ,27) 1 8.22, p < .00 1 ] .
But details of the patterning aside, our respondents see a very far-reaching duty
to intervene, one that generally goes beyond the views instantiated in the codes. In
the high-danger case, involving the necessity to jump into shark-infested waters
to attempt the rescue { scenario 5 of Table 2 . 1 2) , 45 percent of our subjects assign
liability to the person who chooses not to help, although the punishments as
signed in this case were low.
The code-community difference in the no-duty cases is not as great, however,
when one focuses on punishment rather than liability. Many subjects impose lia
bility but no punishment ( compare columns e and [of Table 2. 1 2 ) . In the two sce
narios with elements of danger, only a minority of subjects impose punishment .
(38 percent in the low-danger scenario, 1 4 percent in the high-danger scenario).
There is a possible pattern here, in which the respondents are using an assign
ment of criminal liability to censure conduct, without wishing to impose an ac
tual punishment on the censured individual. (We will see similar patterns of re
sponses in other studies and will return to this theme in Chapter 7.) In the no
danger cases ( in which a majority of subjects do impose punishment), the degree
of punishment is not high, ranging from 2.93 (7.4 weeks) to 3.79 (5.2 months).17
Study 4 : Summary

The results of this study indicate that our subjects would support a system in
which causing a death by omission receives some liability, but less liability and
punishment than if the death is caused by commission, all other things being
equal. Some of the omission study's results support the standard legal distinc
tions: In those cases in which there are relationships that the law suggests create a
duty to act, our respondents assign more liability and punishment for failing to
act than in those cases where no such duty exists. Where no duty exists, the degree
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FIGUR E 2. 1 4 Liability as a Function of the Degree of Sacrifice Necessary to Rescue

Low

Inconvenience

High
Inconvenience

Low Danger

High Danger

Sacrifice Required of Potential Rescuer

of liability and punishment is reduced as the degree of danger or inconvenience to
the rescuer increases. Still, only in the case of high danger is the potential rescuer
judged free from liability by a majority of respondents, and only in the case of no
ticeable danger is the potential rescuer assigned no punishment by a majority of
respondents. Inconvenience never exempts the potential rescuer from liability,
but in such cases the degree of punishment is low. These results appear to support
the few American state statutes that create a limited duty to rescue strangers from
serious threats.
When a person fails in a legal duty to rescue, created by contractual agreement,
parental relationship, or voluntary assumption of responsibility, the subjects im
pose significantly lower liability than current doctrine would. Apparently, causing
a death by omission is judged less blameworthy than causing the same death by
commission {with the potential rescuer sharing the same state of mind concern
ing whether the victim was likely to die as the perpetrator). Current doctrine im
poses full liability for the substantive offense for such cases of omission, while our
subjects discount liability for omission . Our findings suggest that code drafters
should provide significant grade reductions in those cases in which liability is
based on a failure to perform a legal duty.
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Finally, our respondents make nuanced distinctions between similar but not
identical cases. For instance, our subjects vary the amount ofliability assigned ac
cording to the nature of the circumstances that create the duty to rescue. A con
tinuum of accountability also exists, in the context of rescue of a stranger, where
liability varies with the degree of danger or inconvenience.18 This is another ex
ample of the law's discontinuous treatment of what our subjects see as a continu
ous function, an issue we take up again in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The four studies reviewed in this chapter suggest that secondary prohibitions are
indeed a rich source of disagreement between community views and criminal
codes. Codes frequently impose liability where our subjects would not-or where
they would at least impose considerably less. For instance, our subjects find the
dangerous proximity test embodied in the common law a better trigger for at
tempt liability than the substantial step test of the Model Penal Code. Further, our
respondents give more weight to the renunciation of a criminal attempt even
when that attempt has progressed far enough to trigger criminal liability. Unsuc
cessful attempts to encourage or assist in a crime seem to our subjects to call for
little or no liability, more in keeping with the common-law treatment of these un
s uccessful attempts than the Code treatment, which would impose full offense lia
bility. Also, a person who intends murder but creates only a slight risk of minor
harm receives a sentence from our subjects that is greatly reduced from the codes'
treatment of the act as attempted murder. Our respondents also assign an accom
plice to a crime higher liability as his contribution to the crime increases, but that
level of liability does not rise high enough to equal the liability assigned the prin
cipal criminal-as the codes provide. A person who has a duty to rescue another
and fails in that duty (and the person who might have been saved dies) is liable,
but not for murder, which is the liability that the codes would assign.
In other instances, our respondents either impose liabilities greater than those
imposed by legal codes or assign liability in cases in which the codes assign none.
For example, some degree of liability is assigned by our subjects to individuals
who develop a settled intention to commit a crime-a case in which the codes as
sign none. Our respondents also would impose some liability on persons who fail
to assist a person in distress, even though the codes impose none.
This last result is worth further comment. Except in limited cases, current legal
codes impose no omission liability on one who fails to help another in distress,
even when that help would be easy to give. Our respondents disagree with this;
they impose some degree of liability in those situations. The liability they impose
is small, and they frequently suggest a verdict of "liability but no punishment."
This suggests to us that they would support the broadening of duty-to-assist laws.
It also suggests that they are discriminating between two functions of liability as-
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signments-two functions that are sometimes not differentiated. First" and up
permost in the minds of people thinking about legal systems, the crimi�al justice
system assigns punishments. But it also communicates community consensus on
what is desirable and undesirable conduct, and it may have been this second mes
sage-sending function that our respondents were thinking of when they assigned
this small omission liability. We will have more to say about the dual functions of
liability in upcoming chapters.
The previous discussion has focused on liability discrepancies between code
and community standards in individual cases; it is also possible to focus on the
difference in patterning of responses across cases and the associated differences
between code and community. Examining those differences highlights what
might be called the underlying conceptual differences between code and commu
nity standards. One very apparent pattern of differences is worthy of note. Our
respondents consistently assign reduced liabilities to individuals who play sec
ondary roles in the commission of a crime, even though the codes assign those in
dividuals with liabilities that are equivalent to those of the principal. Also, and
closely connected with this, our respondents assign reduced liability for the viola
tion of secondary prohibitions, such as attempt, even when the Model Penal Code
assigns liabilities equivalent to those assigned for the commission of the primary
prohibited act. We will see further instances of this respondent pattern in upcom
ing chapters.
Finally, one other overarching pattern in our respondents' system of j udgment
requires noting: The community is more " harm-oriented" than is the Model Pe
nal Code. That is, our subjects' liability j udgments are more affected by whether a
harm actually comes about. For example, a person intends to poison another. If
she succeeds, she receives a severe sentence; if she fails, she receives a reduced sen
tence, graded by our respondents by the degree of actual harm done to the victim.
A wife intends to kill her husband and shoots at him. If he is killed, our subjects
assign a severe sentence; if not, they assign a much less severe sentence. In con
trast, the Model Penal Code generally looks to the intent of the harm-doer and as
signs sentences to that harm-doer that set the liability at the level that would be
given for the successful accomplishment of the crime intended. Of course, our
case that most clearly demonstrated this point is the case in which it was murder
that was attempted. Interestingly, the Model Penal Code makes an exception to its
general tendency and punishes an attempted murder at one grade lower than a
successful murder. However, we will see in upcoming studies that the respon
dents' tendency to assign liability according to the actual occurrence of the harm
exists for offenses other than murder.

3

Doctrines of justification:
When Should It Be Lawful for
One to Engage in Conduct
Tha t Normally Wou ld
Constitu te a Violation ?
Taken together, the criminalization doctrines (some of which we have examined
in Chapter 2), give a complete account of what a person must or must not do in
order to obey the criminal law. The doctrines are not, however, a complete state
ment of the criminal law's rules of conduct. The law recognizes that in some in
stances a greater harm can be avoided or a greater good can be achieved by allow
ing a person to engage in conduct that normally would constitute a violation.
Burning another person's property is a violation, but it is to be tolerated (and
even encouraged) if the burning acts as a firebreak to save a town. Striking an
other person without consent is a violation but is permitted if a police officer
finds it necessary in order to overcome resistance to a lawful arrest. While shoot
ing another person normally would be illegal, it may be justified if it is a necessary
defense against unlawful force. The doctrines defining when conduct constituting
a violation is nonetheless lawful are known as j ustification defenses. They are per
missive only: They tell people when they will be permitted to act in violation of
the doctrines of criminalization; they do not require one to act.
The criminal law recognizes a number of justification defenses. Self-defense
and defense of property, which we examine in this chapter, are examples of defen
sive force justifications: They allow a person to defend him or herself or property
against an aggressor's threat. Law enforcement authority, also discussed in this
chapter, such as the right to use force to arrest a violator, allows the use of
nondefensive force. An officer or a private citizen in some cases (also examined in
this chapter) may use force to effect an arrest even though the violator is no
longer presenting a threat. Other j ustification defenses allow nondefensive use of
force by, for example, teachers, prison guards, military personnel, parents and
custodians punishing children, persons responsible for maintaining order on
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public vehicles, doctors treating patients, and persons acting under a judicial or
der. As we shall see, the law's requirements for all justification defenses are analo
gous in several respects. Basically, the law requires that the force used be the mini
mum necessary to avoid the threatened harm or to further the defined interest.
The law also requires that the amo'Unt of force used not be disproportionate to the
value of the interest to be protected or furthered (see Model Penal Code (MPC),
Article 3; Robinson, 1 982).
In this chapter's studies, we examine not only the rules of justified conduct but
also those governing the effects of a person's mistake as to whether his conduct is
justified. While there is some legal controversy surrounding the term "justified"
when used to describe these cases, for the purposes of our discussion, we shall dis
tinguish conduct that is actually j ustified from conduct that the person only mis
takenly believes is j ustified. The latter cases are in truth instances of excuse, not
justification, which are the subject of Chapter 5.
Unlike some of the other areas that we have reviewed, there are a few studies in
the psychological literature bearing on ordinary people's perceptions of the legiti
macy of justifications for acts that would otherwise generate liability. Darley and
Zanna ( 1982), for instance, have demonstrated that even young children are capa
ble of recognizing and granting validity to some of the most common classes of
j ustifications recognized by the legal system. In the studies in this chapter, we
measure the precise fit of community judgments with the patterns of justifica
tions given validity within legal codes.
STUDY 5:
USE OF DEADLY FORCE I N SELF-DEFENSE
The law allows a person to use force to defend himself or herself, even deadly force
on occasion. What otherwise would be murder ( intentional killing) is fully excul
pated as long as the conditions of self-defense are met. It is universally required
that the use of force in self-defense be necessary. This notion of "necessity" means
that ifless force (than that used) would have been adequate to one's defense, then
the force used is not necessary and therefore not justified. If a person can protect
himself by using no force at all, then any use of force is unnecessary. Thus, codes
typically oblige a person to retreat b efore using deadly force if he or she can do so
in safety. The law limits one's duty to retreat, however, by not requiring retreat
from one's home or workplace, on the theory that such retreat would expose the
person to greater danger. A second, equally important condition of self-defense
requires that the person's use of force take account of the seriousness of the threat.
That is, even if it is necessary to protect oneself, a person is not justified in using
deadly force to defend against a kick in the shin. This required proportionality
b etween the nature of the threatened harm and the nature of the defensive force is
manifested in the law's limitation of the use of deadly force to instances in which
serious bodily injury is threatened.
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A person may fail to meet some of the conditions for the use of deadly force in
self-defense yet receive a defense or mitigation if he or she (mistakenly) believes
that the conditions are satisfied. For example, a person who mistakenly but rea
sonably believes that he or she cannot safely retreat nonetheless will receive a de
fense for the use of deadly force in self-defense. Similarly, a person who mistak
enly but reasonably believes that an attacker is threatening serious bodily injury
will receive a defense. If the person's mistake is culpable ( reckless or negligent ) ,
some j urisdictions deny a defense while others impose reduced liability. In the lat
ter, for example, if a person is reckless as to the existence of a serious threat, that
person may be liable for manslaughter rather than murder if he or she kills in
mistaken self-defense. If the person's mistake is negligent, liability for negligent
homicide may follow. If the mistake is reasonable ( nonnegligent), the person may
have no liability [MPC § 3.09( 2 ) ] . If a person accurately perceives the situation
but is mistaken as to what the law permits, that person's mistake does not provide
a defense or mitigation. Thus, there is no defense for a person who mistakenly be
lieves that he or she is legally justified in killing an attacker who does not present a
serious threat [ MPC § 3.09( 1 ) (b ) ] . The law also denies a defense to a person who
provokes an attack in order to kill the attacker in self-defense [ MPC §
3.04 ( 2 ) (b) (i) ] .
As is obvious, the Code's self-defense rules are detailed and complex. In our
self-defense study, we examine the community's views on the use of deadly force
in self-defense and compare those views to the legal doctrine's rules and condi
tions. The core of this study's scenario is as follows: A man who legally carries a
gun for protection is walking on a deserted street in a city at night. He is accosted
by another man ( under various circumstances) and shoots him, killing him. The
liability results are summarized in Table 3. 1 .
To begin discussion of these results, look first at the lower and upper bound
aries of liability established by our two "control" cases (rows 1 and 2 of the table).
The lower-boundary control scenario (row 2 ) involves a case in which a person is
attacked with a deadly weapon and responds by killing the attacker. These results
confirm that our subjects give a defense to a person who kills under conditions
that satisfy the legal requirements for self-defense. First, the assignment of liabil
ity was vanishingly low, an average of0. 1 4, which scales to well below 1 day in j ail.
Of the respondents, 71 percent gave no liability; 97 percent gave no liability or lia
bility but no punishment.
For a killing that meets none of the doctrine's requirements for j ustification,
the upper-boundary control scenario ( row 1 ) establishes the baseline liability of
7.97 ( approximately 1 5 years). This result surprised us because this level of liabil
ity is noticeably less than the liability typically given to murderers by other re
spondents in the other study scenarios that we have presented or will present later
in this book. After reexamining this scenario, we came up with a possible inter
pretation. In this case, a person is approached by a beggar and then shoots the

TABLE 3. 1

Self-Defense Liability

Liability

(b)
% No
Liability
(N)

(c)
% No Liability or
No Punishment
(N+O)

(a)

Scenarios

(d)

(e)

Model Penal
Code Result

"Force Was
Reasonable"

(f)
Maximum
Force
Permissible

Liable for murder

2.20

2.34
7.83

1.

Killing, n o self-defense

7.97

3

9

2.

Killing, s elf-defense

0. 1 4

71

97

Complete defense

7.97

Knows deadly force is not
necessary because:
3.

Unarmed attacker

6.66

6

14

Liable for m urder

2.97

3.54

4.

Could retreat

4.63

23

40

Liable for m u rder

4.06

4.46

5.

Could retreat from home

0.77

43

86

Complete defense

6.20

7.00

1 .40

31

so

Complete defense

5.89

5.3 1

Believes deadly force is
necessary but:
6.

M istaken as to threat

or mitigation
7.

Mistakenly believes
retreat not possible

B. Actor provokes attack
Beli eves deadly force is not

94

Complete defense

6.86

6.77

6.40

54
6

17

Liable for murder

5. 1 1

4.3 1

6.71

3

17

Liable for m u rder

2.74

3.20

0.49

n ecessary but:
9.

Mistakenly believes
deadly force legal

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:

(e) The amount of force the actor used was reasonable u nder the circumstances: 1 =strongly disagree, 5=unsure, and
9=strongly agree.
(f)

What is the maxim u m amount of force that someone should be able to use to protect themselves in this situation? O=no

force, 2=risk of bodily i njury, 4=bodily injury, 6=serious bodily injury, 8=serious bodily injury with risk of death, and 1 O=death.
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beggar. Apparently, what to us seemed a trivial annoyance (being pestered by a
beggar who persists in requesting money after he is initially turned down) led the
subjects to see the pestered person as less blameworthy than the typical
murderer-that is, the pestered person is seen as less blameworthy than one who
actively seeks out another with the intention to kill. There is, unfortunately, the
possibility that the respondents "read into" the case some degree of threat in the
beggar's behavior or believed that the person who shot the beggar felt such a
threat.
Let us consider this lower sentence further. As we mentioned, in the other sce
nario cases described elsewhere in this book, higher degrees of liability are as
signed to persons who commit murders ( averaging around 1 0, which scales to life
imprisonment); thus, we would not conclude that our respondents take a particu
larly lenient view of murder in general. What the unforeseen lower sentence for
killing the beggar suggests is that we examine, in future research, the minimum
threat that people view as warranting a defensive response. It also may be that the
contexts in which those threatening behaviors occur are important to the study re
spondents. A behavior that signals possible menace on a big-city subway platform
may not be as menacing on a sunny small- town street. Moreover, our context is
perhaps one that is perceived as dangerous by our respondents-a deserted city
street at night. Regardless, our finding that some people consider the approach of
a beggar (even under said circumstances) a mitigation for shooting that beggar
seems alarming to us.
We turn next to the liability assignments given in scenarios 3 through 9. It ap
pears that our respondents are generally telling us that a killing that has some
claim to be carried out in self-defense, whether that claim is granted validity by
the legal codes, should receive a mitigated punishment. The liability assignments
in all of the noncontrol cases are lower than that given for the baseline case ( sce
nario 1 )
In these noncontrol scenarios, the general pattern suggests that assigned liabil
ity is a function of the seriousness of the threat to the attacked individual. (Ap
pendix B presents the text of the different scenarios. ) Where the person knows
that the attacker is unarmed and, thus, that deadly force is unnecessary ( scenario
3 ), subjects impose liability of 6.66 ( 5.8 years). This is less, although only margin
ally significantly less, than the baseline case in which no threat (or a very ambigu
ous one) exists, suggesting that a person is judged increasingly less blameworthy
as the degree of threat increases. As Figure 3.2 shows, our subjects appear to see a
continuum of degree of liability based on the degree of threat; that is, importing
data from other study scenarios in this book, we may conclude that a case of no
threat ( murder) 1 is generally assigned a liability of 1 0 (life imprisonment) ; and,
referring again to Table 3. 1 , killing the source of a trivial threat ( row 1 ) , 1 5 years;
killing an unarmed attacker ( row 3 ), 5.8 years; and killing an armed attacker ( row
2 ) , less than 1 day. While further studies should investigate the exact nature of this
.
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FIGURE 3.2

Liability Assigned for Defensive and Nondefensive Killing Scenarios
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relationship, we already note a contradiction with the legal code. The legal doc
trine adopts a simple cutoff. If the approacher threatens serious bodily injury, the
attacked person is granted a complete defense. If less than serious bodily injury is
threatened, murder liability is imposed. The Code treatment and our respon 
dents' liability judgments are contrasted i n Figure 3.2.
Furthermore, as the degree of the perceived threat increases, the amount of
force our subjects authorize also increases. The subjects' views on the maximum
force that they think permissible in the situation are in column f of Table 3. 1 . In
control scenario 2, when the knife-wielding individual attacks, our subjects judge
that it is appropriate to respond with force that risks "serious bodily injury with
risk of death;' 7.83 on the force scale. In scenarios 5, 6, and 7, the person is at
tacked by a man either wielding or thought to be wielding a knife; our respon
dents agree that the maximum force allowable in self-defense in these cases is also
high, with judgments of 7.00, 5.3 1 , and 6.77, respectively (column f). In the other
cases, our subjects judge that the maximum force that would be appropriate in
self-defense should be less than or equal to that which would cause bodily injury
(but not serious bodily injury) to the attacker. Scenario 8, in which the person
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FIGURE 3.3 Liability as a Function of Maximum Force Allowed
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Maximum Force Permitted by Subjects in Such a Situation

kills an individual that he provoked into attacking him, is a complex case, which
we will address later in this discussion. Note for now that the maximum force that
the subjects deemed allowable is rated at 4.3 1 .
Notice, from Table 3. 1 , that these ratings o f the maximum force allowable are
consistent with the subjects' judgments of liability and (we would suggest) proba
bly provide the basis for those judgments. To visualize this comparison, look at
Figure 3.3. In it, we have ordered, along the horizontal axis, the scenarios in the
order of the maximum force that our respondents would allow in self-defense
(the maximum force is given along with the scenario identification), and along
the vertical axis, the degree of liability assigned to the person who kills his
«attacker." Note the close relationship. If our respondents judge that rather low
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amounts of force are appropriate in self-defense, then they assign the person who
kills the "approacher" more severe sentences. If they judge that more force is al
lowable, they reduce the sentence to the individual who kills the attacker-until,
in the final four cases, they tolerate responses that involve serious bodily injury to
the attacker and give the defender quite low liability assignments. This suggests
that the respondents are arriving at some global judgment-based on the set of
facts they read-about what would constitute a reasonable action in the case,
comparing the person's action and judging liability from the degree of discrep
ancy between the person's action and the "reasonable" action. Again, this view
contrasts with the simple cutoff approach of current codes. Under the Model Pe
nal Code, for example, only a threat of serious bodily injury or greater justifies the
use of deadly force; a lesser threat justifies only the use of force short of deadly
force.
We find an interesting code-subject discrepancy in scenarios involving possible
retreat. Americans, stereotypically, "stand their ground;' and our subjects seem to
want them to even when the legal codes say they should not. That is, when one's
use of deadly force is unnecessary because that person could safely retreat (Table
3. l 's scenario 4), our subjects mitigate liability while the Code does not. As Table
3.4, column f, reveals, subjects agree that the person could retreat, but as Table 3. 1
(scenario 4, column a) reveals, the liability mean of 4.63 (9.6 months) reflects a
considerably less severe sentence than the liability for murder that the current le
gal doctrine imposes. Apparently, some of our subjects are unsure about whether
retreat should be required at all. In scenario 4, 23 percent of our respondents give
no liability; 40 percent give either no liability or no punishment. While a numeri
cal majority appear to support the retreat rule, they support it as a basis for liabil
ity significantly short of what the Code assigns to that case, which is liability for
murder.
Consistent with the subjects' equivocal support for the retreat rule, a large por
tion of our subjects agree with the Code's view that a person should not be re
quired to retreat from his or her own home, even if he or she knows that he or she
can do so safely (see Table 3 . l 's "retreat from home' case of row 5). Table 3.4
shows the respondents' ratings on the various dimensions of perception that we
asked them about in regard to the self-defense cases. From Table 3.4 (column /J, it
is clear that they only rather grudgingly agree that retreat was possible. As in sce
nario 5 ofTable 3. 1 , 43 percent give no liability in such a case. Similarly, a person
who mistakenly believes that it is impossible to retreat (scenario 7) receives al
most no liability (0.49, or less than 1 day in jail) from the respondents. It would
be interesting to contrast this view with the views held by persons from other cul
tures.
Our subjects also agree with the codes in giving a defense to a person who in
correctly but honestly believes that use of deadly force is necessary (scenarios 6
and 7 ) . This occurs both in cases in which the person is mistaken as to

TABLE 3.4

Subjects' Perceptions of Self-Defense Cases

(a)
"Risk of
Bodily
Injury"

Scenarios

(c)
(b)
"Could Have
"More
Force Than
Safely
Necessary" Delayed"

(d)
"Intended
to
Shoor

1.

Killing, no self-defense

7.5 1

7.57

6.63

2.

Killing, self-defense

2.23

2.40

5.03

(e)
"Believed
Force
Necessary"

(f)

"Could
Retreat
in Safety"

(g)
"Unaware
Could
Retrear

Knows deadly force is not
necessary because:
3.

Unarmed attacker

7.51

7.34

6.43

4.

Could retreat

6.60

5.57

6.46

6.23

5.

Cou ld retreat from home

5.37

4.77

6.1 1

5.49

5.66

5.5 1

5.83

4.09

4. 1 7

5.46

6.60

5.77

6.57

7.69

7.26

7. 1 7

Believes deadly force is
necessary but:
6.
7.

Mistaken as to threat
'

6.71

Mistakenly believes
retreat not possible

8. Actor provokes attack
Believes deadly force is not

7.43

7.51

necessary but:
9.

Mistakenly believes
deadly force legal

4.49

Key to column heads:
Statements

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

(a) through (e) were

responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

The force the person used . . . c reated a risk of causi ng serious bodily inju ry.
The person could have effectively protected h imself by using less force.
The person could h ave effectively protected h imself if h e delayed the use of force.
The person i ntended to shoot the person he shot.
The person believed that the amount of force was justified/necessary to protect himself.
The person could have avoided the threat by retreating out of his house i n complete safety.
The person was u naware that he could retreat.
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whether the attacker threatens serious bodily injury (e.g., as to whether he is
armed-scenario 6) and in which the person is mistaken about whether safe re
treat is possible ( scenario 7). The former result suggests some respondent empa
thy for the person who must decide under difficult circumstances whether to
shoot. The latter result, commented on before, is predictable, given the subjects'
weak support for the retreat rule. As noted previously, many jurisdictions permit
a defense only if the person's mistake is reasonable; an unreasonable mistake is
grounds for murder liability. Other j urisdictions allow a mitigation for an unrea
sonable mistake. The scenario used in this study gave no facts to suggest that the
mistake is culpable, and columns

e

and [of Table 3 . 1 suggest that the respondents

see the use of a serious degree of force as acceptable in these situations. Thus the
no-liability result seems consistent with the Code's complete defense for a reason
able mistake. One might speculate that the low liability scores, given in those in
stances in which the p erson's mistake might have been interpreted as culpable,
suggest that the codes should give at least a mitigation for a culpable but honest
mistake. A future study might test its subjects' reactions to various levels of culpa
bility in making a mistake as to a legal j ustification.
It may be that the respondents are attempting to assess what a reasonable per
son would infer from the actions of the attacker and, therefore, the latitude of ac
tion that they will allow the defender. On this account, if the attacker commits
certain actions, those may trigger an inference of significant, imminent harm by
the attacked individual that leads him o r her to respond with deadly force. This
inference may be incorrect, but the attacked individual is given a great deal of lee
way by our respondents in making it. Unless the inference is conspicuously egre
gious, the fact that it is made, and acted on, is largely the attacker's problem. Put
ting this another way, it is the privilege of the attacked individual not only to
judge what force is sufficient to deal with the present level of force that the
attacker is using but also to j udge what level o f force the attacker might escalate to
in the immediate future. Fists may be all the force in play at the moment, but will
knives or guns be next?
Our subjects also agree with the Code in rejecting a defense for a person who
mistakenly believes that he is legally authorized to use deadly force against an un
armed attacker (scenario 9, Table 3 . 1 ) . The liability mean of 6.71 (5.9 years) is not
statistically different from that assigned to a person, using similarly unnecessary
force, who does not believe that his use of deadly force against an unarmed
attacker is lawful (scenario 3, 6.66; 5.8 years) . This is an interesting result, and one
that we will see again. It suggests that respondents believe that it is widely ac
cepted that one should not kill an unarmed attacker. A mistaken belief that the
law allows such an attack does not excuse it. Having said all of this, we should
point out that future research, in which, for example, it is more clear that the per
son knew his conduct was unlawful, will be necessary to confirm these conclu
sions.
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In the scenario in which the person provokes the panhandler into an attack that
requires defensive force (scenario 8 ) , the respondents assign a high degree of lia
bility to the provoker but the Code's liability even exceeds that. The provoked-at
tack liability scenario has a liability mean of 6.40 ( 4.6 years) , which suggests that
the subjects see clear blameworthiness in the provoker-but not of the level of a
murderer (as the Code provides) and perhaps not even of the level of the person
who kills upon a trivial threat (7.97; 1 5 years) . (This last result, 7.97-when com
pared to 6.40-is only marginally significant. ) Further research is necessary to il
luminate the parameters of this complex issue. To guide that research, we can at
least suggest what might be the components of the situation that people seek to
assess when they assign liability to a person who in some sense provokes an attack
and then uses deadly force in response. Intuitively, one would expect that if an in
dividual attacks another in response to a mild provocation, killing the mildly pro
voking attacker would be seen as less warranted than if the provocation is more
complete and violent. Here is the intuitive rule that we think is operating: If I say
something to you that is only mildly provoking, and you then come at me with
dagger drawn, I will be assigned relatively low liability for killing you before you
kill me. My mild provocation does not warrant your overblown response; you are
the primary cause of your attack on me. However, if my provocation to you was
really quite intense, then I have some causal responsibility for your attack on me
and bear some liability for killing you to head off your attack. Perceivers of these
situations are likely to be attempting to unravel the familiar question of "who re
ally started it" (Carpenter and Darley, 1 97 8 ) . There is also a question of what, ex
actly, the one who provokes the attack intends to do when counterattacked. If the
respondents perceive, as in the formulaic cowboy movie, that the fast-drawing
villain provokes the innocent, slow-drawing citizen into "drawing;' with the cer
tainty of outdrawing him and intending to kill him, then they see it as murder
and are glad when the hero "does-in" the villain in the last reel. Fascinating ques
tions lie here for future research.
Study 5: Summary
On the one hand, it appears that the subjects' judgments are complex, and in
many instances they agree with the pattern of distinctions made in the Code. The
subjects generally decline to punish in the scenarios in which the Code gives the
person a defense ( respectively, scenarios 2, 5, 6, and 7 ) : Scenario 2, of course, is
the paradigmatic case-deadly force used in response to an attack with a deadly
weapon. The other scenarios in which the respondents generally decline to punish
the person are those in which the person knows he could retreat in safety but is in
his home; where he mistakenly but honestly believes serious bodily harm is
threatened; and where he mistakenly but honestly believes that he cannot safely
retreat. Similarly, the subjects impose significant liability in scenarios in which
the Code would deny a defense (respectively, scenarios 3 , 4, 8, and 9): where the
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person knows the attacker is unarmed; where he knows he can retreat in safety;
where he provokes the attack to justify his subsequent use of force; or where the
actor sees that deadly force is not necessary to repel the attack but, believing the
law permits it, uses it anyway.
On the other hand, a second element in the patterning of our subjects' re
sponses is evident-a tendency to assign lesser punishments than the Code. Our
subjects and the Code disagree on the extent of liability that should be imposed in
those cases in which the p erson either acts in self-defense but knows that deadly
force i s unnecessary ( cases 3 and 4) or in which he provokes the attack ( case 8).
The subjects' disagreement with the Code is particularly striking in the case in
which it would be possible for the person to retreat from the threat. While the
Code denies a defense in this instance, leaving the person liable for murder, our
subjects impose liability akin to manslaughter (5.8 years in j ail) or, in the case of
failure to retreat, something less (9.76 months). Apparently the subjects see a
clear and significant distinction between an unjustified killing in self-defense and
an intentional killing where no threat of attack exists. A self-defense provision
that mirrors the subjects' views would mitigate liability for even unjustified kill
ings in a self-defense setting.
The significant agreement that does exist between our subjects and the Code
may be the result of community views manifesting themselves in the centuries of
common-law development, upon which most of these rules are based. It may not
be that the detailed rules are intuitive but rather that both the subjects' views and
the Code's rules result from application of a few basic principles, such as the re
quirements that the defensive response be necessary and proportionaP It also is
possible that the rules of the legal code, which once may have been alien to the
moral codes of the governed, over time became accepted moral principles. Moral
ity can shape the law, but the law also can shape morality (Green, 1 985 ).

STUDY 6:
USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
The criminal law typically allows a person to use force in the protection of prop
erty. As with self-defense, the force used must be necessary to protect the prop
erty, both in the amount of force used and in its timing; that is, no lesser force and
no delay in the use of force would have provided adequate protection. The force
used also must be generally proportionate to the threat. Thus, the use of deadly
force generally is prohibited to protect property alone, even if such deadly force is
the only means by which the property can be protected. As with self-defense,
when a person makes a mistake as to the necessity for the use of force, he none
theless may get a mitigation or defense, depending on the culpability level of his
mistake. All jurisdictions give a defense for a reasonable mistake. Some give no
defense for an unreasonable mistake; others give a mitigation in degree ofliability.
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The illegality of using deadly force in protection of property is unequivocal: No
mistake is grounds for a defense.
In this defense of property study, we tested the current defense of property
rules against our subjects' assignment ofliability in analogous defense of property
situations. Subjects were given seven scenarios in which the person uses force to
defend against an attempt to steal his motorcycle. One scenario presented a base
line case in which necessary, nondeadly force is used, which would receive com
plete exculpation under current doctrine. The other six scenarios presented varia
tions in which the person deviates from the baseline case in one or more ways,
typically in violation of one of the limitations on the use of force to defend prop
erty. The liability results are shown in Table 3.5. Notice that column e contains the
various liabilities assigned to the person who attempts the theft. As one would ex
pect, the thief is assigned some liability, and it is roughly constant across the cases.
With respect to perceptions of the use of necessary nondeadly force (the base
line case results in row 1 ), our subjects agree that complete exculpation is appro
priate. Of the respondents, 89 percent judge that no liability should be assigned to
the property defender; the remaining 11 percent assign liability but no punish
ment.
Next, we examine scenario 2, in which the force is labeled "questionably neces
sary." In this scenario, the description reads as follows: "Joe punches the man, be
lieving at the time that it is necessary. Joe's wife begins to yell at Joe that the man
was small and not very muscular and Joe probably could have scared him off with
a yell. Joe later realizes that his wife was right:' Here, too, the subjects imposed es
sentially no liability by the subjects on the property defender.
Table 3.6 contains respondents' perceptions of various aspects of the defense
property scenarios. Examining the ratings on the questions concerning whether
more force than necessary was used (column a) and whether the force could have
safely been delayed (column c), the respondents seem to give the benefit of the
doubt to the defender in scenario 2. That is, they are not convinced that the per
son used more force than was necessary or that the use of the force could have
been delayed. Given that in this particular scenario the defender realizes only later
that the force he used was not necessary, this seems a reasonable set of perceptions
and ( see Table 3.5) liability assignments.
In scenario 3, the owner has rigged a protective device to the garage door so
that if anyone tried to break into the garage and steal the motorcycle, the device is
triggered, firing a beanbag at the intruder. In this case, the thief breaks the lock on
the garage door and opens it, and the device is triggered, breaking the thief's nose.
Here we were beginning a probe of the reactions of our respondents to "spring
guns" and "man traps," the use of which is significantly limited by law [MPC §
3.06( 5 ) ] . Their use is a complex area of the law because it is hard to predict the
degree of harmful consequences of these devices for the thief or the nature of the
existing threat when the device is triggered. Also, they can cause injury when no

TABLE 3.5

Liability for the Use of Force in Protection of Property

(a)

Scenarios
1.
2.
3.
4.

% No
Liability
(N)

Mode/ Penal
Code Result
for Defender

0.00
0.00
0. 1 9

89

1 00

Complete defense

n
n

98
93

Unclear8
Complete defenseb
Unclear:
No defense; liable for
simple assault, a
misdemeanor
No defense; liable for
aggravated assault, a
second-degree felony

Liabilitx_ .

Necessary force
Questionably necessary force
Necessary force applied by device
No imminent threat (perceived
as not immediately necessary)

(e)

(c)
% No Liability
or
No Punishment
(N+O)

(b)

0.48

48

5.

More than necessary force by choice

0. 1 4

55

82
93

6.

Deadly force, ,knowing not lawful

2.56

21

46

7.

Deadly force, mistakenly believing
it lawful

2.63

18

48

(d)

(f)

Maximum
Force That
Liability s.·,ould be
for Thief Permitted
4.58
4.70

3.80
3.91

5. 1 1

3.91

4. 1 4

3.36

4.05

3.41

5.39

4.32

5.45

4.25

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 month$, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:

(f) What is the maximum amount of force that someone should be permitted to use to protect his property in this situation?
O="no force," 2="risk of bodily injury," 4="bodily injury," 6="serious bodily injury," 8="serious bodily injury with risk of death," and
1 O="death."
8This scenario was intended to present the case of a mistaken actor. Such an actor might get a defense under current law,
especially if his mistake was reasonable; he might only get a mitigation if his mistake was not reasonable. In fact, the scenario was
perceived as a case of necessary force, for which the actor would have a defense under current doctrine.
blf the scenario had been perceived as the device creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, as was intended, there
would be no defense. But no such risk was perceived by the subjects. See column
bodily injury, a complete defense is available.
cAn "imminent

threat• was required by common

used be immediately necessary...

d of Table 3.6.

In a case of no risk of serious

law; modern codes such as the Model Penal Code require only that the

"force

0\
0\

TABLE 3.6

Subjects' Perceptions of the Use of Force i n Protection of Property

(a)
(e)
(b)
(d)
(c)
"More Force "Actor Believes "Could Have "Force Used
"Amount
Created Risk Reasonable Under
Than
Safely
Less Force
Necessary'
Circumstancesn
lneffectiven
Delayedn
of Deathn

Scenarios
1.

Necessary force

2.

Questionably necessary

3.
4.

3. 1 6

3. 1 6

2.86

3.84

3.25

force

3.70

Necessary force applied
by device

3.75

3.50

3.52

5.75

5.61

3.42

5.45

3.74

5.66

(f)

"Believes Lawful
to Create
Risk of Deathn

No imminent th reat
(perceived as not
immediately necessary)

5.

More than necessary force
by choice

6.
7.

5.59

4.57

Deadly force, knowing not
lawful

5.48

4.39

7.41

4.00

3. 95

Deadly force, mistakenly
believing it lawful

5.41

4.34

7.70

4.70

6.41

Key to col umn heads:
Statements

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)

(a) through (f) were

responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

The actor could have effectively protected his property by using less force than he did.
At the time when the actor hits the man, the actor believes that less force would be ineffective to protect his property.
The actor could have effectively protected his property if he delayed his use of force.
The force that the actor used created a risk of causing the man's death.
The amount of force the actor used was reasonable in light of the situation.
The actor believes that he is legally entitled to use force that risks causing the thief's death.
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threat to person exists, because no one is present. Subjects seem to read this case
as within the bounds of acceptability: They disagree that it was more fo rce than
was necessary ( Table 3.6, column a) and do not agree that it created a risk of death
( column d) . Of the respondents, 93 percent assign no liability or punishment to
the person who set the device. Future research ought to examine how respondents
feel about setting more lethal traps for thieves.
Examining next scenarios 4 and 5, we find a continuation of the general pattern
of lenient treatment of the person protecting his property. In case 4, in which the
force used in defense is described as not immediately necessary, 82 percent of the
respondents still assign no punishment to the force user. (Briefly, the thief agrees
to leave when Joe yells at him, but the thief makes it clear that he has an imprint of
the keyhole and will return for the motorcycle. Joe resorts to force in order to re
trieve the imprint.) In scenario 5, we sought to make it completely clear that the
force used was knowingly more than was necessary: «Joe realizes that he can sim
ply scare the man away by yelling at him. He nonetheless approaches the man and
punches him in the face." Despite our efforts, even in this scenario 93 percent of
the respondents impose no liability or no punishment on the property defender.
For each scenario, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they
agreed with the statement that "the [ person ] could have effectively protected his
property by using less force than he did" {column a of Table 3.6). An examination
of the respondents' ratings here suggests the thinking that may lie behind their
rather permissive stance on property-defender punishment: They are not con 
vinced that more force than n ecessary had been used. Thus, even when a scenario
explicitly describes the forte as unnecessary, the subjects generally are uncon
vinced. In scenario 5, subjects' ratings on the n ecessity of the force used average
5.59, less than one point above the scale midpoint of 5 ( column a) , indicating that
they are unsure that the force was more than was necessary. It may be in this case
that the subjects are taking the role of the person whose property is threatened
and concluding that we cannot require that his cognitions be perfectly clear or his
responses perfectly measured, when he is in the midst of the stressful circum
stances of an attempted theft. Further, there may be an element of calculation that
involves the value of the property at risk; a motorcycle is a relatively costly object,
and a punch on the nose not too high a price for the potential thief to p ay.
Consistent with the subjects' tendency to see nondeadly force as necessary is
their general failure to impose liability even in those cases in which they see the
force as possibly unnecessary. Even in the last scenario quoted above· where the
subjects fall somewhere between uncertainty and agreement as to whether the
amount of force used was unnecessary-5 5 percent of the subjects think that no
liability was appropriate and 93 percent think that no liability or no punishment
was appropriate.
Summing up this initial look at the five scenarios involving nondeadly force, a
considerable maj ority of our subjects would impose no liability in any of the see-
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narios. Of the respondents, 82 percent or more would impose either no liability
or no punishment. Overall, this might suggest that our subjects are not concerned
with the �any distinctions that the Code uses and that the subjects generally ap
prove of the use of nondeadly force in the protection of property, whether neces
sary or not.
Examining the matter more closely, however, some evidence hints that subjects
do take into account the necessity for the use of force in assessing the proper de
gree of liability. The two cases ( in Table 3.6, column a) perceived as the weakest
cases for necessity are scenarios 4 and 5, with average agreement ratings of 5.75
and 5.59, respectively, indicating slight agreement with the "unnecessary
amount" manipulation check, as compared to means of 3. 1 6, 3.70, and 3. 75 for
the other nondeadly force scenarios, which indicate disagreement with the state
ment that unnecessarily strong force was used. Scenarios 4 and 5 also have the
lowest "no liability" percentages, 48 percent and 55 percent, respectively ( see Ta
ble 3.5). But this seems at best weak support for the necessity principle, which is
seen as fundamental to the legal doctrine. Recall that current doctrine treats the
use of unnecessary force as a basis for denying any mitigation or defense to the
property defender. Our respondents rather obviously treat it differently, as a fac
tor determining liability. And the average liability of less than one day in jail (0.48
and 0. 1 4, respectively, Table 3.5) that they impose for using more than necessary
force is considerably less than would be imposed by current legal codes, which
would treat the case as one of simple assault with a maximum sentence of one
year ( MPC §§ 2 1 1 . 1 and 6.08 ) .
Rather than focusing o n the necessity of the force, the subjects seem to rely
more heavily on the reasonableness of the amount of force in light of the serious
ness of the threat-what the doctrine calls the proportionality of the force-as a
basis for determining liability. Where the aggressor makes a single threat to take
property, as in the first five scenarios, the subjects see the "maximum amount of
force that someone should be able to use to protect his property in this situation"
as approximately constant (see Table 3.5, column f, ranging from 3.36 to
3.9l ,where 4 = bodily inj ury) . The amount of force that our subjects think ought
to be permitted increases slightly in the remaining two scenarios, however, where
the thief persists after repeated efforts by the owner to discourage him are unsuc
cessful ( rows 6 and 7, 4.32 and 4.25 ) . As we have noted, it would be interesting to
determine in future research whether the maximum amount of force perceived as
appropriate in defense would increase in relation to the value of the property de
fended. For example, if the individual was a store owner defending his goods,
would subjects see a greater degree of force as reasonable than if he were only de
fending some inexpensive piece of property?
Our subjects' tendency to see ( or claim to see) the person's use of force as nec
essary, despite statements in the scenarios to the contrary, does not appear to exist
in the deadly force scenarios. The two deadly force scenarios ( 6 and 7) have the

70

Doctrines of Justification

following core description: A thief is detected attempting to steal a motorcycle,
and the owner attempts to get him to stop. The thief persists, and the owner gets a
gun and shoots him. The respondents are told that the thief is wounded but not
killed. Given the persistence of the thief in the face of several attempts to stop him,
we thought the shooting portrayed force that at least some respondents might see
as necessary, but it b rought manipulation-check responses of 5.48 and 5.41 (Table
3.6), suggesting that our subjects as a group are leaning slightly toward agreeing
that the force is unnecessary or are at best unsure that it is necessary. Our respon
dents (see column Jof Table 3.5) j udge that force that causes bodily injury b ut not
serious bodily injury is the maximum force appropriate to use on the persistent
thief and that they agree ( column d of Table 3.6) that the actual force used, the
gunshot, creates a risk of death, and therefore is, by inference, more than the
maximum allowable force. This is confirmed by column e of Table 3.6.
In these deadly force cases, the number of subjects who impose no liability
drops to 2 1 percent and 1 8 percent. (This is a significant decrease in contrast with
the nondeadly force scenario percentages.) The liability means correspondingly
increase, from between 0.00 and 0.48 (less than 1 day) to 2.56 and 2.63 (about 5.6
weeks).3 Thus, the thief's greater aggression may justify the use of greater defen
sive force, b ut the use of deadly force correspondingly results in a considerable in
crease in liability. While the use of unnecessary force in defense of property is
generally approved of by respondents, this principle has a limit: The majority of
subjects think that the person's resort to use of a deadly weapon is unjustified. A
majority of our respondents think it wrong to shoot the person attempting the
theft of the motorcycle. Interestingly, they are not moved by being told that the
person mistakenly thought that the shooting was lawful ( scenario 7). This sug
gests that people see a clear moral issue here: One should know better than to
shoot in defense of that sort of property.
These findings tend to support the Code's prohibition against the use of deadly
force in defense of property, but we also must point out that there are vast differ
ences between the way our respondents view the use of deadly force in defense of
property and the way that such use of force is treated by the Model Penal Code.
Indeed, almost half of the subjects ( 46 and 48 percent) would impose no punish
ment in the cases of deadly force in the protection of property; Also significant is
the fact that the liability means of 2.56 and 2.63 imposed by the subjects repre
sent-on average-a sentence of 5.6 weeks, not the 1 - to 3 -year minimum, 1 0year maximum sentence guidelines provided by the Model Penal Code.
Scenario 6 may be the most revealing of the seven cases in what it shows us
about people's judgments:
Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle.
[Next are described a number of attempts by Joe to stop the thief, through which
the thief persists in his attempts to steal.] While Joe believes that it may not be lawful
to use a gun to prevent the theft of a motorcycle, he sees no other way to stop the
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man. He goes to his house just a few steps away, retrieves his gun, returns, and shoots
the man. The man survives and is later taken into custody by the police.

The subjects indicate that the maximum amount o f force that should be per
mitted to protect property in this situation is 4.32 (Table 3.5, column !J, or ap
proximately enough force to result in bodily injury ( 4 == bodily injury; 6 == serious
bodily injury; 8 serious bodily injury with risk of death) . Additionally, the sub
jects clearly perceive Joe's conduct as creating a risk of death. Yet, despite Joe's
failure to limit his conduct as the subjects would think appropriate, 46 percent of
the subjects assign either no liability or no punishment. What of the remaining 54
percent who believe that some punishment is important? Do they impose the rel
atively severe sentence suggested by the codes? It turns out that they do not.
About 75 percent of these subjects assign a punishment of less than one year.4
This strikingly differs from the Code's treatment of the offense; the Code treats it
as aggravated assault, a second-degree felony with a maximum sentence of ten
years.
=

Study 6: Summary
Even in those cases in which the force used in defense of property is unnecessary
or disproportionate-according to legal codes-the vast majority of subjects im
pose no punishment. The subjects also show a tendency to interpret a person's
conduct as necessary to defend his property even in instances in which such a
conclusion is difficult to support on the objective facts. As with self-defense, the
defensive nature of the person's situation appears to have a significant effect on
the subjects' judgment. Even when the person's defensive response is knowingly
improper-that is, he knows that the law does not justify his conduct-the sub
jects significantly reduce the person's liability. Again, the subjects appear to dis
tinguish a person who improperly defends his property from a person who uses
the same force in other than a defensive context. This argues in favor of providing
reduced grades of liability for those who err in defending property against an at
tack It remains a question for further research as to whether the value of the
property being defended enters into the respondents' calculations.
If the legal code were modeled after the subjects' responses, it would give a
complete defense for nondeadly force, necessary or not, used in the defense of
property. The use of deadly force would be disapproved of but would result in low
liability and punishment if the force appeared to be necessary (and the thief is not
actually killed) .5 In further research it would be important to address the ques
tion of what "philosophies" lie behind the judgments of individuals. Are there
some individuals who believe that even deadly force is allowable in the defense of
property? Does this belief reflect the view that the criminal justice system has be
come ineffective in defending property? The results may well be consistent with a
public that is angry with what they see as the criminal justice system's failure to
protect. "At the very least," the argument might go, "if the system will not protect
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my property, I should be permitted to do what is necessary [ and perhaps more J to
protect it myself."
STUDY 7:
CITIZENS' LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
Citizens sometimes seek to exercise the authority of a law enforcement officer, as
when they attempt to apprehend a person who has committed a crime against
them. If the use of force is defensive in any way-for example, an aggressor is at
tacking them or attempting to take their property-a citizen can rely on a defen
sive-force defense, such as self-defense or defense of property, which frequently
permits the use of greater force than would a citizen's law enforcement authority.
If the use of force is not defensive, as when an offense is complete-for example,
after a rape or after property damage has been caused-a citizen nonetheless has a
right to use some degree of force to apprehend and restrain the offender [ MPC §
3.07( 1 ) ] .
Exercise o f a citizen's law enforcement authority is subject to several limita
tions. A citizen is never justified in using deadly force to arrest an offender ( un
less he or she does so in assisting a peace officer and meets other special condi
tions) [ MPC § 3.07( 2 ) (b) ] . A person may use nondeadly force only to the extent
that it is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest. If a citizen is mistaken in
some respect-for instance, about whether the person he or she is attempting to
arrest is the actual perpetrator of the crime-that citizen may nevertheless get a
defense if his or her mistake is reasonable. If it is unreasonable, some jurisdictions
deny any defense or mitigation while others permit a mitigation. In the latter ju
risdictions, if the citizen recklessly or negligently injures an innocent person, for
example, the citizen may be liable for an offense of recklessness or negligence, as
the case may be [ MPC § 3 .09( 3 ) ] .6 The Code does not alter the degree of
nondeadly force permissible according to the seriousness of the offense for which
the arrest is made; in all cases, the force must be just that which is necessary to
effect the arrest.
In the citizens' law enforcement authority study, we sought to test the current
doctrine's rules on such authority against the community's views. Subjects were
presented with scenarios involving the use of deadly and nondeadly force by the
victim to restrain an offender after a rape and after a property damage offense
(setting the victim's car on fire). Notice that in both cases the offense is already
complete at the time force is used; thus, we are not dealing with cases of self-de
fense or defense of property. The deadly force scenarios depict the victim as
shooting the fleeing offender with a handgun and killing him; in the nondeadly
force scenarios, the victim uses a stun gun that temporarily immobilizes but does
not inflict lasting injury on the offender. In some scenarios, the person stuns or
kills the offender and in others the person stuns or kills an innocent person that
she mistakes for the offender. The subjects were asked, as usual, to determine how
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much liability the restraining person should receive, if any. They were also asked
how much force a person in such a situation should have been able to use ( col
umn e of Table 3 .7 ) and whether the actual force used created a risk of death ( col
umn j). The results are shown in Table 3.7.
Notice first that the subjects saw the differences between the use of the stun gun
and the handgun as we had wished. They agreed ( column f, 7.92 on the average)
that the person's use of the handgun creates a risk of death ( not surprising, since
they were told that the person shoots and kills the fleeing offender), and the per
son's use of the stun gun does not create a risk of death ( 2.83 on the average).
Please look next at the liability judgments. First, observe the patterning of the
liability assignments in the four cases in which the citizen uses force to apprehend
the individual who actually committed the crime ( scenarios 1 , 3, 5, and 7). Wbile
the difference in liability assigned to the individual who uses deadly force ( sce
narios 1 and 5) is slightly higher ( 0.2 1 and 2.60; respectively, less than 1 day and
5.6 weeks) than the zero liability assigned to the person who uses nondeadly force
( scenarios 3 and 7), what is most striking, as we noted in the previous study, is the
tendency of our subjects to assign very low degrees of liability no matter what de
gree of force is used. The most dramatic difference between our subjects and the
Code is in the deadly force scenarios. A strong majority ( 65 percent) would allow
the use of deadly force by the citizen to apprehend the rapist-or at least would
not punish such conduct. If we add to this group the respondents who find the
defendant guilty but would impose no punishment, we include 90 percent of our
respondents. The Code, in contrast, denies a defense ( or a mitigation) and
thereby holds the person liable for murder. Only in the case of the use of deadly
force to apprehend an individual who has damaged property do we see any mean
ingful assignment of liability by a majority of respondents ( 67 percent) ; appar
ently, the use of force that has the potential to kill the offender in this particular
instance exceeds the respondents' perceptions of the allowable level of force. Still,
the average liability imposed for the same case, 2.60, translates to a sentence of 5.6
weeks for an act that the legal code would treat as murder-a vast difference.
Does this pattern of results change in the scenarios in which the restraining
person stuns or kills an innocent milkman instead of the actual person who com
mitted the crime? No-the liability ratings do not change very much at all. Exam
ine the four cases in which the person mistakenly uses force to apprehend an indi
vidual who did not in fact commit the crime ( scenarios 2, 4, 6, and 8 ) . Look ahead
now to Table 3 . 1 0 and notice, in column d, that the respondents judge that the
person is unaware of the possibility of making this mistake. The person is not,
therefore, seen as lashing out at anybody in the vicinity; the force is directed at the
individual whom the person thinks committed the crime. Figure 3.8 compares
the liability results in the mistaken-identity cases to the matched cases in which
the person apprehends the correct individuaL Examining this figure, we see that
the respondents deal with the cases of mistaken identity by assigning liability

TABLE 3. 7

Liability for Exercise of Citizens• Law Enforcement Authority

(a)

Scenarios

Liability

(b)
% No
Liability
(N)

(c)
% No Liability or
No Punishment
(N+O)

'-.)
*'"

(d)
Model Penal
Code Result

(e)
Maximum Force
That Should
Be Permitted

(f)
"Force Used
Created Risk
of Death"
7.87

Rape-Deadly force:
1.

Actual offender

0.2 1

65

90

Liable for murder

2.

Mistaken identity

1 .27

13

68

Liable for murder

7.5 5
6.87

0.00

1 00

Complete defense

6.85

2.92

0.35

83
30

83

Complete defensea

6.49

2.82

2.60

33

45

Liable for murder

4.39

8.08

3.27

8

43

Liable for murder

3.92

7.92

Complete defense

4.07

2.67

Complete defense8

4.00

2.90

7.82

Rape-Nondeadly force:
3.

Actual offender

4.

Mistaken identity

Property destruction
Deadly force:
5.
6.

Actual offender
Mistaken identity

Property destruction
Nondeadly force:
7.

Actual offender

0.00

70

1 00

8.

Mistaken identity

0.62

23

80

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5= 1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death .
Key to column heads:

(e)

What is the maximum amount of force that a person should be permitted to use to detain an offender in this situation?

O=no force, 2=risk of bodily injury, 4=bodily injury, 6=serious bodily injury, 8=serious bodily i njury with risk of death, and 1 0=death.

(f) The force used was likely to cause death or bodily injury: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."
8This assumes that the actor was not reckless as to injuring an innocent person. If the individual was reckless, the person
could be liable for assault under M PC

§§ 3.09(3) and 2 1 1 . 1 (1 ).
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FIGURE 3.8 Effect of Mistake on Liability for Exercise of Citizens'
Law Enforcement Authority
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judgments that are slightly higher than the matched cases in which no such mis
take occurs.
The Code's treatment of mistaken-identity cases does not match that of our
subjects in several important respects. On the one hand, the Code does give a de
fense to the person who mistakenly injures an innocent person with nondeadly
force,? and a majority of the subjects would impose no punishment in such a case
( 83 percent in the rape arrest, 80 percent in the property destruction arrest).8 On
the other hand, a vast difference exists between the Code and our subject-com
munity in the mistaken deadly force scenarios (2 and 6 ) . Here the Code permits
no defense9 and imposes liability for murder. But the number of subjects who
would impose no punishment (column c of Table 3. 7) is substantial-68 percent
in the rape case and 43 percent in the property destruction case. The no-punish
ment percentages are not dramatically different between the mistaken-identity
and no-mistake deadly force scenarios (68 percent versus 90 percent in the rape
arrest scenarios, 43 percent versus 45 percent in the property damage arrest sce
narios), but the percentage of subjects who would impose no liability (column

76

Doctrines of Justification

b) is significantly lower where the restraining person has mistakenly killed an in
nocent bystander ( 13 percent versus 65 percent in the rape arrest scenarios, 8 per
cent versus 33 percent in the property destruction arrest scenarios). One interpre
tation is that o ur subjects disapprove of the mistaken killing, and the person's
conduct is judged to warrant the formal disapproval of the legal system ( in the
form of a "guilty" verdict) but not to warrant a prison sentence. We further dis
cuss this "liability but no punishment" response-by now familiar to the
reader-in Chapter 7 of this book.
Our respondents' low-liability ratings of the person in the mistaken use of
deadly force scenarios are striking. Figure 3.9 presents this graphically; in analyz
ing it, one should bear in mind that the legal code would treat the deadly force
cases as murder and assign a liability of approximately 10. Only in the case in
which the person mistakenly kills an innocent person in an attempt to arrest the
offender who set fire to her car does a majority of subjects (57 percent) impose
punishment. Even in this case, however, the respondents' liability mean suggests
that the punishment imposed is relatively minor-3.27 (3.2 months)-consider
ing that an innocent person is mistakenly killed. This is considerably less severe
than the potential life ( or death) sentence that a person could receive for the same
accidental murder under the Code. In our scenarios, the mistake is what arguably
might be described as "reasonable"; the person is at least not egregiously wrong
in assuming that the person whom she harmed was the actual perpetrator. In fu
ture research, the plausibility of the case of mistaken identity should be varied,
and we would expect that at some point this variation would make a difference. In
the present case, however, it is only the combination of mistaken identity and the
application of deadly force that receives any substantial penalty-and this is still
nowhere near the penalty that would be given by the legal code.
What can we learn-from the patterns of the subjects' perceptions of the
cases-that might reveal the grounds for their relatively lenient judgments? Three
sets of perceptions stand out. First, given that the perpetrator is fleeing, respon
dents deem that immediate action is required to apprehend him-otherwise he
will escape arrest (see Table 3. 1 0, column a). Second, and particularly in the cases
with the fleeing rapist, no less harmful action on the victim's part would success
fully apprehend the perpetrator ( column b). What the respondents clearly see is
the dilemma that we intended to create: A perpetrator of a crime is fleeing and
will escape unless the victim uses the only resource at her disposal to stop him,
which is the gun. Third, notice, as we mentioned before, that the subjects always
judge that the victim is quite unaware of the risk that she has mistakenly
misidentified the individual whom she shoots as the true perpetrator of the crime
(column d) . These three perceptions, taken together, suggest that the victim of the
crime is seen by the respondents as reacting reasonably to the event.
Recall the Code's treatment of the force allowable as it relates to the seriousness
of the offense committed. The Code gives the same liability for use of force in the
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FIGURE 3.9

Effect of Use of Deadly and Nondeadly Force on Liability

for Exercise of Citizens' Law Enforcement Authority

4

-a-•

3

Property
Destruction:
Deadly Force

Rape:
Deadly
Force

Actual offender
Mistaken identity

Property
Destruction:
Nondeadly Force

Rape:
Nondeadly
Force

Scenarios

rape scenarios as it gives for use of the same force in the property destruction sce
narios, suggesting that the Code does not find it appropriate to allow relatively
greater latitude to a citizen apprehending an individual who has committed a rel
atively more serious crime. As is shown by their ratings of the maximum force al
lowable in the various cases (Table 3.7, column e) , our respondents deeply dis
agree. The subjects approve the use of greater force for arrest after the more
serious rape offense than after the less-serious property damage offense (p <
.00 1 ) .10 After cases of rape, the average maximum force our subjects would per
mit is 6.94 (with 6 = serious bodily injury and 8 = serious bodily injury with risk
of death); after setting fi re to a car (the property destruction case), the average
maximum force our subjects would permit is 4 . 1 0 (with 4 = bodily injury). These
results suggest that our subjects would have the law vary the degree of force per
mitted according to the seriousness of the underlying offense. The subjects would
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TABLE 3 . 1 0 Subjects' Perceptions of the Exercise of Citizens'
Law Enforcement Authority
(b)

(a)
"Immediate
Action
Required
to Detainn

"No Less
Harmful
Means
to Detainn

(c)
��Intended to
Shoot the
Person
Shor

(d)
"Aware of
Risk of
Mistaken
Identity"

Rape-Deadly force:
1 . Actual offender
2. Mistaken identity

7.62
7.42

6.62
5.57

7.74
3.20

3.08
3.1 2

Rape-Nondeadly force:
3. Actual offender
4. Mistaken identity

7.40
7.41

7.32
7. 1 5

7.82
2.97

3.20
3.03

Property destructionDeadly force:
5. Actual offender
6. Mistaken identity

6.41
6.27

4.58
4.70

6.82
3.50

3.62
3. 1 7

P roperty destructionNondeadly force:
7. Actual offender
8. Mistaken identity

6.69
6.87

6.26
5.97

7.46
4.1 0

3.1 6
3.37

Scenarios

Key to column heads:
Statements (a) through {d) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly
disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."
(a) If the victim did not act immediately, she would not have been able to
detain the offender.
(b) There was no less harmful way, given the facts in this scenario, for the
victim to successfully detain the offender.
(c) The victim intended to shoot the person she shot.
(d) Before she shot, the victim was aware of a significant risk that the
person she was about to shoot may not be the offender.

authorize something between serious bodily injury and risk of death to effect the
arrest of a rape offender b ut only bodily harm for arrest of an offender who causes
property damage.

Study 7: Summary
To summarize our general findings on force in citizen arrests: The subjects agree
with the Code's defense for a citizen's use of nondeadly force to effect an arrest.
They disagree, however, with the Code's position that a citizen may not, indepen
dent of a law enforcement officer, use deadly force to effect an arrest. Most of our
subjects would approve the use of deadly force to arrest a fleeing rapist. A large
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minority would take the same view even if the offender is fleeing from a property
damage offense.
In general, the subjects are much more forgiving than the Code of a p erson's
mistakes in using deadly force to effect a citizen's arrest. The Code imposes mur
der liability if the apprehending p erson kills an innocent p erson. A strong major
ity of the subjects, in contrast, impose no punishment even in the case in which
the citizen kills an innocent person in trying to stop a fleeing rapist. Only in that
case in which an innocent p erson is killed in an attempt to stop an offender flee
ing from a property damage offense does a (bare) majority of our subjects judge
punishment to be appropriate and, even then, liability is a few months rather
than the murder liability that the Code provides. 1 1 As the foregoing study demon
strates, the difference in views between the rape and property damage cases re
veals that many subjects take into account the seriousness of the offense in j udg
ing the amount of force permissible to make an arrest-while the Code does not.
We are surprised by these results. Although intuitively we expected that our re
spondents might j udge the use of force by citizens to apprehend criminals more
leniently than does the legal code, we did not expect the overwhelming magni
tude of the differences we found. We had expected that the use of deadly force
would be more widely condemned in cases where, as here, the damage is already
done and the force is being used aggressively ( rather than defensively) to arrest
the offender. This seems especially true where only damage to property is in
volved, b ut though our respondents do assign more liability to that case than to
others, the liability assigned is very low.
Given these results, future research should test the generality of the leniency
that the subjects display. Intuitively, one would expect that there must be limits
on what sorts of mistake will generate these lenient patterns of liability. Surely one
cannot egregiously mistake innocents for criminals and kill them with little or no
liability. Furthermore, in this study's scenarios, the respondents could have be
lieved that the person's primary goal in shooting the offender was to apprehend
him rather than to kill him as deserved punishment. What if it were established
instead that the arrester's primary purpose was otherwise? Would such a scenario
receive equally lenient treatment? F inally, our offenders were fleeing. Do people
believe that the legal system would be successful in eventually apprehending the
p erpetrator? Do those people who believe that the police will not be able to appre
hend the criminal believe that it is more acceptable for the victim to shoot the
perpetrator as a kind of victim-administered vigilante justice? From the perspec
tive of the legal code, whether the criminal j ustice system will catch the offender is
an irrelevant factor, but it may not be irrelevant to the community.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
We have now examined community views on three cases in which an individual
has a j ustification for the use of force: when the force is used in self-defense, in de-
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fense of property, or to apprehend o ffenders fleeing fro m crimes they have com
mitted. In all of these studies, the community judges that these justifications are
more compelling than the legal codes are willing to grant. Respondents frequently
assign no liability in cases to which the code attaches liability. Even when respon
dents assign liability, they typically assign considerably less punishm�nt than
would be suggested by the legal codes. This discrepancy is least evident in the jus
tifications provided by claims of self-defense. In defense of oneself, the Code al
lows force, even deadly force, to be used in a number of cases. The differences be
tween community standards and criminal codes become increasingly apparent
when we examine what people think is justifiable in defense of property-and
even more apparent in the cases involving a citizen who uses force to apprehend a
criminal fleeing a crime or to apprehend a person thought to be a criminal fleeing
a crime. Community standards, as evidenced by our respondents, tolerate the use
of more force than the Code permits and assign lesser sanctions to the use of
force-even in the instances in which our subjects judge that some blame accrues.
What can explain this sharp contrast between community standards and crimi
nal codes? One possible accounting is that criminal codes are formulated with the
often implicit presupposition that there is a reasonably effective criminal justice
system in place. In the assumptive world of the code drafters, people who commit
crimes have a high likelihood of being caught, convicted, and punished with due
severity. But we know that many individuals do not believe this is true of the real
world of the 1 990s. Our subjects may believe that the criminal justice system is
not likely to apprehend criminals, convict them when it apprehends them, or
justly punish them when it convicts them. Our subjects also may believe that the
criminal justice system is failing in its role of protecting citizens. Our discrepant
results may stem from a general belief that when the criminal justice system does
a poor job in punishing offenders, it is appropriate for individual citizens to do
more in defense of both self and property as well as in law enforcement. The more
ineffective the system is seen to be, the more people may be willing to let victims
take matters into their own hands.
If this is the explanation for our results, it is a sad and troublesome one. The
strength of the differences between community standards and legal codes that we
found would indicate, at a minimum, that large segments of the population are
deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system. These observed discrepancies
may illustrate one of the "hidden costs" to policies that fail to provide adequately
funded police forces or to court systems that fail to punish blameworthy offend
ers.
We are conducting further research to correlate individual attitudes about the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system with judgments on what uses of force
are appropriate in defense of both self or property or to apprehend those who
commit crimes. However, one result is already clear: A code that seeks to mirror
the community's views would have to broaden the Model Penal Code's justifica-
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tions and to ameliorate its treatment of unjustified conduct in a justification con
text. One suspects that in the actual operation of the criminal justice process, spe
cifically when j uries choose to acquit or refuse to indict or when prosecutors
choose to reduce charges through plea bargains, these community judgments are
registered. Still, should the legal codes be modified to match these community
standards or at least to move in their direction? We find that an extraordinarily
complex question, one to which we propose an answer in Chapter 7.

4

Doctrines of Culpability:
When Is One's Violation of
a Legal Rule Blameworthy?
Once we have determined what we want our legal code of conduct to be (the sub
ject of Chapters 2 and 3 ), we need to answer the question of when liability should
or should not follow a code violation. Even if a person violates one of the criminal
law's rules, it does not follow that liability is appropriate. The condemnatory na
ture of criminal law requires that inadvertent and unavoidable violations not be
punished. If a person's violation is blameless, that individual ought to be free
from liability even though he or she may well have caused the harm or evil pro
hibited by the doctrines of criminalization. Furthermore, liability is properly re
served for violations of sufficient seriousness committed with sufficient culpabil
ity to j ustify condemnation as criminal. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the criminal
law's and the community's views on this issue of the minimum requirements for
liability.
The law tests for adequate blameworthiness in two ways. F irst, it requires proof
that the person's violation did not occur by virtue of blameless accident or mis
take. This is achieved by requiring the prosecution to prove a person's culpabil
ity-purpose, knowledge, or recklessness (or occasionally negligence )-as to
each element of an offense. As a second test, the law provides the person with the
opportunity to raise various defenses-such as insanity, immaturity, duress, or
involuntary intoxication-that suggest that, even if a person had the required cul
pable state of mind, the individual nonetheless is not responsible for his or her vi
olative actions. In this chapter, we discuss the studies we conducted that concern
the first kind of minimum requirement, the culpable state of mind. In Chapter 5,
we assemble and discuss the studies that concern the second blameworthiness is
sue, excuse defenses.
To assure the minimum level of blameworthiness, the law requires proof of a
person's culpability as to each element of an offense. Thus, the "intruder" in your
basement is criminally liable only if he knows it is another's house that he is en
tering. I f, because all of the row houses are identical and he just moved in next
door, he enters your basement garage honestly believing it to be his own, his tres-
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pass may be a violation of the rules of conduct but may not be a sufficiently culpa
ble violation to merit the condemnation of a criminal conviction.
As we mentioned earlier, modern criminal codes classify a person's culpability
with regard to the circumstances or results that make his conduct criminal into
one of four broad categories: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. A
person can bring about an outcome "on purpose;' meaning that he or she fully
intends that the particular consequence will happen. For example, I may set a
bomb, hoping and intending to injure the people in a particular area. Alternately,
the injury can be brought about knowingly but not purposefully. When I blow up
a safe to steal the contents, I may know that the blast will inj ure people on the ad
j acent floors, but it is not my purpose to do so; all things being equal, I would pre
fer that no one would be injured. Alternatively, I may only be reckless as to the
blast injuring others. That is, I may be aware of a risk of causing injuries but dis
regard the risk. Finally, I may be unaware of a risk that people may be injured b ut
should have been aware-a reasonable person would have been aware-in which
case the law judges me negligent as to causing the injuries [Model Penal Code
(MPC) § 2.02(2); Robinson and Grall, 1 983 ] .
Generally, a minimum o f recklessness as to each objective element i s required
for criminal liability, given the rather severe penalties that the system imposes-as
compared to the civil justice system. Thus, for example, a person must be aware of
a substantial risk that his or her conduct may obstruct a highway or that the prop
erty he or she is taking belongs to another or that the garage the person is entering
is not his or her own-in order to incur criminal liability. This preference for
recklessness as the normal minimum culpability required for criminal liability is
expressed by provisions, such as the Model Penal Code's, that "read in" reckless
ness whenever an offense definition is silent on the required culpability as to an
offense element [ MPC § 2.02 ( 3 ) ] .
Several of our previous studies have touched o n culpability issues. For instance,
in Study 1 we discovered that a person who forms a settled intent to commit a
crime is assigned some liability. Study 2 found that when a person's purpose is to
kill another, even though the action taken runs only a slight risk of bringing about
a minor harm, our respondents judge the person to be highly culpable. These
findings give us some preliminary indications that culpability is not only a pre
requisite for liability but also a powerful determinant of the degree of liability. We
will have more to say about this later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 6 (in
which we take up issues of offense grading) .
STUDY 8: OFFENSE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
AND MISTAKE/ACCIDENT DEFENSES
The definition of an offense typically requires that a person's conduct cause a
specified harmful result or that the conduct be performed under specified cir
cumstances that make it harmful or evil. Offense definitions are constructed from
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these three kinds of obj ective elements-conduct, results, and circumstances
[MPC § 1.13 (9)] . A result element might be something like the requirement in ar
son that a building be damaged. A circumstance element might be the require
ment that the building be a dwelling and that it belong to another person (specific
required characteristics of the nature of the damage) or the requirement in rape
that the intercourse occur without the consent of the victim or the requirement in
"statutory rape" that the partner be underage (an existing circumstance at the
time of the conduct) . A conduct element might be the requirement of intercourse
in rape or of setting a fire in arson. In some instances, the definition of an offense
does not require a specific kind of conduct. Homicide offenses prohibit conduct
of any kind that causes a death. Property destruction offenses frequently require
only that the person engage in some conduct-any conduct-that causes the pro
hibited damage.
Satisfaction of all of the objective elements of an offense definition is required
for liability for the offense. Burning a dwelling that is your own property is not
arson. Having intercourse with another who consents is not rape. Of course, such
conduct may render a person liable for another offense, if the conduct satisfies the
elements for that other offense. Intercourse with someone who consents is not
rape but may be statutory rape if the person is underage.
In addition to the objective elements of an offense definition, modern codes re
quire proof that a person have a specified culpability level as to each objective ele
ment of an offense [ MPC § 2.02( 1 ) and (3)] . That is, it is not enough for criminal
liability that a person's conduct caused destruction of another's dwelling or that a
person had intercourse with another without consent. The person must be shown
to have been culpable as to the fact that the property belonged to another (and
even that the property was a "dwelling;' if that is an objective element of the of
fense) or that the person was not consenting to intercourse.
Just as all objective elements must be proven to establish liability, so too must
each culpability requirement as to each obj ective element be proven. Where a re
quired culpability element is not proven, the person is given a defense frequently
called a mistake defense, especially where the missing culpability concerns a cir
cumstance element [MPC § 2.04( 1)] . That the person made a reasonable "mis
take" as to the partner's age, for example, means that the person did not have the
culpability of negligence as to the partner being underage that some statutes re
quire for statutory rape. In those cases in which a person lacks the required culpa
bility as to a required result, in contrast, ordinary language might refer to the case
as one of "accident." For example, when a person has no reason to be aware that
his storage of a friend's improperly labeled goods creates a risk to his neighbor's
house, he is faultless as to causing damage to the neighbor's house if the goods
turn out to be dangerous chemicals that explode when improperly stored. The
reasonableness of the person's conduct in causing the "accident" means that the
offense's requirement of negligence as to causing damage is not satisfied.
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As one can imagine, the process of drafting a criminal code requires thousands
of decisions as to the level of culpability that should be required as to each objec
tive element of each offense. Each decision determines the kind of mistake or ac
cident that will provide a defense to the violation. The drafters must determine
what minimum level of culpability should be required as to each element of each
offense. By what process and under what guiding principles should these deci
sions be made? Should a person's liability be increased if he or she has a greater
culpability than the minimum required?
Our culpability requirements study sought to determine the community's
views of the appropriate level of culpability that should be required for various
kinds of elements of various kinds of offenses. Subjects were given scenarios con
taining instances of "unconsented-to" sexual intercourse, statutory rape, and
property damage offenses involving damage to a dwelling or to unimproved
property. The property damage offenses have a clear result element, while the
rape offenses have "circumstance" elements-lack of consent and age-that are
central to liability. Some of the property scenarios focus on the person's culpabil
ity as to causing the harmful result; others focus on the person's culpability as to
the fact that the property belongs to another.
The six base scenarios-mistake as to causing damage to a house, mistake as to
causing damage to unimproved property, mistake as to ownership of the house
damaged, mistake as to ownership of the unimproved property damaged, mistake
as to lack of consent to sexual intercourse, mistake as to age of the underage part
ner-were each presented in four variations �n which the level of culpability of the
person's mistake varied-among knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and fault
lessness. 1 In this culpability study,. unlike in some of the others we have con
ducted, we informed the respondents that the action was either knowing, reckless,
negligent, or faultless rather than giving them circumstances and hoping that
they inferred the violator's proper state of mind. For instance, in the case of prop
erty damage in which we wanted our subjects to perceive the person to be faultless
as to the property being that of another, we told the respondents that the person
was told by his lawyer that the property is his. In the corresponding negligence
case, respondents were told that, although the person does not realize that title to
the property has not yet come to be his, a reasonable person would realize this.
(Because we specified these matters directly, and because these respondents had
so many cases to judge, we omitted asking them the questions about how they
perceived the various elements of the case. Research carrying these topics further
might give more subtle information about culpability and might include the ma
nipulation-check questions. )
The liability results of our respondents for each of these twenty-four variations
are contrasted with those of the Model Penal Code in Table 4. 1 . The table gives the
complete results of the study and is not easy to follow. Therefore, we also will pre
sent several figures that clarify various aspects of the data.
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Within each of the six scenarios, the differences in liability assignments due to
the different levels of culpability suggest the general importance of the assessment
of culpability in the assignment of criminal liability and punishment. This result
emerges very clearly in Figure 4.2, which graphs liability assignment as a function
of the person's level of culpability.
Subjects perceive the four variations of each scenario as presenting distinguish
able cases in which liability and punishment increase as the manipulated level of
culpability increases. The consistent slopes of the lines graphing the six cases
make this very clear. Furthermore, the patterns of liability in Figure 4.2 suggest a
special significance in the distinction between recklessness and negligence ( that
is, between conscious versus inattentive risk-taking). This can be seen by the fact
that the slope of the line connecting the reckless and negligent cases is always
more sharp than the slopes of the lines connecting the other cases. This effect on
the subjects' liability assignment of the reckless-negligent distinction would seem
to support the Model Penal Code's special treatment of recklessness as the normal
minimum culpability requirement [ MPC § 2.02 ( 3) ] .
However, a further examination o f Figure 4.2 suggests a result that is not always
in accord with penal codes. The difference between the average liability assigned
by our respondents for reckless and knowing culpability suggests that the higher
culpability, knowing, might properly be reflected in an offense definition that
grades the knowing violation one grade higher than the reckless violation. (Each
unit on the liability scale represents a difference in punishment that commonly is
equal to one offense grade. ) 2 The Model Penal Code treatment of offenses, shown
in column d of Table 4. 1 , sometimes but not always makes grading distinctions
according to the reckless-knowing distinction. In the case of damage to the neigh
bor's house, knowingly causing the damage is a second-degree felony although
recklessly causing the damage is only a third- degree felony, a grading similar to
the ones that our respondents imposed. However, in both the damage to unim
proved property and rape cases, in which the Code does not assign a different
level of liability to the knowing and reckless commission cases, our respondents
would do so. The responses of our subjects, if modeled in the code, would assign a
higher degree of liability to the knowing versus the reckless commission of all of
fenses.
In fact, on examination, the Code's differing grading of the culpability levels
for the various offenses generates more inconsistencies with our subjects' ten
dency to have culpability alter such grading in all offenses. Look first at the Code's
treatment of various levels of culpability as to causing damage (Table 4. 1 , sce
narios 1 and 2 , column d). The Code's treatment of knowingly and faultlessly
causing damage to a dwelling tracks that imposed by our subjects. A knowing vio
lation is one grade higher than that for a reckless violation; a faultless violation is
exempt from liability (Table 4. 1 , scenario 1 ). The Model Penal Code scheme devi
ates from the subjects' view in that it fails to lower liability for cases of negligent
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TABLE 4. 1

Liability for Mistake/Accident
(a)

Scenarios:
Element of Offense
and Actor's Culpability

1 . As to causing damage
to house:
a. Knowing

(b)

{c)
% No Liability
or No
% No
Liability Liability Punishment

(d)
Model Penal
Code Result

6.21

0

0

b. Reckless

5.08

0

10

Negligent

2.22

8

55

d. Faultless

1 .25

30

75

2nd-degree felony
[§220. 1 (1 )(a)]
3rd-degree felony
[§220.1 {2)(b)]
3rd-degree felonyb
[§220.3(a)]
No liability

2. As to causing damage
to unimproved p roperty:
a. Knowing
b. Reckless
c. Negligent
d. Faultless

5.54
4.3 1
1 .75
0.95

0
3
15
38

3
18
65
83

Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a))
Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)J
Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)J
No liability

3. As to house belonging
to another:
a. Knowing

5.77

0

3

b. Reckless

5.31

0

3

c. Negligent
d. Faultless

3.62
3.26

0
8

28
38

2nd-degree felony
[§220.1 (1 ){a)]
3rd-degree felony
[§220.1 {2)(b)]
No liability
No liability

4.92
4.49
3. 1 0
2.44

3
3
3
10

10
13
38
50

Misdemeanor- [§220.3(a)]
Misdemeanor- [§220.3(d)]
No liability
No liability

a. Knowing

6.60

5

8

b. Reckless

5.55

3

15

c. Negligent
d. Faultless

3.82
0.26

13
78

33
90

c.

4. As to unimproVed
property belonging to
another:
a. Knowing
b. Reckless
c. Negligent
d. Faultless
5. As to victim's lack of
consent in rape:

1 st-degree felony
[§2 1 3. 1 (1 )(a)]
1 st-degree felony
[§21 3.1 (1 )(a)]
No liability
No liability
(continues)
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TABLE 4. 1 (continued)

(a)

Scenarios:
Element of Offense
and Actor's Culpability
6. As to victim being
underage in statutory
rape:
a. Knowing

(b)

(c)
% No Liability
or No
% No
Liability Liability Punishment

5.28

3

8

b.

Reckless

3.97

8

23

c.

Negligent

1 .38

33

73

d.

Faultless

0.51

65

88

(d)
Model Penal
Code Result

3rd-degree felonyc
[§21 3.3(1 )(a)]
3rd-degree felony
[§2 1 3.3(1 )(a)]
3 rd-degree felony
[§2 1 3.6( 1 )]
No liability

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1 =death.
aAssumes property damage between $1 00 and $5,000.
bAssumes property damage i n excess of $5,000.
cAssumes that the defendant is at least 1 8 years old (4 years older than the
1 4-year-old victim).

damage as compared to cases of reckless damage. Indeed, it imposes the same de
gree of liability ( third-degree felony) for negligent violations as for reckless viola
tions, contradicting its own general tendency to draw the line between reckless
and negligent culpability.
The Code's treatment of analogous cases of damage to unimproved property
(Table 4.1, scenario 2) is also divergent from our subjects' views. As above, a neg
ligent violation is a basis for liability under the Code, while the subjects would
considerably reduce the liability of the person in that case. Knowing and reckless
violations are not distinguished in the Code; they are treated the same as a negli
gent violation. They are distinguished by our respondents, as the line in Figure
4.2 marked "causing damage-property" makes clear.
The Code's scheme also is divergent from our subjects' views in its treatment of
violatons that involve mistakes as to ownership (Table 4.1, scenarios 3 and 4). The
Code gives no liability in cases of negligent and faultless m istake as to ownership;
our subjects give liability-albeit low liability-as also is shown in Figure 4.2.
Turning to an examination of the rape cases (Table 4.1, scenarios 5 and 6),
what can be said about our respondents' perceptions of the two rape scenarios?
Note first the lack-of-consent case in Figure 4.3. Our respondents' views ( as rep
resented in this figure) also diverge in several respects from the Code's treatment
of mistake as to consent in rape. Our subjects treat the degree of culpability as a
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FIGURE 4.2 Liability as a Function of Culpability Level
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graded consideration, assigning a higher degree of liability as the offense
progresses from negligence with respect to consent, through recklessness, to
knowing. In contrast, the Code (Table 4.1, column d) imposes no liability for a
negligent mistake, while the subjects' liability mean ( column a) is 3.82 (5.2
months). The Code does not distinguish reckless and knowing errors, grading
both as first-degree felonies; the subjects impose greater liability for a knowing
error, 6.60 ( 5.4 years) , than for a reckless error, 5.55 (2.2 years) .
A more exaggerated form o f this difference appears in the liability patterns for
statutory rape, the case in which the victim is described as being under the statu
tory age of consent. The Code treats knowing, reckless, and negligent errors as to
the victim's age as the same grade. Our subjects make significant distinctions be
tween them all. The majority of subjects (73 percent) would impose either no lia
bility or no punishment where the person is negligent as to age (Table 4.1, sce
nario 6c, column c) , but the Code treats this as a third-degree felony.
The rape results reveal that the subjects tend toward setting different minimum
levels of culpability for the two different cases. In statutory rape, a majority of the
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Liability as a Function of Culpability as to Different Offense Elements:
Rape and Statutory Rape

FIG U R E 4.3
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subjects impose no punishment on a person who is faultless or negligent as to the
victim's age. In rape, in contrast, only faultlessness as to the victim's lack of con
sent draws no punishment from a majority of subjects; negligence as to lack of
consent is no defense in the view of most subjects. This suggests that the subjects
perceive the minimum culpability requirements of these two offenses somewhat
differently, and intuitively one sees why they make the particular distinctions that
they do.
If one were to draft a statutory rape provision using the intuitions contained in
our respondents' judgments, one would grade the offense as a continuous func
tion of the degree of culpability of the offender, rather than-as the Code cur�
rently does-as a dichotomous function, with negligent and higher degrees of
culpability all assigned a third -degree felony grade.
Many of the foregoing results can be summarized as follows: Our results gener
ally support the Code distinction that draws a sharp line between reckless and
negligent commission of an offense. However (and frequently counter to the
Code), our respondents also distinguish between knowing and reckless commis
sion and between negligent and faultless commission. They assign differing liabil-
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FIGURE 4.4 Uability as a Function of Culpability as to Different
Offense Elements: Damage to House

7

6

--m-•

Causing damage-House
Other owner-House

5

3

2

Faultless

Negligent

Reckless

Knowing

Culpability Level

ities, in other words, to all of the different levels of culpability. This strikes us as an
important result, but a somewhat predictable one; it is the result that we would
have intuited. But certain of our other results confront us with a data pattern that
we did not expect (or, at least, did not expect to be so strong in effect as to be evi
dent from our data). If confirmed in further research, it would reveal an impor
tant code-community disagreement.
Evidence of the disagreement is shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. In them, we have
graphed liability for damaging a house and for damaging unimproved property.
In each of those cases, we had two culpability elements pertaining to the same of
fense. In Figure 4 .4, liability as a function of culpability is graphed for both the el
ement of culpability as to causing damage and the element of culpability as to the
property belonging to another-in this case a house that is owned by another.
( Recall that the person has some reason to believe that he himself has bought the
house.) Figure 4.5 displays liability as a function of the analogous elements of cul
pability as to damage to and ownership of unimproved property. Notice that, in
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FIGURE 4.5 Liability as a Function of Culpability as to Different Offense Elements:
Damage to Unimproved Property
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each graph, the line graphing liability as a function of culpability as to the prop
erty belonging to another is flatter in slope than is the line graphing liability as a
function of culpability as to causing damage. \Vhat this means is that in each in
stance, where the culpability as to ownership is varied, the range of liabilities, 5.77
(2.6 years) to 3.26 ( 3.2 months) for the house and 4.92 ( 1 1 .4 months) to 2.44 ( 4.4
weeks) for property, is noticeably less than the range ofliabilities when the culpa
bility as to damage is varied, 6.2 1 (3.8 years) to 1 .25 (4.9 days) for the house and
5.54 ( about 1 .5 years) to 0.95 ( 1 day) for property. This suggests that the person's
culpability as to causing damage is a stronger determinant of his liability, in our
respondents' minds, than is his culpability as to another's ownership.3 This seems
to give objective evidence of the somewhat vague feeling shared by many criminal
law practitioners and scholars that some obj ective elements within an offense are
different in effect and importance than others. \Vhile both "causing damage" and
"property of another"-and culpability as to each-are required elements of the
damage offenses, culpability as to "causing damage" and culpability as to "prop-
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erty of another'' appear to play different roles in the determination of liability and
punishment. "Causing damage" appears to be a primary determinant, a "core" el
ement, while "property of another" appears to be a more "collateral" element,
which establishes a minimum background condition. We will discuss the implica
tions of this further in the summary of this study herein below.
One last result is worthy of note. Elsewhere in this book ( in Chapter 6), we
comment on the task of the comparative grading of offenses. Here we would point
out that the respondents saw the various offenses we described to them in this
study as differentially serious in nature. The differences in elevation between the
lines in Figure 4 .2 illustrate a pattern that makes good intuitive sense. Look sim
ply at the treatment of the various crimes committed knowingly. As one might ex
pect, the rape scenario in which another person is harmed shows the highest lia
bility, 6.60 (5.4 years) for knowing culpability, followed by the scenario of damage
( in which people might be endangered) to a dwelling, 6.2 1 (3.8 years) . Damage to
unimproved property, 5.54 (2 years) , and consensual intercourse with a minor,
5.28 ( 1 .6 years), are viewed as slightly less-serious offenses.
Study 8: Sum mary
The culpability requirements study sought to determine the community's views
of the degree of liability that ought to be assigned to various levels of culpability
required for different kinds of elements for three kinds of offenses. Culpability el
ements of offenses serve two distinct functions: defining the minimum require
ments for liability and distinguishing different grades of a single offense. The re
search results give some insight into how the subjects would have each function
performed.
We take up our most interesting finding first. In setting the minimum require
ments for liability and also in grading offenses, it appears that some culpability el
ements are considerably more significant than others. For example, in an offense
of causing damage to property, a person who is faultless or only negligent as to
causing the damage ( while knowing it is another's property) receives no punish
ment from a majority of our subjects. In the cases in which the person is faultless
or negligent as to the property being that of another (while knowing that he is de
stroying the property) , in contrast, a majority would impose punishment. Our re
spondents seem to be suggesting that, at least in the specific case of storing poten
tially dangerous material, which was the way we manipulated elements in these
scenarios, the person needs to recognize an obligation to assess the danger poten
tial of what is being stored. It is of some concern ( though a lesser degree of con
cern) that the person figure out who owns adjacent property. A sturdy compo
nent of common sense commends itself to our attention here: A person first needs
to figure out the damage-causing potential of his or her actions. To whom, ex
actly, the potential damage might occur is an important but secondary question.
Thus, in formal terms, we would suggest that the person's culpability as to the po-

Doctrines of Culpability

95

tential for causing damage is more influential on the subjects' decision to impose
liability than the person's culpability as to the property being that of another. The
same pattern is seen at the high-culpability levels; higher culpability as to causing
damage increases punishment significantly more than higher culpability as to the
property being that of another (Table 4. 1 , scenarios l through 4, columns a
through c) .
This pattern suggests the need to distinguish between elements when defining
the minimum requirements for liability. If one were to follow our subjects' intu
itions, the minimum culpability as to causing damage may properly be set higher
than the minimum culpability as to knowing whether the property belonged to
another. Moreover, differences in levels of culpability as to causing damage should
make a larger difference in the liability grading of an offense than culpability as to
ownership. This illustrates one of the dangers of a provision such as Model Penal
Code § 2.02 ( 4 ) , which applies a stated culpability term in an offense to all objec
tive elements. It tends to apply the same culpability requirement to both "core"
elements-such as causing damage-and "collateral" or "background" ele
ments-such as ownership by another.
But what constitutes a core element as opposed to a collateral element? The re
search results s uggest that this is not an easy question. The results reveal different
patterns o f weighing culpability elements, depending on the circumstances of the
crime. These are complex considerations that merit further investigation.
With respect to the second function of culpability requirements-distinguish
ing grades within the same offense (as in homicide)-our subjects appear to
make significant liability distinctions on this basis across the range of culpability
levels. The difference in the respondents' assigned punishment for a person who
is knowing and one who i s reckless frequently is greater than what constitutes the
difference between offense grades i n American criminal codes. Also, our respon
dents generally distinguish between the other levels of culpability as well; they
generally assign increasing levels of liability as the level of culpability rises from
negligent, to reckless, to knowing. As we have suggested, these patternings of lia
bility assignments significantly differ from those provided by the Model Penal
Code. First, few offenses in the Code, other than homicide, contain grades de
pendent upon culpability level.4 Indeed, most offenses are not defined to have
more than a single grade. This may have been an attempt by the Code to preserve
the sentencing discretion of j udges. The fewer the grades of an offense provided
in the Code, the greater the flexibility of the judge to rely on distinctions of his or
her own choosing in imposing sentence. The shift to more articulated sentencing
rules in the thirty-plus years since the drafting of the Model Penal Code may sug
gest that it is time to have the Code make more distinctions in grading offenses.
Certainly degrees of an offense based on the person's level of culpability would
provide a refinement that would better mirror the community's liability and pun
ishment j udgments. If code drafters want the criminal code to follow community
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views, it would be useful to do studies of this sort-to determine where the com
munity sets the minimum culpability levels for different elements of different of
fenses and whether increased culpability over these minimums ought to give rise
to a higher grade of liability.5
STUDY 9:
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLICITY
Liability for complicity requires that a person assist another in the commission of
an offense. The precise nature of the conduct requirement of assisting is exam
ined in the objective requirements of complicity study in Chapter 2. In addition
to this objective requirement, current doctrine requires that a person have a de
fined culpable state of mind as to providing such assistance in commission of the
offense.
Just as criminal liability is inappropriate for an inadvertent commission of an
offense, so too is liability inappropriate for one who indvertently assists another
in the commission of an offense. Thus the Model Penal Code requires that, at the
time of assisting the perpetrator, the accomplice must be acting "with the purpose
of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense" [MPC § 2.06( 3)(a) ] .
A proposal to require "knowledge" rather than "purpose" was rejected by the full
membership of the American Law Institute ( the Institute) . The requirement of
«purpose" was j udged preferable and was said to continue the long-standing
common-law rule.
However, the phrase "purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense" is ambiguous on an important point. Does the very demanding "pur
pose" requirement apply only to the person's culpable state of mind as to assisting
("promoting or facilitating ") the perpetrator's conduct, or does it apply as well to all
elements of the substantive offense, such as "purposeful" with respect to the prohib
ited results of the person's conduct? If it applies to all elements of the substantive of
fense, the effect is dramatic, for it makes complicity very difficult to establish, es
sentially limiting it to cases in which the accomplice intended not only the offense
conduct to occur but also intended any required results to occur or circumstances
to exist. For example, statutory rape typically requires no more than negligence as
to the partner being underage. When a person purposely assists conduct that in
fact constitutes statutory rape, can that individual be defended by claiming that
he or she only thought it probable ( reckless) that the partner was underage but
did not know or did not necessarily intend that the partner was underage? If com
plicity liability requires purpose as to all offense elements, anything less than pur
pose as to the partner being underage will provide a defense in this case. For an
other example relating to a result element, the offense of endangerment requires
that the perpetrator be at least reckless as to creating a risk of death. When a per
son purposely assists conduct that constitutes endangerment (dumping hazard
ous chemicals near a playground, for example), can that person be defended by
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claiming that he or she knew that, by assisting such conduct, a risk of death would
be created but that he or she did not necessarily intend such a risk to be created? If
complicity liability requires purpose as to all offense elements, anything less than
purpose as to creating the risk of death will provide a defense in this case.
This was the ambiguity at issue in Etzweiler v. State!> for example, where the de
fendant was charged as an accomplice to a killing caused by a drunk driver. The
defendant clearly had "purposely" assisted h is drunk friend to engage in the con
duct consisting the offense, driving; he gave his drunken friend the keys to his car. It
was not clear, however, that Etzweiler was "purposeful" or even "knowing" as to
his conduct creating a risk of de ath. At most, one might conclude that, by giving
car keys to his obviously intoxicated friend, Etzweiler was "reckless" as to the re
sulting death; that is, at the time of giving the keys, he was aware of a substantial
risk that a death could result.
The justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Etzweiler disagree over
the proper interpretation of the state code's "purpose" requirement for complic
ity, which was modeled in large part on the Model Penal Code. A majority of the
court holds that the purpose requirement has the effect of elevating a ll culp ability
requirements of the homicide definition to purposeful for the accomplice. Thus,
while manslaughter normally requires only recklessness as to causing a death,
complicity in manslaughter requires that the accomplice be purposeful as to caus
ing the death (even murder liability requires only knowing as to causing death) .
Some common-law cases came to a similar view that the culpability requirements
for complicity in an offense are "elevated" over those of the substantive offense it
self. Other common-law cases essentially came to the view of the dissenting
judges, which is as follows.
The dissenting justices in Etzweiler conclude that complicity's p urpose require
ment only requires that the complicit individual be purposeful as to assisting the
perpetrator's conduct-that is, p urposely giving the friend the car keys with the in
tention of allowing him to drive the car. The culpability requirements of the sub
stantive offense-recklessness as to causing death, for manslaughter-are not ele
vated to purpose for complicity liability. Under the latter view, a person can be an
accomplice to manslaughter by purposely assisting another to engage in conduct
that the accomplice is aware creates a substantial risk of causing death ( i.e., the ac
complice is reckless as to causing death) . The Model Penal Code drafters make it
relatively clear that they support this "no-elevation" view, at least with respect to
result elements as in Etzweiler [ MPC § 2.06( 4) ] . The complicity culpability re
quirements study sought to test the subjects' views on the importance to liability
of an accomplice's culpability as to assisting and culpability as to the elements of
the substantive offense.
Six scenarios presented variations on the Etzweiler situation. The study in
volved the same core description of an individual who makes his car keys avail
able to an intoxicated friend. The two individuals arrive at the plant where they
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work. Because the friend is intoxicated, the other individual is driving. The intox
icated friend announces his plan to borrow the car to race home to change clothes
before work. The area through which he will drive is crowded with workers arri�
ing for their shift at the plant. In some cases, we describe the nonintoxicated indi
vidual as sure that his drunk friend will kill people if he drives; in other cases, the
sober person is only aware of the possibility that his drunk friend might kill peo
ple. Thus, we attempted to make clear that the state of mind of the complicit indi
vidual was knowing or reckless as to causing the death that we described as ensu
ing, an element that we intuited was likely to be an important one to our
respondents. The drunk obtains access to the car keys, heads home, and kills two
workers just arriving through the factory gate.
We manipulated the description of the circumstances of the drunk's obtaining
the car keys from his friend to create the perceptions that the accomplice is either
purposeful, knowing, or reckless as to his drunk friend taking the car to drive
while intoxicated. In the purposeful case, the sober friend willingly hands the
drunk friend the keys. In the knowing case, he first urges the drunk friend not to
drive, then reluctantly hands over the keys. In the reckless case, he refuses his
drunk friend but then leaves the keys in a place where his friend can find them,
even though it crosses his mind that the friend might take them.
The results of the study are presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. In Table 4.6, we in
clude the liability assigned to the accomplice. In Table 4. 7, we present the respon
dents' perceptions of the accomplice's and the perpetrator's states of mind with
respect to the various elements of the situation.
We will examine some general aspects of the data patterns. Notice first the
commonsense result (Table 4.6, column a) that the liability of the individual who
drives while drunk and kills others is high; translated into years, the sentence is
from eleven to fourteen years. This is as we would expect. The perpetrator, while
drunk, is not so drunk that he cannot pressure the accomplice to give him the
keys, make his way to the car, start it up, and drive off. As column i of Table 4. 7
indicates, the respondents see the driver as somewhere between unaware and
aware that his driving has a substantial chance of killing somebody. Second, no
tice that the driver's liability is constant through all scenarios; it is not affected by
variations in the state of mind of the accomplice, and again this is as we would ex
pect. Third, note that in each instance, the liability of the accomplice (column b)
is significantly less than that for the perpetrator. This is a second instance of a pat
terning of results that we saw in Study 3-that accomplices are given a significant
discount in liability as compared to the perpetrator. The doctrine, remember,
holds an accomplice liable at the same grade as the principal.
We examine next the questions that enable us to see how the respondents per
ceive the accomplice's state of mind in the different scenarios (columns g and h).
Respondents give their answers on a 4-point scale, with "4" indicating a rating of
"purposeful;' " 3 " a rating of «knowing," and "2" a rating of "reckless." (See the

TABLE 4.6

Liability as Related to Culpability Requirements for Complicity

(a)

Scenarios

Driver
Liability

(b)

Accomplice
Liability

(c)

% No
Liability
(N)

(d)
% No
Liability
or No
Punishment
(N+O)

(f)

(e)
Result
· under
MPC

Result Under
"/Elevation"
View

( & Etzweiler

(Etzweiler

dissen�

decision)

Purposeful as to assisting driving:
1.

Knowing as to causing death

7.76

4.50

8.8

29.4

M u rder

No liability

2.

Reckless as to causing death

7.65

3.56

8.8

44. 1

Manslaughter

No liability

7.82

3.56

5.9

38.3

No liability

No liability

7.68

2.74

1 4.7

50.0

No liability

No liability

Knowing as to causing death

7.50

1 .82

1 7.6

67.6

No liability

No liability

Reckless as to causing death

7.74

1 .68

23.5

70.6

No liability

No l iability

Knowing as to assisting d riving:
3.
4.

Knowing as to causing death
Reckless as to causing death

Reckless as to as,sisting d riving:
5.
6.

Liability Scale: N=No c riminal liability, O=Liabi lity but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.

\0
\0

1 00

TABLE 4. 7 Subjects' Perceptions as to Culpability Requirements for Complicity

(i)
(h)
Accomplice's Perpetrator's
State of
Accomplice's
State of
Mind as to
State of
Mind as to
Causing
Mind as to
Causing
Death
Driving
Death
(g)

Scenarios
Purposeful as to assisting driving:
1 . Knowing as to causing death
2. Reckless as to causing death

3.09
3.21

2.59
1 .97

1 .29
1 .26

Knowing as to assisting driving:
3. Knowing as to causing death
4. Reckless as to causing death

2.82
2.59

2.47
2.00

1 .29
1 .32

Reckless as to assisting driving:
5. Knowing as to causing death
6. Reckless as to causing death

2.21
2.03

2.24
1 .9 1

1 .29
1 .35

State of Mind Scale: 1 = negligent, 2 =reckless, 3 = knowing, and 4 = purposeful.
Key to column heads:
(g) State of mind as to driving:
1 . The accomplice was unaware of a substantial chance that the
driver would drive the car.
2. The accomplice was aware of a substantial chance that the driver
would drive the car.
3. The accomplice was practically certain that the driver would drive
the car.
4. The accomplice hoped or wanted the driver to drive the car.
(h) State of mind as to causing death:
1 . The accomplice was unaware of a substantial chance that the
driver would kill someone.
2. The accomplice was aware of a substantial chance that the driver
would kill someone.
3. The accomplice was practically certain that the driver would kill
someone.
4. The accomplice hoped or wanted the driver to kill someone.
(i) Perpetrator's state of mind as to causing death:
1 . The driver was unaware of a substantial chance that he would kill
someone.
2. The driver was aware of a substantial chance that he would kill
someone.
3. The driver was practically certain that he would kill someone.
4. The driver hoped or wanted to kill someone.
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key to Table 4.7 for the full description o f the questions. ) Look first at the num
bers in column g for scenarios 1 and 2. Respondents see the accomplice as closer
to knowing (3 .09 and 3.2 1 , with 3 = knowing) than to purposeful as to having the
friend drive the car, where we hoped the accomplice would be perceived as pur
posefuV and slightly below knowing in the knowing scenarios (3 and 4)-(2.82
and 2.59). The reckless scenarios (5 and 6) are perceived about as we had wished
(2.2 1 and 2.03) .
Examine next the question concerning the accomplice's state of mind with re
spect to the killing that eventuated (column h); there one sees a similar effect. The
reckless scenarios (2, 4, and 6) are perceived about as we had intended, 1 .97, 2.00,
and 1 .9 1 , respectively, with 2 = reckless. The knowing scenarios are perceived as
intermediate between knowing and reckless (2.59, 2.47, and 2.24).8 This last re
sult is mildly troublesome; it means that the dimension of variation that we
thought was most important, which was the state of mind with respect to the kill
ing, was not perceived by our subjects as varying across the full range that we had
desired. Keep this in mind as we interpret the data; found differences in liability
scores are likely to be of a lesser magnitude than they might otherwise have been
if the full range of perceived culpability had been achieved.
As can be seen from the graph of the results in Figure 4.8, the punishment as
signed to the accomplice is affected by his state of mind, both with respect to the
degree of deliberateness that he shows in giving his friend the car keys when he
knows it is his friend's intention to drive and with regard to what he knows about
the risk that his friend's driving creates. The line labeled "purposeful" is the line
graphing the liability assigned to the accomplice who plans that the friend will
take the car keys and drive. The line labeled "knowing" is the line graphing the re
sults for the accomplice who knows that the drunk will take the keys and drive;
the "reckless" line shows the liabilities assigned to the accomplice who recklessly
disregards the known risk of the other driving. Note also the increase in liability
assigned, particularly &t the "purposeful" and "knowing" levels of assisting the
perpetrator to drive, to the accomplice who is "knowing" with respect to the
driver's causing death, as opposed to only "reckless."
Statistical analyses confirm what the figure reveals: First, the accomplice is
judged more liable if his conduct in turning over the keys is purposeful with re
spect to assisting his friend's driving ( although recall that the respondents see it as
intermediate between purposeful and knowing) , less liable if his action is know
ing as to assisting, and least liable if his conduct is simply reckless in that respect
[ F (2,64) = 1 8.20, p < .0 1 ] . Second, the accomplice is held more liable if he is
knowing (although recall that the respondents see the accomplice as intermediate
between knowing and reckless) rather than merely reckless with respect to the
risk of killing others [ F( l ,52) = 1 0.97, p < .02 ] . The figure hints that the accom
plice's state of mind with respect to the risk of killing another becomes less im
portant when he is only reckless with respect to giving the perpetrator access to
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FIGURE 4.8 Liability as a Function of Accomplice's Culpability as to
Resulting Death

Culpable state of mind as to
assisting perpetrator to drive:
5

o--o

Purposeful
o--o Knowing
<>----¢ Reckless

4

3

2
_
__
_

o--__

-¢

1
Reckless

Knowing

Culpable State of Mind as to Causing Death

the car keys, but the statistical analysis that tests the reliability of that difference
does not reach significance. Further research might examine this possibility.
At the higher levels of culpability with respect to assisting, the magnitude of the
two effects looks about the same. Being knowing versus only reckless as to caus
ing a death causes a difference of about one grade in both categories, and the state
of mind with respect to assisting the perpetrator also causes a difference of about
one grade. Recall that we had a prediction about the relative magnitude of these
two effects; we thought that culpability with respect to causing death, ignored by
the Code, would be the more major determinant of liability among our respon
dents. But recall also that we have a possible reason why this might not show up in
our results: Our manipulation of culpability with respect to causing a death was
not entirely successful, leading to a range restriction on that dimension. Given
our subjects' one-grade-level difference that derives from only a slight difference
in perceptions of culpability as to resulting death, one might speculate that the ef-
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feet of culpability as to death indeed has the strong influence that we predicted.
But this conclusion will have to be tested by further research.

Study 9: Summary

First, and as we have seen previously, the respondents are making graduated, con
tinuous judgments where the codes make dichotomous ones. Next, our subjects
can and do see the difference between the two culpability issues that this study
presented to them, and these two dimensions of culpability make a difference in
their collective liability assignment. This suggests that both of these issues should
be addressed within the legal provisions dealing with complicity liability.
Next, let us consider how our results bear on the various formulations of the
doctrine. To do this, recall our discussion of the interpretation of the requirement
of "purposefulness." In one (the "elevation" ) view, the accomplice needs to be
purposeful as to bringing about the prohibited result; in this case our accomplice
would need to be purposeful (a rating of 4) in bringing about the eventual out
come of death. As column h of Table 4. 7 shows, not even our highest three
"knowing" cases ( 1 , 3, and 5) meet this criterion-and yet significant liability is
assigned to the accomplice in each of those three cases. (These three cases are
shown as the upper ends of each of the three lines in Figure 4.8.) Obviously, our
respondents do not hold the interpretation (as do the majority justices in
Etzweiler) that purposefulness with regard to causing death is essential for liabil
ity. In fact, they do not even require knowledge for liability; they assign significant
although reduced criminal liability to an accomplice who is merely reckless-not
even knowing-with respect to the death that eventuated (the lower ends of each
of the three lines in Figure 4.8, or cases 2 , 4, and 6 of Table 4.7) . However, notice
also that the accomplice's state of mind about the death, when it is reduced from
knowing to reckless, does cause our respondents to assign noticeably less punish
ment. ( This is shown by the liability difference between the opposite ends of each
of the three lines in Figure 4.8.)
The subjects' stark disagreement with the "elevation" view is shown in Table
4.6; that view (column !J would assign liability in none of the cases we presented
to our subjects-yet the subjects assign liability in all cases. Subjects are assigning
punishments to accomplices who are knowing or even only reckless with respect
to the criminal outcome in instances in which the elevation view would assign no
liability. From the point of view of our respondents, the culpability requirement
as to result should not be elevated to purposeful as the Etzweiler majority and
others would require; instead, the offense should be graded according to the de
gree of culpability that the accomplice shows.
Even the "nonelevation" view of the Model Penal Code (column e)-that the
accomplice need merely be purposeful with respect to assisting the conduct that in
fact causes the death-does not entirely accord with our subjects' judgments. Ac-
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complices who knowingly-rather than purposefully-commit the act of assis
tance draw punishment (scenarios 3 and 4 of Table 4.6) that corresponds to more
than 4 months and 6 weeks, respectively. Accomplices who merely recklessly assist
(scenarios 5 and 6) draw reduced but still significant sentences from our respon
dents-about eleven days and nine days, respectively.9
Remember that our respondents do not see our "purposeful" cases as being
completely purposeful. Although we were not altogether successful in producing
cases that the subjects interpreted as creating accomplices who are completely
purposeful with respect to causing death, that variable nevertheless makes a con
siderable difference in the liabilities that our subjects assign. This result suggests
that the variable might emerge as even more determinative of liability assign
ments of respondents in future studies ( that leave no doubt as to purposefulness).
If this proves to be the case, then it strengthens the argument for recognizing cul
pability as to causing death as the primary determinant of complicity liability.
From the point of view of our respondents, the Code is wrong to set "purpose"
as the minimum requirement for culpability as to assisting the conduct. The re
sults support a tentative draft proposal that was voted down by the full Institute
that would have required only "knowledge" as the minimum requirement for as
sisting the conduct (see earlier discussion at the beginning of Study 9). Further,
even if only knowledge was required as to assisting the conduct, the Code would
differ from our respondents' judgments because it would exclude liability in cases
of recklessness as to assisting the conduct. Finally, our respondents would also
view the Code deficient, as a grading matter, because it fails to adjust grade ac
cording to culpability level.
So, our subjects assign liability ( although reduced liability) in knowing and
reckless cases of assistance, and the Code does not. What might explain this dif
ference? One rather speculative explanation is that the legal code seems to begin
by taking for granted that the central question is whether the accomplice should
be regarded as committing the same offense as that with which the perpetrator is
charged. In other words, is the crime committed by the "assister" the same as the
crime committed by the perpetrator? Not surprisingly, the Code sets quite high
standards for a "yes" answer to that question. Judging by the reduced liability rat
ings that they give, our subjects do not ask themselves the same question. They do
not ask themselves in this study: "Is the accomplice guilty of manslaughter?" They
instead express the view that an individual who contributes to the commission of
a crime by another deserves some punishment. The more purposeful that contri
bution-both in terms of facilitating the actions of the perpetrator and being
aware of the perpetrator's criminal purposes-the higher the liability incurred.
But, even when the accomplice is merely reckless in his or her contributions to the
offense, some liability is incurred, although eventually it may result in nothing
more than a condemnation rather than incarceration.
There are some hints that legal code drafters have recognized this point. Some
states have created an offense called "criminal facilitation" that punishes the ac-
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complice at a lower level than is assigned to the perpetrator of the offense, but this
"facilitation" also requires less in the way of culpability. Such a "facilitation" pro
vision would approximate the liability pattern assigned by our respondents.

STUDY 10: VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
When a person voluntarily becomes intoxicated and, in that state and as a result
of it, commits an offense, the assignment of liability is complicated by two com
peting factors. On the one hand, because of his intoxicated state, the person may
not be aware of the nature or consequences of his conduct. For example, the indi
vidual's conduct may create a risk of causing another's death but because the per
son is intoxicated, he is unaware of the danger. This absence of awareness of risk
normally would bar liability for reckless homicide (manslaughter) because reck
lessness requires such awareness. In the first study in this chapter, we confirmed
the importance of such culpable state of mind requirements to a finding of
blameworthiness. On the other hand, that the person voluntarily became intoxi
cated makes it less clear that he should gain a mitigation for the resulting lack of a
culpable state of mind; many would say that the person should not benefit from a
self-imposed dysfunction of this sort. Obviously, the issue is a complicated one.
Current criminal-law doctrine typically responds to this dilemma with the fol
lowing rule: If a person is culpable as to becoming intoxicated, that person will be
treated, for the purposes of assessing liability, as if he were aware of a risk ( i.e.,
"reckless" as to an offense element)-even though, because of the state of intoxi
cation, the person is in fact unaware of the risk. A fixed minimum requirement of
culpability as to becoming intoxicated [ "negligence" in Model Penal Code §
2.08( 5 ) (b) ] thus establishes whether a person falls under the rule that imputes
awareness of risk ( recklessness) to the person. This means, for example, that a
person who negligently becomes intoxicated and thereafter kills another (with no
culpability as to the killing at the time because of the person's intoxication) will be
held liable for reckless homicide ( manslaughter) under the Model Penal Code.
Given this approach by current law, the primary focus of inquiry in investiga
tions and trials is on whether the person has the minimum required culpability as
to becoming intoxicated. A higher culpability as to becoming intoxicated-reck
lessly, knowingly, or purposely-does not increase the person's liability. Nor do
different levels of a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to committing the of
fense have a bearing on his liability. In concrete terms, this means that a person
may be only negligent as to becoming intoxicated but that the law will impute
recklessness to him or her-even recklessness as to causing death. The liability
here may seem more than is deserved.
At the same time, an individual who (for one reason or another) intentionally
desires to harm another, gets intoxicated, and does so, is given the same liability
treatment as an individual who has no desire to harm another but gets intoxi
cated and does so accidentally. This seems counterintuitive to us; an individual
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who has some reason to know that he might be violent when intoxicated would
seem to have more reason to avoid getting intoxicated-and perhaps such a per
son warrants more condemnation if he does get intoxicated and commits the
crime.
The voluntary intoxication study sought to test the subject-community's sup
port for the rule that, as long as the minimum of negligence as to becoming intox
icated is met, a fixed level of culpability-that of recklessness-will be imputed to
a person who lacks a culpable state of mind because of voluntary intoxication.
The study also sought to test whether some instances exist in which the respon
dents judge that the level of culpability imputed under the rule should be higher
or lower than the "recklessness" provision of the present law. Specifically, we ex
amined the case suggested by the previous example, i n which-before becoming
intoxicated-individuals have various levels of culpability as to causing another's
death while intoxicated.
We speculated that a person's pre-intoxication level of culpability as to the of
fense elements (causing another's death) would be seen as properly influencing
the intoxicated offender's liability. That is, as a person's pre-intoxication culpabil
ity as to the offense increases, so too would the degree of liability assigned to him.
A person who has no reason to think that he might cause a death while intoxi
cated (this is where the conditions are labeled "faultless as to causing a death")
would, we speculated, be given less liability than a person who becomes intoxi
cated while aware of a risk that he might cause a death while intoxicated ( reck
less), and that person in turn would be given less liability than a person who be
comes intoxicated intending and hoping to cause another's death (purposeful). In
commonsense terms, a person who is aware that he becomes violent when drunk
ought to avoid becoming drunk in the first place.
Current doctrine, as we said before, does not take account of a person's pre-in
toxication culpability as to causing harm; the law focuses only on the pre-intoxi
cation culpability as to becoming intoxicated and on the culpability as to the of
fense elements at the time of the conduct constituting the offense. 10 This strikes
us as odd; we speculated that a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to the of
fense would have the greatest effect on our subjects' assignment of liability and
that culpability as to becoming intoxicated would have less effect and further that
the latter probably would not operate simply as the minimum-level requirement
that current doctrine gives it.
In this study, we presented subj ects with two control scenarios containing cases
of a purposeful and a reckless unintoxicated killing, which would be murder and
manslaughter, respectively, under current law. We then presented nine test cases
that varied the person's pre-intoxication culpability as to becoming intoxicated
and the person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing a death while intoxi
cated. In each scenario, the person is described as sufficiently drunk so that he
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lacks awareness of the consequences of his conduct at the time of the killing. He
is-at the time of the killing, therefore-only negligent with respect to the killing,
but the legal codes will impute to him recklessness as to causing the death. Thus
the code treatment of all of these cases is alike: manslaughter.
A few comments on the scenarios will be useful. The core of the scenario de
scribed an individual who is angry with his roommate for attracting the affections
of the individual's girlfriend. In the control murder scenario, included to deter
mine what liability the respondents would assign to an act of murder involving
no intoxication, the roommate returns home and the perpetrator beats the room
mate, who later dies from the beating. The liability assigned here is 9.54, between
a 30-year sentence and life imprisonment ( see Table 4.9). In the control reckless
killing scenario, he plans only to severely beat his roommate b ut not to kill him.
He beats him, this time with a lead pipe about the head, and the roommate later
dies from the beating. Again, no intoxication is involved. The liability assigned
here is, on the average, thirty years in prison-high compared to some of the
other study cases we report. It is almost certainly higher because beating another
individual with a lead pipe about the head is an action that is highly likely to
cause death. In the comparisons below, it is well to remember that the sentence
assigned to this manslaughter also is relatively high. In future research it would be
worthwhile to create a reckless killing case that involves an act that is less certain
to bring about death. 1 1
A closer description of the various noncontrol scenarios is in order here. When
the scenarios involved pre-intoxication purpose to kill, the person plans to kill his
roommate and gets drunk while waiting to do so. In the pre-intoxication reckless
killing scenarios, the person plans only to severely beat his roommate. In the
faultless killing scenarios, the person is angry with his roommate b ut plans no as
sault on him and does not kill the roommate; instead, he kills a friend with whom
he is drinking. As for his culpability as to becoming intoxicated, in the scenarios
presenting purposeful intoxication, the perpetrator drinks in order to get intoxi
cated. In both the reckless and negligent culpability conditions, he is taking medi
cation for a back condition. In the reckless scenario, he thinks that alcohol might
interact with his medication to make him severely intoxicated, but he drinks any
way. In the negligent condition, he never reads the warning label on his medica
tion and is unaware of any possibility that the medication will react with alcohol
to produce severe intoxication, although the warning label clearly states this. In
both of these latter conditions, when the person drinks, the medication interacts
with the alcohol and he gets very drunk, whereas the alcohol alone would not
have produced such an effect.
Before examining the liability results, let us examine how our respondents ac
tually perceived the various kinds of culpability that we intended to create. Notice
first the three rightmost columns d, e, and f of Table 4.9. These tell us how the

TABLE 4.9 Liability for Voluntary I ntoxication

(a)

(b)

(c)
(d)
% No Liability
Culpability
or No
as to
IntoxicationPunishment
Pre-intoxication
(N+O)

(e)
Culpability
as to
KillingPre-intoxication

(f)

Culpability
as to Killing
at Time
of Killing

Liability

% No
Liability
(N)

Controls:
1 . Purposeful killing
2. Reckless killing

9.54
9.02

0
0

0
0

Pre-intoxication purposeful killing:
3. Purposeful intoxication
4. Reckless intoxication
5. Negligent intoxication

9.89
9.78
9.46

0
0
0

0
0
2

1 .59
2.37
3.26

1 .07
1 . 37
1 .28

1 .83
1 .96
2. 1 7

Pre-intoxication reckless killing:
'
6. Purposeful intoxication
7. Reckless intoxication
8. Negligent intoxication

8.82
8.56
8.37

0
0
0

0
0
0

1 .80
2.44
3.61

3.37
3.76
3.85

3.52
3.67
4.07

Pre-intoxication faultless killing:
9. Purposeful intoxication
1 0. Reckless intoxication
1 1 . Negligent intoxication

8.38
8.02
7.89

0
0
0

2
4
7

1 .65
2.50
3.57

4.29
4.39
4.52

3.80
3.80
3.9 1

Scenarios

1 .71
3. 1 4

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 = 1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years , 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:
(d) Culpability as to intoxication, pre-intoxication. Before becoming intoxicated, the actor:
1 = wanted to become i ntoxicated.
2 = was practically certain that he would become intoxicated.
3 = was aware of a substantial risk of becoming intoxicated and most people would have been aware of the risk.
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk of becoming i ntoxicated but most people would have been aware of the risk.
5 = was not .aware of a substantial risk of becomin g intoxicated and most people would not have been aware of the risk.

......

0

00

{e)

(f)

Culpability as to killing, pre-intoxication: Before becoming intoxicated, the actor1

=

wanted to cause the death.

2

=

was practically certain that he would cause the death.

3

=

was aware of a substantial risk of causing t h e death and most people would h ave been aware of the risk.

4

=

5

was not aware of a substantial risk of causing the death but most people would have been aware of the risk.

=

1

=

2

=

3

=

4

=

5

=

was not aware of a substantial risk of causing the death and most people wou ld not have been aware of the risk.
Culpability as to killing at the time of the killing: At the time of h is conduct constituting the offense, the actorwanted to cause the death.
was practically certain that his conduct would cause the death.
was aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death and most people would have been aware of
the risk.
was not aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death but most people would have been aware
of the risk.
was not aware of a substantial risk that his conduct would cause the death and most people would not have been
aware of the risk.

......

0
\0
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subjects perceive the various kinds of culpability that we thought relevant to their
j udgments. Column d contains mean responses to the statements concerning how
culpable the individual is as to getting intoxicated-that is, how deliberately he
goes about getting drunk. The element of the story that we included about getting
intoxicated had the desired effect to some extent. When we described the individ
ual as purposefully setting about getting drunk, the subjects accurately see this as
more purposeful than the individual who only recklessly sets about getting
drunk. The individual who negligently sets about getting drunk is seen as even
less purposeful than the individual who recklessly sets about getting drunk. How
ever, the differences are not as extreme as we would have liked. In the cases in
which we described the individual as purposeful, for instance, the subjects see the
person as between purposefully and knowingly getting drunk (the average is 1 .68,
where 1 = purposeful and 2 "practically certain that he would become intoxi
cated") . We will say more about the implications of this later.
In column e, we present the subjects' ratings of the degree to which they see the
perpetrator as purposeful as to killing the eventual victim before getting intoxi
cated. As we had wished, in the story in which the perpetrator is described as hav
ing formed a plan to kill the other, the perpetrator is always seen as highly pre
meditative as to the killing, less so (substantially aware) when he only plans to
beat the other ( reckless), and not at all planful when the stories describe him as
having no intention of killing another. In column f, we indicate the degree to
which the subjects see the perpetrator as purposeful in killing the other at the
time that the killing takes place. The results indicate that subjects see differences
in intentionality here, when we would have preferred this to have been a constant,
approaching 4.0 (where 4 = unaware of a risk of causing death). This creates a
complexity that we will discuss later.
As we next examine the data on liability assignments from the various experi
mental conditions (column a of Table 4.9), note first that all of the assignments of
liability are consistently high; the lowest liability score ( 7.89) translates to a sen
tence of 14.2 years. In retrospect, we would suggest that a person who beats an
other about the head with a lead pipe is an individual whom people are going to
be enthusiastic about incarcerating-and the generally high scores reflect that.
Next, we examine the differences in liability judgments caused by the varia
tions in the different kinds of culpability-a task facilitated by Figures 4. 1 0 and
4. 1 1 . The differences between the liability assigned to the various cases that dif
fered with respect to the purposefulness of causing the death before becoming in
toxicated are statistically significant (p = .01 ), suggesting that the subjects see a
person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing a death as a significant and im
portant determinant ofliability. The importance of the differences that pre-intox
ication culpability makes is shown in Figure 4. 1 1 .
Also confirming this is the fact that liabilities assigned in the reckless and fault
less cases of pre-intoxication culpability are statistically significantly lower than
the results in the control murder scenario, while the results in the purposeful case
=
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FIGURE 4. 1 0 Liability as a Function of Pre-Intoxication Culpability as to Killing
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9

8
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Reckless intoxication
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Negligent intoxication

7 �------�--r---�
Faultless

Reckless

Purposeful

Pre-Intoxication Culpability as to Killing

(scenarios 3, 4, and 5 of Table 4.9) are not. (These numbers are pooled across the
three levels of purposefulness with respect to intoxication. ) This suggests that the
subjects see the case of pre-intoxication purpose as similar to murder but view
the cases of pre-intoxication recklessness and faultlessness as less serious than
murder. Suggesting a similar conclusion, the liability ratings assigned to the per
son who plans to kill the roommate and then purposefully gets drunk while wait
ing to do so are statistically significantly higher than the results for the man
slaughter control; two of the three liability assignments in the reckless cases are
not statistically different from the manslaughter control; and all of the liability as
signments in the faultlessness cases are statistically significantly lower than the
manslaughter control.
All this suggests that the subjects see a pre-intoxication purpose to kill another,
followed by a deliberate attempt to get drunk, followed by killing the other, as
more serious than manslaughter; they see pre-intoxication recklessness as similar
to manslaughter; and they see pre-intoxication faultlessness as less serious than
manslaughter. In sum, a person's pre-intoxication culpability as to causing death

Doctrines of Culpability

1 12

FIGURE 4. 1 1 Liability as a Function of Pre-Intoxication Culpability as to
Becoming Intoxicated
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is not only a highly influential determinant of liability but, indeed, is viewed by
our subjects as being similar in effect to a person's culpability as to causing death
at the time of the offense in the nonintoxication ( control) cases.
The liabilities assigned in the "faultless, killing scenarios (represented by the
" faultless killing" line of Figure 4. 1 1 ) might strike the reader as high. But consider
the facts. In those variants of the scenario the person, upset with his roommate,
goes out with friends and drinks. One of his friends assists him home and the per
son "loses control and starts striking [the friend J with a lead pipe. [The friend J
later dies from the beating." The preexisting condition of anger is likely to affect
the subjects' judgments here; one should not drink when in a hostile state. Also,
and again, those who beat people about the head with a lead pipe are persons
whom we want to incarcerate. Still, the person who is nonnegligent (i.e., faultless)
as to causing a death before his intoxication is given less liability than our man
slaughter case; the average sentence is about twenty years. It is, however, still a
substantial amount.
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Recall that the legal codes place considerable emphasis on the person's culpa
bility for getting intoxicated. What are our subjects' judgments about that dimen
sion of variation? They were told that the perpetrator, awaiting the return of his
roommate, becomes intoxicated either deliberately or recklessly, or he drinks and
is unaware that it will interact with the medication he is taking, and so becomes
drunk negligently. As Figure 4. 1 1 shows, this makes a difference in the liability
judgments of the respondents in the way that one would expect (p = .05 1 ) , but the
difference is of a lesser magnitude than the difference caused by the pre-intoxica
tion culpability as to the killing, a fact that is revealed by the flatter slopes of the
lines in Figure 4. 1 1 . Look again at Figure 4. 1 0, which displays the person's liability
as a function of the degree of culpability represented in his pre-intoxication plans
to kill another. Obviously, as the steepness of the slopes of the lines suggests, pre
intoxication culpability is a more major determinant of the respondents' assign
ment of liability than is culpability as to getting intoxicated.
Still, the statistically reliable effect for culpability as to getting intoxicated sug
gests that the subjects see a person's level of culpability as to becoming intoxicated
as a small but relevant factor in determining the person's liability for a death
caused while drunk. The subjects do perceive that the person's intoxication comes
about either purposefully, recklessly, or negligently (as their responses in column
d of Table 4.9 indicate) . Our respondents moderate their sentences slightly, de
pending on the level of this culpability, but are not much moved by these distinc
tions.
This minimal adjustment of sentences is still worth noting, given that our sub
jects do not see the person's culpability as to being intoxicated in the various con
ditions as differently as we would have hoped. Examine the ratings of the cases in
which we expected the subjects to perceive the person as negligent with respect to
getting drunk-the cases in which the medication he took for back problems in
teracted with the alcohol to cause the drunkenness. Instead of negligence, the
subjects saw the person as reckless, perhaps reasoning that anyone who is taking
medications must be aware of at least a risk of serious intoxication through inter
action of medication and alcohol. In these cases (5, 8, and 1 1 of Table 4.9), the av
erage culpability as to intoxication rating is 3.48 (column d) , meaning that the
person is seen as between being aware of the risk and not aware, but most persons
would be aware of the risk.
Even though range-restricted, the alteration of liability judgments caused by
the person's level of culpability for getting intoxicated is inconsistent with the
doctrine's treatment of a person's culpability as to becoming intoxicated as a sim
ple "trigger"-a minimum requirement-rather than as a liability factor. It is
true that the legal code would impose similar liability for manslaughter in all of
the scenarios, given that all of our actors are at least negligent with respect to be
coming intoxicated, while our subjects grade the punishment as a close function
of the specifics of the circumstances. In a broader sense, however, the results gen-
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erally fit with the code's rule. All of the persons are at least negligent with respect
to getting intoxicated, and all are assigned sentences within one grade of that as
signed to the individual in the control scenario who commits manslaughter. The
generally high level of liability assigned to all appears to support the doctrine's se
lection of negligence ( rather than recklessness, for example) as the trigger point
for the attribution of liability equivalent to manslaughter. 12
Concerns that negligence as to becoming intoxicated might be too low a level
on which to impose liability cannot be perfectly tested in this study since the re
spondents see the person we tried to portray as negligent as about midway be
tween negligent and reckless (Table 4.9, column d of scenarios 5, 8, and 1 1 ). Still,
they impose significant liability on a person whom they see as near negligent
who lacks awareness of the consequences of his conduct at the time of the killing.
This suggests to us that negligence is not seen by our respondents as too low a
level to set as a requirement for liability.
We previously indicated that we would need to say something about our sub
jects' perceptions of the culpability of the person as to causing death at the time of
the killing, and we turn to that topic now. Returning to the results in Table 4.9,
notice the data on the culpability of the person as to causing death at the time of
the killing ( column f). In scenarios 3, 4, and 5, an interesting set of attributions
emerges for the perpetrator who had previously planned to kill his roommate and
then became intoxicated for whatever reason. Note that the average score for cul
pability at the time of the killing for these cases hovers around 2, meaning that the
respondents see the person in each of these cases as being knowing with respect to
killing the roommate at the time of the killing, even though the perpetrator was
described as so drunk that "at this point [he J could barely stand. His thought pro
cesses and vision are severely impaired." Although we expected that the subjects
would see this individual as less aware of the consequences of his actions, and
thus less culpable as to causing death at the time of the killing, what the respon
dents may be suggesting with their high ratings of purposefulness makes psycho
logical sense: If I plan to kill somebody, and then get drunk, my intent is pre
served almost no matter how much the drink impairs my motor, thought, and
perceptual systems. Furthermore, the subjects see people as being able to cling to
their central intentions under these conditions and assign punishments that are
as high as when the people commit the act without drinking. Future research will
need to determine whether it is possible to separate these two kinds of culpability
in the minds of perceivers.
Study
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Summary

In the subjects' view, the factor that is highly determinative of liability is the per
son's pre-intoxication culpability as to committing the offense. A person who be-

Doctrines of Culpability

1 15

comes intoxicated-purposefully, recklessly, or negligently-and at the time of
becoming intoxicated is purposeful as to causing death is treated by the subjects
as a murderer and, as we already mentioned, is seen as having a highly culpable
state of mind as to the killing at the time the person causes the death. A person
who is reckless as to whether he will cause a death (as shown by his plans to se
verely beat another individual) , becomes intoxicated either purposefully, reck
lessly, or negligently, and while intoxicated beats and kills the other, is assigned li
ability similar to one committing reckless homicide (manslaughter). In the
faultless cases, the person, upset because his roommate stole his girlfriend, drinks
with friends and beats and kills the friend who helps him home. He too receives
quite high sentences, although ones that are diminished from the reckless and
purposeful cases.
These results suggest that the differences between our respondent's moral intu
itions and most codes are occasionally different, but not as different as in some
other studies that we have considered. Certainly, the codes' position is consistent
with the subjects' view in the cases in which a person culpably intoxicates himself
and, before his intoxication, has no purpose as to causing another's death. Such
an offender is treated as liable for manslaughter by most codes and treated nearly
so by our subjects.
The major code-community difference arises in the consideration of the per
son's pre-intoxication degree of culpability as to causing death. It makes a great
deal of difference to our respondents and none whatsoever in the codes. For in
stance, when a person is purposeful as to causing death before he becomes intoxi
cated, the subjects would impose liability for murder although each of the codes'
voluntary intoxication provisions imposes liability only for manslaughter. That is,
the codes, counterintuitively, do not discriminate the case of the individual who is
purposeful about killing another beforehand and then gets drunk and kills from
the case of the individual who has no such pre-intoxication purpose. But, as one
of us has suggested in another work, the codes do not prevent a prosecutor from
using-as the basis for homicide liability-the person's conduct in becoming in
toxicated and his culpable state of mind as to causing death at that time (Robin
son, 1 985). Such a theory of prosecution would produce the murder liability that
the subjects impose. 13
Higher culpability than negligence as to becoming intoxicated generally has
some but not a major effect in increasing the liability assigned by our subjects;
however, such higher culpability is given no such effect in the legal codes. Appar
ently, culpability as to getting intoxicated is only slightly a determinant of degree
ofliability but serves mainly to provide a fixed minimum requirement for liability
in the legal codes. Codes could be altered to give a slightly higher degree of liabil
ity for greater culpability in becoming intoxicated, or such a consideration could
be taken into account as a factor in sentencing.
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STUDY 1 1 : INDIVIDUALIZATION OF
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE
The Model Penal Code's culpability distinctions-distinguishing among being
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent as to causing a result or as to the
existence of a circumstance-have been confirmed by several of our studies as re
flecting decreasing levels of blameworthiness as p erceived by our respondents. All
other things being equal, as the level of a p erson's culpability decreases, so too
does the level of assigned liability. The higher culpability levels-purposeful,
knowing, and to a lesser extent reckless-focus primarily on the person's con
scious state of mind as to causing the harm-desiring, knowing, and risking it,
respectively. The lowest level of culpability, negligence ( and recklessness to a
lesser extent), relies not on a person's conscious wrongdoing but rather on a per
son's need to pay adequate attention to whether his conduct creates an unaccept
able risk of harm. This means that judgments about a p erson's negligence must
involve a different sort of consideration than j udgments of purposeful or know
ing harm-doing; such judgments must consider what a person "should" have
known or reasoned out. A person parking a car on a hill should think of the possi
bility of the car overcoming its brakes and rolling downhill; a person shooting at a
deer in a backyard should realize that the bullet could hit something other than
the deer.
In these negligence cases in which the p erson may have no consciousness of the
circumstances or consequences that make his or her conduct criminal, the law
assesses the person's blameworthiness by comparing his or her attention ( or inat
tention) to that of a "reasonable" or "prudent" individual in the same circum
stances. The reasonable, prudent individual knows that cars sometimes roll and
b ullets carry. It is for this reason that, within legal circles, negligence is said to b e
based on a n objective standard, rather than on the subjective inquiries into this
particular p erson's exact state of mind that would be characteristic of inquiry into
higher culpability levels.
Thus, a person's unawareness of the risks of harm that his action creates is cul
pable if a "reasonable p erson" would have been aware of those risks. Obviously,
the phrase "reasonable person" does not give a precise standard. Rather, it pro
vides a jury or judge with a mechanism for thinking about whether the person is
blameworthy. The reasonable person is not the average person, statistically.
Rather, the term necessarily represents a composite of those traits that the com
munity sees as making up a person who is perceived as reasonable. That is, it
embodies the commun ity's judgment of how the prototypical person can prop
erly be expected to behave, not necessarily a prediction of how the average p erson
actually would behave ( an inquiry that would leave the standard of care hostage
to the percentage of sociopaths in the community) . Nor is the reasonable-person
standard the same for every person and for all situations. Modern criminal codes
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ask a jury to imagine a reasonable person in the actor's situatio n. \Vould the rea
sonable person have been unaware of the risklo as the person was? Momentarily, we
will further detail what kinds of circumstan c es and characteristics are taken into
account in imagining the reasonable person �< in the actor's situation:'
The j udgments of imprope r risk-taking c an be relatively refined. For example,
in the case of driving, some driving may be n egligent while other driving is not. A
p erson may well drive in a manner that creates a gr eater risk than is acceptable.
Even if the driver is not conscious of the unj ustified risk he or she is creating-for
exam ple, the driver did not look at the speedometer to ascertain speed and did not
noti ce the ..school zone" signs and the chi kiren j ust getting out of school-the
driver nonetheless may be blamed for inatteru ivenes s to the risk he or she creates.
A reasonably carefuLdriver would have been aware o f the risk; therefore, the inat
tentive driver should have been aware. His or her failure to be attentive to the cir
cum stances is judged to be blameworthy and an adequate basis for criminal liabil
ity.
The criminal and civil aspects of the legal system divide the responsibility for
the punishment of negligence in an interestil) g way. Not every deviation from the
reasonable-person standard is sufficiently condemn able to merit criminal liabil
ity. Unlike civil liability, where the issue is "Vho am ong the parties should suffer
the pecuniar y loss that has occurred, crimi nal liability is not appropriate simply
because a harm has occurred and the defendant caused it by conduct that was not
entirely reasonable. Crimina l negligence requires a s ufficient degree of unreason
ableness to merit condemnation. Thus, the Model Penal Code requires proof that
the person's risk-taking is a «gross deviatio n" from the standard of care of a rea
sonable person. Therefore the criminal justice system, which is set into action by
representatives of society rather than of the i nj ured party and which has at its dis
'
posal society's most severe penalt ies, deals Wi th those cases of negligence in whid
the negligent action is grossly out of line with societal standards. Less-flagrant
cases can be pursued within the civil justic<: system, in which the penalties nor
mally involve financial recompense for the <ia m ages done.
These aspects of criminal negligence are relatively well accepted and clearly ex
pressed in the statutes and cases. One final aspect is more problematic: Early legal
tests defined the negligence standard in Pur ely objective terms-or so it was
thought . The particular characteristics of the person-whether he or she was un
usually stupid or distracted-were irrelevant. B ut there has also been a tradition
of uneasiness with the absolute applicatio n of this standard; it seems to many
commentators to be unrealistic and unfair to some violators. The mentally re
tarded or physically handicapped person, for examp le, presents a relatively obvi
ous case of one who cannot meet a fixed objec tive standard that the vast majority
of persons can meet. To impose criminal liability on such persons when it is be
yond their ability to meet the objective standa rd is to violate the primary princi-
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ple that criminal liability ought to be imposed only in those instances in which
the person is blameworthy for the violation. One cannot be condemned for fail
ing to do something that one is incapable of doing.
In response to this very fundamental problem, some modern codes seek to par
tially individualize the objective reasonable-person standard. The person is held
to the standard of a reasonable person possessing attributes modified to reflect
some attributes of the defendant that may make it difficult for him to meet the
objective standard. Thus, the mentally handicapped person, j udged under the
standard of the reasonable person similarly handicapped, would not be held lia
ble for failing to perceive a risk that a person with such a mental handicap could
not reasonably have been expected to perceive in the same circumstances. Yet the
handicapped individual might be held liable, despite his or her handicap, for a
failure to perceive very obvious and serious risks that someone like him or her
could be expected to perceive and avoid.
The weakness in this policy lies in the difficulty of determining which charac
teristics ought to be recognized as potentially altering the reasonable-person stan
dard. Mental retardation might be an easy and obvious reason to reduce our ex
pectations of a person, but what of the parent upset over recent news of a child's
death? Should our expectations be adjusted for a person's age, gender, cultural
background, religious beliefs, or genetic makeup? At some point, individualiza
tion of the objective standard runs the danger of rendering it a subjective stan
dard that every person will meet because we have so individuated the reasonable
person as to make him or her identical to the specific individual. Even a callous
egomaniac will be judged nonnegligent if his failure to perceive risks to others is
j udged by the standard of an equally callous and egomaniacal reasonable person.
Even more complicated considerations also arise. For example, if we are to recog
nize factors that lower our legal expectations, should we similarly recognize fac
tors that raise our expectations? Should smarter, stronger, more coordinated peo
ple be held to a higher standard because, with the same effort, they can do better
than the average person?
A similar challenge arises in j udging a person's recklessness. A person may be
aware of a risk he or she creates yet disregard that risk as reasonable under the cir
cumstances. The standard of culpable recklessness must determine whether a per
son acts reasonably when he disregards a given risk. Again, the system must ask
what circumstances and characteristics of the person it is fair to superimpose
upon the reasonable person in creating a standard by which to j udge the blame
worth iness of the person's disregard of the known risk. Are these circumstances and
characteristics of a person different from those that are properly taken into ac
count when j udging the reasonableness of a person's failure to perceive a risk in the
category of negligence?
Neither the Model Penal Code nor the existing literature gives a coherent the
ory for determining which characteristics or attributes of a person ought to be
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used to individualize the reasonable-person standard and under what circum
stances. Indeed, the Model Penal Code drafters essentially admit that the matter is
beyond their current ability to sort out. The Code allows judges and j uries to
make an ad hoc determination of which attributes to consider. The Code does so
by providing that a person is to be j udged by the standard of care of a reasonable
person "in the actor's situation":
There is an inevitable ambiguity in "situation:' If the person were blind or if he had
just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would certainly be facts to be
considered in a j udgment involving criminal liability, as they would be under tradi
tional law. But the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the person would not be
held material in judging negligence, and could not be without depriving the criterion
of all its objectivity. The Code is not intended to displace discriminations of this
kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts [MPC § 2.02, comment 4, 242
( 1 985)].

In the present study, we sought to begin the inquiry into which attributes
ought to be taken into account in judging either a person's failure to be aware of
or his conscious disregard of a risk. Because no existing literature or case law pro
poses a general theory or principle that can be tested, this study attempts the very
preliminary step of identifying attributes that might be seen by people in the
community as either mitigating or aggravating criminal negligence liability. From
this initial sampling, it was hoped that the responses might show a pattern that
could be used to develop hypotheses and that those hypotheses might then be
tested in subsequent studies.
The methods we used in this study were somewhat different from the ones to
which the reader has become accustomed. Subjects were first asked to assign lia
bility and punishment to each of three base scenarios, each of which presented a
situation of risk: a commission resulting in death, an omission resulting in death,
and an omission resulting in property damage. The commission resulting in
death (scenario 1 ) involves a hunter who, in a remote wilderness area, shoots into
the bush at a noise he hears and kills another hunter, earning a liability rating of
3 .98, or about 6 months in jail. In the omission resulting in death (scenario 2 ) , a
caretaker of a child pays insufficient attention to symptoms of the child's illness
and fails to seek medical attention for the child, who dies. This was assigned a lia
bility of 4.82, or between 10 and 1 1 months in jail. The omission resulting in
property damage is depicted by an apartment house owner who does not main
tain the property well, and thus it catches fire. This scenario (case 3 of Table 4. 1 2 )
drew an average liability rating of 2 .6 l , o r 5 to 6 weeks i n jail. Notice the subjects'
responses ( in column d) to the question about whether the incident occurred be
cause of something the person did ( row 1 ) or failed to do ( row 2 ) . Obviously, the
two acts of omission were seen as omissions. The act that we labeled "commis
sion" was rated nearer an act of omission (Table 4. 1 2, case 1 , column d) ; this rat
ing puzzled us until we talked to some who read the case who said that they
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TABLE 4. 1 2 Liability and Culpability in Core Cases

(a)

Scenarios
Commission:
Death
2. Omission:
Death
3. Omission:
Property damage
1.

Liability

(e)
(c)
(d)
% No
Liability
or No
Commission
% No
Culpability
or
Liability Punishment
Level
Omission?
(N+D)
(N)
(b)

3.98

2

32

1 .73

4.00

4.82

5

29

2.00

3.87

2.61

7

44

2.02

4.07

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 O=life, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:
(d) Please indicate whether you think the incident occurred because of:
1 = something the actor did.
2 = something the actor failed to do.
3 = some cause unrelated to the actor's conduct.
(e) At the time of the incident, the actor:
1 = wanted the other to die.
2 = was practically certain that his action (or inaction) would cause
serious injury or death.
3 = was aware of a substantial risk of serious injury or death.
4 = was not aware of a substantial risk but should have been.
5 = was not aware of a substantial risk and a reasonable person would
not have been aware of such a risk.

thought the hunter "had failed to take proper precautions;' which was what they
were rating rather than the act of shooting. Given this, we will continue to use the
"commission" label for the case. Now notice the culpability-level ratings (column
e) . They hover around «4;' which was a rating of "was not aware of a substantial
risk but should have been." This suggests that our respondents saw the cases as in
stances of negligence-as we had hoped.
Each subject then was asked to consider whether each of fourteen "actor char
acteristics" would make a difference in the liability they had assigned to the base
scenarios. 14 The fourteen actor characteristics were selected from those that were
thought to be most likely to give some kind of reaction-either mitigating or ag
gravating. Frequently, the characteristics included the two extremes of a single
continuum-for example, lower and higher than average intelligence, subnormal
and advanced training, and youthfulness and old age. Subjects were asked to indi-
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TABLE 4. 1 3

Factors in I ndividualization of Negligence Standard

Scenarios

Actor Characteristics
1.

Old age

2.

Advanced experience

3.

Genetic i rregularity

4.

Upbringing (knowledge)

5.

Below-normal i ntel ligence

(b)
(c)
(a)
Omission:
Commission: Omission:
Death
Death Property Damage
-0.3

-0. 4

0.6

1 6

-0.5
1 . 5*
-0.2

6.

Religion (knowledge)

0.2

7.

Above-normal intelligence

0.6

8.

Upbringing (environment)

9.

Lack of knowledge (culture)

0.0

*

1 .8*

-0. 9 *

-0.7 *

-0.2

-0.3

-1 . 4*

-0 . 7 *

-0.2

0.0

.

0.8*

0.6

-0. 3

-0. 1

-0.3

-1 .7*

-

-0.3

-0.2

0.7*

1 0
.

1 0.

S ubstandard education

-0.4

11.

Cultural n o rms

-0.8*

-0. 1

-0. 5

1 2.

Recent upset

-0. 4

-0 .4

-0. 5

1 3.

Religion ( norms)

0.2

0.0

-0. 1

*These items a re statistical l y sig nificantly different

(p <

*

. 05) from the liability

assigned to t h e person who did not have the named condition.
Note: The characteristic of "immatu rity" is not included in t h is table's analysis.

cate for each variation whether, if the person possessed this characteristic, they
would alter the punishment assessment they gave in the base scenario. A nine
point scale allowed subjects to indicate less liability ( 1 ), no change ( 5), or more
liability (9) . Table 4. 1 3 needs to be analyzed differently than the other tables that
we have presented. A rating that hovers around 0 means that the respondents, on
average, did not believe that that characteristic either lowered or raised the liabil
ity assigned to the person in the original case. Ratings that differ from 0 by about
0. 7 are reliably different from 0, meaning that a rating of -0.7 or lower indicates a
tendency on the part of the respondents to want to lower the liability assigned to
the negligent individual in that case, and a rating of + 0. 7 or higher indicates that
the average respondent believes that possession of that characteristic warrants an
assignment of more liability.
Before we look at the ratings, we need to briefly explain how we created the spe
cific stories that the subjects based their judgments on. The specifics of the story
that we created, for example, in the lack of cultural knowledge characteristic sce
narios, for example, needed to vary depending on whether the story was about a
failure to perceive a child's illness or the precautions to keep a building from
burning. Similarly, different upbringings would cause the actor to know little
about hunting or child care. Our case writers simply tried to create individuating
information that fit the general category and that seemed to them to be both
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plausible and a reasonable stimulus for individuation. For these reasons, the la
bels that we have assigned the various conditions creating the different cases are
rather approximate ones, and we will therefore interpret our results with consid
erable tentativeness.
Looking at Table 4. 13, we first note that subjects do not often give ratings that
deviate far from zero; that is, they rarely find that a particular characteristic is a
reason to sharply increase or reduce the liability they assigned to the perpetrator
in the original scenario. That is, in several instances of individuation, our respon
dents changed their ratings both far enough and systematically enough to pro
duce a statistically reliable difference from their original ratings. (We have placed
an asterisk by those scores to call them to your attention.) Given that we created
the stories in ways that we thought might have some influence on our respon
dents' individuations, this is an interesting fact. Our respondents, like code draft
ers, seem cautious about individuating the objective standard of negligence.
However, in several instances the subjects do individuate. The results suggest
that some actor characteristics, according to our subjects, do affect a person's lia
bility for inattention to risks. In each scenario, two or more characteristics
showed statistically significant differences in each direction from the "no change"
point on the scale, or "zero" (0). In the hunter scenario (Table 4. 1 3, column a) on
the one hand, an individual whose upbringing ( characteristic 4) was such as to
make him knowledgeable about hunting was judged more liable for shooting at a
noise in the bushes. On the other . hand, an individual whose cultural norms
( characteristic 1 1 ) do not include care with guns is judged as less negligent. For
the apartment house owner (Table 4. 1 3, column c), the characteristic of coming
from a cultural background in which persons have little or no knowledge of the
risks of particular materials catching fire caused respondents to reduce liability;
however, having advanced experience at building care increased it.
Our respondents saw a number of factors as increasing or mitigating liability in
the case of the child caregiver who failed to take the child in for medical attention
(Table 4. 13, column b) . This makes sense if we note that that case is a more com
plex one than the other two, involving recognizing "warning signs" of the infant's
distress. Immaturity, below-normal intelligence, genetic irregularity, and a lack of
knowledge of children all are characteristics that decrease liability. Having above
average intelligence or past experience with children-and still failing to get med
ical treatment for the infant-increases liability.
But which individuating characteristics do our respondents give weight to
across the three base scenarios? This is a difficult generalization to infer from the
data. 1 5 We would tentatively suggest the following: In each of the cases, having
relevant experience with the situation is seen as increasing liability for behaving
negligently within it; and having a genetic defect, below-normal intelligence, or a
culturally established lack of knowledge about the hazards often reduces liability.
But the results suggest that the characteristics appropriate for individuating the
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reasonable-person standard vary with the factual situation, confirming the code
drafters' assessment that this is a complex problem and suggesting that perhaps
they were right to leave this to the ad hoc determination of courts. Further study
may reveal a pattern to the kind of characteristics j udged influential on liability in
different kinds of situations. Or perhaps the jurisprudential literature will de
velop a hypothesis that can be tested.
Study 1 1 : Summ a ry

In several ways, the study's results do give us some meaningful insights. The re
sults confirm that some individuation of the objective standard is consistent with
the community view. Also, they suggest an answer to the question of whether in
dividuation ought to increase as well as decrease our expectations of persons. Our
subjects clearly believe that it is appropriate to elevate the standard of care re
quired of an experienced person and, occasionally, of a person who is above aver
age in intelligence as well.
Furthermore, although the Code drafters in the official commentary concern
ing standard of care of a reasonable person in the "actor's situation" specifically
exclude the characteristics of"heredity" and "intelligence" as reasons to lower the
standard, our respondents occasionally use information about these characteris
tics-genetic irregularity and below-normal intelligence-to reduce the liability
they assign. One might think that, within the legal system, given that it generally
is left to the j uries to decide on the particular ways that they will individuate the
reasonable-person standard, these cases of reduced liability can be accommo
dated. Unfortunately, this is not entirely true. It is the j udge who decides whether
evidence of a particular characteristic will be allowed to be introduced into evi
dence, so j ury intuition on this point is not a safeguard, because the j ury may
never hear about such seemingly relevant factors. The fact that the Code's official
commentary specifically excludes low intelligence as an individuating factor is
particularly troublesome for this reason. A j udge may well feel bound to follow
the commentary and exclude such evidence, while our respondents report that it
is a factor on which they would individuate the standard. Were the court system
willing to individualize the objective standard of negligence to the degree re
flected in these results, it would be possible to call the j ury's attention to the gen
eral possibilities of individuation, perhaps even using these specific examples.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
In our study of the culpability requirements for various offenses, we discovered,
first, general community confirmation of the law's tendency to make a major dif
ferentiation between reckless and negligent commission of an offense. Our sub
j ects make major differences in their liability assignments depending on whether
the individual is reckless with respect to the various elements specified as relevant
by the code or merely negligent. However, unlike the standard treatment of the
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codes, which with the exception of homicide generally assign no higher liability
for an offense committed knowingly or purposefully than for one committed
recklessly, our subjects do assign higher liability for higher culpability than reck
lessness. Our subjects also distinguish recklessly committed offenses from negli
gently committed ones but, unlike the general code treatment, sometimes assign
significant liabilities to negligently committed offenses. In general, to model our
respondents' judgments, code drafters should consider more frequently having
their codes make a distinction in the grade of the offense depending on the degree
of culpability of the offender, rather than dichotomizing judgments between only
two particular levels.
Of course, it is possible that judges accomplish one of these results in their sen
tencing decisions, by giving longer sentences to individuals who they see as filling
the requirements for purposeful commission over and above knowing commis
sion. However, given the current tendency to move toward more articulated sen
tencing rules that remove discretion from judges, it strikes us that it might be bet
ter to have this result included in code formulations-or at least embodied in
sentencing guidelines-rather than being left to the discretion of the individual
judge. Also, since cases of negligent commission in current code treatment typi
cally do not trigger liability, these cases do not reach trial, and our respondents
judge that they should.
A similar result emerged when we examined the culpability requirements for
complicity. The codes set purposefulness as to assisting as the minimum require
ment for complicity, but our respondents are willing to assign liability to a person
who knowingly-or even recklessly-assists. Our respondents assign different
and lower levels ofliability as the culpability level decreases, which again suggests
that the community would support a difference in grading of the offense depend
ing on the degree of culpability.
For the cases of voluntary intoxication that we presented to our respondents,
we found a pattern of judgments that was broadly consistent with the legal treat
ment of the cases in one respect. Codes commonly use negligence as the trigger
point for the attribution of liability, and so do our subjects, thus supporting the
codes' adoption of that standard rather than one triggered by a higher degree of
culpability. However, our respondents are considerably influenced by the degree
of pre-intoxication culpability that the person had with respect to commission of
the offense, while codes, counterintuitively, do not consider that factor.
A person is negligent if he or she disregards possible risks that a reasonable or
prudent individual would consider. Traditionally, codes have treated this as an
objective standard not to be varied as a function of, for instance, the lower intelli
gence of the person whose conduct is being judged. However, some modern codes
have moved in the direction of individualizing the standard, based on some of the
characteristics of the charged individual, but have not provided a coherent theory
of how to determine which individuations should be taken into account. Instead,
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judges (and, to a lesser extent, juries) are allowed to determine what attributes of
the person should be considered. Without a theory to test, we conducted a study
that was to some extent a "fishing expedition," seeking to discover what attributes
our subjects considered to be appropriate grounds for individualization of the
reasonable-person standard. As the reader will recall, the results were complex
and instances of both lowered and raised standards were found. This suggests that
the modern trend toward individualizing the objective reasonable-person stan
dard has support among the community. The absence of an obvious pattern tends
to confirm the practical need to leave the individualizing determination to ad hoc
judgment with little principled guidance. At the same time, the dangers inherent
in this lack of a guiding principle are illustrated by the Model Penal Code com
mentary's exclusion of a specific characteristic-below- normal intelligence-that
our subjects believe is relevant in assessing the appropriate degree of liability. Be
cause judges control the evidence that a jury will hear, jurors may never know of
characteristics or circumstances that might alter their assessments of liability.

5

Doctrines of Excuse:
When Is One's
Rule Viola tion Blameless?

That a person satisfies the culpability requirements of an offense (discussed in
Chapter 4) typically will be enough to establish the blameworthiness for one's
rule violation that makes criminal liability appropriate. Nonetheless, this pre
sumption of blame may be rebutted by showing that, at the time of the offense,
the perpetrator had a "disability" that excuses the person from responsibility for
the offense. A person may be excused through any of the general disability excuse
defenses-insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, or duress. 1 An insane
arsonist, for example, may have intended to burn the building (a culpability re
quirement of arson ) , yet the offender's insanity may render him or her blameless
for the offense. While assumptions of sanity, maturity, sobriety, and absence of
coercion normally are correct and applicable in most cases, in the unusual case a
person may have a disability-insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, or
coercion-and its effects may be such that he or she cannot reasonably be ex
pected to have avoided the criminal violation.
The class of excuses that we address in this chapter are called "disability ex
cuses" because society's reduced expectations for the conduct of the person come
from some sort of disability or abnormality of the person. We have seen hints of
these reduced expectations in previous studies, notably the study on the individu
ation of standards for negligence (Chapter 4, Study 1 1 ) in which our respondents
were willing to require lowered standards of care from individuals whose charac
teristics gave them various disadvantages. Another class of excuses, "mistake ex
cuses;' look not to a person's abnormality but, on the contrary, to the normalcy
(or reasonableness) of that persons' mistake as to an aspect of the circumstances
that, if the mistake holds true, would render the conduct noncriminal. ( In Chap
ter 3, we discussed several examples of this kind of excuse relative to j ustification
defenses. For example, we saw that a person who uses deadly force on an attacker
whom he or she mistakenly believes threatens him or her with deadly injury is
granted a defense by our respondents.) Future research might examine other mis
take excuses, such as those given to the following: ( 1 ) a person who violates a law
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when that law has not been made reasonably available to the public; (2) a person
who violates a law because he or she reasonably relies on what proved to be an of
ficial misstatement of the law; and (3) a person who makes a mistake as to the
criminality of his or her conduct after making a diligent effort to ascertain the
law.2
We begin our examination of disability excuses with one of the most frequent
points of contact between psychology and the law: the insanity defense.

STUDY 1 2: INSANITY
Previous psychological research has probed many questions about the insanity
defense, but two seem particularly germane to our interests. The first question is
dealt with in surveys focusing on people's estimates of the fairness and effective
ness of the insanity defense as an instrument of public policy. These surveys have
proven quite useful in comparing attitudes toward the insanity defense across dif
ferent segments of the general population. For instance, Pasewark and colleagues
have used this approach to compare laypersons' and legislators' estimates of how
frequently defendants enter an insanity plea ( Pasewark and Pantle, 1 979;
Pasewark and Seidenzahl, 1 980) . They found that while legislators' estimates of
the frequency of cases of the insanity plea were substantially more conservative
(i.e., fewer) than those of lay community members, both groups vastly overesti
mated the frequency and the success rate of insanity pleas. This overestimating
tendency has been confirmed in more recent studies; people generally assign a
much greater role to the i nsanity defense than it truly plays in the workings of the
criminal justice system (Hans, 1 986; Steadman and Braff, 1 983). This finding is
interesting in the present study, in that it suggests that most respondents, con
cerned not to overapply the defense themselves, will be relatively reluctant to
grant validity to mental illness as a reason for excusing offenders from criminal
liability.
Surveys and experiments that attempt to discover lay definitions of insanity
constitute the second approach that previous researchers have applied to the
study of the insanity defense. These studies have focused on the implications of
lay definitions of insanity for the decision-making processes of j uries. One con
clusion has been that instructing jurors in simulated trials to apply different legal
code tests of insanity makes remarkably little difference in the verdicts that jurors
ultimately reach ( Finkel, 1 988; Finkel, Shaw, Bercaw, and Koch, 1 985). This sug
gests that various individuals hold their own views of what constitutes insanity
and that they do not modify these views in the direction of code formulations,
even when instructed to do so during their participation in simulated trials. In
other words, lay definitions of insanity appear strong enough to override the
specifications of the legal code in determining the Not Guilty by Reason of Insan
ity ( NGRI) verdict.
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One study has tested lay understandings of legal definitions of insanity directly
( Hans and Slater, 1984) . This survey was conducted in the week following the an
nouncement of an NGRI verdict in the case of John Hinckley, Jr., the man who at
tempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1982. During this week,
Americans were exposed to unprecedented amounts of information and debate
about the insanity defense. Consistent with previous research, Hans and Slater
found that the majority of their respondents were still unable to accurately report
the legal test for insanity that was being applied to Hinckley.3 A substantial pro
portion of respondents (23%) volunteered the definition: "Didn't know what he
or she was doing" ( Hans and Slater, p. 1 07).
From our point of view, the interesting question is: Do ordinary persons spon
taneously use standards for j udging mental illness that are in rough accord with
those that the legal system suggests are relevant? This question is not answered by
the research cited above. What distinctions, then, are made by standard legal
codes? Within the legal system, mental disease or defect can affect a person's crim
inal liability either ( 1 ) by negating ( i.e. , making it impossible for the prosecution
to prove) a culpable state of mind that is required by the definition of the offense
charged or (2) by satisfying the conditions of a general insanity defense. The lat
ter, the general insanity defense, operates without regard to the elements of the of
fense charged. If the conditions of the general insanity defense are met, the person
escapes criminal liability, whatever the offense. Rather than focusing on the per
son's actual state of mind as to the offense elements, the general insanity defense
focuses on the person's general capacity for normal mental and emotional func
tioning.4 In this study, we test the similarities and differences between community
standards and the provisions of the general insanity defense.
The common law recognized an insanity defense under what is called the
McNaughten test, which provides a defense if one was laboring under such a de
fect of reason due to mental disease that one did not know the nature or quality of
the act one was doing or, if one did in fact know about the act, one did not know
that what one was doing was wrong.5 The test focuses exclusively on the person's
cognitive ( as opposed to control) dysfunction and requires a very high, if not ab
solute, degree of loss of function. The person must "not know" either the nature
of his conduct or that it is wrong. In contrast, the cognitive dysfunction prong of
the Model Penal Code's more modern formulation (called the "ALI test" because
the American Law Institute authored the Model Penal Code) sets a somewhat
lower standard of dysfunction: It requires only that the person lack "substantial
capacity" to "appreciate" the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct [MPC §
4 0 1 ( l ) ] . The Code's language permits the defense upon less dysfunction; cogni
tive function only need be impaired, not absolutely lost.
Many jurisdictions adopting the McNaughten test have added an alternative
ground of exculpation: Even if one knows the nature of what one is doing and that
it is wrong, one nonetheless is excused if he or she has lost the power to avoid do.
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ing the act in question to such a degree that one's free agency is at the time de
stroyed.6 This introduces the possibility of a defense based on a pure control dys
function, with a person's cognitive functioning intact. Like McNaughten,
however, this "irresistible impulse" test, as it is called, is stated as absolute in its
demands. One must have no power to control one's conduct, and one's free
agency must be "destroyed." Under the control prong of the Model Penal Code's
ALI test, in contrast, one need only lack "substantial capacity" to conform one's
conduct to the requirements of law [ MPC § 4.01 ( 1 ) ] . Absence of control is not re
quired for the Code's defense; substantial impairment of control is sufficient.
These distinctions-cognitive versus control, and complete loss versus sub
stantial impairment of function-represent the major distinctions among the
most common American formulations of the insanity defense. Some jurisdictions
still use just the McNaughten test-requiring high cognitive dysfunction. Some
adopt McNaughten and add the irresistible-impulse test as an alternative ground
of defense-thus requiring either high cognitive or high control dysfunction. The
Model Penal Code's ALI test has been adopted in many jurisdictions. It requires
only substantial impairment of either cognitive or control functioning. Some ju
risdictions, such as the federal system, have recently dropped the control-function
prong of ALI and kept the cognitive-function prong. Rather than reverting to
McNaughten entirely, they have retained the ALI test's substantial impairment
approach.7 Public disillusionment and dissatisfaction have led a few jurisdictions
to drop the insanity defense altogether.8
The following insanity study sought to determine whether our subjects would
give a general defense because of a person's insanity, whether they recognize the
validity of the cognitive versus control distinction that the doctrine uses, and
which of the tests, if any, best reflects their views. In the core of the story we pre
sented to the subjects, an individual (who is characterized with various details
that suggest insanity) picks up an object that is nearby, such as a baseball bat, a
mallet, or a rock, and hits another person with it, killing that other person. Be
cause the writers of these cases wanted to make the mental dysfunction of the per
son vivid, they created scenarios that differed from one another in several ways.
What we will need to look at carefully, therefore, are the respondents' perceptions
of the kind and degree of mental dysfunction experienced in each case.
When we examine the subjects' perceptions of the degree and kind of insanity
that was conveyed by the scenarios, we discover that their perceptions are some
what different than we had expected them to be.9 The cases and the way our re
spondents perceived them are shown in Table 5. 1 .
The cases are numbered as they will appear i n the next table, which i s why the
numbers run from 4 through 7 rather than beginning with 1 . Columns a and b
show the subjects' ratings of the degree to which the perpetrator suffers from a
substantial or complete control dysfunction. Columns, c, d, and e report their
perceptions of the degree of cognitive dysfunction. The questions on cognitive
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TABLE 5. 1

Respondents' Perceptions of Cognitive and Control Dysfunctions

Control Dysfunction

Suggested
Scenario Label

Cognitive Dysfunction

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
(e)
Unaware of
Nature of Unaware of
Complete
Substantial Conduct Wrongfulness
Substantial

4.

H igh control,
7.58

7.39

3.05

2.76

2.71

5.

low cognitive
High control,
low cognitive

7.29

6.61

2.95

2.50

2.74

4.47

4.74

7.68

7.97

7.58

3.79

3.89

6.82

3.29

6.68

6.

Medium control,
h ig h cognitive

7.

Low control,
high cognitive

The questions asked whether the respondent 1 ="strongly disagreed," 5=was
"unsu re/' or 9="strongly agreed" that the actor had a substantial or complete
control or cognitive dysfunction. The exact questions are shown in Table 5.4 and
correspond to each of the five lettered columns of this table. The questions
tabulated here a re the common-language fo rmulations.

dysfunction are more numerous because, as we noted about cognitive dysfunc
tion, the legal doctrine distinguishes between cognitive dysfunction of two sorts:
First, one may be unaware of the nature of one's conduct ( unaware that the thing
one is hitting is a person) and second, even if one is aware of the nature of the
conduct, one may be unaware of the wrongfulness of the conduct (unaware that
hitting another is wrongful). Therefore, we included questions about both of
these sorts of cognitive dysfunction.
The results indicate that respondents are well able to distinguish cognitive from
control dysfunction, a fact that lends some support for the use of this distinction
by the doctrine. As can be seen from the scenarios in rows 4 and 6, we were gener
ally successful in creating perceptions of high dysfunction, whether cognitive or
control. Subjects perceived the case in row 5 as being a case of high control dys
function; and perceived the case in row 6 as having a fairly high degree of cogni
tive dysfunction. Looking at these degree-of-dysfunction ratings, one is struck by
the fact that we have two conditions in which the control dysfunction is judged to
be high and the cognitive dysfunction moderately low (scenarios 4 and 5) and
two conditions in which the cognitive dysfunction is judged high and the control
dysfunction low or moderate (scenarios 6 and 7 ) . Therefore, in our analyses of li
ability j udgments, we will treat each member of each pair as to some extent a rep 
lication of the other member of the pair, although trying to remain sensitive to
the differences between the pair. (These are the scenario descriptions of this study
and are represented in the "suggested label" columns of Tables 5. 1 and 5.2. )
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TABLE 5.2 Liability as Related to Insanity

(a)

Suggested Label
Control Conditions:
1 . Murder
2. Self-defense
3. Mistaken identity
Experimental Conditions:
4. High control, low cognitive
5. High control, low cognitive
6. Medium control, high cognitive
7. Low control, high cognitive

Liability a
1 0.42
0.1 1
7.79
1 .89
3.00
0.64
1 .65

(b)
% No
Liability
(N)

(c)
% Civil
Commitment

0
79
0
( 1 9%-8.29)
(34o/o-9.25)
(8o/o-5.67)
( 1 6%-9.00)

81
66
92
84

81
66
92
84

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
8Civil commitment cases are included as 0 in calculating these m eans. The
numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents who assigned
criminal liability and, of those, the average liability they assigned.

Before we leave Table 5.1, one more result is worth interpreting. The two differ
ent aspects of cognitive dysfunction have a complex relation with each other. As
we previously noted, one can be aware of the nature of one's conduct but unaware
of the wrongfulness of the conduct. It looks like this is the way that our subjects
treat this situation, as the doctrine suggests. Scenario 7 is perceived by them as be
ing a case in which the person is aware of the nature of his conduct ( column d)
but unaware of the conduct's wrongfulness ( column e) . As column c shows, our
respondents agree that this individual has a substantial degree of cognitive im
pairment. Note that if one is unaware of the nature of one's conduct that one will
of course be unaware of its wrongfulness, but not the reverse. The two categories
of awareness-of the nature of the conduct and of its wrongfulness-are serial in
relation rather than alternative.
Next, we will examine Table 5.2. The liability results again are shown in col
umns a and b, and there is one additional feature in column a that we will explain
in a moment. Before we examine the liability ratings for the mental illness cases, a
note on the comparison cases is in order. The comparison ( control) cases are sce
narios 1, 2, and 3. The murder case ( row 1) involves a person who, because he is
angry at another, goes to that person's house and bludgeons him to death, a
straightforward murder, and we notice ( in column a) that it commands a sen
tence of somewhere between life imprisonment and the death penalty. The self
defense control case (row 2) shows the liability assigned to a convenience store
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owner who defends himself from a knife-wielding robber by pulling a nightstick
from under the counter and striking the robber, who is lunging at him with a
knife. The robber is killed. This seems a straightforward case of self-defense to us
and, judging by their slight liability assignment, to our respondents as well. The
third control case ( row 3) involves again a convenience store owner who chases a
robber, loses him, and misidentifies another individual as that robber. The look
alike individual and the owner get into a fight, the owner uses the nightstick that
he is carrying, injures the look-alike, and the individual eventually dies from the
injuries. The liability assigned to this case is high. This indicates the respondents'
views about the wrongfulness of a mistake as to what the store owner thinks is
j ustified force. The subjects' response is notable because the mistake is in some
sense similar to the sorts of mistakes that the mentally dysfunctional persons
make in the experimental cases.
Notice that a new column, c, appears in this table, containing the percentage of
subjects who assign civil commitment to the perpetrator. In the real world, the
choice facing judges and juries in insanity cases is not simply criminal liability or
no criminal liability. A special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is avail
able where an insanity plea is made, and this disposition generally leads to civil
commitment, not to immediate release into society. Because of this fact, we gave
subjects the option to recommend this course of handling the mental illness cases
and even to suggest a term of the civil commitment. 10 We gave them this option as
a way of assuring that those who are concerned about community safety more
than anything else would feel that the civil commitment system would provide
this assurance and that they need not impose criminal liability on someone who
they thought might not deserve it in order to assure the community's safety. No
tice that many of our subjects (66 percent or more) choose this civil commitment
option (Table 5.2, column c) . The ability to specify not just civil commitment but
also a term of years thus makes the civil option equally effective at protecting the
community as the criminal option. Thus, those who give the criminal option
would be those who are doing so because they believe that the person really de
serves the condemnation and punishment of criminal conviction.
The first result to notice from these various liability-j udgment comparisons is
the global one. Perpetrators who are j udged to be suffering from a high degree of
dysfunction, whether that dysfunction is of the cognitive or conduct-control sort,
are normally not assigned criminal liability. In other words, our subjects do grant
validity to a defense of insanity and sharply reduce the liability assigned to a per
son who commits a crime while mentally ill; in making this judgment, our sub
jects are in general accord with the way that the criminal codes treat such cases.
Typically, more than 70 percent of our respondents assign no criminal liability to
such cases.
This result has special implications for the current controversy over whether
the insanity defense should excuse only those cases of cognitive dysfunction or if
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control-dysfunction cases also should be provided a defense. Recall that the fed
eral system, as well as several states following its lead, recently has reverted to a
cognitive-only test, denying any defense for a control dysfunction. Our respon
dents would disagree with this change. In scenario 4, which is perceived as show
ing high control and low cognitive dysfunction, 81 percent of the respondents im
pose no criminal liability, and in scenario 5, similarly perceived, 66 percent
impose no liability. Scenario 7, perceived as the reverse ( low control and high cog
nitive), has about the same number of respondents giving no criminal liability
(84 percent). This suggests that both cognitive and control dysfunctions can sup
port an insanity defense. This conclusion is supported as well by the results in
scenario 6. Where medium control and high cognitive perpetrator characteristics
are perceived, 92 percent of subjects give the defense, noticeably more than the 84
percent who give the defense in scenario 7 for low control and high cognitive
traits. Control dysfunction can support a defense; the greater the perceived con
trol dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of a defense. Of course, these respon
dents do j udge that civil commitment is appropriate for the insane individual;
they do not wish to release the perpetrator into the community. Indeed, were we
to graphically illustrate the length of the period of confinement recommended by
the respondents-without respect to whether it was civil or criminal confine
ment-we would see that the time period of incarceration recommended was rea
sonably constant across cases. Our respondents seem to be making a complex
j udgment here. As is reasonably well understood in legal circles, there are a num
ber of reasons why one incarcerates a person: because the person is blameworthy
and deserves the sentence is one; to incapacitate the person so that no further
crimes will be committed is another. (The latter is how one might treat a man
eating tiger, were one to stray into the legal system. One would recognize that it is
in the nature of tigers to eat men; so, one would not morally condemn the tiger
for doing so. But exactly because it is in the nature of tigers to do so, one would
lock the tiger up so that it would not have the opportunity to eat more men.)
What our respondents wish to happen, given the alternatives presented to them,
is to punish the noninsane perpetrator with a prison sentence and to incapacitate
the insane perpetrator for a long period o f timell in a place that, within our sys
tem, may look remarkably like a prison.
Return now to the criminal liabilities ( Table 5.2, column a) assigned to the
cases in which we depicted possibly insane persons bringing about death. The
number not in parentheses is the normal liability assignment; that is, the average
liability assigned by all respondents, treating those who assigned no liability, no
liability or punishment, or civil commitment as assigning a criminal liability of
zero.
The corresponding numbers in parentheses show the average criminal liability
assigned by those who assigned criminal liability. ( To make the reader's task easier,
we have included two numbers. The first is the percentage of respondents who as-
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signed criminal liability. The second is the average liability assigned by those per
sons. So, for instance, in case 4, we see that 1 9 percent of the respondents assigned
criminal liability in that scenario, and their average liability score was 8.29.) This
new "average liability" number is a different statistic than we have previously in
cluded in our tables, and it is informative in this context because it reveals that
those subjects ( a minority of respondents in each case) who do not exculpate the
offender for reasons of insanity judge that quite high sentences are appropriate.
Additionally, notice that this is true for all of the insanity cases ( 4 through 7 ) .
Even within this minority group, however, liability ratings varied: Slightly more
respondents assign criminal liability to the two high-control-dysfunction cases
than to the two high-cognitive-dysfunction cases, and the average liability that
they assign is higher. Further research will need to be done to determine both the
persistence and importance of these differences and the degree to which they will
transcend the specifics of the scenarios that we created for each case.
Having examined the liability scores related to the insanity cases, we address
one more issue in this study-the respondents' understandings of the legal code's
wordings of the various formulations of the insanity defense. ( See Tables 5.3 and
5.4, which together explain our subj ects perceptions in this regard. ) For each sce
nario, we asked our respondents to estimate the degree to which the individual in
the scenario fits the various formulations of the insanity defense, and we did this
in two ways: First, we presented our subjects with our best commonsense transla
tion of the legal code concept (Table 5.4, column a); and second, we also gave
them the exact wording of the legal code formulation (Table 5.4, column b). For
example ( in insanity case 2 ) , we asked the degree to which the respondents agreed
with the statements that the perpetrator "did not realize that striking the [victim]
with the baseball bat was wrong" and that the perpetrator "was laboring under
such a defect of reason [due to mental disease] that he did not know that what he
was doing was wrong."
Table 5.3 shows the average responses of our subjects to these questions and,
more important, shows the correlations between the pairs of equivalent questions
(that is, between the common and legal language formulations ). The correlations
(column c) are generally high, averaging 0.86 in scenario 4, 0.85 in scenario 5 ,
dropping t o 0.58 i n scenario 6, and returning to 0.84 in scenario 7. We interpret
these high correlations to mean that, in this context, the subjects saw the paired
statements as having about the same meanings. This conclusion of the essential
interchangeability of the two forms of the statements is supported by the general
close agreement between the average scores on each of the two equivalent ques
tions. (The comparison across rows between columns a and b shows this. 1 2 ) This
suggests that, on the one hand, it would not be wrong in the criminal justice sys
tem to use the ordinary language formulations of the questions that the jurors are
instructed to decide in determining whether a specific individual meets the legal
criteria for insanity. On the other hand, it also suggests that the people to whom
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TABLE 5.3 Respondents' Perceptions of Cognitive and Control
Dysfunction: Agreement with Common and Legal Language Formulations
(a)
Common
Dimension of
Perceived Dysfunction

Scenario
4. High

1.

(b)

(c)

Legal

Language Language
Agreement Agreement Correlation•

U naware of nature of

control, low

conduct

2.76

3.42

0.79

cognitive

2.

Unaware of wrongfulness

2.71

2.97

0.87

3.

S ubstantial impairment of
appreciation of
wrongfulness

3.05

3.29

0.86

4.

Complete loss of control

7.39

7. 1 3

0.94

5.

S ubstantial impairment
7.58

7.47

0.86

of control
5. High

1.

control, low
cognitive

2.
3.

U naware of nature of
conduct

2.50

3.24

0.84

U naware of wrongfulness

2.74

3.08

0.90

S ubstantial impairment of
appreciation of

4.
5.

w rongfulness

2.95

3.21

0.86

Complete loss of control

6.61

6.42

0.83

7.29

6.84

0.83

S ubstantial impairment
of control

6. Medium

1.

control,
high

2.

cognitive

3.

U naware of nature of
conduct

7.97

7.71

0.48

U naware of wrongfulness

7.58

7.63

0.34

Substantial impairment of
appreciation of
wrongfulness

7.68

7.50

0.57

4.

Complete loss of control

4.74

4.42

0.68

5.

S ubstantial impairment
4.47

4.61

0.85

conduct

3.29

4. 1 6

0.77

6.68

6.68

0.74

of control
7. Low

1.

control,

Unaware of nature of

high

2.

U n aware of wrongfulness

cognitive

3.

Substantial impairment of
appreciation of
wrongfulness

6.82

7. 1 6

0.89

4.

Complete loss of control

3.89

3.63

0.85

5.

Substantial impairment
3.79

4.26

0.95

of control

Note: The exact wordings of these questions are shown in Table 5.4.
Question 1 is tabulated in column d of Table 5 . 1 , question 2 i n column e,
question 3 in column c, question 4 in column

b,

and question 5 in column a.

Respondents were asked whether they 1 ="strongly disagreed," 5=were "unsure,"
or 9="strongly agreed" with the common and legal language formulations that
correspond with each of the five dimensions of perceived dysfunction for each of
the four scenarios presented here.
*All of the correlations shown in column c are statistically significant

{p <

.05).
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TABLE 5.4

Key to Table 5.3-Questions for Common and Legal

Language Formulations

Dimension of
Perceived
Dysfunction
1.

2.

(a)
Common Language
Formulation

Because of mental illness,
Unaware of
nature of conduct the actor did not realize
that he was striking the

(b)
Legal Language
Formulation
The acto r was laboring under
such a defect of reason due

tenant with a baseball bat.

to mental disease that he did
not know the natu re or the
q uality of the act h e was doing.

Un aware of

Because of mental illness,

The actor was laboring under

wrongfu lness

the actor did not realize

such a defect of reason that

that striking the tenant with he did not know that what he

3.

Substantial

a baseball bat was wrong.

was doing was wrong .

Because of mental illness,

As a result of mental disease

impairment of

the actor's ability to under-

or defect at the time of his

appreciation of

stand the wrongfulness of
his conduct was substan-

conduct, the actor lacked
substantial capacity to appre-

tially impaired.

ciate the c riminality or the

wrongfulness

wrongfulness of his conduct.
4.

Complete loss
of control

Because of mental ill ness,

Because of the duress of

the actor lacked any

mental disease, the actor had

ability to stop himself from

so far lost the power to avoid

striking the tenant with the

doing the act in question, as

baseball bat.

that his free agency was at
the time destroyed.

5.

Substantial

Because of mental illness,

As a result of mental disease

impairment of

the actor's ability to stop

at the time of his conduct, the

control

himself from striking the

actor lacked substantial

tenant with the baseball

capacity to conform his con-

bat was substantially

duct to the requirement of
the law.

impa ired.

we gave these scenarios, and by extension, j urors, are able to understand and ap
ply the somewhat ponderous legal wordings of the various formulations of insan
ity as well. This does not contradict the findings of other research (discussed at
the beginning of this study) that showed that people were unable to reproduce the
legal system definitions of insanity.
Study

1 2:

Summary

Recall our discussion of the treatment that would be given to each case by various
formulations of the current law. Let us for the moment assume that the typical
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judgments in every insanity scenario are of "not guilty:' as in fact they are. If this
is assumed, interestingly, both the formulation of insanity contained in the Model
Penal Code and the formulation under the McNaughten-irresistible-impulse test
accurately fit the pattern of our respondents' judgments, and the formulations of
the McNaughten rule and the recently passed federal statute do not match the re
spondents' judgments. Specifically, the last two formulations do not grant a de
fense when the person is laboring under a control dysfunction, even though our
respondents do see control dysfunction as establishing a defense of insanity.
Thus, the two formulations that grant validity to the insanity defense based on ei
ther a cognitive or a control dysfunction are the ones that best match the judg
ments of our respondents. Further, the subjects were able to distinguish cognitive
from control dysfunctions, lending some support for the use of this distinction by
the doctrine. As the history of the doctrine might predict, cognitive dysfunctions
appear to provide persuasive excuses to more of the subjects than do control dys
functions.
Further examination of the data suggests, rather tentatively, one more conclu
sion. Examine again the degree of our subjects' agreement with the substantial
impairment dysfunction statement for scenarios 6 and 7 (column c of Table 5. 1 ) .
Although the subjects are in strong agreement with those dysfunction statements,
they are by no means in total agreement with them. We would suggest that this
supports the Model Penal Code's formulation of the cognitive dysfunction rule,
which requires only that the person lack "substantial capacity" to appreciate the
criminal wrongfulness of his conduct. This accesses the defense when cognitive
functioning is impaired-rather than totally lost-a judgment with which our re
spondents seem to be in accord. In further research, we will test whether a cogni
tive dysfunction that respondents judge as establishing a lack of substantial ca
pacity to appreciate the criminal wrongfulness of one's conduct is sufficient to
cause those respondents to grant the insanity defense.
Further research also will be necessary to provide more support to the conclu
sions we have drawn from this study. Since our respondents perceive all of the
cases as containing a high level of either control or cognitive dysfunction, further
testing is necessary to determine what degree of each dysfunction is required be
fore support for the insanity defense appears. It would also be useful to determine
whether respondents use the defense in an essentially dichotomous way, granting
it standing as a complete defense after it rises above a certain level, or if they
would continuously scale their liability judgments to the degree of dysfunction
that they detect. The former is the process that most closely matches those con
tained in all of the legal formulations.
There is a great deal of controversy about the insanity defense in our society. As
we noted, many individuals feel, probably inaccurately, that the defense is used
too often and has the effect of "letting off" many blameworthy persons. Given
this is so, it is worth noting that a strong majority of our subjects still excused a
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person who bludgeoned his victim to death if they judged that perpetrator as be
ing genuinely dysfunctional because of mental illness. It may be that much of the
controversy about the insanity defense is generated in circumstances in which the
average reader of the publicity about a case sees the perpetrator as having only a
modest degree of dysfunction-not enough to trigger the defense-whereas the
jurors see the same degree of dysfunction as sufficient to trigger the defense. Still,
we should also note that those minorities of the respondents who did find crimi
nal liability appropriate assigned quite lengthy sentences.
STUDY 1 3 :
IMMATURITY AND INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
As our discussion of the previous study on insanity has suggested, when one com
mits an offense under the influence of some significant dysfunction of one's ca
pacity to control one's conduct or to understand the nature of one's conduct, the
criminal law frequently recognizes an excuse that provides a defense. In addition
to mental illness, the law excuses for dysfunctions that arise from either involun
tary intoxication or immaturity (or, as we shall see in the next study, from du
ress ) .
Current legal codes typically use a person's chronological age (although there is
considerable debate over the exact age that divides maturity from immaturity) as
conclusive evidence that the person is too immature to understand or control the
harmful and criminal nature of his or her conduct [MPC § 4. 1 0; Robinson, 1 984,
§ 1 75] . Our study sought to test the subjects' willingness to excuse persons be
cause of their immaturity, as evidenced by their chronological age. A "control"
harm was described, and then the same harm was described as having been com
mitted by an individual of various ages. No other information accessing an excuse
was given, so if respondents gave lesser sentences to the younger offender, they did
so solely because of the differential inferences they drew from the offender's age.
The defense of involuntary intoxication in legal theory works through mecha
nisms similar to those used for the defenses of insanity and immaturity, as de
scribed in the previous study concerning insanity. In Chapter 4, we discussed the
legal theory relating to voluntary intoxication. If a person voluntarily becomes in
toxicated, that person's intoxication has a limited effect in mitigating his or her li
ability. In those cases in which a person's intoxication is involuntary, however, lia
bility may be eliminated or mitigated in two ways, parallel to those seen for
mental illness. First, the resulting dysfunction from involuntary intoxication may
provide a defense if it negates a culpable state of mind required by the offense def
inition. Second, the condition may excuse the violator if it satisfies the conditions
of the general involuntary intoxication defense, notwithstanding that the ele
ments of the offense are satisfied. Those conditions typically are analogous to the
conditions required by a jurisdiction's particular formulation of the insanity de
fense [ MPC § 2.08( 4); Robinson, 1 984, § 1 76] . As with insanity, the most com-
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mon defense formulations use the McNaughten test, the McNaughten-irresist
ible-impulse test, or the ALI test. The differences among these tests arise from the
distinctions between cognitive and control dysfunction and between loss versus
impairment of function, as described in the previous study.
In this study, we attempt to see the degree to which our respondents agreed
with the immaturity and involuntary intoxication defenses recognized by the le
gal doctrine, as well as the degree to which these two defenses are based on similar
underlying mechanisms of exculpation. To examine community views on the
general involuntary intoxication defense and its effect on a person's liability, sub
j ects were given five homicide scenarios intended to present a person who suffers
from the following dysfunctions, respectively: high control only, high cognitive
only, low control only, low cognitive only, and low cognitive plus low control. To
examine community views on the doctrine's immaturity defenses, three scenarios
presented cases in which the person engages in similar conduct under similar cir
cumstances ( but without being under the influence of any intoxication). In these
cases, it is the person's age that is varied, from 1 0 to 14 to 1 8 years of age. 13 Finally,
there was a control comparison case to establish the penalty these respondents
would give to the perpetrator of a similar homicide who suffered from no dys
function.
In the control case and the three age-related cases, the core scenario is this: Two
brothers have a history of antagonism. After an argument, one waits until the
other is asleep and then kills him by dousing him with kerosene and setting him
on fire. In the involuntary intoxication scenarios, the respondents were told that
the cause of the involuntary intoxication is an unexpected interaction between
two medications that the person is taking: one to control long-term pain and the
other described as an over-the-counter drug for treatment of a cold. ( By describ
ing it as an over-the-counter medication, we attempted to create the perception
that people would regard it as generally safe and unlikely to enter into side-effect
interactions with other medications.) The prescribing physician had not men
tioned the possibility of drug interaction side effects, and the person had not
thought to ask about them. The core of these stories had the involuntarily intoxi
cated person killing his brother by suddenly dousing him with kerosene and set
ting him on fire. We manipulated the kind and degree of the resulting dysfunc
tion both by a description of the person's resulting mental experiences and the
later testimony of a physician about what dysfunction the particular drug interac
tion would cause. Thus, we attempted to create perceptions that the involuntary
intoxication experienced by the person brought about high or low cognitive or
control dysfunctions. Our respondents' liability judgments regarding these sce
narios are in Table 5.5.
Look first at the five scenarios (2 through 6) that involve involuntary intoxica
tion. We consider these cases first because they are more closely analogous to the
insanity cases of the previous study. For these cases, the civil commitment of the
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TABLE 5.5

Liability as Related to I mmatu rity and I nvol untary I ntoxication

(a)

Scenarios
Contro l :
1 . M u rder
I nvolu ntary intoxication :

Liability a

(b)

(c)
(d)
% No Liability
% No
or No
Liability Punishment
% Civil
N
N
Commitment
( )
( +O)

1 0.42

0

0

7
23

44

2.
3.

High control
High cogn itive

5.00
3.84

4.

Low contro l

6. 1 9

0

26

5.

Low cognitive

6.83

0

20

6.

Low control and
6.93

7

20

4.84 (53%-8.94)

47

47

47

cognitive
I mmatu rity:

52

7.
8.

1 0-year-old
1 4-year-old

6.66 (77%-8.77)

23

23

23

9.

1 8-year-old

8. 70 (90%-9.26)

7

10

7

Liability Scale: N=No c riminal liabil ity, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,

8 = 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
8Civil commitment cases a re included as 0 in calculating these means. The
n umbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of respondents who assigned
criminal liability and, of those, the average liability they assigned.

perpetrator was not an option that made sense within the judicial system and,
therefore, was not given to our respondents as an option. First, and obviously, the
sentences are greatly reduced from the control case of murder ( as is revealed in
column a). Second, both cognitive and control dysfunction appear to support a
defense. This is similar to the conclusion of the insanity study. Third, statistical
analysis reveals that the high and low dysfunction cases differ reliably: The high
dysfunction scenarios ( 2 and 3 ) receive lower criminal liabilities (p < .05) than
the low dysfunction scenarios ( 4, 5, and 6). The type of dysfunction-cognitive
versus control-is not found to produce reliable differences. The interpretation
that arises from this, then, is that people do assess cases of involuntary intoxica
tion in terms of the degree of dysfunction that such cases bring about, and those
perceptions of the dysfunctions cause respondents to reduce the liability they as
sign to the perpetrator.
Before taking this conclusion at face value, we need to look at the respondents'
actual ratings of the degree of dysfunction brought about by the different sce
narios (shown in Table 5.6). As column b indicates, the respondents certainly see
the person in all of these scenarios as being intoxicated by the drug. They see him

.....

*"'
N

TABLE 5.6

Subjects' Perceptions of Immaturity and I nvoluntary Intoxication Cases

(a)
Scenarios

Age

(h)
(g)
(c)
(e)
(d)
(f)
"Intoxication "Unaware "Unaware of "Understanding "Not Able "Ability to Stop
Impaired"
to Stop"
Impaired"
"Intoxicated" Involuntary" of Actions" Wrongfulness"
(b)

I nvol untary intoxication:
3.87

4.90

6.03

6.42

7.00

7. 1 0

7. 1 3

6.74

7. 1 0

3.71

3.55

5. 1 3

4.74

5.58

8.45

6.39

7. 1 0

8.00

6.84

7.39

6.42

5.97

4.06

4.32

5.48

4.58

8. 1 9

2.

High control

7. 1 9

6. 1 3

3.77

3.

H igh cognitive

7.90

6.52

4.

Low control

6.90

6.03

5.
6.

Low cognitive
Low control and

8.26

cognitive
Immaturity:
7.

1 0-year-old

1 0. 1 9

-

-

2.58

2.90

3.61

2.58

3.35

8.

1 4-year-old

1 4. 1 3

-

-

1 .74

1 .90

2.42

2.00

2. 1 9

9.

1 8-year-old

1 7.87

-

-

1 .39

1 .32

1 .39

1 .42

1 .48

Key to column heads:
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The actor was drug intoxicated at the time he performed the offense.

(f)

Because of drug i ntoxication, the actor's ability to u nderstand the wrongfulness of his conduct was substantially impaired.

(g)
(h)

The actor, if d rug intoxicated, was not responsible for being drug intoxicated.
Because of drug intoxication, the actor did not realize that he was committing the offense.
Because of drug i ntoxication, the actor did not realize that committing the offense was wrong .
Because of drug intoxication, t h e actor lacked any ability to stop h imself from committing the offense.
Because of drug intoxication , the actor's ability to stop himself from committing the offense was substantially impaired.
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as comparatively less intoxicated in scenario 6, and since that involves low degrees
of dysfunction, that is appropriate. Moreover, as column c indicates, our subjects
agree-somewhat grudgingly-that the offender is not responsible for being
drug intoxicated in all of these scenarios.
Next, let us look at the individual scenarios and see what conclusions we can
draw from them. The information in columns d through h tells us how these cases
are perceived in terms of cognitive and control dysfunctions, with columns d
through f relating to cognitive dysfunction and g and h relating to control dys
function.
In the high control dysfunction case (row 2), respondents agree that the indi
vidual is tending toward being unable to stop (column g) and is also impaired in
his ability to stop (column h). They also see the individual as being moderately
cognitively aware; that is, they tend to disagree that he is unaware of his actions
(column d), that he is unaware of the wrongfulness of those actions (column e),
and that his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions is substantially
impaired ( column f). In this condition, it is reasonable to say that the respon
dents perceive that the individual has a modest degree of cognitive impairment
and a higher degree of control dysfunction; in other words, that scenario is not
inaccurately described as a «high control, low cognitive dysfunction" case. Per
sons perceived to have that level and kind of dysfunction by our subjects get a
considerable reduction in sentence; certainly as compared to the control case of
murder but also as compared to the low dysfunction cases. However, the liability
rating of 5 ( 1 year in jail) is some distance from the sentence of no liability that
many of the legal codes would give to an individual who has that dysfunction.
Still, our respondents grant some considerable degree of validity to a defense
based on a control dysfunction, which suggests that the legal codes that include a
control prong in their formulations accurately represent community standards.
Look next at scenario 3, in which we attempted to create perceptions of a high
cognitive dysfunction ( an unawareness of the meaning or the wrongfulness of the
harmful actions) and a low degree of control dysfunction. The respondents' rat
ings of the two statements on unawareness and the third on whether the individ
ual is impaired in his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions all are
high; clearly the case is perceived by our respondents, as intended, as one of high
cognitive dysfunction. But the high ratings on the questions about whether the
individual is able to stop the wrongful act indicate that the respondents see this
case as one of high control dysfunction as well as one of high cognitive dysfunc
tion. This means that, in this study, we were even less successful in creating a dear
case of high cognitive dysfunction coupled with low control dysfunction than we
were in the insanity study discussed previously. (Recall that it was demonstrated
in that study that subjects do considerably reduce sentences for individuals who
have high cognitive and moderate control dysfunctions.) Notice here that this in
dividual receives a low liability rating of 3.84 ( about 5.5 months in prison), which
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is the lowest sentence given in this study's various cases of involuntary intoxica
tion. This makes sense, since the respondents see this individual as impaired on
both of the prongs of the defense.
The fact that the present case of high cognitive dysfunction was also read by
our respondents as having a high control dysfunction may tell us something in
teresting about their "theories of mental dysfunction." Intuitively, a person who is
thinking so oddly as to be unaware of the wrongfulness of killing somebody may
be seen by the respondents as not able to stop the action because he or she sees no
moral need to stop it. To put it another way, one who is unaware of one's own ac
tions and their wrongfulness has a cognitive dysfunction that may be seen by the
respondents as also creating a control dysfunction. A similar pattern showed up
in our insanity cases, in which the individual who is seen as highly cognitively
dysfunctional is also seen as having a substantial although not complete control
dysfunction (Table 5. 1 , case 6). Again, future research will need to examine the
generality of this inferential pattern of individuals; it may not always occur. For
instance, it might be an inference based on the particular disability or the sub
stance that brought about the voluntary intoxication in this case. Still, the fact
that it also occurred, although to a more moderate degree, in the insanity case
suggests that this inference pattern might be general.
In the three involuntary intoxication cases in which we intended to communi
cate various kinds oflow dysfunction levels ( Table 5.6, rows 4 to 6), we notice that
the respondents in fact perceive those cases as involving moderate levels of dys
function of a rather generalized sort. Specifically, the descriptions of scenarios 4
and 6 caused the respondents to perceive a moderate degree of both control and
cognitive dysfunction ( columns d through h). Intuitively in keeping with this,
they do reduce the sentences given to those individuals as compared to the con
trol case of murder ( Table 5.5, case 1-sentence of 1 0.42, above life imprison
ment) or the case in which an 1 8-year-old, nonintoxicated individual committed
the same act ( case 9, liability of 8.70, or more than 25 years in prison) . But the
sentences are by no means minor ones, ranging around five years in prison, and
relatively few respondents (20 to 26 percent) assign no liability or no punishment
in these cases.
We should mark one anomaly that we cannot currently explain. In the "low
cognitive" impairment scenario ( 5 ) , the respondents perceive that individual as
having a considerable degree of both control and cognitive impairment-yet gave
that individual a relatively high sentence. Further research will be needed to clar
ify this finding. It is possible that the subjects saw something in the specifics of
our description that led to this odd result.
Still, with some tentativeness, we can derive one conclusion relevant to code
drafters. Our respondents seem to analyze i nvoluntary intoxication cases as anal
ogous to those of mental illness; the subjects use the same concepts of control and
cognitive dysfunction that they employ for analyzing mental illness. This sup-
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ports the common practice of providing analogous conditions of exculpation in
the general involuntary intoxication and insanity defenses.
It strikes us that some general comments may be in order on the exact circum
stances that we created for the core scenario of the involuntary intoxication cases.
Recall that the individual is taking a long-term drug for the control of pain, has
not been warned by the physician as to the possibility of side effects, and takes an
over-the-counter cold remedy that, in interaction with the pain medication, trig
gers the mental dysfunction. This case seems fairly far toward the involuntary end
of a voluntary continuum that we will now suggest. Briefly, that continuum repre
sents what a sensible person should know about what might happen to his or her
mental state as a consequence of certain actions. Our actor, it seems to us, is rela
tively justified in not realizing in advance that the particular drug combination
would produce mental dysfunction. He is, in other words, in a state of high dys
function for involuntary reasons. Our previous study on voluntary intoxication
showed what happens when the intoxication is more voluntary.
What can we conclude from our respondents' j udgments of liabilities and asso
ciated perceptions of the immaturity cases? ( Refer again to Table 5.6, scenarios 7,
8, and 9, which vary the control, or murder, case only as to the the age of the per
son.) Notice, first, the "age" column ( a) of the table; clearly the readers notice and
can accurately report the age of the different persons in the scenarios. Also, col
umns d through h list respondents' perceptions as to the degree of awareness that
the person has about the consequences and the wrongfulness of his actions. I n
general, these results tend to suggest that the youngest person is seen a s compara
tively less aware of the wrongfulness and likely consequences of his actions. He is
less aware-but by no means unaware-all of the ratings stay well on the "aware"
side of the scale midpoints.
Next, notice the civil commitment factor ( column d of Table 5.5) . For the cases
involving underage perpetrators, we asked whether the respondents would rec
ommend some alternative, nonprison form of dealing with the offender, as is
sometimes available in the juvenile criminal justice system. Notice that some of
our respondents do indeed recommend this form of treatment for the underage
offender; the younger the offender, the higher the percentage of those recom
mending civil rather than criminal commitment. For the 1 0-year-old person, al
most half of the respondents recommend this form of treatment.
Next notice the liability ratings assigned to the differently aged persons (Table
5.5, column a) . Again, as in the previous study, the first number is the average lia
bility assigned by all respondents, factoring in zero (0) for those who selected the
civil rather than the criminal commitment option; the parenthesized numbers re
port the percentage of respondents imposing criminal liability and, of those, the
average sentence they would impose. Relatively severe sentences are given, and age
makes little difference in this. This surprises us, and we would like to see if this
result holds up in future research. However, tentatively, we will interpret it: The
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younger the perpetrator, the higher the percentage of respondents that would rec
ommend that person to receive treatment that is alternate to criminal incarcera
tion; however, for the majority of respondents who see criminal sentences as ap
propriate, youth does not decrease the duration of the sentence. Two possible
interpretations strike us: The majority sees criminal incarceration as an appropri
ate vehicle for reform of the young individual, and they think that a long time in
prison will accomplish this; or they see him as being just as incorrigible as an
older offender would be, and they want to lock him away for a good long time. We
suspect the latter.
As we mentioned in the introduction to this study, the treatment of juvenile of
fenders within the legal system is a topic of current discussion and controversy.
Although our subjects are willing to assign some degree of cognitive and control
impairment to 10- and 1 4-year-old youngsters, it may be that stronger inferences
about impairment, or the lack of it, would be made from a consideration of the
facts and circumstances of other particular acts of wrongdoing than those we have
devised for this study. There may be instances in which a 10-year-old is judged
both perfectly capable of being aware of the wrongfulness of a specific action and
quite able to maintain the self- control necessary to avoid committing it. There
also may be some instances in which an 1 8-year-old is seen to act without this
awareness. If so, then some examination of these issues within the context of a
trial might be the preferred procedure for judging the validity of the application
of this defense.
Study 1 3: Summary
Our involuntary intoxication scenarios involved an interaction between a pre
scribed and an over-the-counter drug; one would want to have cases about other
forms of involuntary intoxication before coming to any firm conclusions. That
said, involuntary intoxication does seem to be j udged by our respondents accord
ing to principles similar to those used for the general defense of insanity. How
ever, our respondents are noticeably less willing to treat involuntary intoxication
as a complete defense; it mitigates liabilities, but the liabilities assigned are still
reasonably high. Further research is needed to determine whether this is the case
in all instances of involuntary intoxication or if this was specific only to the cases
we created.
The younger the offender, the higher the percentage of our respondents who
recommend that the offender be treated in some alternative to the normal crimi
nal j ustice system. However, for any of a number of reasons that we have dis
cussed, those who would require that the offender be retained in the criminal jus
tice system are willing to give that person, despite the age factor, sentences of
more than twenty years. Much depends, we suspect, on the degree of rationality
that the respondents attribute to the offenders, and that may not correlate well
with the age of the offender. Much remains to be explored in further research on

1 47

Doctrines of Excuse

this topic, and we notice that the criminal justice system is in a somewhat unset
tled state with regard to the treatment of youthful offenders as well.
STUDY 1 4:
DURESS AND ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES
In legal codes, another defense, duress, exculpates a person whose conduct other
wise would create liability. In duress, unlike in the insanity, immaturity, and in
voluntary intoxication defenses, the focus is not directly on the dysfunction
caused but on the external pressures on the individual that might create reasons
why he or she engaged in the otherwise punishable conduct. These pressures nor
mally arise from the improper actions of other people and create such a force that
even a reasonably resolute p erson, subject to those pressures, might succumb to
them and violate a law. The bank manager who lets the burglars into the bank
vault after hours because the burglars have kidnapped his family (and he believes
that they will harm his family if he does not let them in) is an example of an indi
vidual who acts under coercion. The external pressure may cause coercion that, in
turn, one might guess, causes an impairment of control analogous to the impair
ments excused under insanity or immaturity defenses. Statutes typically require
that the force exceed a given level and reach a level of sufficient coerciveness to
render the person blameless, before a defense is available. Frequently the defini
tion of that level involves the familiar legal fiction of the "reasonable person:' Un
der the Model Penal Code, for example, the force must be such "that a person of
reasonable firmness in [the actor's] situation would have been unable to resist"
( MPC § 2.09 ) .
The case of the "entrapped individual" is sometimes thought t o share a similar
philosophical grounding; an individual who would not otherwise have commit
ted the criminal act is led by abnormal circumstances into doing so. The possibil
ity of entrapment arises when an agent of the government somehow lures or en
tices an individual into committing a crime. At the highest level of generalization,
the entrapment doctrine gives a person a defense if a government agent induces or
persuades that person to commit the offense. But as intuition would lead one to
expect, entrapment statutes typically have additional limitations and restrictions
that are taken into account. The defense is limited to instances of improper en
trapment by a police officer, typically undercover; the same inducement by a pri
vate individual is not grounds for a defense. The inducement or persuasion of en
trapment is not as compelling as the coercion typical of duress and does not seem
to so clearly exculpate the acting individual.
The entrapment defense is almost unique to the United States, and there is a
great deal of variety among different U.S. jurisdictions in defining it. The debated
differences center around defining it in an appropriately limited way. Two general
approaches are common. What may be called the "subjective formulation" of en
trapment requires both that the person be induced to commit the offense by the
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police agent and that the person is not otherwise predisposed to commit the of
fense. Thus, under the subjective formulation, a career drug dealer cannot get an
entrapment defense-even if the transaction was induced or encouraged by a
government agent-because the dealer's previous transactions demonstrate pre
disposition.
Note that, somewhat counterintuitively, the subjective formulation of the en
trapment defense does not have a specific requirement for the amount of pressure
or enticement that was brought to bear on the person. As long as the person is not
predisposed to commit the offense, any amount of pressure or inducement that
successfully causes the person to commit the offense will provide a defense. The
subj ective approach focuses on both the police and the accused and requires two
conditions for the defense to be successful-improper police conduct ( conduct
that would have caused a person not otherwise predisposed to do so to commit
the offense) and no predisposition on the part of the defendant.
One �senses that some competing policy considerations may be trading off
within this formulation. On the one hand, one does not want the police to go
around inducing criminal acts among citizens not otherwise predisposed to com
mit these acts. On the other hand, one recognizes that having undercover police
officers purchase drugs or otherwise induce illegal transactions is sometimes nec
essary for catching career criminals. Letting off career criminals is too high a price
to pay for deterring police entrapment practices, hence the exclusion ( from the
subjective formulation of the entrapment defense) of persons "predisposed to
commit the offense."
A second common approach of entrapment defenses is what may be called the
"objective formulation." Under this approach, the focus excludes whether the de
fendant was predisposed to commit the offense and focuses exclusively on the
propriety of the government agent's conduct. Of course, the subjective approach
also focuses on one aspect of the police officer's conduct-Is the conduct such
that it would cause a person not predisposed to commit the offense to do so? The
difference, however, is that the objective approach does not ask, in addition,
whether the defendant was in fact predisposed.
A career drug dealer may get an entrapment defense under the objective for
mulation if the government agent's conduct is "improper:' What conduct is "im
proper"? Under the Model Penal Code ( which uses such an objective formula
tion) , for example, a government agent acts improperly and may generate an
entrapment defense for an offender if the agent induces an offender to commit an
offense by: " ( a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or (b) employing methods of persua
sion or inducement that create a substantial risk that such an offense will be com
mitted by persons other than those who are ready to commit it" [ MPC §
2 . 1 3 ( 1 ) (a) and (b) ] .
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Note that the objective formulation seems somewhat more inconsistent with
people's intuition. The first clause of the statute requires only that the false repre
sentation be designed to induce a belief that the conduct was not prohibited. The
second clause requires only that the methods create a risk of inducing a person not
ready to com mit the offense to commit the offense. Thus, the statute does not re
quire that the actual offender be brought to the belief that the action is legal or
that the offender actually be persuaded or induced to commit the offense. That is,
the defendant need not actually be induced by the agent; the person need only
have committed the offense in response to certain actions on the part of the agent.
For instance, a government agent may tell a habitual drug dealer that it is not ille
gal to sell a certain sort of drug. The dealer may know full well that it is illegal and
yet escape liability for the act of selling the drug under the objective formulation
of the defense because of the agent's knowingly false representation.
It may be apparent by now that the entrapment defense is not, strictly speak
ing, an excuse that exculp ates the accused. It permits the person to escape from li
ability but does so for a variety of reasons relating to fairness and deterring gov
ernmental overreaching rather than the defendant's lack of blameworthiness.
This is true of the subjective formulation as well as the objective formulation. No
minimum coerciveness of the inducement is required. Nor is the defense available
if the person succumbs to inducement from a private citizen-even under cir
cumstances where the same inducement from a government agent would evoke a
defense.
This study tested cases involving both duress and entrapment. First, we sought
to determine whether the subjects would recognize a duress defense for coerced
conduct and, if so, how much coercion would be required to evoke the defense.
Second, and considerably more tentatively, we explored the related questions of
entrapment. We sought to determine whether our subjects would recognize a de
fense under the various conditions of entrapment suggested by different formula
tions of the defense. That is, we sought to determine whether the subjects would
see entrapping conditions as exculpating the person or, alternatively, whether
they might reduce the person's liability because they saw mitigating if not excul
pating conditions. We sought to examine as well whether the respondents' views
correspond better with one or the other of the two formulations of the entrap
ment defense.
In this study, we gave subjects both duress scenarios with varying levels of coer
cion and entrapment scenarios with and without predisposition of the offender,
with and without improper inducement by a government agent, as well as varia
tions substituting a private citizen for the agent. The core story involved an indi
vidual who agrees to transport eight ounces of cocaine for another individual. We
asked the respondents to tell us the degree to which they saw the person as being
personally disposed to commit the crime that he commits, to rate the amount of
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coercion they saw exercised on the person, to judge whether a person of reason
able firmness would be coerced or induced to commit the same offense, and to in
dicate the degree of impropriety of the inducements that are held out to the per
son in committing the crime, as well as to assess the punishment that the person
·deserves, if any. Table 5.7 contains the respondents' judgments.
As to the duress defense, notice first that in the control scenario (row 1 ) , in
which the person commits the crime of transporting cocaine with no degree of
duress or inducement, the liability our subjects imposed is 5.52, corresponding to
a sentence of approximately 2 years. For contrast, take the most extreme duress
case, that of high coercion (row 2) next. In this case an individual with no prior
record transports the cocaine for an individual who threatens to kill his family if
he does not do so. This high-coercion duress scenario gave liability results that are
much lower than the control case, suggesting that the respondents see a consider
able mitigation in this case; the average liability they assigned (column a, 2.29) is
a sentence of 3.8 weeks. Notice also that 50 percent of the subjects assign no pun
ishment to the offender.
As the degree of coercion decreases (the low-coercion case of row 3 ) , the sub
jects assign a liability that is between that of the high-coercion and the control
cases ( 3.65, corresponding to 4.4 months in jail). An examination of the distribu
tion of the results provides no evidence of bimodality, which would have sup
ported a "threshold" notion of coercion. It appears that here, as in other cases we
have examined, the respondents are making continuous judgments of liability for
cases in which the legal system imposes a threshold concept by requiring a fixed
minimum coercion for a complete defense. Our respondents see degrees of coer
don; the legal system sees either coercion or no coercion.
Examine next the ratings on the perceptions of the coercion cases (columns d
through h). In the case of high coercion, respondents are in agreement that the
coercion i s indeed high (column d, 8.2 1 on a scale in which 9 extreme coer
cion) , and they are in agreement with the statement that it is sufficient coercion to
cause any reasonable individual to succumb to it and commit the offense (col
umn e) . ( But notice that the extent of the agreement is not strong, 6.3 1-where 5
= unsure and 7 = agree. Respondents mention such options as reporting the
threat-making i ndividual to the police.) Our case of low coercion, which involves
a person smuggling cocaine because he would lose his job as a truck driver other
wise, is assessed by our subjects as a moderate to high coercion case (column d,
6.29-where 9 = extreme coercion ) , and they are generally unsure whether it is
enough coercion to get a reasonable person to commit the offense (column e,
4.88, or quite near the "unsure" response) . This suggests, in future research, cases
of very low coercion be included to test the lower limits of the respondents' per
ceptions. There may be cases in which subjects recognize that some degree of
pressure has been exerted yet do not grant the defense of coercion. However, note
that in one sense the pattern of results takes us in the opposite direction-to con=

·-···-·

TABLE 5.7

Liability and Subjects' Perceptions a s Related to D u ress a n d Entrapment

Scenarios
1.

(c)
(d)
% No Liability
or No
Punishment Amount
of Coercion
(N+O)

(a)

(b)

Liability

% No
Liability
(N)

5.52a

0

3

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

"Reasonable
"Reasonable
Person
"Improper
Person
Coerced" "Predisposition" lnducemenr' Induced"

Controlno duress or
inducement

-

-

5.58

Duress scenarios:
2.

High coercion

2.29c

9

50

8.21

6.31

2.32

8.09

6.32

3.

Low coercion

3.65b

3

24

6.29

4.88

3.68

7.53

4.82

2.44C

21

50

7.62

6.06

2.79

8.1 8

5.91

6.24a

6

9

3.65

4.38

6.91

6.03

4.50

3.5ob

3

26

7. 1 2

5.41

2.65

7.62

5. 1 8

Entrapment scenarios:
4.

No prior
record-agent

5.

Prior recordagent

6.

No prior
record-buddy

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
Key to column heads:
Statements

(e) through (h) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."
(d) How much coercion (i.e., pressure or force) did the actor feel, from the accomplice, to commit the offense?

(1 =no coercion; 9=extreme coercion).

(e) The amount of coercion (i.e., pressure or force) from the accomplice on the actor would have been enough to cause a
reasonable person in the actor's situation to commit the offense.

(f) The actor Is generally inclined to commit an offense like this even if no one encouraged him to do so.
(g) The accomplice used methods of persuasion or inducement on the actor, to get him to commit the offense, that were

improper.

(h) The accomplice used methods of persuasion or inducement on the actor, to get him to commit the offense, that would
have caused a reasonable person to commit the offense.
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate
means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only.
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sider what degree of coercion is necessary to completely exculpate the defendant.
Even our actor who experiences high coercion receives no punishment from only
50 percent of the subjects. This puzzles us, because the facts described in this sce
nario appear to be highly coercive-the respondents see them as highly coer
cive-and yet the offender does not receive complete exculpation.
Still, the degree of coercion that our subjects perceive as operating on the per
son makes a difference in the liabilities that our respondents assign. There is a sec
ond line of evidence that coercion makes a difference to our respondents. Look
within the low-coercion condition (scenario 3 ) ; specifically, at the perceptions of
whether a reasonable person would have been coerced into committing the crime
( column e). The extent to which the average subject judges that the degree of co
ercion would cause a reasonably firm individual to succumb to the pressure and
the degree of liability assigned to the offender correlate strongly. ( Beta -0.48,
F( l ,3 2 ) 9.62, p .004, with the negative sign indicating that the lesser the de
gree o f coercion that the respondent sees exerted on the person to commit the
criminal act, the longer the sentence he or she imposes on the offender for com
mitting the act.)
We next look at the psychologically more complicated situation of entrapment
to see if we can discern a pattern in the respondents' judgments. In scenario 4, the
driver, who has no prior record of an offense, is approached by an undercover
government agent who was previously acquainted with him in the Navy. The
driver is put under pressure by the agent to transport drugs. Scenario 5 is the
same, except the respondents were told that the person has had prior convictions
for transporting drugs. 14 The liabilities assigned to the two cases are significantly
different; the liability assigned to the person with the prior record is as high as
(indeed, higher than) the liability assigned to the individual who commits the act
with no inducement (control-case 1 ) . Compare this result with that suggested by
the objective formulation, which relies solely on the propriety of the conduct of
the government agent. Quite dearly, the objective formulation does not accord
well with our subjects' intuitions. For the objective formulation, the past convic
tions are irrelevant; what is critical is that the government agent approached the
person and, in some sense, "lured" him into the behavior. Yet for our respon
dents, prior convictions are critical; the individual with a prior record is assigned
a mean sentence of about four years, exceeding that assigned to the perpetrator in
the control case; in contrast, the individual with no prior record is assigned a sen
tence that is sharply lower (between four and five weeks in prison) .
The reason for this difference i s p robably found i n the respondents' percep
tions of the degree to which the criminal act resulted from the predispositions of
the person. ( Refer to column f in which subjects were asked whether they agree
that "the [ individual] is generally inclined to commit an offense like this even if
no one encouraged him to do so.") When the person has a prior history of similar
offenses, the respondents interpret the person's current criminal action as spring
ing from his predispositions (they agree with the statement that the action is due
=

=

=
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to the person's general inclinations) , and they tend to think that the coercion
would not have worked with a reasonable person (column e) ; they judge the
criminality of the person accordingly. In contrast, when the person is a first-time
offender (case 4), the coercive force of the inducements provided by the agent is
seen as much more potent, and the assigned liability is accordingly reduced.
These results are psychologically interesting: The discovery of prior convictions
has caused our respondents to see that entrapment scenario quite differently from
the others.
This is not to say that there is no concern that government agents are involved
in the inducement process or are acting improperly. In cases identical in every
other respect, a slightly greater mitigation of liability is given in the case of in
ducement by a government agent15 (case 4) than by a friend of the person (case
6 ) , and the percentage of respondents who assign no punishment in the former
case ( column c) is much higher. However, an examination of the various other
ratings of the two cases suggests that this may not be due to the fact that the in
ducer is a government agent; instead it may be because, knowing that the induce
ments came from a government agent who can be expected to be more skilled at
the "inducement game:' the amount of the coercion contained in the inducement
is j udged by the subjects as being slightly higher, the degree to which a reasonably
firm person would succumb to the inducement is rated slightly higher, and so on.
Whatever the source of this slight difference in the liabilities assigned in these
two nearly identical cases, the finding tends to undermine the validity of the en
trapment defense generally-both the objective and the subjective formulations.
The defense is available only for inducement by a police agent, yet the subjects see
the definition of police versus nonpolice source of the inducement as not a major
determinant of liability.
Much about the objective formulation is untested in this study and awaits fur
ther research. For example, such research might create cases in which the govern
ment agent entrapped but was not perceived as having coerced the person or in
which the government agent violated one of the objective formulation's specific
prohibitions, such as telling the person that the action was not illegal.
The subjective formulation of entrapment is this: A person, who is not predis
posed to commit the offense, is induced ( not coerced, as in the duress defense) to
commit the offense by a police officer with methods that would have induced a
reasonable person to also commit the offense. On initial examination of our data,
the subjective formulation of the entrapment defense corresponds better to the
subjects' view than the objective formulation. Of our three entrapment cases, sce
nario 4 draws on average the lowest liability assignment from our subjects-2.44
( 4.9 weeks)-and the person is perceived as not predisposed to commit the crime
(column f) . Further, subjects tend to agree that a reasonable person in the same
situation would have been induced to commit the crime (column h). Scenario 5,
in which the person, who has a prior record, is seen as predisposed and the in
ducement tends to be seen as not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to com-
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mit the crime, draws a sentence higher than our no-inducement control case (sce
nario 1 ) ! Further analysis confirms that the degree of perceived inducement
matters. Within entrapment scenario 4, we examined the correlation between the
agent providing an inducement and the degree ofliability our subjects assigned to
the induced individual [ Beta = -0.49, F( 1 ,32) = 9.62, p = .004 ] .
Note that even the subjective formulation o f entrapment does not find support
among the subjects as a defense. The individual with no prior record who is lured
by the government agent into committing the crime gets a liability rating of 2.44
(about 5 weeks in jail). This assignment of some liability on the part of our re
spondents suggests that they do not believe that a complete defense should be
available in entrapment cases (as provided for in current doctrine) but believe
that only a mitigation is appropriate. Moreover, recall also that the subjective for
mulation, like the objective formulation, stresses the importance of the inducer
being a police agent; however, our subjects give only minor weight to that distinc
tion.
We are tempted to ask whether, in terms of community standards, there should
be an entrapment defense at all. One of the questions that awaits further research
is whether one might explain the entrapment mitigations found in this study as
reflecting the subjects' assessment of the degree of duress-like coercion that ex
isted in the entrapment cases. Some of our results suggest that the subjects may
recognize entrapment as a defense only to the extent that it would give a defense
or mitigation under a duress defense (albeit a duress defense altered to take ac
count of degree of coercion and to give mitigations for coercion that does not ex
culpate). If this were so, then, if one were to reform the criminal-law doctrine to
conform to the subjects' views, one would expand the duress defense to provide a
mitigation (but not a complete defense) in cases of high to moderate coercion.
Having done that, one might then abolish the entrapment defense as unnecessary.
Study

1 4:

Summary

This study confirms the fact that people do mitigate and exculpate for coercion. If
duress is perceived, liability is lowered. An individual who is under quite high du
ress to commit a crime receives a significant reduction in liability but does not, as
we might have expected, receive complete exoneration. The frequent use of the
"liability but no punishment" option suggests that our respondents want to make
it clear that they are not condoning the conduct, but such disapproval of the con
duct does not diminish their willingness to exculpate the person. Recall that un
like insanity, which has a special verdict that signals the reason for the acquittal, a
duress acquittal under the current system leaves the message about the conduct
ambiguous. Thus, one would expect more resort to this particular verdict of, es
sentially, "rule violation but no punishment," under cases of duress than in insan
ity cases. The use of this option by our respondents shows no ambivalence about
exculpating the person, we suggest, but rather ambivalence about apparently ap
proving the conduct.
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With respect to entrapment, we found that both of the standard formulations,
which emphasize the importance of the inducement coming from a police agent
as well as the particular conduct of the police agent, do not have much effect on
the liability judgments of our subjects. Instead, our subjects give a mitigation in
those cases in which they believe the person is strongly coerced and in which they
believe a reasonably firm person would also be induced to commit the crime.
Thus, if the community's view was to be followed, the entrapment defense would
disappear as a separate defense and be subsumed under the duress defense.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The issues that we have addressed in this chapter are perhaps broader in scope
than in other chapters, and much about these doctrines of excuse remains to be
explored. Still, some conclusions seem reasonably well established. The disability
caused by mental incapacity is recognized by our respondents as a valid reason to
exculpate a person. Formulations of mental incapacity that recognize both a con
trol and cognitive deficit are the preferred ones; the respondents seem to judge
that dysfunction of either type is a valid trigger for exculpation. The greater the
dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of a defense. In addition, respondents
seem satisfied with a substantial rather than a complete dysfunction as establish
ing exculpation.
Involuntary intoxication is analyzed in legal codes on principles similar to the
ones used for the analysis of mental illness, and this seems appropriate to our
subjects. Their responses show a similar pattern ofliability for involuntary intoxi
cation as for insanity: They recognize both cognitive and control dysfunctions as
an excuse and the greater the dysfunction, the greater the likelihood of exc ulpa
tion.
Duress scenarios, our data reveal, are recognized as providing at least a mitiga
tion of liability for offenses, and the degree of mitigation is a function of the de
gree of coercion that the respondents see in the particular situation. Whether du
ress can provide a complete excuse-in the community's view-awaits further
research. Code formulations of the entrapment defense require that it be given
only when a police agent supplies the inducement that leads the person to commit
the crime, and our respondents did not see the importance of this requirement.
Instead, ·they seemed to judge these cases using considerations similar to the ones
they used in the duress cases, leading us to consider the possibility that the en
trapment defense might properly disappear as a separate defense and be sub
sumed under the duress defense.
We suggest that our respondents often deal with their complex judgments
about many of these excuse cases by giving a response that signals that they do
wish to disapprove of the conduct, but they do not wish to do more than symboli
cally punish the person.

6

Doctrines of Grading:
What Degree of Pun ishmen t
Is Deserved for One's
Blameworthy Violation ?

A legal code's grading of the seriousness of a blameworthy violation appears in
two forms: within offenses and between offenses. \Vi thin a general offense such as
rape or theft, it is often the case that the code makes some distinctions about the
differential seriousness of different kinds of rapes or thefts. Different levels of
punishment are attached to these different intra-offense gradings. Also, different
types of offenses are given different grades, reflecting the relative seriousness of
rape as compared to theft, for example.
We have touched on the issue of grading within offenses already. The factors
that establish the minimum requirements for criminalization and for liability,
discussed in the previous chapters, provide the starting point for grading within
an offense. They establish the requirements for the lowest grade of any given of
fense. The determination of higher grades of the offense then requires consider
ation of various other factors. Nearly all jurisdictions recognize several grades of
homicide: negligent homicide, manslaughter (paradigmatically reckless homi
cide), and murder (intentional homicide) . It is also common to distinguish even
within these categories. Some j urisdictions may recognize two grades of murder
and of manslaughter-first and second degree. Thus, first degree murder might
be reserved for the most brutal forms of murder. Other offenses also have higher
grades contained within their definitions, such as aggravated assault. Rape may
have three or four grades-the term "rape" sometimes being used only in relation
to the most serious of these grades.
A second sort of question involves what might be called "comparative grading»
across different offenses. This requires j udgments about the seriousness of a par
ticular offense in comparison to other offenses. Murder intuitively seems a more
serious offense than rape, which seems a more serious offense than theft, and so
on, and the criminal codes recognize this by classifying murder as a higher grade
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of offense than rape and rape a higher grade than theft, with a corresponding
classification of each of the grades within each general offense.
Questions of offense seriousness and grading have become more important of
late because of the move to standardize sentences by creating sentencing guide
lines that j udges must follow when they sentence convicted criminals. Factors that
were once left to be considered by the sentencing j udge in a highly discretionary
j udgment of how much punishment ought to be imposed are now articulated and
given defined weight under modern sentencing guidelines. So, offense-grading
principles, historically important in constructing criminal codes, have become
important in the sentencing context.
The criminalization doctrines identify many of the most important factors in
assessing the degree of punishment a person deserves-and thus what we might
call the comparative grading of the offense-because they define the harm or evil
of the offense. Interestingly, they frequently have done so by appeal to human in
tuition, although others have suggested that comparative grading is derivable
from some more logical, less intuitive, analysis. Regardless of presumed source, it
usually comes out that human safety is more important than the safety of prop
erty; intercourse with a 9-year-old is a more egregious wrong than intercourse
with a 1 6-year-old. Assessing the relative seriousness of an offense requires an as
sessment of the relative value of the full range of interests protected by the crimi
nal law. Criminal-law theorists have only recently attempted to formulate princi
ples for determining the relative seriousness of violations, having relied
previously on appeals to shared intuitions within the culture ( see, e.g., Feinberg,
1 984; von Hirsch and Jareborg, 1 99 1 ) .
The grading task for the code drafters, then, is twofold: to distinguish among
distinct grades of an offense, specifying minimal requirements for the crime, and
specifying the circumstances that will produce a more aggravated version of that
crime; and also to put these individual crimes into some comparative relationship
of seriousness. Many of the studies reported earlier in this book give a hint at the
kinds of factors that are relevant to these tasks.
First, the greater the seriousness of the harm caused, the higher the grade as
signed to the offense. "Seriousness" can be an intuitive notion, and people can
differ on how "serious'' a particular offense ( like theft) is, but it is dearly a notion
that occupies a central place in a person's grading of offenses. Crimes in which life
is risked or lost consistently receive more severe sentences than what we cannot
help referring to as "lesser crimes." As we saw in our study on offense culpability
requirements (Study 8 ) , people regard a sexual offense, in which an individual
who did not consent to intercourse is raped, as more serious than setting fire to a
dwelling ( in which people could conceivably be harmed) , and setting fire to a
dwelling, in which a person could conceivably be harmed, as more serious than
setting fire to a similar site that is uninhabited. Second, similar notions of serious
ness define the grades within a category of offense. The risk-of-harm study (Study
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2 ) , for example, showed that subjects increase liability as the extent of the harm
risked increases.
The operating principle used to grade between and within offenses appears to
be the same: The greater the harm caused or risked, the greater the liability, all
other things being equal. In Study 1 5, a study concerning sexual offenses, we show
just how refined the community's judgments can be in distinguishing among ac
tions judged to be of different seriousness. We also show that the general principle
of "greater harm means greater liability" applies as well to offenses, such as many
sexual offenses, that are defined in terms of the depravity of the conduct rather
than the harmfulness of the results of those actions.
A second powerful influence in grading is the person's culpability level. Several
studies in the previous chapters (and particularly Chapter 4) have demonstrated
that greater culpability in producing a fixed level of harm generally means greater
liability. For instance, recall that greater liability is assigned to the accomplice
who has greater culpability as to the perpetrator's offense or as to assisting a per
petrator (Study 9 ) . Also recall the greater liability assigned to the individual who
purposefully sets out to become intoxicated before he kills another, as compared
to the individual who only knowingly or recklessly does so (Study 1 0 ) . In Study
1 6, we refine that discussion with an investigation of felony murder, a doctrine
frequently criticized as deviating from the normal principles of culpability. The
study's results suggest that the subjects make relatively refined judgments about
culpability.
A third influence on grading is the actual presence of the harm or evil of the of
fense and the strength of the person's causal connection to it. This is a related but
distinct factor from the nature of the harm or evil noted previously. We said that,
for instance, intentional killing is perceived as more serious than theft and is
therefore graded more seriously. The point is that, within the realm of intentional
killings, an actual killing is assigned more liability than an unsuccessful attempt
to kill. The attempt study (Study 1 ) demonstrates this point. We refine this notion
in this chapter by showing that resulting harm provides increased liability-but
only if the harm is sufficiently causally connected with the person's conduct. In
Study 1 7, we present subjects' reactions toward different causal connections to a
resulting death, which indicate that the stronger the causal connection with a re
sulting harm, the greater the increase in liability because of that resulting harm.
This result was signaled in the objective requirements of complicity study (Study
3 ) . Complicity is a form of causing an offense perpetrated by another person. The
complicity study suggested that the greater the degree of the accomplice's causal
contribution to the offense, the greater the accomplice's liability.
A fourth contributor in setting a person's ultimate punishment is the number
of offenses for which he or she is to be punished. Consider the example of a head
line which reads, "Burglar Who Committed 20 Burglaries Finally Caught." Obvi
ously whether the burglar actually did commit the twenty offenses requires judi-
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cial determination, but suppose the system determines that the burglar did.
Somehow this must be reflected in the sentence that the burglar receives. This
goes somewhat beyond the issue of offense grading, but it is an essential part of
setting the general range of punishment-the goal of the grading determination.
In Study 1 8, we investigate a few of the basic principles involved in determining
the range of punishment for multiple offenses.
STUDY 1 5:
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE-SEXUAL OFFENSES
One of the major tasks of a criminal code is to identify the most significant fac
tors that affect the seriousness of a criminal action and to define offenses in a way
that incorporates these factors. Our first study in this chapter examines the grad
ing of offenses within the category of sexual offenses. We selected these offenses
because, intuitively, some of the judgments encased within some legal codes on
these issues seemed "out of kilter" with the ways that ordinary people seem to
think about these offenses in the 1 990s.
Sexual offenses, as they are defined by the Model Penal Code (MPC, or "the
Code" ) , are defined and graded around several central distinctions. For example,
forms of forcible intercourse generally are treated as more serious than forms of
consensual but unlawful intercourse, such as consensual intercourse with an un
derage partner. Within each of these groups (forcible and consensual inter
course) , the Code adds several grading refinements and it is here that we think
that the Code may contradict community standards. Forcible intercourse is
deemed less serious if the victim is a voluntary social companion on the occasion
of the crime or previously permitted the person sexual liberties [ MPC §
2 1 3 . 1 ( 1 ) ] . Forcible intercourse is judged to be still less serious (indeed, is not a
sexual offense but only simple assault) if the aggressor and the victim are mar
ried ' or living together as married [MPC § 2 1 3. 1 ( 1 ) and (2) ] . However, if the
same forcible intercourse occurs between a homosexual couple living together as
married, it is not judged to be as serious as rape, because the relationship between
the parties is not given legal standing in the Code. 2
Cases of consensual intercourse similarly are distinguished in seriousness ac
cording to several factors. Intercourse with a partner under the age of 1 6 ("statu
tory rape" ) or with a mentally retarded female who is "incapable of appraising the
nature of her conduct" is judged less serious than forcible rape but more serious
than consensual intercourse by a female with a retarded male or consensual inter
course with a person who is in the person's legal custody (such as a prisoner is to a
jailer). It is a complete defense to several offenses, including statutory rape, that
the victim previously engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others
[MPC §§ 2 1 3 . 1 ( l ) ( a ) ] and ( 2 ) (b), 2 1 3.3( 1 ) (a), 2 1 3.4(2) and (8), and 2 1 3 .6(4) ] .
Our sexual offenses study sought to test the offense distinctions used in the
Model Penal Code against the community's views by presenting a series of see-
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narios, each o f which embodies one o f the Code's distinctions. In this study, those
who wrote the different scenarios allowed the circumstances of the scenarios to
vary more widely than has been the case in many of the other studies, because
they wanted the cases to have some overall plausibility. Thus, occasionally a code
community difference that we will report may be due to differences in scenarios
other than the ones that are central to the legal issues that we are pursuing. When
that is possibly the case, we will comment on it. The results of the study are de
scribed in Table 6 . 1 .
The control case of "straight" rape involves a woman who is followed as she
leaves her health club, forcibly detained in a deserted parking lot, and forced to
have sexual intercourse by a man who threatens to kill her if she screams or resists
him. Our respondents gave this act (Table 6. 1 , case 1 , column a) a liability rating
of 7.84, which corresponds to 1 3 .4 years in prison. Examine next the case of the
rape perpetrated by an individual who was out on a date with the woman, returns
with her to her apartment, and rapes her there, the "date" case ( row 2 ) . The forc
ible intercourse mitigation that the Code recognizes for a voluntary social com
panion appears only as a slightly lower liability mean for that scenario than the
control scenario, 7.26 versus 7.84 (9.4 years versus 1 3.4 years, p < . 1 1 ) .
This interpretation of the difference is complicated by the fact that the readers
p erceive a higher, although not significantly different, degree of consent on the
part of the woman to the intercourse in the date scenario and also attribute a
higher degree of causation to her as well. ( Examine Table 6.2, scenarios l and 2,
columns b and c for these results.) In future research, a date rape versus a stranger
rape comparison should attempt to create similar perceptions of consent and
causation in both instances, and see if any reduction of sentence for the offender
remains.3 Still, one can say of these results that, even if the subjects see greater
consent in the date context, they see it as having only a slight effect on liability, not
such that would seem to support the grading difference assigned to the two cases
by the Code. It may well be that our perceptions of the meaning of accepting an
invitation to a date may have changed from those held at the time the Code's
drafters developed these rules. Perhaps the point to extract is that community
standards can change over time, and legal codes might properly change with
them. The hint of a discovered difference between the two cases, if it can be repli
cated in future studies, provides some support for the grading difference that the
legal code assigns to the two cases, but even so the extent of the Code's difference
in its treatment between the two ( maximum of life for first-degree versus maxi
mum of ten years for second-degree offense) is much more of a difference than is
justified in the subjects' view.
In the next two cases, the rape occurs between people who have been cohabit
ing. The woman tells the man with whom she has been living ( case 3) or to whom
she has been married ( case 4) that she is leaving him and does not want to see him
anymore. The conversation takes place in their residence and she asks him to

TABLE 6. 1

Liability for Sexual Offens�s

(a)

Scenarios
Forcible intercourse:
1 . Stranger

Liability
7.848

(c)
% No Liability
% No
or No
Liability Punishment
(N)
(N+O)
(b)

0

0

(d)

Model Penal
Code Result

1 st-degree felony
[§21 3. 1 (1 )(a), rape]
2nd-degree felony
[§2 1 3 . 1 (1 )(a)&(ii},
rape]
Misdemeanor
[§2. 1 1 (1 )(a),
simple assault]
Misdemeanor
[§2. 1 1 ('1 )(a},
simple assault]
2nd-degree felony
[§2. 1 3.2( 1 )(a),
deviate sex by force]

2. Date

7.268•b

26

29

3. Live together

6.27b,c

26

31

4. Married

5.68C

53

66

5. Homosexual

5.58C

53

66

Consensual intercourse:
2.29d
6. Statutory

18

55

3rd-degree felony
[§2 1 3.3(1 )(a),
statutory rape]

2.39d

21

53

8. Mentally
handicapped
female

Complete defense
[§21 3.6(3)]

1 .97d

34

63

9. Mentally
handicapped·
male

3rd-degree felony
[§21 3.1 (2)(b), gross
sexual imposition]

1 .37d

37

74

1 o. Female in jail

1 .82d

37

63

Misdemeanor
[§21 3.4(2), sexual
assault]
Misdemeanor
[§21 3.3( 1 )(c),
seduction]

7. Statutoryprior promiscuity

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, /5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
Note: Superscript letters indicate. significance at the p < .05 level by a
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns
only.

TABLE 6.2

Subjects' Perceptions of Sexual Offenses

Scenarios

(a)

(b)

(c)

"Actor
Forced"

'Victim
Consented"

'Victim
Caused"

1 .37C
1 . 87 b,c

(e)
(d)
(f)
'Victim
'Victim Should 'Victim Acted
Capable of
Morally
Have Struggled
Inappropriately" Consent"
More"

Forcible intercourse:
1.

Stranger

8.1 88

2.

Date

8. 1 38

3.

Live together

4.

Married

5.

Hom osexual

7. 798•b
7.828• b
7.oob

2.32b
2. 1 8b
2.26 b

1 .82

2.55

1 .47

2.47

2.97

1 .89

3.95
3 95

2.97

2.87

2.95

3.1 1

3.50

3.97

3.76

.

Consensual i ntercourse:
6.

Statutory

7.

Statutory�rior promiscuity

2.26C

8.

Mentally handicapped female

9.

Mentally handicapped male
Female in jail

3.05C
2.82C

1 0.

2. 1 6C

2.57C

5. 1 6

5.32

5.37

7.638

5.71

5.47

5.55

6.958

4.05

7.708

7.088

3.89

3.37
3.45

7.228

3.86

3.89

Key to column heads:
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

The actor forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him.
The victim consented to have sexual intercourse with the actor.
The victim's behavior caused the actor's actions.
The victim s hould have struggled harder to prevent what happened.
The victim acted in a way that is morally inappropriate.
The victim was capable of meaningfully consenting to sexual i ntercourse.

Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the

p < .05 level by a Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate

means that are not statistically sig nificantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only.

0\
\.;.)
-
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sleep in a different room or at a relative's home. Angered, the man comes into the
bedroom, and they begin fighting. Then the story returns to the core, in which
the man forces the woman to have sex and threatens to kill her if she screams or
resists. Notice that the rejection of the man creates the possibility that the respon
dents would perceive the rapist as in the grip of an emotion, and perhaps they re
duce the liability assigned for that reason. With that in mind, let us examine the
results.
Notice first that the respondents agreed that in this forceable intercourse case,
the man forced intercourse on the woman-but agreed less enthusiastically than
in the stranger and date rape cases (Table 6.2, column a) . They also perceive ( col
umn b) a low degree of consent on the part of the victim-but significantly more
consent than in the stranger rape case. This may provide at least a partial account
of why the subjects' liability means for stranger rape ( column a ofTable 6. 1 , 7.84,
or 1 3.4 years) and date rape ( 7.26, or 9.4 years) are noticeably higher than those
for a couple living together (6.27, or 4.2 years) or for a married couple ( 5.68, or
2.4 years) . But even with this possibility, the differences we found are not nearly
so different as the Code provides when the aggressor and victim are married or
living together: from first- or second-degree felony for rape of a stranger or date
rape to a misdemeanor for forcible intercourse with a legal or common-law
spouse (treated as simple assault, for which the maximum sentence is one year) .
This seems to us to suggest that a reexamination of the Code is in order.
If the Code regards forcible sexual intercourse between a couple who are mar
ried or living together as significantly less serious, this seems a judgment that is
no longer in tune with the way people think. If the Code lowers the degree of the
offense because the drafters were attributing an automatically higher degree of
consent to the woman, this too seems inappropriate. Sadly, we have learned in the
past few decades that spouses do batter, abuse, and rape their mates without re
gard for the lack of the victim's consent. The issue of consent is a judgment best
left to the jurors who are privy to the details in each specific case.
.
The greatest difference between the Code's and the subjects' views of the forc
ible intercourse scenarios arises where the aggressor and victim are a homosexual
couple living together. In this story (Table 6. 1 , case 5), the circumstances are the
same as in the married couple story. One individual announces he wishes to end
the relationship; angered, the other forcibly rapes him, threatening to kill him if
he resists or screams. The subjects see the case as meriting essentially the same de
gree of punishment as that given in the case of forcible intercourse between a
married couple ( 5.58 versus 5.68, p ::::: ns). The Code, in sharp contrast, treats the
married heterosexual case as a misdemeanor (simple assault), not a sexual offense
at all, and the homosexual case as a serious sexual offense (deviate sexual inter
course by force) , a second-degree felony. Clearly, a good deal of the reason for this
lack of difference is that our respondents see the case of rape within marriage as
much more serious than does the Code. A further reason is that our respondents
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are not assigning an increment in liability for the fact that the homosexual inter
course is "deviant" although the Code appears to.4
D isparities between the Code and the subjects also exist in the consensual in
tercourse scenarios. The two cases at issue here are the "statutory" and the "statu
tory with prior promiscuity" cases (Table 6. 1 , scenarios 6 and 7). In both, a
1 4-year-old girl initiates sexual intercourse with a 1 9-year-old boy. In the latter,
she has a reputation for prior promiscuity. The Code gives a complete defense to
the third-degree felony of statutory rape for the offender in the case of a victim's
prior promiscuity, while the subjects see no significance in an underage victim's
prior promiscuity ( 2.29 versus 2 .39, column a). The mean sentence in both cases
is a b it less than four weeks, and more than half of the subjects would assign no
punishment. The respondents' reasoning here seems clear. Given the specifics of
the case (that the girl is 1 4, near the age of consent, and initiates the intercourse,
that the boy is 1 9, and that there is no suggestion of violence) , the respondents do
not regard the case as particularly serious whether or not there is prior promiscu
ity on the part of the girl. Notice that in these two scenarios-and these two
only-the respondents tend to agree with the statement that the victim brought
about the intercourse ( column c of Table 6.2 ) . They also agree strongly that she
had consented to it ( column b) ; a sensible judgment, since they were told that the
girl had initiated it. However, note the sharp difference in the relatively lenient
sentence that our subjects assign ( 2 .29, or 3.8 weeks in jail) and the third-degree
felony liability (a five-year maximum) that the Code assigns in the case of the in
dividual who has intercourse with a nonpromiscuous 1 4-year-old girl. As we said
earlier, the respondents do not see this particular case of statutory rape as serious.
The Code classifies consensual intercourse with an underage female and with a
mentally retarded female as the same grade, and the subjects also consider the lat
ter (case 8) as approximately equal in seriousness to consensual statutory rape.
( The liability difference between the two cases is not statistically significant. ) Here
it is important that we say more about the specifics of the mentally handicapped
case. The degree of mental retardation or mental handicap is probably perceived
by our subjects as mild, since the mentally retarded woman is described as able to
attend physical therapy sessions at a local health dub, and the case description
makes it clear that the handicapped individual initiates the sex act with the man.
Our respondents clearly perceived ( column b and c of Table 6.2) that these cir
cumstances, taken jointly, warrant the inference that the handicapped individual
tends to play a causal role in bringing about the intercourse and certainly "con
sents" to the intercourse.
In these circumstances, the respondents do not view the male's participation in
this case of intercourse as particularly blameworthy. This does not mean that peo
ple will never see intercourse with a mentally handicapped person as serious; an
other set of circumstances would probably lead to an inference of more serious
wrongdoing. For instance, one would expect that a person who is extremely men-
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tally retarded would not be perceived as able to give meaningful consent to inter
course. However, the results do suggest that people are capable of making quite
nuanced judgments in this area and resist seeing statutory rape or intercourse
with a mentally handicapped person as always being as serious as a third-degree
felony.
One obvious limitation on our results ought to be mentioned here; in our case
of consensual intercourse with an underage person, the underage person is a
1 4-year-old teenager and is likely to be seen by the respondents as fairly adult in
her decision-making capacities. Were the victim to be younger, one would expect
that the subjects would see the offense in a more serious light. ( So would the
Model Penal Code; if the victim is less than 10 years of age, the Code moves the
grade up to the same grade as for forcible rape of a stranger-first or second-de
gree felony [MPC § 2 1 3. 1 ( l ) (d) ] . Similarly, the mentally retarded person also
seems to be perceived as competent enough to give consent. However, the contra
diction between our respondents' j udgments on these two cases and the Code re
mains. The consensual statutory rape cases we presented-of the teenage girl or
the mentally retarded individual-are cases that represent classes of cases that re
ceive different treatment by our respondents than they are assigned by the Code.
We will return to a discussion of what this suggests.
Turning to a comparison of cases 8, 9, and 10, in the mentally handicapped
male case (scenario 9), a female has sexual intercourse with a mentally handi
capped male under the same circumstances as the previously described case in
which the male has intercourse with a mentally handicapped female ( scenario 8);
and in the «female in jail" case (scenario 10), a female prisoner has sexual inter
course with one of the guards. The guard has supervisory responsibility over the
woman, but there is no suggestion in the scenario that he has used his power to
coerce the woman into intercourse (she consents to it). The Code finds differ
ences between these three cases. Under the Code, consensual intercourse with a
mentally retarded female is classed as a third-degree felony, while the same con
duct with a mentally retarded male or with a person for whom the offender has
custodial supervision is a misdemeanor. The subjects, in contrast, do not distin
guish significantly between these three forms of consensual intercourse { mentally
retarded male, mentally retarded female, and person in custody). Nor do they as
sign significant sentences to any of them; all persons receive a mean sentence of
less than two weeks in jail, and approximately between two-thirds and three
quarters of the respondents assign no jail term at all.
In these three cases, the respondents see the victim ( or perhaps we should say
the «victim") as giving consent to the intercourse. As an examination of the rat
ings in the «consent" column for these cases reveals, in all of these cases the re
spondents agree (Table 6.2, column b) that the "victim" has consented to the in
tercourse. An underlying issue here (that code drafters might raise) is the degree
to which the consent is freely and competently given-that is, perhaps a reason-
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able person's interpretation of the perceptions of the perpetrator on this issue of
consent. The legal code may treat other cases involving prisoners or mentally
handicapped individuals differently because it regards those cases as involving a
lower degree, or otherwise flawed case, of consent. If this is so, then code drafters
might consider making the degree and quality of consent the explicit focus of the
j udicial inquiry rather than imputing different degrees of consent to the different
categories of sexual offenses. Alternatively, this may be one of those cases in which
there is a reasoned set of valid considerations for having the legal code contradict
the intuitive judgments of respondents, in which case it would be useful to articu
late those considerations.
Another important aspect of the results is that some major differences appear
in punishment assignments between groups of our subjects. More specifically, the
results reflect a dramatic disagreement in the amount of punishment imposed in
the consensual intercourse scenarios. A majority of subj ects would impose no
punishment in any of scenarios 6 through 10 (see column c of Table 6. 1 ) . Our ex
amination of the distribution of punishment given by the subjects suggests two
distinct camps of opinion among the subjects. While a m ajority of subjects im
pose no punishment, the subjects that do impose punishment impose liability in
the 4 to 6 range ( 4 == 6 months; 6 == 3 years) ; no one in the study assigned punish
ment in the in-between range of 1 to 3. One would have expected more sentences
in this range if the distribution was of the typical normal curve pattern. 5
Obviously, this finding arises mainly from the cases in which the lower liability
assignments were made. This is one of the few times in our studies that we have
found a relationship that suggests that subsets of subjects see the situation differ
ently. The grounds for this result will need to be addressed in future research. One
obvious hypothesis, that males and females are seeing the situation differently,
seems not to be the case.6 A related possibility is that a small subset of our sample
regards sexual congress with an underage or mildly retarded person as a serious
offense while most others do not. Further research is needed to understand this
difference and the possible attitudinal sources of it.

Study 1 5: Summary
The results of the sexual offenses study suggest that the subjects agree with some
of the distinctions contained in the Code but not others. Of the scenarios tested,
all forms of forcible intercourse are viewed by the subjects as more serious than
any form of unlawful consensual intercourse. The subjects do not, however, rec
ognize the Code's significant reduction in liability for forcible intercourse with a
social companion, nor do they provide as much reduction as the Code does for
forcible intercourse with a spouse. The Code defines a marital-like relationship of
a heterosexual couple as receiving a greater mitigation than our subjects would
grant in the seriousness of forcible intercourse. Yet, at the same time, the Code
disregards a marital-like relationship of a homosexual couple, treating the offense
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as if it is one between strangers, though our subjects would treat the case as analo
gous to that of a married couple. These differences between the Code and our
subjects may reflect a change in public attitudes since the late 1 950s, when the
Code was drafted.
The subjects see as less serious than the Code does all forms of consensual in
tercourse, and most of the Code's distinctions in this area are not particularly sig
nificant to the subjects. In our respondents' view, consensual intercourse with
someone under 1 6 years of age is seen as only slightly more serious than other
forms of consensual intercourse. Contrary to the Code's rule, our subjects j udge
prior promiscuity of the underage partner as having no such mitigating effect, al
though there is the possibility that this is true because the sentence assigned the
non-prior-promiscuity is so low as not to be much reducible. In the context of
consensual intercourse as well, the distinctions that the Code uses-prior promis
cuity of a statutory rape victim, female versus male mentally handicapped vic
tim-and its more serious treatment of all forms of unlawful consensual inter
course may reflect public opinion as it was before 1 962. More than three decades
have passed since then, and public opinion has shifted. Even in the several years
since this data was collected, state code reforms have nearly eliminated use of the
Model Penal Code's spousal exception to rape as well as other traditional formu
lations of sexual offenses. Thus, state legislatures appear to have been sensitive to
the changing public views revealed by these results and have reformulated their
codes accordingly.
Another more complex explanation of the differences between the Code and
the subjects' responses is that the Code standards were based on a mix of two con
siderations-first, assumptions about what the degree of consent was likely to
have b een, as inferred from the nature of the existing relationships between the
two individuals; and second, notions concerning "a husband's rights" and the
"unnaturalness" of any homosexual relationship. It would be useful, in future re
search, to see if individuals who differ on these attitudes also differ in their liabil
ity assignments to specific rape scenarios. But we would continue to suggest that
it would probably be useful, to the degree to which codes were based on what
seem to us to be outmoded notions, to revise the Code to reflect changes in com
munity views. If codes are instantiating notions about what degree of consent is
assumed to exist in different relationships, it might be b etter to deal directly with
consent issues in the context of the specific trial rather than infer them from rela
tionships.
Should the Code be drafted in terms of the ultimate issue of effective consent,
rather than using substitutes for consent such as age, mental handicap, or posi
tion of power disadvantage? In an age in which sexual harassment is a
commonplace issue, this is a remarkably timely question. Some might suggest
that these objective substitutes are needed because a p erson uses them to know
whether the partner is capable of, and in a position to, give effective consent. In
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this way, we avoid punishing persons who are honestly mistaken about effective
consent. But an alternative approach to protect these same persons from liability
is available: to rely on culpability requirements to exculpate for a mistake. To be
logically consistent, however, this might mean that the culpability requirement
would need to be restored for statutory rape, for example, from which it fre
quently has been removed.
We have offered the suggestion that community standards about sexual of
fenses may have changed over the past few decades. Not all offenses are likely to
be the subject of significant changes in public opinion, but a mechanism ought to
exist that will detect such changes and signal a need for code drafters to reexamine
the offense definitions. This is one important function of increased social science
research on community views of criminal liability and punishment.
STUDY 1 6:
THE CULPABILITY OF THE PERSON-FELONY MURDER
One person causes the death of another. As common intuition suggests, the legal
codes concern themselves with exactly how this came about and assign different
degrees of liability depending on the answer. Specifically, the standard grading
differences among homicides tie the degree of liability to the level of a person's
culpability as to causing the death. As is familiar to the reader by now, a person
who purposely or knowingly causes a death is liable for murder; one who reck
lessly causes a death is liable for manslaughter; one who negligently causes a death
is liable for negligent homicide; and the grade of the offense in each instance is di
minished.7
When an accomplice is involved in the homicide, similar considerations of cul
pability are used. Specifically, the culpability level of a person who assists the prin
cipal (an accomplice) as to causing another's death is determinative of the degree
of liability. Like the principal, an accomplice who is purposeful or knowing as to
the homicide is liable for murder; one who is reckless is liable for manslaughter;
and one who is negligent is liable for negligent homicide.8
But for a certain kind of homicide-when the homicide occurs during the
commission of a felony-the consideration of either the principal's or the accom
plice's degree of culpability abruptly stops; any homicide of this kind is consid
ered to call for the penalties assigned for murder. Most jurisdictions have a special
doctrine, called the felony-murder rule, that holds a person liable for murder,
without regard to his level of culpability as to causing the death, if that person
causes the death in the course of a felony.9 Thus, an offender's negligent killing
that would otherwise be punished as negligent homicide is treated as murder if it
occurs during a robbery. 1 0 A second aspect of the felony-murder rule applies this
aggravation of culpability to accomplices as well. Thus, an accomplice in a rob
bery is liable for murder, although he assists a principal who is only negligent as
to the killing and is himself (the accomplice) only negligent as to such a death. 1 1
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Initially, one intuitively sees the point of this. Assume I am robbing a bank and
fire a warning shot into the floor, but I have used such a powerful pistol that the
shot ricochets and kills some innocent customer to my surprise. The force of the
claim that I have committed a more serious offense than negligent homicide is
clear. I have created a situation fraught with danger and should pay the price
when the potential harm is realized. Still, one also understands why the case is still
distinguishable from intentional killing ( murder) in a way that suggests lower lia
bility.
The felony-murder rule is still broader in some jurisdictions, and it seems to
move even farther away from our intuitions. Some jurisdictions hold felons liable
for a death caused by an innocent person who resists the intended felony. 1 2 Thus,
in the case in which a person who is being robbed draws a gun and accidentally
kills an innocent bystander, the robbers are held liable for murder for the killing
of the bystander by the robbery victim. A specific case will make the operation of
the rule clear and also will help explicate why it causes us uneasiness. Two thieves
have tunneled into a bank vault and are surreptitiously hauling away cash. Alerted
by a silent alarm, two independent private security groups rush to the scene, each
unaware of the other. In the confusion, a member of security force A shoots and
kills a member of security force B. The thieves, neither of whom are armed, are
charged with murder. Now clearly, the thieves created the occasion for the acci
dent and are in some very basic and central way responsible for the outcome, but
it does not seem intuitively obvious that the right decision is to assign them the
same penalty we would assign a thief who shoots the security guard.
In some jurisdictions, the rule goes yet farther. It has been applied to both kill
ings of an innocent and killings of one of the felons. 1 3 In this latter case, it is fel
ony murder for the surviving robber if a robbery victim pulls out a hidden gun
and kills one of the robbers in self-defense; that is, some jurisdictions hold surviv
ing robbers liable for murder for the death of their fellow robber. Consider the
case: I and my accomplice are stealing valuable property from a warehouse at
night. A security guard approaches to apprehend us, and my accomplice unwisely
attacks the guard while I cower in the corner. The guard shoots the accomplice,
kills him, and I am charged with murder. Intuitively, this seems a bit severe.
It seemed severe to the Model Penal Code drafters as well. The Code drafters
disapproved of the felony-murder rule, even in its most narrow form. They sub
stituted an evidentiary presumption, rebuttable by the defendant, that if a killing
occurs in the course of a felony, the felons are presumed to have caused the death
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value
of human life;' which it defines as adequate culpability for murder [ MPC §
2 1 0.2( l ) ( b) ] . Commentators similarly criticize the felony-murder rule and have
applauded the Model Penal Code's rejection of it. 1 4 Finkel ( 1 990) has provided a
forceful analysis of the complexities and apparent contradictions in the various
courts' holdings in the felony-murder matter, and the degree to which the felony-
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murder rule seems to contradict community sentiment. Both code drafters and
commentators argue, in part, that the rule fails to accurately assess the felon's de
gree of blameworthiness. That is, they concur with what we would expect ordi
nary people's intuitions would be about the blameworthiness of the individual
who admittedly caused the state of affairs that led to the death but did so in ways
that cause us to wish to distinguish that case from a prototypical case of murder.
Interestingly, this is one of the instances in which the code drafters and the
commentators have had little effect on state criminal codes. The enduring popu
larity of the felony-murder rule is reflected in the fact that although more than
over two-thirds of the states have recodified their codes to adopt the Model Penal
Code's general structure, a majority have insisted on reinserting felony murder.
Could this be because we misunderstand community standards about this issue?
Does the community wish to impute the penalties for murder in the cases we have
discussed? Or, might those legislators be wrong in believing that their constitu
ents would insist on such a rule? Another perspective suggests itself. A broad fel
ony-murder rule, while in some general sense unjust, is a useful additional deter
rent that might make felons more careful during the commission of a felony, or
better yet, might make them not commit the felony in the first place. Relatedly, it
does give the prosecution a heavy weapon to bring into play during pretrial ma
neuvering on crimes in which a death has occurred; various individuals who have
played some subsidiary role in a crime that has led to a death can be threatened
with murder liability if they do not cooperate with the prosecution.
We will first examine the community view on the various possible instances in
which the felony-murder rule could come into effect and then say more about the
sources of the rejection of the Model Penal Code position.
Subjects in this study were presented with a variety of felony-murder scenarios
and three control cases (Table 6.3 ) . The control cases give us the baseline liability
that our respondents assign for standard murder (scenario 1 ) , for manslaughter
(scenario 2 ) , and for negligent homicide (scenario 3 ) . The liability-punishment
results in the felony-murder scenarios (cases 5 through 1 1 ) can then be compared
to the three controls to determine which of those controls the subjects see each
felony-murder scenario as more akin to, murder, manslaughter, or negligent ho
micide.
Look first at the control scenarios. In scenario 1 , an individual deliberately pur
chases a gun and kills his best friend, at whom he is angry. The respondents, not
unnaturally, see this as a case of deliberate murder (the culpability rating in col
umn d is 1 .64, with 1 = purposeful and 2 = knowing) and assign an average pun
ishment (column a) to the killer of between life imprisonment and death. When
an individual recklessly fires a gun at a noisy and drunken party in a nearby house
(case 2 ) , the offender is seen by our subjects as reckless ( 3 .29, with 3 = reckless
and 4 = negligent) and deserving of a penalty of 9.08, or approximately 30 years in
prison. This, then, is the punishment we would expect if a person commits man-
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TAB LE 6.3

Scenarios
1.

Purposeful killing

2.

Reckless killing

3.
4.

Negligent killing

owner victim
negligent co-felon,

owner victim
Negligent shooter,
pu rposeful co-felon,
owner victim
8.

Principal
Uability

Accomplice
Uability

(d)

(e)

(f)

Culpability
Defender Culpability
Culpability
Uability of Principal of Accomplice of Defender

(g)
Legal Treatment
Under Felony
Murder Rule

1 0.39a
9.08a

1 .64

Murder

3.29

Manslaughter

4.58f

4.58d

4.0 0

Negligent homicide

1 0. 1 1 a , b

9.56a

1 .43

1 . 54

Murder

8.78c, d

7.31 a

3.86

3.9 1

Murder

1 0. o8a,b, c

6.92b

1 .76

3.83

Murder

9. 1 1 a

4.00

2. 1 9

Murder

1 0 . 39a
9.08 b , c, d

8.53d

Purposeful but innocent
shooter, pu rposeful
co-felon, felon victim

9.

(c)

Purposeful shooter,
N egligent co-felon,

7.

(b)

N egligent shooter,
owner victim

6.

(a)

Pu rposeful shooter,
pu rposefu l co-felon ,

5.

"-.]
N

Liability for Felony Murder

(killed)

5.25c,d

0.69

2. 1 1

1 . 97

Murder*

(killed)

4.97d

0.67

3.71

2. 1 1

Murder*

Purposeful but innocent
shooter, negligent
co-felon, felon victim

1 0.

Negligent but innocent
shooter, pu rposeful
co-felon, felon victim

1 1.

(killed)

5.39c,d

0.51

6.64b,c

0.33

1 .89

3.69

M u rder*

1 .72

4.08

M u rder*

N egligent but innocent
shooter, purposeful
co-felon, owner victim

6.83e

1 .83

Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year,
6=3 years, 7=7 years, 8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
N ote: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a N ewman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate
means that are not statistically sig n ificantly different from each other. Means are compared within columns only. In addition, no
subjects g ave either No Liability ( N ) or Liability but No Punishment (0) . The columns i ndicating (N) and (N+O) have therefore been
left out of this table, as all percentages were 0. Culpabil ity of principal (col umn d), accomplice (column
were scored on the fol lowing scale:

e), and defender (column

�

1 = The actor wanted to kill the victim (purposeful).

2 = The actor was practically certain that his conduct would cause the victim's death (knowing).
3 = The actor was aware of a substantial risk that the victim would be killed (reckless).
4 = The actor was not aware of a substantial risk that the victim would be killed but should have been aware (negligent) .
5 = The actor was not aware of any substantial risk that the victim would be killed and a reasonable person in his situation
would not have been aware of such a risk (faultless) .
*On ly u nder the broader forms of the felony-murder rule, where the rule is applied to killings by nonfelons.

.......
"'-1
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slaughter-the reckless killing of another person. 15 When the person fails to
check on whether the gun is loaded and accidentally kills a friend (case 3), the re
spondents j udge that he should have been aware of that risk and therefore was
culpably negligent (their culpability rating was 4, and 4 = negligent) and assign
punishment of 4.58 (9.6 months). These controls provide reference points against
which we can evaluate the sentences assigned in the various felony-murder cases.
We next examine the felony-murder cases. Looking back, we see that we created
a number of cases in which the differences between them, which are critical to our
analysis, are quite difficult for the reader to understand. (And in retrospect, con
ceivably, quite difficult for the writers to understand as well.) For that reason, we
will walk through them in some detaiL Begin with cases 4 through 7, all of which
share a common core. Two men set out to rob a liquor store, carrying guns. One
or both of them plan to shoot the owner if he does not turn over the cash fast, or
one or both do not plan to shoot the owner b ut simply plan to menace him with
what they think is an unloaded gun. The owner is slow about turning over the
cash, and one of the robbers, whom we have labeled the principal or "shooter;'
shoots him. This is true even if the principal did not plan originally to shoot the
owner. To go on in a slightly tedious fashion, this creates four cases in which the
principal does shoot the owner: The principal did or did not plan to shoot the
owner and the accomplice did or did not plan to shoot the owner. In the cases in
which the person, whether principal or accomplice, did not plan to shoot the
owner, we thought that he would be perceived as negligent with respect to causing
death and perhaps draw a reduced sentence. For all of these cases, the felony
murder rule grades the offense as murder.
Look at the liability results for cases 4 through 7 (column a) . There are a num
ber of questions that we can ask of these data. Let us start with a relatively simple
one. In each case, the p erpetrator, p urposefully or negligently, is the one that
shoots the owner; the accomplice does not. Does this p erpetrator-accomplice dis
tinction make a difference in liability assignments given by our respondents?
As Figure 6.4 reveals, it does. The figure is made by simply averaging the four
sentences given to the perpetrator and the four given to the accomplice i n the four
symmetric cases of scenarios 4 through 7. As can be clearly seen, the perpetrator
receives a higher average sentence. The principal, even though he sometimes does
not plan to do so, does pull the trigger and shoot the owner; the accomplice, even
though he sometimes plans to do so, does not. The legal doctrine, in contrast,
fails to recognize such a mitigation for an accomplice. Standard complicity rules,
such as those in the Model Penal Code, hold the accomplice liable as if he were the
principal; our respondents do not. This result is consistent with the "complicity
discount" that we have seen in other studies, for instance, Study 3, Objective Re
quirements of Complicity (Chapter 2 ) and Study 9, Culpability Requirements for
Complicity (Chapter 4 ) . However, in a more global sense, our respondents and
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FIGURE 6.4 Liability as a Function of the Role of the Actor

Accomplice

Perpetrator

Role of Actor

the various versions of the code are in accord: All give a very high sentence to both
the principal and the accomplice.
A useful next question to ask is whether the state of mind as to causing death
with which the two robbers enter the situation makes a difference to our respon
dents. Variations in the story made the accomplice or the principal either negli
gent as to the death because he had no plan to shoot or purposeful as to causing
the death because he had plans to shoot. In Figure 6.5, we have simply averaged
the liabilities assigned to those who plan to kill, whether perpetrator or accom
plice, and those who do not.
Obviously, state of mind matters. Those who plan to kill receive higher average
sentences than those who do not plan to kill.
Averages can be built up from more than one pattern of differences, and both
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 present averages. Thus, we need to look at the various
cases that make up the averages, to see if anything is hidden by the averaging pro
cess. Figure 6.6 shows the results of the four cases that are averaged in Figures 6.4

D octrines of Grading

1 76

FIGURE 6.5 Liability as a Function of the State of Mind of the Actor as to Killing

Negligent

Purposeful

State of Mind of Actor as to Killing

and 6.5. Our look can be mercifully brief, because the figure indicates that the in
dividual cases are rated about as we would expect, based on the two rules we ar
ticulated: The shooter gets a higher liability than the one who does not shoot, and
a person who plans to shoot gets higher liability than one who does not plan to
shoot. In the figure legend, we first indicate whether the principal is purposeful or
negligent with respect to the shooting and indicate second whether the accom
plice is purposeful or negligent with respect to the shooting. Thus, for instance,
the line labeled "Purp-Neg" is the one that charts the results of the case in which
the principal plans to shoot and the accomplice does not (or scenario 6 of Table
6.3 ) .
Three o f the lines give a lower sentence for the accomplice, as we would expect
from the joint operation of the two rules. The only case in which the accomplice
draws a higher liability than the principal is the one ( corresponding to scenario 7)
in which the principal does not plan to shoot and the accomplice does plan to,
which is the case in which we would expect this reversal to happen. This being the
case, it is fair to summarize the results as follows: Respondents assign more liabil-

1 77

Doctrines of Grading

FIGURE 6.6 Liability as a Function of Role and State of Mind as to Killing
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ity to the principal than to the accomplice, probably reflecting a tendency to pun
ish more heavily the individual who does the actual shooting. They also give less
liability to a person-principal or accomplice-who they know does not intend
to shoot if the store owner resists. These two effects, combined, give the accom
plice who does not plan to shoot a considerable reduction in liability from the
other cases. Finkel and his associates (Finkel and Duff, 199 1 ; Finkel and Smith,
1 993 ) have found similar effects. They demonstrated that, in a number of felony
murder scenarios, college student respondents assigned lesser sentences to ac
complices than to felony-murder principals.
Recall a point that we have made before. It is worth noting that our scenarios
were such as to give the respondents confidence in the belief that one of the rob
bers really does not intend to shoot. Subjects were straightforwardly told this in
the scenario. Notice the culpability ratings in Table 6.3 ( column d for the princi
pal, and column e for the accomplice) , which indicate that the subjects believed
what they were told. Further, the culpability ratings do make a difference; they do
predict the liability ratings assigned to the two individuals. An actual robber, try-

1 78

Doctrines of Grading

ing to convince an actual jury of that lack of intention, might have considerable
difficulty in doing so and therefore often may be treated as a purposeful
murderer. Still, the pattern of responses of our respondents argues that the ac
cused should at least have the chance to try to convince the j ury concerning his
intentions. More generally, this pattern of differences between the felony-murder
rule and the subjects' responses echoes the commentators' criticisms of the rule
and the Model Penal Code's rejection of it in its current form.
Here is how we would formulate the rule that might underlie our respondents'
judgment. Notice that the penalties assigned the negligent persons were re
duced-but not reduced to the level of the grade given the negligent individual
who kills another while cleaning his gun. The baseline for negligent homicide is
4.58 ( 9.6 months ) , although the subjects' sentences for negligent felony-murder
principals are 8.53 ( 22.5 years) and 8.78 (27.0 years) and for negligent accom
plices are 6.92 (6.6 years) and 7.3 1 (9.4 years) . These sentences are sufficiently
greater than the baseline for a negligent killing to suggest that there is some sup
port for the notion at the heart of the felony-murder rule-that a killing in the
course of a felony ought to be punished more severely than it would be without
the felonious context. This suggests that our subjects, like the state legislators, are
assuming that committing an armed robbery for example, creates a risk of caus
ing death of which the person must be aware. The data pattern suggests that, from
our respondents' view, the felony-murder rule is on the right track but simply
goes too far. The subjects would support a felony-murder rule that significantly
aggravates negligent killings during a robbery but only to the level of manslaugh
ter for principals and to something less than that for accomplices, not to the level
of murder as the current doctrine does. In other words, they would support a "fel
ony-manslaughter rule" with a standard "accomplice discount."
We now proceed to a discussion of cases 8 through 1 0. In these cases, a by
stander to the robbery (the wife of the store owner) , who is hidden from view,
shoots and kills the principal felon. Since the principal felon is dead, the question
we asked in these cases is what sentence should be given to the accomplice. As
noted previously, some j urisdictions extend the felony-murder rule to impute to
the surviving felon, as murder, killings committed by innocent persons defending
against the felony. In case 8, the wife purposefully shoots the principal, and the
accomplice had planned to shoot the store owner if he did not respond quickly. I n
scenario 9 , the wife purposefully shoots the principal, and the accomplice had not
planned to sho ot the store owner. In scenario 10, the wife accidentally shoots the
principal, and the accomplice had not planned to shoot. G iven these facts, it is
possible to intuitively order the cases. One might expect that the accomplice who
had planned to shoot would get a higher sentence than the accomplice in either of
the cases in which he had not planned to shoot, and that the purposeful choice of
the wife to shoot might further lower the liability assigned to the accomplice.
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In fact, no such "intuitive" differe nces appeared. The subjects' liability assign
ments hovered around 5.20, a sentence of about 1 year for all cases, with no statis
tically significant difference among them. One way of saying what this means is
that the subjects do not spontaneously impose the level of liability that the most
extended form of the felony-murder rule provides in these cases. Intuitively, the
respondents might condition their liability ratings on the fact that a bystander
shoots the felon, and the respondents do not attempt to reason through the some
what complex possible interpretations of the various intentions of the accom
plice.
The lower level of respondent liability assigned to the accomplice in these cases
of killings of the principal by an innocent does not differ significantly from the
baseline for a negligent killing, 4.58 (9.6 months) . It is possible ( some would say,
likely) that standard homicide grading would impose liability for negligent homi
cide in such cases. That is, it is likely that a jury would conclude that a robber who
enters a store with his gun drawn is at least negligent as to causing a death (when
one occurs) regardless of who shoots whom ( i.e., the robber should have been
aware of a substantial risk that such conduct could cause a death) . If this is true,
then the liability levels given by the subjects in cases of killings of co-felons by in
nocent bystanders may be obtained in settings in which the code is applied with
out the felony-murder rule. The rule is needed, in the subjects' view, only in cases
of negligent killings of innocents by felons. Further, even in these cases the sub
j ects would prefer that the rule only aggravate liability to manslaughter ( reckless
homicide) at most, and in most cases to something considerably less. 16
Finally, let us examine the somewhat baroque case of scenario 1 1 , in which a
bystander attempts to stop the robbery and clumsily shoots the owner of the store
instead. In this case, although the felon is actually purposeful or knowing as to
planning to cause a death, the subjects put his liability for the killing by an inno
cent of another innocent at 6.83 (6.2 years) , significantly less than the liability for
murder (p = .01 ) . Indeed, such liability is significantly less than the liability im
posed on the purposeful accomplice in the analogous situation ( scenario 7 in
which a negligent principal kills the innocent owner, 9. 1 1 ( 9 = 30 years; 1 0 life).
The fact that the killing is actually done by an innocent person, not the principal
or an accomplice, appears to matter a great deal to the subjects.17
Study 1 6: Sum m ary

This study confirms that subjects, like current legal doctrine, aggravate the liabil
ity of a person who kills during a felony over what that liability would be if the of
fense did not occur during a felony. They punish a person's negligent killing dur
ing a robbery at a liability level similar to a reckless killing in a nonfelonious con
text. If one brandishes a gun during the course of a robbery, and it goes off acci
dently and kills an innocent, the subjects are not particularly sympathetic to the
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view that this is equivalent to accidentally discharging a gun and killing another.
But according to our subjects, current doctrine goes too far, for it punishes such
a negligent killing as if it were murder, although the subjects would prefer to pun
ish it as manslaughter. So, the subjects would support a "felony-manslaughter
r ule."
The complicity aspect of the felony-murder rule reflects similar differences.
Like the doctrine, the subjects punish the accomplice for more than negligent ho
micide when the perpetrator kills during a felony. But while the doctrine treats
the accomplice exactly like a murderer, the subjects impose liability somewhat less
than they would for manslaughter. The lesser liability of the accomplice is signifi
cant. It reflects the view of the subjects, manifested in several studies, that the ac
complice generally deserves less liability than the perpetrator, all other things b e
ing equal. If the code were to adopt a standard "accomplice discount:' felony
murder accomplices could remain within the rule; the accomplice would be held
at some level of liability less than that of the "felony-manslaughter" perpetrator.
The vicar ious aspect of the felony-murder rule-holding a felon liable for
murder for a killing by the intended victim of the felon or by some other by
stander-has even less support among the subjects than the aggravation and
complicity aspects of the rule. Where the victim kills the principal felon, the lia
bility imposed by the subjects on the surviving accomplice is not significantly
more than that imposed for a negligent homicide and is far from the murder lia
bility imposed on the accomplice by the felony-murder rule in some jurisdictions.
(Also, under the felo ny-murder rule, the state of mind of the accomplice as to
planning to kill does not seem to matter.) Where an innocent person is killed by
the robbery victim, the accomplice's liability is slightly more than that for negli
gent homicide but is still nowhere near manslaughter liability. This result is likely
under norm al homicide grading; thus, the subjects would see no need for exten
sion of the special rule to these cases.
To conclude, it is possible that a jury might reach the same conclusions as our
subjects even without a felony-murder rule, by seeing culpability in the felon's
creation of a situation in which the likelihood of a killing is brought about. It may
be, as we suggested earlier, that it is this perception of blame for creating the dan
gerous situation that generates the subjects' responses. Such increased liability is
possible if not likely under the normal graded-homicide offenses, and its likeli
hood is increased if the Model Penal Code's evidentiary presumption approach is
used. The Code, recall, uses the fact of the felony as grounds to create a presump
tion of "recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life:'
which is defined as sufficient culpability for murder; the defendant can rebut this
presumption. One might suggest, on the one hand, then, that these results argue
against the continuing need for a felony-murder rule. On the other hand, the re
sults suggest that a form of a felony-murder rule might be unobjectionable-and,
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thus, if politically demanded, might be continued-if revised to better reflect the
subjects' views, which call for lower liability levels.
A rule that mirrors the subjects' views would aggravate a negligent killing by a
felon in the course of a felony to reckless homicide (manslaughter) , not murder.
No special complicity rule would be required; accomplices would receive the nor
mal complicity discount, which varies with the level of the accomplice's culpabil
ity and degree of contribution. A felon might be liable for killings by an intended
victim of the felony, at the level of negligent homicide, but not under a special
rule for killings during a felony.
STUDY 1 7: THE STRENGTH OF THE PERSON'S
CONNECTION WITH THE PROHIBITED
RESULT-CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS
A person acts, intending a result that is prohibited, such as another's death.
Through some chain of circumstances, the result intended occurs, but not exactly
in the way intended by the person. Should we hold the person liable for that re
sult? This situation is a familiar one to fans of courtroom drama. For example, I
intend to kill Jones but only put him in the hospital with a minor wound. The
hospital, due to some medical ineptness, causes Jones's death. Have I committed
murder? In another example, I shoot at Jones and miss, but he dies of fright in
duced by the noise of the shot. Have I murdered him? Alternatively, and as a third
example, intending to kill my rival, Smith, I administer a slow-acting poison to
him. Before it acts, a third rival, Clark, bludgeons Smith to death. What is my lia
bility? Philosophers have posed these and similar cases for generations, to explore
the limits o f moral sanctions; we posed some similar cases to a set of our respon
dents.
We begin by examining the current legal code. Current criminal-law doctrine
typically imposes two requirements for a person to be held causally accountable
for a prohibited result. First, the person's conduct must have been necessary for
the result to occur: " It is an antecedent but for which the result in question would
not have occurred" [MPC § 2.03 ( l ) (a) ] . Second, even if the person's conduct is a
necessary cause ("but for" cause ) of the result, the nature of the connection be
tween the conduct and the result must be sufficiently close and direct; the result
must not be "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [j ust] bearing
on the person's liability or on the gravity of his offense" [MPC § 2.03 ( 2 ) (b) ] .
Where these two requirements-termed "factual cause" and "legal cause:' respec
tively-are not met, a person cannot be held accountable for the result and, typi
cally, is liable only for an attempt to commit the substantive offense (or, in some
instances, has no liability 1 8 ) .
A "necessary cause" requirement is one formulation of factual cause. Another
is a "sufficient cause" requirement. A cause is necessary if the result would not
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have occurred but for the cause. A cause is sufficient if, without additional assis
tance, intervention, or changed circumstances, it will cause the result. The tradi
tional doctrinal position is to require the former (a necessary cause) . During the
Model Penal Code debate, it was argued that an alternative, less-demanding
ground for causal accountability be permitted, requiring only that the cause be "a
substantial factor in producing the result," 19 a formulation even less demanding
in many ways than a sufficient-cause requirement.20 The members of the Ameri
can Law Institute rejected the sufficient- or substantial-cause formulations, in
stead adhering to the traditional requirement of a necessary cause.21 This means
that, in the case example in which I poisoned Smith but Clark bludgeoned him to
death before the poison acted, I would not be liable for murder (but would be lia
ble for attempted murder). Although the poison eventually would have killed
Smith without additional assistance or intervention, and thus fits the definition of
a sufficient cause, it was not a necessary cause: Smith would have died when he
did from the beating by the subsequent person, even if he had never been poi
soned. O ne goal of the causation study was to examine which of these two tests
necessary cause or sufficient cause-best represents the community's view of a
prerequisite for causal accountability.
A second concern of the causation study was the effect of the strength of the re
lationship between a person's necessary cause and the prohibited result-the so
called legal-cause requirement. This is the question that arises, to refer to the first
example described previously, when I set out to murder Jones but only wound
him, and some other events (such as carelessness in the hospital) bring about
Jones's death. The test of the legal-cause requirement in current doctrine is rela
tively vague: The result must not be "too remote or accidental in its occurrence to
have a j ust bearing on the actor's liability." Yet much depends on the application
of this standard, specifically, the difference between liability for the full substan
tive offense and liability for an attempt (or, in some cases, exoneration from all li
ability). The study sought to test various factors that might affect the communi
ty's liability j udgment in such cases of potentially ((remote" or "accidental"
results. An identification of relevant factors, it was felt, might lead to formulation
of a more specific standard or might guide decision-makers in applying the pres
ent vague standard.
In summary, the causation study sought to determine which of the two factual
cause requirement tests-necessary cause or sufficient cause-best reflects the
community's view of a p rerequisite for causal accountability. A second goal was to
examine the effect of the strength of the relationship between a person's necessary
cause and the prohibited result-the legal-cause requirement.
We first presented respondents with two control scenarios that established lia
bility baselines for a clear, direct, and immediate killing ( scenario 1 of Table 6. 7)
and a failed attempted killing ( scenario 2 ) . The various other scenarios can then
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TABLE 6.7

Liability as Related to Causation

Scenarios
1.
2.

Principal

Second Actor or Accomplice

(a)
(b)
Liability Legal Code Result

(c)
(d)
Liability Legal Code Result

Murder, control 9.89a
Attempt, control 7.258

Murder
Attempted murder

8.89b
6.678

Murder
Attempted murder

Subsequent
killer
Allergy
4.
5. Careless nurse

9.473
8.75b
8.33b c

Accident on
way to hospital

Attempted murder
Murder
Murder or attempt
O ury)

9.893 Murder
7.97C Murder
7.5ac,d Murder or attempt
Oury)

8 03C d

Construction
accident

Probably attempted
murder

7 .36d,e Probably attempted
murder

7.36d•8

Attempted murder

6.758

3.

6.

7.

,

.

,

Attempted murder

Liability Scale: N=No criminal l iability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8=1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not
statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within
columns only.

be compared to the control cases to see if the assignment of liability in each in
stance is more akin to the case of causal accountability for murder or more akin to
the case of no causal accountability, where only attempt liability is imposed. As
this process suggests, we first examine the liability ratings for the two control sce
narios, which establish boundaries within which the other cases can be inter
preted. Examining Table 6.7, one sees that the liability assigned to the murder in
scenario 1 is high (9.89, or just slightly less than life imprisonment) . Second, no
tice that the attempted murder scenario drew an average sentence of 7.25 (9.4
years) . This finding in itself is significant for the topic of this chapter, because it
shows j ust how important the actual occurrence of the resulting harm is as related
to the respondents' grading of liability.
Let us first look at the "factual cause" issue-the necessary- versus sufficient
cause debate. In scenario 3, labeled "subsequent killer;' the first person inflicts a
wound sufficient to kill but, before the victim can die from this wound, the sec
ond p erson, unaware of the prior attack, shoots and immediately kills the victim.
(This scenario is equivalent to the earlier example in which I poisoned Smith but
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Clark bludgeons him to death before the poison takes effect.) Recall that the nec
essary-cause requirement of the legal code is not satisfied in this scenario. The
first person's conduct is sufficient to cause the death but is not necessary; the vic
tim would have died exactly when he did from the conduct of the second person.
The subjects found the first person warranted a high degree of liability. The
subjects impose liability upon the first person that is very dose to that imposed in
the direct-killing control case ( 9.47 versus 9.89). However, the liability that they
impose is very different from that imposed in the attempt control (9.47, or 30
years to life, versus 7.25, or 9.4 years, for the attempt control, with p < .02). Thus,
where a person's conduct is sufficient to cause death but is not necessary for the
death, the subjects impose liability only slightly less than that imposed for con
duct that is both necessary and sufficient to cause death.
Obviously, the respondents are much closer to a formulation that treats either
necessary or sufficient actions equally as examples of murder than they are to the
code formulation in which one is treated as murder and the other as only attempt.
But we also point out that column e of scenario 3 (see Table 6.8) indicates that
subjects were unclear that the act of the first person was not necessary for bring
ing about the death; instead, their mean rating (5.74) hovered around the neither
agree-nor-disagree point on the scale. Further research will need to see if the pun
ishment equivalent to murder is given by the community for actions dearly seen
as not necessary b ut sufficient to bring about death.
Consider next the "legal cause" requirement, which holds that the connection
between the person's conduct and the result must be close and direct for liability
to be incurred. Four scenarios (4 through 7 in Table 6.7) involving an attempted
homicide were used to present various situations that we thought might raise le
gal causation issues. In all of these scenarios, two persons go to the victim's house
to kill him. The first person shoots at the victim, either missing or only wounding
him, while the second person serves as a lookout. The scenarios differ in the way
in which the death of the victim ultimately results. In two scenarios, the death oc
curs when the man is being treated in the hospital. The victim dies from an un
usual allergic reaction to a drug given during initial treatment of the wound (case
4). Alternatively, death results from the careless actions of a nurse during initial
treatment (case 5). In a third case, death of the wounded individual results from a
traffic accident that occurs while the victim is on the way to the hospital for
followup treatment, and this occurs two months after the shooting (case 6). In the
fourth case, the shooters miss their intended victim, and he flees from them. His
death results from a construction-crane accident that occurs during his flight
(case 7). The liabilities assigned to the persons in these cases are contained in Ta
ble 6. 7, and the respondents' perceptions of the cases are listed in Table 6.8.
Let us deal with what is by now a familiar issue, which is the liabilities assigned
to the perpetrator and to the individual who plays a lesser role in the incident. To
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TABLE 6 . 8

Subjects' Perceptions o f Causation

Scenarios
1.

Murder, control

2.

Attempt, control

3.

Subsequent killer

4.

Allergy
Careless nurse
Accident on way to hospital

5.
6.
7.

Const ruction accident

(e)
(f)
"Actor's
''Actor's
Act
Act
Necessary" Sufficient"
7.86a

8.22a

(h)
(g)
"Actor ''Accomplice
Intended
Intended
Death"
Death"
8. 56a
8. 1 7b

5.74c
7.2oa.b
6.91 a,b
4.37d

6.34b, c

7.7aa

8.31 a,b

5.22b
4.8 1 b

a.oab
a.oab

4.83b

8.Q3b

4.8 1 b

8.1 1 b

7.75b
7.92b
8.36a
7.83b
7.72b
7.69b
7.8 1 b

Key to column heads:
All statements were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly disagree,"
5 ="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

(e) The victim's death would not have occurred but for the actor's conduct.

(f)
(g)

The actor's conduct was by itself sufficient to cause the victim's death.
The actor intended to kill the victim.

(h) The accomplice intended that the actor kill the victim.
Note: Superscript letters indicate significance at the p < .05 level by a
Newman-Keuls test. Matching superscripts indicate means that are not
statistically significantly different from each other. Means are compared within
colu mns only.

test all of the complex causal connections we wanted to investigate, it was neces
sary to have two individuals involved in the commission of the act. The liability
assigned to the second person, who functioned as lookout in the cases we will ex
amine, in contrast to that assigned to the first person, gives us another chance to
examine the effect of the criminal role on liability. To examine that, we have plot
ted the liabilities assigned to the perpetrator and to the lookout in Figure 6.9.
As this figure shows, the liability scores assigned to the perpetrator and the
lookout are consistently quite different; the liability assigned to the individual
who fulfills only the lookout function is consistently lower than that assigned to
the major perpetrator.
This is consistent with the "accomplice discount" that we have seen in other
studies. In these cases, in which the second individual serves only as a
watchkeeping accomplice, the codes regard both as equally liable. Given the re
sults that emerge so clearly from Figure 6.9 and the results of our two earlier com
plicity studies, the community standard is in significant disagreement with the
codes, in that a lesser degree of liability ( reflected in a lesser prison term) is given
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FIGURE 6.9 Liability for Perpetrator and Lookout in Causation Scenarios
11
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Murder
Allergy
Nurse carelessness
Accident (delayed)
Construction accident
Attempt

9

8

7

6 ._------�-

Attacker

Lookout
Role of Actor

to the accomplice. Recall that some modern sentencing guidelines are moving in
this direction; they assign reduced sentences to those who play lesser roles in
crimes.22
Notice that we have omitted scenario 3 from the figure and this discussion. In
that scenario, the second person, unaware of the first person's actions, steps in
and kills the wounded victim. The killer, therefore, is not an "accomplice" but
rather an independent perpetrator, who is appropriately assigned murder liability
by our subjects.
Let us now look at the question of "legal causation:' The point at issue here is
whether and when an outcome of a chain of events is so remote, in any of the var
ious senses of"remote:' that the respondents do not see the perpetrator as having
the normal accountability for the outcome, even if that was the outcome the per
petrator intended.
The drop in liability assigned to the complex causal scenarios (4 through 7 in
Table 6.8) suggests that these scenarios include factors that discount a person's

187

Doctrines of Grading
FIGURE 6. 1 0 Liability as Related to Causation
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Scenarios

causal accountability for the resulting death. In Figure 6. 1 0, we have attempted to
examine this by contrasting the liabilities assigned to the principal in each of the
four test scenarios. The top line in the figure shows the liability assigned by re
spondents to the case of murder, and the bottom line shows the liability assigned
to attempted murder. What one would expect (according to the doctrine of legal
causation) is that some of the scenarios should be assigned murder liabilities and
others should coincide with the liability assigned to the attempt case. Obviously,
our respondents' assignments do not mirror this expectation.
Factors that seem to make a difference include whether the risk that comes to
fruition is one that commonly results from the conduct (compare allergic reac
tion-8.75, or 27 years-to construction accident cause-7.36, or 1 0.2 years) ; the
presence of a subsequent volitional person contributing to the result (compare al
lergic reaction-8.75, or 27 years-to careless nurse-8.33, or 1 9.5 years) ; and
the remoteness of the result in time and place from the person's conduct (see
death by accident two months later when returning to the hospital for treat-
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ment-8.03, or 1 5 years).23 Further studies could establish the factors that con
tribute to a perception of remoteness and the relative effect of the different factors
on liability. It may be that the subjects are reaching their judgments ofliability via
the mediating inference of remoteness-or some alternate reasoning model may
be needed to explain their judgments. Further still, one may need a reasoning
model that includes both remoteness of result and necessary-versus-sufficient
causal contribution to the death.
Notice the pattern of the results in the figure. The liability of the perpetrator in
each of the test scenarios, other than the construction-crane accident, is statisti
cally significantly different than his liability in the murder and attempt control
scenarios-lower than the murder liability but higher than the liability for at
tempted murder. This suggests that the subjects see the circumstances as reducing
but not eliminating the person's accountability and liability for the death. In
other words, the subjects see causal conditions as presenting a continuous rather
than a dichotomous relationship with liability. The legal rules, in contrast, set
causation as a minimum requirement, which when met establishes liability for
the full offense (in this case, murder) and when not met defaults liability to that
for a case of attempt.
Therefore, and as common sense suggests, the degree of perceived liability gen
erally decreases in a graduated way as the causal connection between the person's
conduct and the result becomes weaker. Furthermore, many of the factors that one
might guess would add to a result's "remote or accidental" nature do serve to re
duce the liability that the subjects impose. An unusual event, such as an allergic
reaction to a drug during treatment, reduces liability. A subsequent person's care
lessness reduces liability even further, as does a significant time delay between the
conduct and the result. Notice also, however, that no simple rule summarizes our
results; the construction accident takes place within minutes of the attempted
murder, but receives lower liability assignments than do other scenarios in which
the death-causing incident is much more delayed in time from the murder at
tempt. Therefore, unless the relevant factors (e.g., remoteness, accidentalness)
and their interrelation can be more clearly explicated, it may be best for code
drafters to leave this particular determination to juries, rather than attempt to
codify it.

Study 1 7: Summary
As to the factual cause issue, our findings are inconclusive. Our subjects gave lia
bility almost equal to murder in the sufficient-cause scenario, which would sug
gest that the codes' necessary-cause test was too limiting. But our analysis also
suggests that the subjects were unclear as to whether the cause in that scenario
was a necessary cause.
Our results did dearly suggest, however, that the extent of a person's liability is
reduced as the result becomes more "remote or accidental" in relation to the per-
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son's conduct. This result is at significant variance with the current treatment in
the modern codes. Subjects do not seem to conceive of the causation issue in the
dichotomous way that the doctrine treats it. They do not see causal accountability
as a yes-no issue but as one with a continuum of accountability. As a person's de
gree of accountability increases, so does his liability, from attempt liability up to
liability for the full substantive offense. This is one of several examples of the cur
rent doctrine's tendency to treat continuous functions as dichotomous ones, an
issue discussed further in the concluding chapter.
STUDY 1 8 :
PUNISHMENT FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES
Current law has some considerable difficulty in determining the appropriate
range of punishment for multiple related offenses. If a single instance of theft de
serves a punishment of x amount, how much punishment is deserved if the of
fender is convicted of two identical but separate instances of such theft? Tradi
tionally, judges sentence such an offender separately for each of the two offenses,
then determine whether those sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively.
Concurrent sentences are served at the same time; consecutive sentences are
served one after the other. This leads to the odd result that a person who, for ex
ample, carries out two burglaries and gets a two-year sentence for each-to be
served concurrently-serves only two years. Concurrent sentences are rightly crit
icized because they trivialize the second (and all subsequent) offenses. If consecu
tive sentences are imposed, our burglar would have his two sentences served one
after the other, for a total jail term of fo ur years. Consecutive sentences are criti
cized on the basis that two identical offenses by the same offender do not neces
sarily deserve twice the punishment as a single offense.
The theory behind this latter claim is somewhat unclear. It may stem in part
from the fact that the punishment deserved for an offense is based only in part on
the harm caused, such as the deprivation of the owner of his property. The per
son's willingness to violate the announced rules of society may be part of the
foundation for punishment, and this factor is already taken into account in the
sentence for the first offense. In any event, there seems to be some general sense
that additional punishment is deserved for each additional offense but that the
additional amount deserved is less than that for the first offense. There seems to
be some feeling, in specific, that a third, fourth, fifth, or further offense ought to
each give rise to additional punishment but that, in each instance, the amount of
the punishment ought to be less than the additional punishment assigned for the
previous offense. This multiple-offense discount notion is instantiated in the
United States Sentencing Commission ( USSC) guidelines. Each additional of
fense is punished, although with increasingly reduced penalties. (The Sentencing
Commission guidelines use a formula that takes account as well of different seri
ousness levels of the different offenses, establishing the baseline with the most se-
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rious offense and adding on penalties for additional offenses by considering of
fenses in their decreasing order of seriousness ( USSC Guidelines Manual §§
3D l . l-3D l .5. 1 ). 24
The «multiple-offense discounf' may well describe what sentencing j udges
would like to do, but their options may be limited by the consecutive-versus-con
current options we discussed earlier. (One somewhat manipulative way around
this, reported by some j udges, is to give the defendant more than the offense de
serves on one or both of the counts, then have the sentences run concurrently. )
Given these competing models of multiple-offense sentencing, it seemed useful
to have some empirical data on what ordinary people think on the issue; so, we set
out to collect such data through this study. The multiple-offenses study sought to
determine whether the subjects concur with the general notion of a multiple-of
fense discount in the sentencing of such cases.
The study also sought to investigate the significance of the time interval be
tween multiple offenses (all of which occur before conviction for any one). We
speculated that the closer in time t\l.e offenses occurred, the more the subjects
would treat them as a single offense and, therefore, impose proportionally less in
crease in liability for each subsequent offense. The longer the period of time be
tween the multiple offenses, the more the subjects would be likely to treat them as
entirely independent offenses deserving entirely independent, nonoverlapping
penalties. It might even be the case that they would begin to see the offender as a
habitual offender and assign harsher sentences for the second offense than for the
first. 25
The study also sought to determine whether the operative principles are differ
ent for offenses against a person, such as assault, than for offenses against prop
erty, such as theft. One might speculate that offenses against property, where the
harm can more easily be reduced to a monetary form, may well be thought of in
those terms only. Sentences for multiple offenses against property might follow a
principle of a simple accumulation of the monetary value of all the property
taken. In other words, while two assaults may be viewed as entirely separate of
fenses for which a substantial add-on is appropriate for multiple violations, mul
tiple theft offenses might be viewed as no different in seriousness than a single
theft offense where the value of the property taken equals the sum of the values
for the multiple offenses. This is the approach taken by the United States Sentenc
ing Commission guidelines: If the nature of the harm of multiple offenses is such
that it simply can be aggregated, as in theft or fraud, then the amounts are aggre
gated and treated as a single offense of this amount [USSC Guidelines Manual §
3Dl .3(b) ] . Thus, the guidelines take different approaches to aggregatable and
nonaggregatable offenses. They suggest a very different patterning of additional
penalties for multiple theft offenses than for multiple assault offenses. Even the
treatment of theft, the aggregatable offense, does not really give full value to each
additional dollar of theft, since the grading of theft itself provides a discount for
each additional dollar stolen, but they do ignore whether the total loss is caused
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by one theft o r by many. That seems inconsistent with the general principle that
every new offense should count for something additional-not just in recogni
tion of greater harm but also in recognition of an additional violation of the legal
rules. Nonaggregatable offenses such as assault, however, would be expected to
generate more substantial add-on sentences.
Other possible hypotheses might suggest other patterns of multiple-offense
sentencing. We thought it best first to do the study, and let its results guide further
theorizing.We set up two sets of scenarios. In the core assault scenario, an indi
vidual who had been angered by a co-worker (or co-workers) at an office where
he used to work returns to the office, armed with a baseball bat, and breaks sev
eral bones of the co-worker (or co-workers) . In the core theft scenario, the thief,
waiting until no one is around ( and thus by inference avoiding needing to use vi
olence on anybody who observes him) steals a 55-gallon-drum from a gas station
to resell it (or steals several drums from several gas stations). 26
To study the effects of the time interval between the multiple offenses, we cre
ated several cases in which two persons are assaulted or two drums are stolen, and
the interval between the events is either nearly zero (the previously described sce
narios ) , two weeks, or two years in length.
We asked our subjects, in other words, to read and retain the subtle differences
in a good many cases. Luckily for us, they did. Table 6. 1 1 indicates that subjects
are reasonably accurate as to the number of individuals injured in the various c;:ts
saults and the number of drums stolen in the various thefts (column a). The re
spondents also recognize the differences in the time intervals between the crimes,
in the cases in which multiple crimes are committed (column b) .
The liability results for this study are in Table 6 . 1 2 . As with other tables that we
have presented in which multiple comparisons are possible, it is difficult to ex
tract them from the table. Perhaps the main points to extract from the table are
that no respondent thinks that no liability is appropriate, and only very few assign
liability with no punishment-and when this assignment is made, it is almost al
ways in the theft cases.
As we said, the various comparisons we want to make are difficult to make
from an inspection of the liability table alone. It seemed useful to present them in
figures. Let us look first at the major question of this study, which involves the
patterns of changes in liability when the number of offenses increases. In Figure
6 . 1 3 , we assemble for comparison all of the cases of theft or assault in which the
multiple thefts or assaults occurred immediately one after the other.
First, notice that the liability assigned for any assault is always greater than that
assigned for any theft ( F ( l ,40 )
1 2 7.88, p < .000 1 ] . This is exactly as we would
expect from both intuition and the criminal code; harming another person is
more serious than stealing an oil drum.
Notice, second, that both curves have the general property that both matches
our intuition and is built into the federal sentencing guidelines for
nonaggregatable offenses. The greater the number of offenses, the greater the sen=
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TABLE 6. 1 1 S ubjects' Perceptions of Multiple Offenses

Scenarios

(a)
(b)
Number
of
Time
Offenses Interval

(e)
(f)
(d)
(c)
"Likely
'Threat "Intended "Likely
to
Future
Past
of
Harm" Commit" Offense" Offenses"

Single day-Assault:
1.

1 victim

8.63

1 .00

8.61

5.41

5. 1 0

2. 2 victims

1 .98

1 .00

8.83

8.68

5.83

5.49

3. 4 victims
4. 7 victims

3.93

1 .00

8.93

8.76

5.59

6.85

1 .00

9.00

8.83

5.95
6.44

2.05

8.68

5.22

5.24

2.51

8.71
8.6 1

5.51

5.49

2.41

5.76

2. 1 0

8.51

5.90
5.46
6.05

5.95

5.93

Single day-Theft:
5.

1 item

6. 2 items
7. 4 items
8. 4 items/1 victim

1 .05
2.00
3.88

1 .00
1 .00

1 .46

5.56

7.02

1 .02

2.66

8.66

2 victims

2.00

1 .98

8.83

8.78

6.37

5.90

1 1 . Theft; 2 items

2.05

1 .97

2.52

8.57

5.92

5.90

1 2. Assault, 2 victims 2.00
2.05
1 3. Theft, 2 items

2.98

8.85

8.83

6.71

6.27

2.93

2.73

8.46

6.51

6.47

9.

7 items

Two-week interval:
1 0. Assault,

Two-year interval:

Key to column heads:
Statements (c) through

(f) were responded to on a scale where: 1 ="strongly

disagree," 5="unsure," and 9="strongly agree."

(a) Number of crimes the actor committed: 1 to 1 0.
(b) Time i nterval between offenses: 1 =1ess than a day, 2=2 weeks, and 3=2
years.
(c)

In the scenario above, there was physical harm or a threat of physical

harm to persons.
(d) The actor intended to commit the offense.
(e) After h is conviction, the actor is likely to commit other offenses in the
future.

(f) The actor is likely to have committed other offenses in the past for which
he has not been caught.
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TABLE 6. 1 2 Liability for Multiple Offenses

(a)

(b)

(c)
% No Liability

% No Liability

Scenarios
Single day-Assault:
1.

1 victim

2. 2 victims
3.

4 victims

4.

7 victims

S ingle day-Theft:

Liability

(N)

or No Punishment
(N+O)

5.85

0

0

6. 1 7

0

15

6.76

0

0

7.1 0

0

0

3. 1 7

0

0

5.

1 item

6.

2 items

3.95

7.

4 items
4 items/1 victim

4.37

0
0

2

3.54

0

10

4.68

0

2

6.41

0

0

4. 1 0

0

5

6.59

0

0

4.1 5

0

7

8.

9. 7 items
Two-week interval:
1 0.

Assault, 2 victims

1 1 . Theft, 2 items
Two-year interval:
1 2.

Assault, 2 victims

1 3. Theft, 2 items

5

Liability Scale: N=No criminal liability, O=Liability but no punishment, 1 =
1 day, 2=2 weeks, 3=2 months, 4=6 months, 5=1 year, 6=3 years, 7=7 years,
8= 1 5 years, 9=30 years, 1 0=1ife, and 1 1 =death.

tence grows [F( l , l 20 ) = 70.0 1 , p < .00 1 ] , but it does not do so in a linear fashion.
Instead, it follows the general rule we discussed of adding a decreasing increment
'
for each additional offense.
However, our results do not support the aggregation side of the United States
Sentencing Commission guidelines approach. Under the guidelines, theft is
aggregatable; assault is not. Under the guidelines, therefore, each additional theft
would get even less additional increment; each would be treated as providing no
more punishment than if the person took the two drums from the same gas sta
tion in a single theft. The sharp increase in sentence for the thief for the theft of
the second drum suggests that subjects do not follow this rule. Future research, in
which the scenarios might compare the theft of x drums from different stations
with the theft of x drums all at once, will clarify this still further.
Turn now to the effect that a time delay between offenses has on the sentencing
patterns of our respondents. Figure 6. 14 shows us the effect of time delays be
tween a first and a second offense on liability for the two offenses. (The figure
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FIGURE 6. 1 3 Total Liability as a Function of Number of Offenses (no time delay)
8
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•

Theft
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3 �----�----��0
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5

6

7

8

Number of Offenses

graphs the total liability for the two offenses. ) As can be seen, the time delay does
seem to make a difference; the longer the time between the two offenses, the more
severe the sentence for the pair of them, and this is confirmed by the statistical
test, F(2,78) 9.85, p < .00 1 . However, it is also important to note that, com
pared to many of the other differences we have found between scenarios in other
chapters, the differences we have graphed in Figure 6. 1 4 are not large or dramatic.
Respondents assign only mildly more severe sentences the longer the delay be
tween the incidents for which they are sentencing the individual. It may well be
that this is because the longer the period of time between the multiple offenses,
the more the subjects would be likely to treat them as entirely independent of
fenses deserving entirely independent, nonoverlapping penalties, as we suggested
earlier. The best description of these results is this: increasing the interval between
offenses slightly increases the liabilities assigned.
Why might this be so? A glance at Figure 6. 1 5, in which we have illustrated the
respondents' ratings of the likelihood of the person having committed previous
offenses ( from column fof Table 6. 1 1 ) or the likelihood of the person committing
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FIGURE 6. 1 4 Total Liability as a Function of the Interval Between Two Offenses
7

Assault
•

Theft

......_----m
6

4

3 �------�--��-Immediate
Two Weeks
TINO Years

I nterval Between Offenses

future offenses ( from column e of Table 6. 1 1 ), suggests a mechanism that might
be triggered by the delay between offenses and might be producing the increase in
sentences. Respondents judge that it is much more likely that an individual who
commits two assaults or two thefts separated by several weeks is more likely to
commit similar assaults or thefts in the future (and to have done so in the past27)
than an individual who commits two assaults or thefts immediately following
each other. Further, an individual who commits two assaults or thefts over a
period separated by two years is even more likely to act in a similar way in the fu
ture (and to have done so in the past).
It is clear that the respondents do what a great deal of research on person attri
bution processes suggests that they would, which is to treat information about a
person's actions as providing information about his underlying dispositions
(Jones and Davis, 1 965; Kelley, 1 967). In this instance, if a person does something
once, a number of possible explanations are available for that action, including
situational pressures rather than underlying dispositions. The thief of an oil drum
could have been under some extraordinary pressure (for instance. needing medi
cine for his child) that caused him to steal; and the person who assaults another
could have been assaulting a co-worker who harassed him. However, if the person
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FIGUR E 6. 1 5

Past and Future Likelihood of Committing Similar Offenses

7.0

6.5

"0
0
0
..c:

Q)

6.0

..ll::

::J

5.5

l!1

Assault-Future

•

Assault-Past

•

Theft-Future

0

Theft-Past

5.0 �------�--��Two Weeks
Two Years
Immediate
Interval Between the Two Present Offenses

commits essentially the same act in different situations, then we are likely to con
dude that the act is dispositional; that it reflects the true underlying personality of
the person. So the observer will conclude, specifically, that the person is a thief or
a habitually violent person. What the data pattern suggests is that the time separa
tion between the two acts is read as suggesting that the two situations are in fact
different.

Study 1 8: Summary
Our respondents do function the way that our intuition suggests and as the gen
eral, nonaggregated aspect of the federal sentencing guidelines articulate. They
assign a more extended sentence for two crimes than for one but generally do not
double the sentence that they assign for the first offense. They do not follow the
strictly additive pattern characteristic of consecutive sentencing or the pattern of
no increase in sentence that would be dictated by a concurrent-sentencing philos
ophy. Their sentencing pattern is in accord with the principle that we suggested
earlier-that the punishment deserved for an offense is based only in part on the
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harm caused, such as the deprivation of the owner of his property. The person's
willingness to violate the announced rules of society may be part of the founda
tion for punishment, and this factor is already taken into account in the sentence
for the first offense.
Our respondents do not agree with the aggregational rules provided by the sen
tencing guidelines. Within those guidelines, theft is an aggregatable offense, and a
number of thefts of one item draws the same penalty as one theft of the same total
number of items. Our respondents assign a sharply increased penalty to the sec
ond theft. In further disagreement with the sentencing guidelines, although slight
differences emerged between the pattern of sentencing for multiple assault and
multiple theft cases, the small variations do not suggest any major differences in
our respondents' sentencing "philosophies" in those two kinds of cases.
What remains to be explored in future research are the conditions under which
a pattern of multiple offenses leads respondents to move from a model in which
each additional offense is punished, although with increasingly reduced penalties,
to one in which the "habitual offender" concept comes into play. The latter may
apply when an individual who has served a sentence for an offense repeats the
crime. The "psychological logic" would then be that the sentence for the first of
fense did not deter the convict and a longer one is required. An alternative expla
nation is that, having once been officially sanctioned, greater punishment is
called for with the second offense because the subsequent violation is a greater
challenge to the authority of the criminal law. Yet one more explanation: We no
ticed that our subjects are making the inference that a person who commits the
same sort of crime after a delay is predicted to be more likely to commit future
crimes, and one might expect this to find its way into individuals' sentencing pat
terns. Subjects might be exercising the incapacitation function of punishment,
locking away a person who is likely to commit future offenses. Future research
could sort out some of these issues.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
In several of the cases we considered in this chapter, we found that our respon
dents' intuitions about the appropriate grading for different variants of offenses
differ from those reflected in the legal codes. For instance, in sexual offenses, our
respondents regard forcible rapes as generally of similar grades regardless of the
existence of various kinds of prior relationship between the individuals involved,
while the Code sharply conditions the offense grade as a function of prior rela
tionship. With regard to felony murder, our respondents preferred a "felony
manslaughter rule" with a standard "accomplice discount" rather than the law's
imposition of murder liability for all participants (and, in some jurisdictions, all
variations of involvement by innocents and felons). When this or another com
munity-code discrepancy was discovered, we commented on what principles of
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judgment might be underlying our subjects' responses, and we also discussed the
implications of the discrepancy for code alteration, where we thought that a case
could be made for consideration of that. With those discussions as background,
we now turn to a consideration of the general implications of our subjects' re
sponses.
In sum, it is clear that our respondents are in accord with the general tendency
in the legal codes to distinguish grades of offenses within and between offenses.
For instance, the subjects clearly distinguish different levels of sexual offenses, al
though not always exactly in the ways suggested by the legal codes. Interestingly,
in the case of felony murder, in which, probably for policy reasons, the codes em
phatically reject the idea of grading within felony murder and treat all cases as
murder, our respondents do distinguish grades within that offense, assigning
lower sentences to felons whose causal connection with the resultant death is
more remote. Similarly, in the causation study, respondents grade different causal
connections with a death differently, specifically assigning lower sentences to per
sons who intend to kill but do not succeed in directly doing so, although death
eventuates by means of a later chain of events. The general notion of grading of
fenses is recognized as a basic and appropriate code function, both in the eyes of
our respondents and in legal codes.
However, it is worth noting that the grading of offenses registered by our sub
jects is done in a somewhat different manner than codes generally accomplish
such grading. The codes tend toward dichotomous grading: A botched attack on
another's life, which through a chain of circumstances leads to that other's death,
is either causally closely enough connected to the death (in which case it is mur
der) or not closely enough connected ( in which case it is only attempted murder).
In contrast, our respondents provide more continuous judgments; for instance,
they judge that cases in which an attempted murderer's victim dies only through a
chain of events after the attempt warrant a sentence lower than that for straight
forward murder but higher than that for attempted murder. We will discuss the
implications of this continuous grading further in the concluding chapter.
A different but related point is the tendency of some codes, including the
Model Penal Code, to recognize too few categories of offenses-as compared to
the refined intuitions of our respondents. Most jurisdictions have adopted a grad
ing scheme that uses more than the five grades of the Model Penal Code,28 but
even eight or nine grades could not give expression to the rather nuanced judg
ments that we see our respondents make. The effect of this shortage of grades
means that even in cases in which the codes properly identify a relevant mitigat
ing or aggravating factor, they frequently must give it more or less effect in grad
ing than it merits. Our respondents agreed with the Model Penal Code, for exam
ple, that absence of a prior sexual relationship aggravates liability for rape, but the
Code's one-grade difference for those two cases-the minimum distinction it can
make-significantly exceeds the difference in grade that our respondents would
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give. This argues for codes with more grades into which offenses can be catego
rized.29
The special problems of sentencing multiple offenses also suggest a structural
change in current doctrine. Presently, multiple offenses typically are dealt with ei
ther by concurrent sentences, which impose no additional sentence for the second
offense, or by consecutive sentences, which effectively double the penalty. Our re
spondents assign sentences for a second offense that add to but do not double the
sentence for the first offense; and they continue this pattern for any further of
fenses. This approach matches at best one aspect of the United States Sentencing
Commission guidelines, and the model provided by these guidelines may move
the legal doctrine in this direction.

7

Conflict Between Community Views
and Criminal Codes

We now return to the question, which we raised at the beginning of the book, of
the implications of discrepancies between legal codes and community standards,
using the specific cases on which we have gathered evidence to illuminate the pos
sible meanings of those discrepancies.
Recall our discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the importance of taking account
of community views in formulating liability rules. Certainly, one cannot claim
that the community's view is necessarily the morally correct view. As moral phi
losophers would note, the members of the community may well express views
about proper punishment that they would find unfair if they themselves were to
be judged by such views or that are in some other way unfair when examined
from some rational moral perspective. Nonetheless, the community's disagree
ment with a liability rule may, at the very least, suggest that philosophers should
scrutinize the analysis that leads them to a different formulation of the liability
rule than community intuitions expect.
Community views have a more direct relevance, we argued, under a utilitarian
justification for criminal-law rules, where the primary goal is the reduction of
crime rather than the imposition of deserved punishment. The fear of the shame
and stigmatization of criminal conviction is a powerful yet inexpensive deterrent,
but its effectiveness depends on the established condemnatory value of convic
tion. The more past convictions correlate in the community's collective con
sciousness with morally condemnable conduct, the more likely that condemna
tion will attach with the conviction at hand. Thus, discrepancies between the
criminal code and the community tend to undercut the condemnation of convic
tion and thereby lessen the effectiveness of condemnation as a deterrent threat.
Perhaps more important, recent empirical evidence suggests that the law's
most powerful mechanism for gaining compliance lies not with the negative force
of the deterrent threat but rather with the positive force of the law as arbiter of
proper conduct. Most people obey the law not because they fear punishment but
because they see themselves as persons who want to do the right thing. Again, dis
crepancies between the criminal code and the community tend to undercut the
law's moral credibility and this, in turn, weakens the law's ability to dictate proper
201
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conduct. As the law's moral credibility decreases, so too does its power to set au
thoritative standards of conduct to which people are willing to conform.
Finally, the perceived «justice" of the system also is crucial to gaining the coop
eration and acquiescence of those persons involved in the process (such as offend
ers, potential offenders, witnesses, and jurors) . Greatest cooperation will be
elicited in that situation where the system has greatest moral credibility. A system
that is perceived as unjust is in danger of being subverted and ignored. On the one
hand, it risks jury nullification and martyrdom that rallies resistance to its com
mands. On the other, it risks vigilantism.
Our conclusion is that the moral credibility of the criminal law is its single
most important asset. Discrepancies between the code and the community have
the potential to undercut the law's moral credibility and thereby its effectiveness.
This can occur in either of two ways: by convicting morally blameless persons and
by failing to convict morally blameworthy persons. The former may be more det
rimental than the latter. That is, each time the criminal law convicts a blameless
person, it calls into question, in some small way, the legitimacy of every other
criminal conviction. As the number of blameless convictions increases, the credi
bility of each subsequent conviction decreases.
Where the criminal law fails to convict a blameworthy person, it may earn a
reputation as being ineffective, but it does not as directly undercut the credibility
of the convictions that do result. However, the criminal law's failure to criminalize
certain conduct, which the community finds morally offensive, does call into
question the moral j udgment of the code drafters, which in turn may undercut
the law's moral voice. Imagine for a moment that bestiality was decriminalized on
the basis that no individual was harmed and that the prohibition infringed upon
the individual's right of privacy ( following the arguments that led to the
decriminalization of consensual sodomy in many codes) . A similar dynamic may
occur where the law criminalizes the repugnant conduct but fails to punish viola
tors of the prohibition, for reasons other than a lack of blameworthiness. One
could conceive of many people losing faith in the moral j udgment of the criminal
law generally and reacting to it merely as a collection of rules rather than as a
statement of moral wrongs. And this, in turn, we speculate, might reduce the
criminal law's compliance power.
In the studies we have discussed in this book, we have sought out evidence for
code-community discrepancies an4 frequently found it. However, we have not
shown whether those discrepancies have the undercutting consequences we have
suggested here. Is there any evidence that these discrepancies have the sorts of ef
fects we suggest?
A number of studies have confirmed the existence of one of the relationships
that we suggest, the one between an individual's disbelief in the morality of a par
ticular law and his or her unwillingness to obey that law. Studies show that the
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degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law in the past and plan to
obey it in the future correlates with the degree to which they j udge that law to be
morally valid ( Grasmick and Green, 1 980; Jacob, 1 980; Meier and Johnson, 1 977;
Silberman, 1 976; and Tittle, 1 980 ) .
There i s less evidence for our other claim, which is that disbelief i n the morality
of one law eventually causes contempt for the legal code in general, or more accu
rately, those areas of the code that are concerned with the prohibition of activities
that are not immediately and intuitively regarded as wrong. Tyler's recent ( 1 990)
Chicago panel study provides some indirect evidence on this point. The degree to
which Tyler's subjects saw the legal authorities as having legitimate power pre
dicted their willingness to obey various laws promulgated by those authorities.
Thus, if people believe in the legitimacy of the authorities making the law, they
are willing to believe that the laws that those authorities promulgate should be
obeyed. Other studies find that a person's views about the legitimacy of the legal
system and obligations to obey its laws correlate with that person's reports of en
gaging in lawbreaking activity (Sarat, 1 977; Tittle, 1 980) . We would argue from
this that when authorities promulgate what individuals consider an unjust law,
individuals lose respect for the authorities and regard with suspicion the whole
system of laws. When people report that they do not trust the "governmental sys
tem" or grant relatively little legitimacy to authorities, the evidence suggests that
they are more willing to engage in violent social protest, rioting, aggressive politi
cal behavior, and use of violence for political ends. See Tyler's 1 990 review of this
evidence, pp. 3 3-35.
WHEN CODE AND COMMUNITY AGREE
With this introduction, one may ask whether we found cases in which any sort of
code-community discrepancy exists. We did. But we also found many cases in
which the code and the community seemed in harmony, and we begin by mark
ing those cases.
The results of the studies confirm many aspects of current doctrine, including
several important foundational principles upon which the doctrine is based. The
legal system consistently asserts that the degree to which liability should follow a
violation depends to a considerable extent on the culpability level of the person in
violating the law. With this principle, stated at this broad level, our subjects were
in agreement. The degree of a person's culpability for a violation, ranging from
negligent through pu rposeful commission, made a difference in the penalties that
our subjects assigned. This emerges most clearly from our Study 8, concerning of
fense culpability requirements, but also emerges indirectly in many other studies
as well.
Further, o ur subjects recognized and granted validity to the various "excusing
conditions" that are recognized in legal codes. For instance, debilitating abnor-
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malities in an offender's capacities (from mental illness, for example) can indeed
serve to exculpate a person, even for the most serious offense. Still further, the
studies found broad support for the recognition of j ustification defenses. If the
person's conduct is justified in any of several ways that the law now recognizes, the
subjects do not punish what normally would be an offense.
The studies also support many specific aspects of current doctrine, including
provisions that have been criticized by some commentators. Causing a death dur
ing a felony is treated by the subjects as more blameworthy than causing the same
death under otherwise similar circumstances. Negligence as to becoming intoxi
cated is accepted by the subjects as an adequate basis to impose liability for many
offenses committed while intoxicated, as it is in many legal codes. When faced
with a possibly insane person, people evaluate the degree to which that person
shows both control and cognitive dysfuncion, which are the two dimensions that
the legal codes mark as important. Further in accordance with the standards of
judgment that the codes use, respondents make their liability judgments based on
their perceptions of these dysfunctions.
WHEN CODE AND COMMUNITY DISAGREE
We turn next to the second set of cases, those in which the subjects' views conflict
with current law. How can we characterize these differences in general? What is
sues do these differences raise for code formulation?
Our empirical research suggests factors currently used by the doctrine that are
not relevant to the community's assessment of blameworthiness. The sexual of
fenses study, for example, reveals instances in which the Model Penal Code, which
was drafted in the 1 950s (and promulgated in 1 962) , no longer reflects commu
nity social mores. The subjects do not treat consensual intercourse with an under
age partner as the very serious offense that the Code treats it as; they give no miti
gation because of prior promiscuity of an underage partner, though the Code
does; they do not give the significant mitigation to forcible rape that the Code
gives where the victim is a voluntary social companion. Recall that if subjects see
the violated individual as the nonconsenting victim of a sexual assault, they re. gard the act as incurring approximately equal liability whether or not a previous
sexual relationship existed and the woman was on this occasion a voluntary social
companion. This strikes us as an area in which the opinions of society have genu
inely changed. In fact, current state codes now reflect this change in public opin
ion; most have recently dropped the spousal exclusion, voluntary social compan
ion mitigation, and so on.
Research also can suggest factors that should be added to a code's assessment of
liability. The culpability requirements study, for example, revealed that subjects
impose significant increases in liability for a person's increased culpability over
the minimum required for the offense by most legal codes. As the person moves
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from negligent to purposeful commission of the same offense conduct, our sub
jects assign greater punishment in response to this heightened culpability. Yet,
with the exception of homicide and a few other offenses, most codes typically de
fine each kind of criminal conduct as an offense with a single grade, defined only
by certain minimum culpability requirements, usually recklessness. If the code is
to mirror community views, the culpability study suggests that offenses be de
fined to include multiple grades according to the person's culpability level. The
specific suggestion here is that code drafters consider increasing the grade of the
crime as a function of the culpability of the perpetrator-rather than using reck
lessness as the trigger for a single grade of offense.
Empirical studies have the potential to not only identify when an additional of
fense element is needed but also to guide drafters in formulating the element, as
in selecting the level of culpability to require as to which element. The culpability
study illustrates that the subjects have specific views on what the minimum level
of culpability ought to be and how much liability ought to increase for increases
in a person's culpability. Recall that this judgment was a relatively complex one,
with culpability as to different elements-for example, «core" elements versus
«collateral" elements-having different effects.
In addition to identifying needed elements or setting culpability levels, empiri
cal research can help choose between alternative formulations of an offense or
even suggest new formulations or criteria. The attempt study, for example, chal
lenges the Model Penal Code's formulation of the objective requirement for at
tempt. Though modern doctrine imposes attempt liability as soon as a person
takes a substantial step toward commission of an offense, 77 percent of the sub
jects would impose no punishment in such a case. Instead, the subjects generally
support the older common-law tests for attempt: All respondents would impose
liability and punishment when a person has come close to committing the of
fense. The code-community discrepancy here is an interesting one, and one that
raises pertinent issues in the debate. It may be that, given the current climate of
worry about increased criminal activity, the code is moving in the direction of
criminalizing relatively small steps toward the commission of crimes. Here, those
interested in retaining the system's integrity should carry out this debate with
maximal involvement of the p ublic, so that the public can be put on notice that
the code criminalizes conduct at an earlier point than the community intuitively
would. This is important to protect the code's moral credibility; code drafters
ought to make clear their reasons when their formulation conflicts with the com
munity's views.
Earlier in this chapter, we remarked that, in Study 1 6, our respondents agreed
with the code's tendency to treat a killing that occurs in the course of a felony as
deserving more blame than the killing would in nonfelonious circumstances. Al
though this generally is true, our felony-murder study reveals that the common
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formulations of the rule do not reflect popular intuition. (Subjects tended to pun
ish most accidental killings during a robbery as less serious than manslaughter,
though many codes woud punish those killings as murder.) This makes all the
more puzzling the rule's continuing political vitality despite its extensive criticism
by scholars. Some aspects of the rule are clearly less popular with the subjects
than others, suggesting a means by which the rule could be reformed. For in
stance, subjects do not follow the logic of assigning murder to the surviving rob
ber when, during the course of the robbery, the wife of the store owner shoots and
kills one of the robbers. A reconstruction of the rules to reflect this would be pos
sible. Felony-murder could be retained for killings that directly result from the ac
tion of the perpetrator and perhaps his accomplices, given the utility of holding
participants in the crime responsible for the actions of their fellow culprits. Alter
natively, some might use the results to support abolition of the special rule in fa
vor of reliance upon the usual homicide doctrines with the addition of certain ev
identiary presumptions, as the Model Penal Code does but which most states
have rejected. That is, if a death occurs during the course of a felony, the perpetra
tors would be presumed to have caused that death in a way that warrants a mur
der penalty, and it would be the task of the defense to rebut this presumption with
evidence showing that the defendants' conduct, while reckless, did not manifest
extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Another use of empirical research is to set or adjust the grades of offenses. For
example, if the felony-murder doctrine is not to be abolished or reformulated, the
research suggests that, at the very least, its liability grades should be reduced. A
"felony-manslaughter rule" might be more appropriate.
A more fundamental grading issue is illuminated by the attempt study. Some
codes, like the Model Penal Code, impose the same level of liability for an attempt
as for the offense that is attempted;1 but a majority of codes provides a standard
discount for attempt liability. The subjects support the majority rule here.2 This
sheds some light on a dispute in the literature over people's intuitive notions as to
whether actual resulting harm should increase liability.3 The attempt study also
suggests that resulting harm does increase a person's deserved punishment-in
the subjects' view-but that even liability for a completed offense sometimes is
reduced if the person is able to undo the harm that has been done. This evidence
has implications for the formulation and grading of all offenses, as well as doc
trines of liability such as complicity; it suggests that codes ought to distinguish
and punish more severely instances where the prohibited harm actually occurs or
the prohibited conduct is actually consummated, as compared to instances where
the harm or evil is only intended (but not carried to completion) .
The studies also suggest different grading than current law for most of the doc
trines that concern errors in justification. If a mistake as to a justification does not
give a defense, it ought to at least mitigate liability, according to our subjects.
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The general area of justification for actions otherwise prohibited is an interest
ing one from the perspective of code-community clashes. Review for a moment
our findings on the degree of force that the community finds appropriate to use
in defense of self or property or to bring about a citizen's arrest. The shared theme
here is the degree to which the average citizen can take the law into his or her own
hands. Recall that our subjects were willing to approve the use of a good deal
more force than the legal codes would permit, and the use of force in a good many
more cases that the codes would allow.
We see several possible explanations for this. First, many of our subjects may
see the criminal j ustice system as failing to keep its side of the social contract
failing either to apprehend criminals or to get them convicted when they are ar
rested or to keep them in j ail when they are convicted. If this is the case, have they,
therefore, reverted to a vigilante notion of justice, in which any individual is enti
tled to take almost any step to protect his or her property or person? To the degree
that this is the case, it represents a complex problem for code drafters. To what de
gree can or should the code be formulated to represent people's views about a per
ceived or actual breakdown of the criminal j ustice system? This seems a particu
larly acute question for the case of force allowable in carrying out a citizen's
arrest. Our subjects seem to be trying to convey the message that a person who
uses a high degree of force in these circumstances, even unnecessary or dispropor
tionate force, should receive only relatively minor punishment for doing so (in
contrast to the codes' dichotomous, aU-or- nothing assignment of liability) .
Again, what may be going on here is that subjects may perceive the existence of
crisis within the criminal justice system. People may believe that our overtaxed
police departments have a very low likelihood of apprehending a thief or that our
court system has a very low likelihood of appropriately punishing the thief if ap
prehended. If respondents are thinking along these lines, they may believe that
the violent acts of the theft victims are the only punishment a perpetrator is ever
likely to receive and, therefore, that victims are appropriately empowered to de
liver this punishment.
A second explanation of the results is this: People may rely on a different set of
principles than those that we articulated from the legal code for judging appropri
ate defensive force. For instance, the legal code formulation seems to require some
apparently complex calculations-on the part of the attacked person-about ex
actly what an attacker intends and about the minimum force sufficient to thwart
those intentions. People may regard it as inappropriate to require such judgments
of an attacked individual in what they perceive as a rapidly occurring and emo
tionally terrifying situation (such as an assault or a robbery) .
The above cases raise the possibility that subjects would approve of alterations
in the legal codes that decriminalize certain acts or reduce the liability assigned to
those acts. However, we would remind the reader that, in other cases, our subjects
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seem to be calling for the criminalization or more serious treatment of actions
that the codes do not criminalize or to which the codes assign relatively minor
penalties. These studies suggest that new offenses be created or that liability be
expanded from its current scope. The omission study, for example, reveals that
about 80 percent of the subjects would impose liability for a person's failure to
rescue a stranger when such can be done with no danger to the resc\ler. Current
doctrine, recall, imposes no duty to rescue in such a case and, therefore, imposes
no liability for failing to do so, no matter how minor the inconvenience to the po
tential rescuer.
LIABILITY REQUIREMENTS VERSUS LIABILITY FACTORS
AND DICHOTOMOUS FUNCTIONS VERSUS
CONTINUOUS FUNCTIONS
Perhaps more dramatic than the comparison with any particular aspect of current
doctrine are the rather clear findings that the process by which our subjects assess
liability is different from the way in which the drafters of current doctrine con
ceptualize the issue. Where the doctrine treats a factor as setting a fixed minimum
requirement for full liability, the subjects frequently see the same factor as aggra
vating or mitigating the degree of a person's liability and punishment. For exam
ple, while the doctrine treats complicity as a means of establishing full liability for
the substantive offense, the subjects generally consider an accomplice to be less
blameworthy than the principal and reduce the accomplice's liability according
ly.4 A similar general "discount" in liability is seen in cases of omission. Though
the doctrine holds a person fully liable for the substantive offense if he or she
satisfies the requirements of omission liability, the subjects significantly reduce a
person's liability if he or she commits an offense by omission from what it would
be if he or she committed the same offense by commission.5 Reacting intuitively,
the community's views seem to us to be more rational than the code treatment
here. In a failure to rescue case, the codes' assignment of no penalty to the
stranger who fails to rescue and of a penalty equivalent to murder or manslaugh
ter if certain complex conditions about the assumption of duty are met seem, re
spectively, too lenient and then too harsh.
The grading of attempt conduct further demonstrates this difference between
the codes' and the respondents' treatment of liability. The codes define a particu
lar point, during the preparation and conduct toward an offense, as the moment
when liability attaches. The subjects, in contrast, see increasing liability as the
person gets closer to committing the offense.
From the subjects' perspective, the codes' tendency to dichotomize signals a se
rious and pervasive flaw in current law. The doctrine more often than not sees a
fact as either establishing liability or not or as giving a mitigation (or an aggrava
tion) or not; a relevant fact in the case typically triggers application of a particular
rule or sub rule. The subjects, in contrast, frequently see a continuum of blame-
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worthiness and liability. A fact more frequently contributes to an increment or
decrement in liability judgment than produces a complete assignment of liability
or total escape from liability.
The notion of a liability continuum for some factors is acknowledged by cur
rent doctrine in some contexts. Codes typically are structured to impose greater
liability for greater harm done, all other things being equal. Codes sometimes
too rarely from the subjects' perspective-vary the degree of a person's liability
with his or her level of culpability. The codes' culpability spectrum is not a strictly
continuous one, at least as it is defined in modern codes, with four discrete levels
of culpability. It is, however, a practical and useful approximation of a continuum.
In most other instances, however, current doctrine fails to acknowledge contin
uums that the subjects dearly support. In complicity, for example, not only do the
subjects give a liability discount to the accomplice, which the codes do not, but
the respondents vary the extent of the discount with the extent of the accomplice's
contribution to the offense. Similarly, in attempts, the extent of the attempter's
discount will depend in part on how far he or she has gone toward completion of
the offense. In omissions, the extent of liability depends on the degree of danger
or inconvenience to the person who is to undertake the rescue.
In causation, liability varies with the strength of the causal connection between
the person's conduct and the result. The law, in contrast, sets a maximum degree
of tolerable remoteness between the person's conduct and the result-for in
stance, in time, place, or strength of causal chain. If this maximum amount is not
exceeded, the person is fully accountable for the result. The subjects, in contrast,
see degrees of liability according to the degree of remoteness.
Obviously, a criminal code cannot take account of the infinite continuum over
which many factors may range.6 It is not unrealistic, however, to expect a code to
recognize that these factors are relevant to determining liability-that is, to recog
nize some kind of discount-and to attempt a rough approximation of their
varying effect. This can be done in the same way that modern codes approximate
the harm and culpability continuums-by defining a few large categories for each
of the most relevant factors. Such a rough approximation of a continuum gener
ally is sufficient for the criminal code's role of indicating a range for the extent of
punishment. More refined distinctions can be made in the se.ntencing process.
Is it not the case that all such distinctions could be reserved for the sentencing
process? We suggest that it would be a mistake to push over to the sentencing pro
cess the responsibility to make such rough approximations of highly relevant fac
tors, especially when such determinations can effectively be made by a code. First;
as a matter of principle, the purposes supporting the legality principle, as well as
modern notions of due process, prefer that the most significant determinants of
liability be considered at the liability stage, where the jury can make the determi
nation under the normal rules of trial procedure. To leave such determinations to
the more discretionary sentencing stage is to devalue legality, the jury system, and
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due process unnecessarily? Second, at the level of practice, jurors are more likely
to abide by their legal instructions to the extent that those instructions reach re
sults that they regard as fair outcomes. To fail to have verdicts that match the gen
eral range of punishment deserved is to invite jury dissatisfaction and resistance.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WITHOUT PUNISHMENT
In many of our studies, the subjects impose criminal liability on a person but then
impose little or no punishment. 8 Such is the subjects' view: ( 1 ) where the person
is intent on crime but his conduct falls short of dangerous proximity of commis
sion; (2) where the person satisfies the objective elements of an offense but is
faultless as to one or another element; (3) where the person fails to rescue the
stranger because of danger (or inconvenience); and (4) where the person mistak
enly or improperly uses deadly force in self-defense, unnecessary force in protec
tion of property, or excessive force or force against the wrong person in attempt
ing to detain an offender.
This practice by subjects may seem somewhat odd. If the person's conduct is
serious enough to merit the condemnation of criminal conviction, why should
the person escape punishment? One explanation is that the subjects want to ex
press their disapproval of the person's conduct but feel that the person is not suf
ficiently blameworthy to be punished for the conduct. If one takes a once-popular
view among academics that the only role of the criminal law is one of deterring
criminal behavior, this response by the subjects makes very little sense. Liability is
taken as a judgment that application of deterrent punishment is appropriate, yet
no such application is made.9 However, if one sees the criminal law as having dual
roles (of both announcing rules of proper conduct and adjudicating violations of
those rules) and, further, sees desert as the primary guide for assessing punish
ment, then this sort of judgment of "improper conduct, no punishment" makes
more sense. It is the mechanism by which the subjects seek to achieve the some
times conflicting functions oflaw: j udging the propriety of the conduct as a signal
to others in the future and judging the blameworthiness of the defendant at hand
for his past violation.
Notice that, in each instance that "liability but no punishment" is given as a re
sponse, the person's conduct is arguably inappropriate although the actor is not
held to be terribly blameworthy. In the omission cases, for example, in which an
individual fails to rescue a drowning man although he could do so without great
danger, our subjects often assign a verdict of "liability but no punishment." Here
the subjects seem to be saying that this is conduct that they want to disapprove of,
but the individual does not deserve a term in jail. The subjects use the condemna
tory function of the legal system in a way that makes perfect sense if one sees that
ordinary people take the legal code as having moral force to exert on the citizen.
The respondents also seem to be saying that these sorts of behaviors are morally
inapproprfate, without feeling that the person is to be punished for the conduct.
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In doing so, they are acknowledging what has become one of the major messages
of our discussion: that the legal code is seen as having moral force by the citizens
of the state, and the legal code's moral force operates independently of its coercive
force. For this reason, we suggest that code-community discrepancies have far
more importance than the previous rather scant attention to the topic has given
them.
Still, imposing criminal liability in such a verdict, in one sense, perverts the
function of criminal conviction. · If the person is not sufficiently blameworthy,
why should he or she suffer the condemnation of a criminal conviction? The an
swer may be found in the limited options available in the criminal law. The law
provides no opportunity, other than through criminal conviction, for a person's
criminal conduct to be disapproved. The subjects are caught in a difficult situa
tion. On the one hand, to decline to impose liability is to seemingly approve of
conduct of which they in fact disapprove. On the other hand, to impose liability is
to blame a person whom they see as not warranting the blame they hand out. The
liability-but-no-punishment option may seem an attractive compromise in such
a situation.
In the end, however, the liability-but-no-punishment option is just that-a
compromise-rather than an accurate expression of the subjects' or jurors' feel
ings. The fact is that such a practice imposes criminal liability, albeit without
punishment, on persons who do not deserve it. This is not only unfair to the per
son and unsatisfying to the subjects and jurors but also undercuts the effective
operation of the criminal law. If the law's role is to exact justice, it fails in that
function when an insufficiently blameworthy person is convicted. That no pun
ishment is imposed only minimizes the extent of the injustice. Also, of course,
when juries convict, they cannot control whether the judge will exercise the no
punishment option.
The difficult situation and the undesirable compromise arise because the crim
inal law has two important but distinct functions, each of which has its own spe
cial demands. These two functions-announcing public rules of conduct and as
sessing individual blame in adjudication of a violation-have very different
doctrinal foundations. The rules-of-conduct function gives the general popula
tion ex-ante direction as to what they can, must, and must not do. The principles
of-adjudication function gives decision-makers (i.e., prosecutors, juries, and
judges) guidance in assessing ex post the blameworthiness of an individual's vio
lation of the rules. When the doctrine tries to serve both of these functions with
the same provisions, one or the other of the functions suffers. In this instance, an
offender is convicted to assure that the proper signals are sent to disapprove of the
conduct-the rules-of-conduct function is satisfied-yet a blameless or insuffi
ciently blameworthy offender suffers the condemnation of conviction-the adju
dication-of-blame function is perverted. In other instances, the reverse perver
sion occurs. 10
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The solution to the subjects' dilemma and to the "perversion" of the law is to
allow subjects and j urors to disapprove of the person's conduct without con
demning the person. This requires the use of trial verdicts that allow a distinction
between an acquittal based on approval of the person's conduct and an acquittal
based on a person's blamelessness for admittedly improper conduct. The available
trial verdicts might be: "no violation;' "blameless violation;' and "guilty" or
"blameworthy violation" (see Robinson, 1990, pp. 766-767). In future research,
one could allow for such verdicts from subjects and test the conditions under
which they would use each.
THE JURY AS A RESOLVER OF
CODE-COMMUNITY CONFLICTS
Is it possible that our elaborate focus on code-community comparisons misses
the point? One could argue that we misunderstand the functioning of the legal
system and ignore the presence of a mechanism within it that modifies the results
produced by a mechanical application of the legal code where community stan
dards would be seriously violated by formulaic application of the code. The
mechanism, of course, is the jury. Juries have been known to produce verdicts that
seem far from the ones that would be required by an exact application of the legal
code, choosing instead, for instance, to find an individual not guilty of the offense
or guilty of a lesser offense that provides the reduced punishment that the j urors
judge to be appropriate. Here we recall the case of"the subway shooter:' Bernhard
Goetz, who shot several persons whom he believed were beginning to mug him
during his ride on the subway in New York. He was found not guilty of any seri
ous charges even though his actions seemed to clearly violate what the code for
mulations allow in self-defense. Similarly, the rather inelastic code formulation of
self-defense has been stretched to find persons innocent who would otherwise be
found guilty under the code-for example, battered women who finally kill their
abusive husbands.
Certainly, within the Anglo-Saxon legal system, the j ury emerged with what is
called "jury nullification" as one of their legitimate functions. Historically, this
was not always the case; the jury was not always given leeway to make these sorts
of adjustments. Early in the history of the emergence of the j ury, there were cases
in which the civil authorities, outraged at a particular verdict of a j ury, threw the
members of the jury in jail. But quite early in the development of the jury, jurors
became immune from this kind of retrospective punitive evaluation of their ver
dicts (Green, 1 985). This gave the jury the autonomy to refuse to find individuals
guilty ( even when the code would have found them guilty) , or to find guilty un
popular individuals who were charged with offenses they might not have com
mitted. Interestingly, Green's analysis of jury deliberations occurring in the
twelfth century showed that jurors actually did use their nullification powers to
find innocent various of their neighbors who had harmed or killed others in what
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the jurors regarded as acts of self-defense, even though the acts did not meet the
stringent requirements that the legal code set up for legal self-defense.
The code requirements at that time were not dissimilar to what they are now,
requiring that the attacker be threatening injury at the moment and that retreat
from the attack be impossible. Facts damaging to the claim of self-defense, there
fore, were that the attacker was wounded in the side or the back (since it would
follow then that the attack could not have been in progress) or that the incident
took place in an open field or some other location from which it should have been
possible to flee the attack. Coroner's reports often attested to the awkward pres
ence of these facts in specific cases. But during the jury deliberations (as inferred
from the facts as they were described in the jury reports) , wounds that the coro
ner had described as located in the back or side of the attacker were mysteriously
relocated to the front--creeping wounds-and what were described as open
fields were found to contain ditches, dikes, hedges, or other obstacles that made
retreat from the attack more plausibly impossible. l' Juries have nullified the me
chanical operation of the criminal code in the twelfth century, in the twentieth
century, and no doubt every century in between. By doing so, they bring commu
nity standards to bear in a context that finally gives them no apparent role.
However, relying on the jury to nullify the normal operation of the legal code
in cases of code-community discrepancies does not seem to us to be an entirely
satisfactory mechanism for adjudicating differences. First, it is unlikely to consis
tently work in a way that provides fairness across cases. One jury, somehow aware
of its power to nullify, does so. Another jury, unaware of its power to nullify, or
more cowed by the authority of the court, does not. One of the accused goes to
jail, the other goes free.12 What frequently happens is that this discrepancy, now
personalized in the form of two individuals, is publicized, drawing attention to
the unfairness of the legal system in a vivid and personal way. Second, as we have
discussed earlier, for the legal code to criminalize certain actions that people re
gard as morally acceptable (even though juries at least sometimes do not convict)
is to give a signal that damages peoples' respect for the legal code and, thus, likely
impairs what we have called its moral credibility. Third, as pointed out by Green,
if juries systematically provide this kind of "safety valve" function for the legal
code, they reduce pressure for a change in the code that would move it in the di
rection of better rendering community standards (and thereby enhance its moral
credibility). In the extreme case, they stultify code change.
Further, the jury's nullification ability is effective only as far as their power ex
tends-in the assignment of liability. The jury's power only works in one direc
tion; they can with their verdict minimize the extent of punishment that a person
can receive, but they cannot ensure that a judge will sentence a person to the full
punishment that their verdict calls for. Finally, and relatedly, many of the code po
sitions that we have shown to conflict with community views are instantiated in
sentencing-guideline systems. Most of what we have said about "missing dis-
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counts, and dichotomous rather than continuous treatment in codes applies
equally to existing sentencing guidelines. Although judges who pronounce sen
tence might share the jury's desire to deviate from the formal demands of the
code and might regularly have done so through the exercise of sentencing discre
tion, that possibility is reduced when sentencing guidelines have been articulated
that deviate from community views. 13 For all of these reasons, then, it seems pref
erable to us to have community standards reflected in legal codes when it· is ap
propriate to do so.
Our argument has been a long one, and it seems useful to draw some elements
of it together as a conclusion. In doing so, we will emphasize what we think the
implications are for those who are involved in legal code drafting.
Drawing on both empirical social science research and various theories of the
justification of punishment, we suggested that code-community conflicts, if they
are to exist, would have various corrosive consequences on the general respect
that ordinary citizens have for the criminal justice system and, therefore, their
willingness to obey the law. Next, via a set of scenario experiments, we demon
strated that, frequently, such discrepancies do exist. The moral intuitions of ordi
nary persons and the rules formulated in legal codes frequently dash in ways that
seem very important to us.
We suggest that the implications of this for code-drafting groups are as follows.
First, we would urge that various alternative formulations of code provisions un
der consideration by code drafters or legislators be subjected to the sort of empiri
cal scrutiny represented by our experimental procedures. We suggest, specifically,
that social science research of the sort we have illustrated in this work be an ex
plicit part of a code-drafting process and that social scientists be included among
the parties involved.
The research process need not be complex or time-consuming. Representative
samples of subjects could be drawn in advance from the state or other jurisdiction
that was to be governed by the proposed legal code. Once the specific alternate
code provisions were clear, the social scientists could quickly design scenarios that
would test the community intuitions about the alternative possibilities instanti
ated in the proposed versions.
Second, how would these empirical results play into the drafters' deliberations?
A number of possibilities exist. Frequently, if one examines the minutes of the de
liberations of code-drafting groups, one finds that they intend to base the code
provisions under discussion on the intuitive standards ofjustice of the commu
nity. If this is so, then disagreeing factions among the code-drafting group are of
ten disagreeing about the moral intuitions of the community. Certainly, in that
case, the empirical findings, particularly if they result from experimental designs
that the disagreeing factions have agreed on in advance, should be of considerable
utility in resolving the controversy. Nevertheless, one or more factions may be
pressing for the consideration of other reasons for preferring a specific code for-
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mulation than one reflecting the moral intuitions of the community. I f so, sup
pose our sort of empirical research reveals that the proposed formulation is in
some way at significant odds with the community's view. Then, such conflict
ought to be taken into account in debating the provision and, if the counter
intuitive provision is finally adopted, community education about the provision
would be required.
In fact, two kinds of education are necessary. First, the community should be
informed that the counterintuitive provision is the one that the lawmakers chose
to adopt and therefore people should govern their behavior accordingly. Other
wise, since individuals generally tend to assume that code provisions match their
moral intuitions, they will be uninformed about the possibilities of transgressing
the law. 14 Second, the public needs to be informed about the reasons why the code
deviates from moral intuitions in order to avoid the lessening of respect for the
criminal law that would otherwise result when some violation of it is publicized,
causing the community to become aware of it in what could be explosive circum
stances. In other words, when a counterintuitive provision of the legal code is put
into effect, the community needs to be informed about the provision and per
suaded of its validity.
Certainly, social science has a role to play here as well. Research could deter
mine not only what sorts of explanations of the new code provision would make
people most aware of the code, but also what sorts of explanations would make
them most convinced of the necessity of the provision.
Our attempt, then, has been to persuade the reader of the value of a certain
kind of research in the formulation of legal codes and to demonstrate what the
beginnings of such research projects would entail.

Appendix A:
Research Methodology

In this appendix, we discuss several related technical matters that we believe will
be useful to the reader attempting to evaluate the weight to be given to the find
ings that we report. We begin by placing our research design in a more general so
cial science context and then discuss the strengths and weaknesses associated with
that design. Finally, we turn to what proves to be a quite complex question: When
can it be said that there is a consensus among our individual respondents in their
treatment of cases? This brings us again to a discussion of the role of community
views in drafting legal codes.
OUR RESEARCH DESIGN IN CONTEXT
In a good many ways, our present research method resembles what Rossi and
Nock ( 1 982) refer to as a "factorial survey:' As they report, the method of factorial
survey was designed to gain an empirically based understanding of people's judg
ments in various domains. Basically, it asks people to j udge a number of cases and
then analyzes the pattern of judgments across cases in order to determine the
j udgmental principles that the people are using.
The factorial survey method combines elements from experimental psychology
with those of survey sociology. From experimental psychology one takes the no
tion of the balanced multivariate experimental design and from sociology the
method of sample survey procedures. Subjects are presented with a number of
cases to judge, and these cases differ on the various factors that the researchers
think might make a difference to the respondents. The cases are arranged so that
the different factors are varied orthogonally, enabling an assessment of the inde
pendent contribution of the different factors to the final judgment. Because a rea
sonable sample of respondents is surveyed, it is possible to determine to what de
gree the judgment structure is a shared one and to what extent it differs between
individuals in the sample.
An example may make this clear. Automobiles differ on a number of dimen
sions, but surely safety on the road, gas mileage, and price are three of them. Sup
pose, for a beginning, we set three levels of each of the three factors. Combining
each level of each factor together generates 27 (33) cases. 1 By having a number of
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respondents rate each case, we would be able to determine the weight they put on
each dimension in determining their preference. We would expect some consen
sus on the ratings; we would be surprised if anyone did not put a reasonable
weight on safety. However, we would also expect some individual differences in
the ratings as well; one respondent might value gas mileage a great deal; another
might care more about price.
In the present studies, our goals have caused us to deviate from standard facto
rial survey methods in several ways. First, our research was theory-driven in a
particular way. Because we are interested in only a subset of dimensions that
might determine judgments, we designed cases that varied only on those dimen
sions rather than on all of the possible dimensions that might contribute to hu
man judgments. Specifically, we examined the dimensions of a crime that were
signified by legal codes as important, such as culpability or the presence or ab
sence of excusing conditions. We also examined the plausible alternate dimen
sions that had some claim to be included within the legal codes and along which
we suspected our respondents might assess the cases. Certain dimensions that do
not have a claim to be included within the legal code were omitted from the stud
ies. For instance, a considerable body of research suggests that the physical attrac
tiveness of the defendant can make a considerable difference in the sentence
handed down for a crime. Despite this fact, there is no argument that recom
mends including such a dimension in legal codes, and we did not include a physi
cal attractiveness dimension in our studies.
Second, although it will be relevant in future studies, we were not initially con
cerned with a highly precise assessment of group or individual differences in
j udgments, so we did not include the larger numbers of respondents that would
have been required to assess such differences in a more precise fashion. Also, we
did not do the careful sampling of a defined population that would be required to
precisely generalize our results-with a known degree of error-to this popula
tion. Our reasons for this, discussed in Chapter 1, involved a decision as to what
we thought was valuable to achieve in these initial studies (investigating the moral
intuitions of the community and discrepancies between those intuitions and the
legal codes).
The procedures we used for examining the community's views on appropriate
punishments for various crimes can be quickly overviewed. We contacted people
to participate in our studies and asked for their views on the appropriate level of
liability to assign to perpetrators of various crimes that we described to them.
Each individual read about a particular crime case, "a scenario'' in our vocabu
lary, and was asked to decide whether a criminal sentence was appropriate for the
perpetrator. Individuals, "subjects" or "respondents" as we call them, then read
another crime scenario and assigned a punishment to it. The sets of scenarios that
our respondents were given usually were identical in a set of core elements and
differed only on the dimensions that we thought would make a difference in their
liability j udgments or were thought by criminal codes to make such a difference.
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By this method of examining the differing sentences assigned to closely related
cases, we sought to determine whether shared community notions of justice exist
and, if so, on which issues, as well as the ways in which such notions compare to
current law.
For example, criminal codes often treat the crime of forcible sexual intercourse
differently if it is committed between individuals who have had a previous sexual
relationship. Is this in accord with the way people currently think about rape? To
determine this, we first developed a description of a rape that could function as
the core of a scenario. To form the "stranger" scenario, we then added to that core
a few sentences making it clear that the two parties were strangers to one another.
To form another of the scenarios, we added to the core a few sentences making it
clear that there had been a previous sexual relationship between the two parties.
In this way, we formed the various scenarios that were needed for investigating
the various issues in sexual offenses. Using the same general procedure of core
and additions to the core designed to create the variations of interest to codes and
community standards, we developed the sets of scenarios that we used for all of
our studies.
Reported in this book are 18 studies that were designed and executed in semi
nars at Rutgers University School of Law in Autumn of 1990 and Spring 199 1 ,
with the help of faculty and graduate students from the Princeton University De
partment of Psychology. Some of the studies informed us as to conduct that the
community believes should be criminalized or as to the conditions that exculpate
a · normally blameworthy violation of a legal rule. Other studies were directed at
community standards for appropriate behavior in defense of selfor property. In
still others, on the vexing questions of actions committed while the offender is in
toxicated or insane, we returned to some of the oldest questions at the intersec
tion of law and social science. In the book, we discuss the results of our studies
and attempt to draw out the implications of our findings for the criminal code. To
help the reader evaluate the evidence, we now will take a closer look at our re
search methodology and particularly at its potential pitfalls.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
OF OUR RESEARCH METHODS
Each study presented subjects with a series of scenarios depicting variations of a
criminal episode. Each scenario embodied a particular variable or combination
of variables that ·were to be tested. The subjects typically were asked to indicate
the liability that they would impose given the facts described, and their responses
to the different scenarios were compared to determine the effect of the variable or
variables.
For non-social-science readers, the dangers and limitations of such "scenario"
research should be noted. Briefly, three difficulties exist. First, the scenarios may
not be perceived by the respondents as we hoped they would be. Second, because
our version of the experimental design asks the same respondent to respond to
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many versions of the same core scenario, the differences between those scenarios
are highlighted and called to the respondent's attention in a way that they might
not be in other situations. Third, the people we tested, "the samples we drew" in
technical parlance, were not selected to represent the population of the United
States or even of a particular state or jurisdiction. They were individuals whom we
contacted who were willing to participate. In the end, more than seven hundred
individuals had participated in our studies.
Next we will say a bit more about each of the difficulties that we have just de
scribed, what we did to combat them, and what limits they still impose on our
findings.
The first, that "the scenarios might not be perceived by the respondents as we
hoped they would be:' really references a whole family of related concerns. When
we were writing scenarios about the amount of force that it is legitimate to use in
self-defense, for instance, suppose we attempted to create a case in which the de
fender used just sufficient force to stop the attack on him. But did the subjects
read the case in that way? That is an open question. The standard procedure to
answer the question involves asking the respondent to report not only on the lia
bility he or she would assign to the person but on �he various ways that he or she
perceived the details of the case. So in this instance, we would ask the respondents
to tell us "if the force used was just sufficient to deter the attack" or greater or less
than that. These questions that test the respondent's general perceptions of the
story (and whether these perceptions agree with the ones that the researchers in
tended to create) are called "manipulation checks." Sometimes we "passed" the
checks and sometimes we did not. That is, sometimes the respondents read the
stories as we intended, and sometimes, even though we wrote and rewrote nu
merous versions of the stories, they did not.
Further, it is not enough to confirm that the subjects perceive the scenario as
presenting the factor that the researcher wishes to have represented. One needs to
be careful that a change in one element of the story, intended to create one per
ception, does not create others as well. For instance, in some j urisdictions, an in
sanity defense is provided if an individual suffers from what is called a "control
dysfunction." In other jurisdictions, only an individual who suffers from a "cog
nitive dysfunction" qualifies for the defense. To test which formulation agrees
with the views of the respondents, we needed to create a scenario version in which
a person assaults or kills another and does so because he has a control dysfunction
rather than a cognitive dysfunction. (And, in another version, vice versa.) To see
that the scenarios were correctly interpreted, we asked readers questions about
what degree ofboth dysfunctions they inferred from the story. Not surprisingly, it
was often the case that the reader inferred both a control and a cognitive dysfunc
tion from information that we had hoped would create the inference of one dys
function but not the other. People process information in rich, multiple, and
complex ways, when occasionally we wished that they wouldn't.
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Even confirmation that the tested variables are properly perceived does not
guarantee usable results, however. In addition, a researcher must attempt to dem
onstrate that the scenarios are not perceived as presenting other unintended but
potentially influential factors. If such extraneous factors exist and are perceived as
being present in varying degrees in different scenarios, differences in liability re
sults may reflect the subjects' reaction to the unintended factor rather than to the
variables sought to be tested. One method of reducing such unintended varia
tions is to have all scenarios use the same basic facts-with differences only to re
flect the intended variables. While this procedure might seem relatively effective
at reducing unwanted variations, it has its limitations. A subject may give differ
ent meaning to identical language in different scenarios. Context matters, as we
occasionally discovered in our studies.
Given these difficulties, it came as no surprise to us that some studies required
five or ten drafts and pretests of the test instrument before they could be adminis
tered to the full subject pool. Even where the manipulation seems successful,
however, there is always the theoretical possibility that an unidentified factor in
fluenced the liability results. As we learn more about the determinants of liability
from the community's perspective, we will be in a better position to identify and
control the effect of unintended influences. Only the last study on the last unre
solved liability factor can be a perfect study.
Now to the second difficulty. All of our studies employed what is called a
within-subjects design. A within-subjects design has each subject respond to all of
the scenarios in a study (a between-subjects design, the primary alternative, has
each subject respond to only one or some of the scenarios). Within-subjects de
signs, when they can be used, have an enormous advantage over between-subjects
designs: they get rid of a certain kind of error. An illustration will make this dear.
Our research question concerns whether people see forcible sexual intercourse
between people who have had a previous sexual relationship as less serious than
between strangers. If we were to attack this with a between-subjects design, we
would give individual A a description of a rape between strangers and individual
B a description of a rape between acquaintances. But suppose, by the bad luck of

the draw, A was a person who does not think rape of any sort is much of a crime
and, thus, assigns the stranger rape case a low penalty. However, person B consid
ers rape of any kind a major offense and assigns the acquaintance rap e case a high
penalty.
Seeing only those results, we might be led to the odd conclusion that stranger
rape is considered a less-serious offense than acquaintance rape! More likely we
might conclude that people saw no difference between them. 2 Note that these re
sults are not inconsistent with the possibility that both persons A and B see
stranger rape as more worthy of punishment than acquaintance rape. A within
subjects design would reveal this. Person A, who rated the stranger rape low,
would rate the acquaintance rape even lower. Person B, who rated the acquain-
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tance rape as requiring a stiff prison sentence, would rate the stranger rape as re
quiring an even higher sentence.
So a within-subjects design is preferable from this point of view-if using it
does not cause other problems. Given what we want to study, does its use cause
other problems? Yes, but we judged them to be manageable, and so we opted to
use within-subject designs. Now to an account of those problems.
One disadvantage of a within-subjects design is that, to keep the task manage
able for subjects, the number of scenarios in a study must be limited. On balance,
we thought that we could live with the limitation on the number of scenarios.
There also is the danger that, where multiple scenarios are given to a single sub
ject, the order in which a subject sees the scenarios may affect his or her re
sponses. We attempted to minimize the potential order effects by "randomizing"
the scenario order. Thus, different groups of subjects considered the scenarios in
a different order. This makes possible a statistical test for what are called "order
effects," and they proved not to be of particular concern.
The main problem in a within-subjects design is the possibility that subjects
will focus more directly on the variable being tested than they might in other cir
cumstances. Because subjects see all of the test scenarios and because the sce
narios differ only in relation to the variables being tested, the differences that are
being tested inevitably are obvious to the subjects. If subjects seek to give results
that are expected of them ( as much social science research suggests) , they may
tend to give greater weight to the differences between scenarios than they might if
they confronted these differences in another context.
Actually, there are two related differences here. First, subjects may give defer
ence to distinctions that they do not believe are relevant. Second, subjects may ex
aggerate the significance that they give to a factor that they do find relevant. We
sought to minimize these possibilities by insisting to subjects that there were no
right answers and that it was acceptable to find that differences between scenarios
were not significant. Each study contained instructions to this effect. In fact, sub
jects frequently gave "no difference" responses to a series of clearly different sce
narios, even though the instrument's design was classically thought to suggest to
them that the researchers wanted to see different responses. So we were not overly
concerned with subjects being driven to find nonexistent differences between sce
narios. We ended up thinking that having subjects who were aware that they were
comparing cases was useful, because the subjects generated a more informed and
thoughtful response-something we thought valuable for our specific purposes.
Another difficulty with our studies is not inherent in the research design but
lies instead in the particular procedures we used for selecting our respondents.
Putting it inelegantly, we grabbed whomever we could get our hands on. Typi
cally, the subjects were neighbors, family, or friends of the students. Law students,
lawyers, and persons involved in the criminal j ustice process, such as police offi
cers, were barred as subjects because we thought that their responses might be
driven by their knowledge of the details of the legal codes.
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Having said all of that, our subjects did show a reasonable demographic varia
tion. The number of subjects that took part varies among the studies. Forty sub
jects per study is typical. Demographic information was collected on the subjects,
and the 307 subjects in the first semester's sample had the following demographic
characteristics:
%

Age
Less than 20

Income (U.S. dollars)

0.7
37.2

20-29

Less than 1 0,000
1 0,000-24,000

%

Education

%

Political
Affiliation

%

High school

26.4

Democrat

32.3

1 4.2

College

47.2

Independent

31.1

Graduate degree

26.4

Republican

36.6

3.0

30-39

1 7.8

25,000-39,000

28.3

40-49

24.2

40,000-54,000

2 LO

50-59

1 0.4

55,000-69,000

1 5.5

Sex

%

60-69

5.7

70,000-95,000

1 1 .6

Female

56.4

70-79

3.7

More than 1 00,000

Male

43.6

BO or more

0.3

6.4

These results suggest considerable diversity in the subject population. We thought
these accidental samples were a reasonable place to begin our research. As the re
search continues and (as we hope) others are drawn into it, it may be useful to
turn to more self-consciously drawn samples that are constructed to be demon
strably representative of various populations that are defined by the code-drafting
conditions as central. For instance, if a state legislature was contemplating a
change in the legal code of the state, then one would want to carefully draw a rep
resentative sample of the population of that state.
It would also be useful to use a research design that including some elements of
a between-subjects design. We have argued that the awareness of the differences
between conditions that is created by the within-subjects design is not likely to af
fect the outcomes of the study, but it would be well to verify this when the results
were going to affect code drafting.

THE PENALTY SCALE AND WHAT CAN BE LEARNED
FROM THE SUBJECTS' PENALTY RESPONSES
identical liability-punishment scale was used in each study to enable us to
make some comparisons across studies as well as within studies.

An

Crimina! liability and sentence for ___

N
no liab.

0
liab.
no
punish.

I day

2

2 wks

3
2 mo

4
6 mo

5

I yr

6

3 yr

7
7 yr

8
15 yr

9
30 yr

10
life

imprisonment

II

death

The penalties on the scale were selected after an examination of the offense classi
fication schemes used in current American criminal codes. The relative relation
between each point on the scale represents the typical relation between grades of
offenses in the states that use the �ore refined grading schemes (e.g., New York,
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Illinois, Virginia, and Florida). The Model Penal Code is atypical in this respect,
with fewer classifications (5) than most state codes (9). Because of this character
istic of the scale, the results could be understood in liability terms (the grade of an
offense) as well as punishment terms (the length of a term of imprisonment) .
What can we learn from the subjects' responses to such a scale? Examining the
experimental design gives us some answers to this question. Suppose that our re
spondents, on the average, assign a liability scale score of 7.8 ( this translates into
13.4 years). This can be useful in giving us a very approximate sense of the
amount ofliability and punishment that the community thinks is appropriate for
this offense. But it strikes us that it would be inappropriate to try to infer from
their rating the grading of the offense, as it is doubtful that members of the com
munity have strong feelings that a particular grade or length of sentence is essen
tial. More likely, people may have only a general sense of the approximate degree
of punishment that is appropriate.
This observation is important to the analysis and use of liability results. The
amount of punishment imposed by subjects in a given scenario should be under
stood as providing no more than a general idea of where punishment should fall
on the absolute scale. So the results should not be taken to mean that 13.4 years
(7.8 on the penalty scale) and 2.4 years (5.7 on the scale) are, in the subjects' view,
the specific punishments appropriate for stranger rape and spousal rape, respec
tively. Every rape case will be different; the liability responses in any rape scenario
represent only the subjects' view as to that particular case's description. Further,
there also is some question as to what the subjects have in mind when they select a
value ·on the penalty scale. Do they fully understand how much punishment is
suffered through a sentence of 1 3.4 years imprisonment? Would their views
change if they knew more? Although the instructions tell them to assume that the
sentence will be served in full, are they sufficiently skeptical about current early
release practices to the extent that they impose a higher sentence to account for
this possibility? Is their notion of the "going rate" for this offense distorted by
news of the high sentences that are commonly imposed (but not served) under
the practice of early release? These and other uncertainties make the use of the lia
bility results as absolute measures inappropriate.
But exactly because we use a within-subjects design, the differences in sen
tences assigned across variations in the same core scenario give us what we regard
as reasonably precise information of a comparative sort. By assigning different li
ability scores in these comparisons, the respondents can with some precision
identify those situations that they see as more and less condemnable than others
and those factors that increase and decrease the assignments of punishments.
What this means is that the results are most useful as a means of comparing the
subjects' views of different scenarios. A liability mean of 7.8, where a person rapes
a stranger, compared to 5 . 7, where the person rapes a spouse, would suggest that
the community sees stranger rape as more serious than spousal rape.
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This does not mean that the test results cannot be tied back to current sentenc
ing practices. In many of the studies reported in this book, we had subjects rate
"control, scenarios that describe relatively common forms of the study's offense,
for which the current sentencing practice in any given jurisdiction may be pre
dictable. By comparing the liability results to these benchmarks, one can get a
rough idea of what the liability results would mean in current practice terms. For
example, the felony-murder study included three control cases of rather straight
forward purposeful, reckless, and negligent killings not committed in the course
of another offense. By comparing the felony-murder results to each other, one can
learn which variations are seen as more (or less) blameworthy. By comparing the
results of each felony-murder variation to those of the control scenarios, one can
determine which of the traditional homicide grades-murder, manslaughter, and
negligent homicide-the subjects see each of the felony-murder scenario varia
tions most akin to in overall blameworthiness.
Having said all of this, we still think that sometimes the absolute value of a sen
tence assigned can illuminate a community standard. It may give some general
sense of the level of seriousness that is perceived. The data mentioned in the dif
ferent rape cases, for example, suggests that while spousal rape is viewed as less
serious than stranger rape, it nonetheless is seen as a serious offense-a view con
trary to the common law and Model Penal Code rules, which provided a complete
defense to spouses against charges of forcible intercourse.
Still, one corollary to these observations about the limitations of scenario re
search results is that singling out the exact liability assigned to any scenario within
a study is rarely of value. The nature of the research puts the primary focus of the
results on comparisons between scenarios within a study. And if the conclusions
drawn from the results are to be reliable, the difficulties concerning subject per
ception and scenario manipulation already described must be overcome. As the
readers examine the study reports, we would remind you of the need to keep these
points in mind. This illustrates the care with which these results must be used; we
report them to begin a discussion rather than end one.
THE QUESTION OF "CONSENSUS":
AGREEMENT AND D ISAGREEMENT AMONG RESPONDENTS
Many of the analyses of the data including in the 1 8 studies in this book compare
current law to the statistical means of the subjects' liability responses, with the
latter taken by us as representing the community's views. Of course, the subjects'
liability mean is a reliable indicator of the community view only if the underlying
methodology is sound. 3 Moreover, even if the methodology is sound, liability
means alone do not always tell us all we need to know about the community's
view. While a liability mean can always be calculated, it can mask considerable
disagreement among the subjects. The liability mean does not disclose the level of
agreement. To measure degree of agreement among respondents, it is customary
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to use some measure of the «spread" or "dispersion" of their responses. The stan
dard measure of dispersion is a statistic called the «standard deviation:' It has a
number of useful properties, specifically that 68 percent of the sample's responses
lie within one standard deviation of the mean of the distribution.4
In the pilot projects described in this volume, the level of agreement varies con
siderably from scenario to scenario. Some of this variaton is artificial, that is, the
product of the test instrument rather than a reflection of disagreement on the
substantive issue. Apparent disagreement among subjects increases as the sce
narios are open to greater differences of interpretation. Diversity in the subjects'
perceptions of the situation naturally translates into diversity of their responses to
the situation. Even with general agreement on how a scenario is perceived, how
ever, there will be diversity of opinion on some issues. This is especially true in the
studies in this book because controversy was one of the criteria used to select is
sues for study.
Empirically, it turned out that a considerable degree of agreement among re
spondents exists on many matters. For some scenarios, there exists near unanim
ity that punishment is inappropriate.5 For other scenarios, there exists near una
nimity that some kind of punishment is appropriate.6 In these scenarios, the
mean standard deviation of the liability responses is 1 .39. For a normal distribu
tion, this means that 68 percent of all responses fall within 1 .39 points of the
mean on the penalty scale?
We are struck by this degree of agreement. It is significant that agreement exists
even on issues that have probably never been the subject of public discussion, for
it suggests that the shared notions are the result of some process other than intel
lectual or political analysis, or direct knowledge of a societal consensus. We have
frequently referred to an individual's judgment of appropriate liability as "intu
itive," but in fact it is likely to be grounded in shared cultural understandings of
the differential seriousness of different crimes, what counts as intentional, and so
on.
However, other scenarios generate a significant range of responses. In 20 per
cent of the scenarios, the standard deviation of the liability responses exceeds
3.50.8 This raises an interesting question. What level of agreement ought to be re
quired before the expressed view of the "mean" subject is taken as giving us a
"community standard"? Recall that we have already conceded that there are valid
reasons why a legal code does not conform to a community standard. Let us as
sume, however, that we are facing a particular case in which we grant the rele
vance of a community standard to code formulation. When is a community stan
dard "standard enough" to be used as a basis for formulating doctrine? On the
one hand, at least a majority is required even to call a "position" a community's
"view." On the other hand, it no doubt is rare that every member of a community
agrees with a proposed rule or principle for adjudicating blame. Should more
than a majority be required? If so, how much less than absolute agreement may be
tolerated?
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Precedent might be found in the two-thirds or other supermajority proportion
typically required for a legislature to override the veto of an executive. The pro
portion required to modify a state's constitution, sometimes three-fourths,9 is an
other possible analogy. No particular proportion stands out, however, as an obvi
ous logical preference. Beyond requiring that the proportion represent a
substantial majority, the particular choice seems somewhat arbitrary. One might
require a sufficiently high percentage so that the position will not be likely to
change over short periods of time. A potential problem with requiring only a bare
majority is this potential for slight shifts in community views to mandate changes
in the liability rules. Indeed, such concern for the disruption that comes with too
frequent changes may be at the root of the high proportions required to override
an executive-branch decision or to change a constitution.
Another reason to require more than a bare majority stems from the reasons
for considering the community's views, discussed in the introductory chapter. If
the utilitarian goal is to create dear moral credibility in the criminal law, it fol
lows that the proportion of agreement must be high. The view of a bare majority
can easily be dismissed as a matter on which reasonable people can disagree. A
bare majority, after all, means that people are about equally divided on the issue.
It is hardly persuasive to those in the minority to claim that "a majority'' disagree
with them, if that majority can be changed with the decision of one person. A
two-thirds proportion means that for every person in the minority, two people in
the majority hold a contrary view. A three-quarters majority means that the mi
nority are outnumbered three to one. One of these latter proportions seems more
likely to give the sense of a strongly shared view, which would be needed to per
suade the members of the minority to reconsider their view.
Another argument derives from the utilitarian interest in maximizing the de
terrent effect and cooperative appeal of the criminal law. The larger the propor
tion of people who share in the majority view on an issue of blameworthiness, the
greater will be the benefit to the criminal law of adopting that view, all other
things being equal. At the very least, those who share in the view will see greater
moral credibility in the criminal law and the larger that number, the larger the
overall effect.
These observations suggest that a supermajority proportion is appropriate for
the just-desert goal as well. If philosophers care about the community's views,
they certainly will be less inclined to reexamine a philosophically derived rule if it
conflicts only with the views of one person more than the number who support it.
The same may be said of us nonphilosophers. Only large majorities on an issue
are likely to be significant in causing us to reassess what we think is and is not
morally blameworthy.
One argument against requiring more than a majority comes from the fact that
the legal code must adopt some position. If this is so, should it not adopt the ma
jority view over a minority view? The goal here is not to make criminal justice ad
ministration a democratic function; the community ought not be voting the re-
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suits in the adjudication of individual cases. The argument here is that, if a
majority of the community share one view on a rule for the distribution of crimi
nal liability to be applied to all members in the community, that rule generally
ought to be preferred to a minority-supported rule. 10
Whatever conclusion one reaches on the degree of agreement that ought to be
required to support a code position, no reform ought to be undertaken without
such information on the degree of agreement. More advanced analysis of the data
collected in the studies described in this book and more advanced studies than
these can give a clearer picture of how much agreement exists on a specific issue.
The studies described here are meant simply to illustrate the kinds of things that
empirical research can teach about substantive criminal-law issues.

Appendix B:
Text of Stimulus
Instrument Scenarios

STUDY 1 :
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTEMPT

Scenario

1:

Thought Only (TH)

(W) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept
in a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray thinks about how easily
he could sneak into the back room during normal business hours and "crack" the
safe. Ray decides that he will rob the safe in the coin shop. Before he does any
thing to prepare for the robbery, Ray tells a friend that he has decided to rob the
safe.

Scenario 2: Substantial Step (SS)
( I ) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend what he
has decided to do.

Scenario 3: Unequivocality (EQ)
( L) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray determines that he
needs a special tool to crack the safe. He buys the parts he needs, and cuts and
welds them to make the special tool, which has no lawful purpose. Ray tells a
friend what he has decided to do.

Scenario 3a: Renounces (EQR)
(A) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
229
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safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. While casing the coin shop,
Ray meets the old man who owns the shop. Ray feels sympathy for the old man,
whose business would be crushed by the robbery. Out of sympathy for the old
man, Ray decides not to rob the safe. Ray tells a friend what he has done.

Scenario 4: Probable Desistance (PD)
(M) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept
in a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob
the safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the
coin shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend about
his plans to rob the safe the next day. His friend tells the police. The next day Ray
drives to the coin shop to rob the safe, but when he is just one block away he is
stopped by two undercover policemen who were alerted by Ray's friend.

Scenario 5: Dangerous Proximity (PX)
(P) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop and checks out the situation before the robbery. Ray tells a friend about his
plans to rob the safe the next day. His friend tells the police. The next day Ray goes
to the coin shop and slips into the back room, where he begins to crack the safe.
Before Ray is able to open the safe, however, two undercover policemen burst into
the room and arrest him.

Scenario Sa: Dangerous Proximity-Renounces (PXR)
(T) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another
customer, Ray slips into the back room. As he is about to crack the safe, Ray feels
sympathy for the owner, whose business would be crushed by the robbery, and
decides not to crack the safe. Ray tells a friend about what he did and why he de
cided not to rob the safe.

Scenario Sb: Dangerous Proximity-Desists Out of Fear (FR)
(H) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another
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customer, Ray slips into the back room. As he is about to crack the safe, Ray hears
someone say, "Good morning Officer Smith:' Ray looks into the next room and
sees a police officer, and decides not to crack the safe out of fear of being caught in
the act. Ray goes home and later tells a friend about what he did and why he de
cided not to rob the safe.

Scenario 6: Completed Offense
(N) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a
briefcase full of valuable coins. That night Ray tells a friend about what he did,
and his friend tells the police. The next day two policemen search Ray's home
with a search warrant, find the coins, and arrest him.

Scenario 6a: Completed Offense-Renounces and «Undoes" (CPR)
( 0) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a
briefcase full of valuable coins. On the way home Ray feels sympathy for the
owner of the coin shop, whose business will be crushed by the robbery, and de
cides to return the coins before they are discovered missing. Ray returns to the
coin shop, cracks the safe, replaces the coins and goes home. Later Ray tells a
friend about what he did and why he decided to return the coins.

Scenario 6b: Completed Offense-Renounces but Unable to «Undo"
( R) Ray, a locksmith, recalls working on a safe in a coin shop. The safe was kept in
a back room and always contained valuable coins. Ray decides that he will rob the
safe in the coin shop. To make sure that the safe is still there, Ray goes to the coin
shop to check out the situation before the robbery. The next day Ray goes to the
coin shop and meets the old man who owns it. While the owner helps another
customer, Ray slips into the back room and cracks the safe. Ray slips away with a
briefcase full of valuable coins. On the way home Ray feels sympathy for the
owner of the coin shop, whose business will be crushed by the robbery, and de
cides to return the coins before they are discovered missing. Ray returns to the
coin shop, but as he enters the store two policemen, called when the owner dis
covered the robbery, see a coin sticking out of Ray's briefcase and arrest him.
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STUDY 2:
CREATING A CRIMINAL RISK

Scenario 1: Slight Injury
(R) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as
to the amount of poison required to cause death, and if Tom eats the raisin that is
poisoned at breakfast, he will only suffer mild stomach cramps.

Scenario 2: Moderate Injury
(I) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as
to the amount of poison required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the raisin that
is poisoned at breakfast, he will suffer material injury to his digestive tract.

Scenario 3: High Injury
(S) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into one of the raisins from the box, returns it to the box, and shakes the
box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with
time, until it is totally harmless after a few hours. If Tom eats the raisin that is poi
soned at breakfast, he will die.

Scenario 4: Slight Injury
( K ) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowl. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst
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to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally
harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poi
son required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned
at breakfast, he will only suffer mild stomach cramps.

Scenario 5: Moderate Injury
( 0) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the

marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowL Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst
to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally
harmless after a few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poi
son required to cause death, so that if Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned
at breakfast, he will suffer material injury to his digestive tract.

Scenario 6: High Injury
(F) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divor�e.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
one piece of fruit from the fruit bowl. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast
Mary injects poison into one of the two pieces of fruit in the bowl. Unbeknownst
to Mary, the poison that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally
harmless after a few hours. If Tom eats the piece of fruit that is poisoned at break
fast, he will die.

Scenario 7: Slight Injury
(D) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a
few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poison required to
cause death, and if Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will only
suffer mild stomach cramps.

Scenario 8: Moderate Injury
(E) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
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raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a
few hours. In addition, Mary is mistaken as to the amount of poison required to
cause death, so that if Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will
suffer material injury to his digestive tract.

Scenario 9: High Injury
(A) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into almost all of the raisins in the box. Unbeknownst to Mary, the poison
that she uses becomes less effective with time, until it is totally harmless after a
few hours. If Tom eats the raisins that are poisoned at breakfast, he will die.

Scenario 1 0: Slight Injury
(T) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins. However, Mary
made a mistake as to the amount of poison required to cause death, and Tom suf
fers only mild stomach cramps.

Scenario

11:

Moderate Injury

(H) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins. However, Mary
made a mistake as to the amount of poison required to cause death, and Tom suf
fers only material injury to his digestive tract.

Scenario

12:

High Injury

(Z) Mary and Tom have been married for fifteen years. Mary is unhappy with the
marriage, and decides to kill Tom to inherit his money and avoid a messy divorce.
Tom has cereal for breakfast every morning before work, to which he always adds
raisins from a large box. Intending to kill Tom, just before breakfast Mary injects
poison into the raisins in the box. Tom eats the poisoned raisins, and dies.
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STUDY 3:
OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLICITY

Scenario

1:

Only Thinks of Helping

(H) Because John knows that Catherine is unhappily married, he wonders if she
longs for her husband's death, which would make her a rich widow. She strikes
him as a woman quite capable of murder, and he often thinks about approaching
her and suggesting a plan in which she could kill her husband and get away with
it. If she did decide to do it, John realizes that he would be willing to help her. Be
fore he can sound her out on the subject, however, Catherine shoots her husband
dead.

Scenario 2: Failed Attempt to Help
(A) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and
claiming that it was an accident.
One night at a party Catherine confides her murder plan to her sister and says
she is going to try to buy a gun. They are unaware that John has overheard their
conversation. He is secretly delighted. He does not tell Catherine what he has
learned. The next day, he takes his own pistol and drives over to Catherine's house
to give it to her. By the time he gets there, however, Catherine has already bought
a gun and has used it to shoot her husband dead.

Scenario 2a: Failed Attempt to Help/Murder Fails
{N) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and
claiming that it was an accident.
One night at a party Catherine confides her murder plan to her sister and says
she is going to try to buy a gun. They are unaware that John has overheard their
conversation. He is secretly delighted. He does not tell Catherine what he has
learned. The next day, he takes his own pistol and drives over to Catherine's house
to give it to her. When he gets there, however, he sees police in the house and
learns that Catherine has already shot at her husband, but missed.

Scenario 3: Encourages/No Help
{ D ) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and
claiming that it was an accident.
She confides her plan to John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. He
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. The next day, Catherine shoots
her husband dead.

Scenario 4: Minimal Help
{ S ) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim
ing that it was an accident.
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She confides her plawto John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. She says she is going downtown
that afternoon to buy a gun. John gives her the name of a gun store, where she
goes and buys a gun. That night she uses it to shoot her husband dead.

Scenario 4a: Minimal Help/Murder Fails
(0) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and
claiming that it was an accident.
She confides her plan to John, sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John
agrees with her that she should kill her husband. She says she is going downtown
that afternoon to buy a gun. John gives her the name of a gun store, where she
goes and buys a gun. That night she uses it to shoot at her husband, but she
misses, and he is unharmed.

Scenario 5: Substantial Help
(M) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and
claiming that it was an accident.
Before she buys a gun, she stops at John's office and reveals her plan to him,
sensing correctly that he will be delighted. John agrees that her plan is a good one.
When she says she is on her way to buy a gun, John says, "I'll give you mine." He
reaches into a drawer and hands her his pistol. She uses it that night to shoot her
husband dead.

Scenario 6: Necessary Help
(E) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim
ing that it was an accident.
She confides her plan to John, realizing that he will be secretly delighted. He
encourages her, and agrees that her plan is a good one. But one day she comes to
his office in despair and tells him that she has been unsuccessful in buying a gun
illegally and has decided to abandon her murder plan. At that point, John reaches
into his desk drawer and hands her his gun. When she confesses her total igno
rance of firearms, he instructs her how to use it. She takes the gun and uses it that
night to shoot her husband dead.

Scenario 6a: Necessary Help/Murder Fails
(P) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim
ing that it was an accident.
She confides her plan to John, realizing that he will be secretly delighted. He
encourages her, and agrees that her plan is a good one. But one day she comes to
his office in despair and tells him that she has been unsuccessful in buying a gun
illegally and has decided to abandon her murder plan. At that point, John reaches
into his desk drawer and hands her his gun. When she confesses her total igno-

Appendix B

237

ranee of firearms, he instructs her how to use it. She takes the gun and uses it that
night to shoot at her husband, but she misses, and he is unharmed.

Scenario 7: Unique and Necessary Help
(I) Finally, Catherine decides to murder her husband by shooting him and claim
ing that it was an accident.
She goes to John's office and reveals her plan to him, sensing correctly that he
will be delighted. He agrees with her that her plan is a good one, but he interrupts
her to say, "When I left your husband an hour ago, he confided in me that he fears
you are going to kill him. He is home packing right now to leave the country, and
he plans on telling the police of his suspicions about you on his way to the air
port." Catherine leaves John's office immediately at this news and goes home,
where she finds her husband ready to leave for the airport. She shoots him dead.

Scenario 8: Masterminds
(G) John is a compulsive gambler and deeply in debt. He has thought of killing
his business partner to gain control of the oil company, but is afraid the murder
would be traced to him because the bad feelings between the two men are well
known. John knows that Catherine is unhappily married, and he wonders if she,
too, longs for her husband's death. She strikes him as a woman capable of murder.
It occurs to him that if he could persuade Catherine to do the murder, they would
both be very rich. He feels free to remind her of what a rich widow she will be
come one day. He says to her, "Why wait?" Then he outlines a plan whereby she
could shoot her husband and make it look like an accident. Catherine is startled,
but she thinks it over and agrees to his idea. The next day, she shoots her husband
dead, just as John planned it.

STUDY 4:
OMISSION LIABILITY

Scenario 1 : Stranger
( Q) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old.
Vic is 1 6 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt cannot
swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier. Walt does not want Vic
to drown and knows that he need only throw the flotation device into the water to
rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw the flotation device into the water. Vic
drowns. Later, Walt explains-" I didn't want him to drown. But I just didn't want
to get too involved."
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Scenario 2: Parent
(U) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old.
Vic is 16 years old. Walt is Vic's father. Suddenly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally
pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out-"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then imme
diately runs away, practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt is also practically
certain that his son Vic will drown. Walt cannot swim. But there is a lifesaving flo
tation device on the pier. Walt does not want his son Vic to drown and knows that
he need only throw the flotation device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does
not throw the flotation device into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"!
didn't want him to drown. But I j ust didn't want to get too involved."
Scenario 3: Contract
(E) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old.
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Walt is
working as a security guard whose job is to protect people and property on the
pier. Suddenly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls
out-"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain
that Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt the
security guard cannot swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier.
Walt does not want Vic to drown and knows that he need only throw the flotation
device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw the flotation device
into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown.
But I just didn't want to get too involved:'
Scenario 4: Assumption
(S) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old.
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I 'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. Walt cannot
swim. But there is a lifesaving flotation device on the pier. Another stranger
approaches Walt and says-"I'll get the flotation device." Walt replies-"Wait.
You go and get help. I'll see what I can do to rescue him:' The other person does
as Walt suggests. Walt does not want Vic to drown and knows that he need only
throw the flotation device into the water to rescue Vic. But Walt does not throw
the flotation device into the water. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't
want him to drown. But I j ust didn't want to get too involved."

Scenario 5: Stranger-High Danger
(T) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 38 years old.
Vic is 16 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
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Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. But Walt knows that man-eating
sharks inhabit the body of water. So Walt does not dive into the water to rescue
Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-" ! didn't want him to drown. But I was
concerned about being attacked by sharks."

Scenario 6: Stranger-Low Danger
{I) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 3 8 years old.
Vic is 1 6 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. But Walt knows that the water may be
cold and that there may be a current. So Walt does not dive into the water to res
cue Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. But I was
concerned that I might get muscle cramps and possibly drown myself."

Scenario

7:

Stranger-High Inconvenience

( 0) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is

38 years old.

Vic is 1 6 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I'm drowning." Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to
rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. Walt knows that it would not be dan
gerous to dive into the water. But Walt is unemployed and is on his way to an im
portant job interview. So Walt does not dive into the water to rescue Vic. Vic
drowns. Later, Walt explains-"! didn't want him to drown. But I was concerned
about missing my job interview."

Scenario 8: Stranger-Low Inconvenience
{N) Walt and Vic are on a pier built over a body of deep water. Walt is 3 8 years old.
Vic is 1 6 years old. Walt and Vic are unrelated and do not know each other. Sud
denly, Pete, a stranger, intentionally pushes Vic into the water. Vic calls out
"Help! I'm drowning:' Pete then immediately runs away, practically certain that
Vic will drown. Walt is also practically certain that Vic will drown. There is no
lifesaving flotation device on the pier. But Walt is an excellent swimmer. Walt does
not want Vic to drown and knows that someone will have to dive into the water to
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rescue Vic. There is no one else on the pier. Walt knows that it would not be dan
gerous to dive into the water. But Walt is wearing a new silk suit. So Walt does not
dive into the water to rescue Vic. Vic drowns. Later, Walt explains-" I didn't want
him to drown. But I was concerned about getting wet."

STUDY 5:
USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE

Scenario

1:

Killing, No Self-Defense

(K) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for protection. One night while
he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man comes up
to him and asks for some money. Paul is in a bad mood and tells the man to go
away. The man continues to pester Paul until Paul says "you asked for it:' He then
shoots and kills the man.

Scenario 2: Killing, Self-Defense
(I) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. The man will kill him unless
Paul acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills the attacker.

Scenario 3: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because Unarmed Attacker
(L) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
'
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul realizes that the man is unarmed and
that he could definitely scare the man away just by pushing him, but he pulls his
gun and kills the unarmed attacker.

Scenario 4: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because Could Retreat
(X) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. Paul notices that the man is
limping and he realizes that he can easily run the half block to his house and be
completely safe from his attacker, but instead he pulls his gun and kills the man.

Scenario 5: Knows Deadly Force Is Not Necessary Because
Could Retreat from Home
(S) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is relaxing at home a man kicks in the front door of his house. The
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man is armed with a knife and Paul realizes that unless he acts fast the man will
kill him. Paul is standing by the back door to his house and he can retreat in com
plete safety, but Paul grabs his gun and kills the armed attacker.

Scenario 6: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but Mistaken
as to Threat
(M) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul believes that the man is armed with a
knife and that the man will kill him unless he acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills
his attacker. Paul later learns that the man was unarmed and could not have seri
ously injured him.

Scenario 7: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but Mistakenly
Believes Retreat Not Possible
{U) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul with a knife. Paul believes that the man will
kill him unless he acts fast. Paul pulls his gun and kills the attacker. Paul did not
realize at the time, however, that the man had a bad leg and that he could have
easily run away from the man in complete safety.

Scenario 8: Believes Deadly Force Is Necessary but
Actor Provokes Attack
( C) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home a man
comes up to him and asks for some money. Paul annoyed that there are panhan
dlers in his neighborhood, picks up a pipe and hits the man in the side of the
head, intending to seriously injure him. The man does not fall but instead pulls
out a knife and attacks Paul. The man will kill him unless Paul acts fast. Paul pulls
his gun and kills the attacker.

Scenario 9: Believes Deadly Force Is Not Necessary
but Mistakenly Believes Deadly Force Legal
(Y) Paul works in the city and legally carries a gun for his own protection. One
night while he is walking down a deserted city street on his way back home, a man
jumps out of an alley attacking Paul. Paul knows that the man is unarmed and
cannot seriously injure him. Believing that he is justified in doing so, Paul pulls
his gun to defend himself and shoots and kills the unarmed attacker.
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STUDY 6:
USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
Scenario 1: Necessary Force
(J) When Joe arrives at home from work, he finds a man attempting to steal his
motorcycle. Joe immediately yells, "Hey! What do you think you are doing? Get
away from that bike!" The man ignores Joe and continues in his attempt to hot
wire the motorcycle. Joe approaches the man and grabs him around the arm. The
man shrugs Joe off and continues hot wiring. Finally, Joe takes a swing at the man
and hits him in the face. The man appears to be in pain and he runs off. The man
is later apprehended by the police.
Scenario 2: Questionably Necessary Force
(L) When Joe arrives at home from work with his wife, he finds a man attempting
to steal his motorcycle. Believing that it is absolutely necessary to protect his
property, Joe approaches the man and punches him in the face. The man appears
to be in pain and he runs off. Joe's wife begins to yell at Joe that the man was small
and not very muscular and Joe probably could have scared him off with a yell. Joe
later realizes that his wife was right. The man is later apprehended by the police.
Scenario 3: Necessary Force Applied by Device
( 0) A man sees Joe riding his new motorcycle and he follows Joe home to find out
where Joe lives. The next day, while Joe is at work, the man returns to steal Joe's
motorcycle. The motorcycle is parked in a locked garage, but the man has
brought the proper tools to gain entry. After working on the lock for 20 minutes,
the man successfully breaks through and opens up the garage door. When the
door is fully opened an automatic device which Joe had previously set up is trig
gered and the man is hit in the face with a mini-bean bag. This breaks his nose
and he stops in his efforts to steal Joe's motorcycle and runs off. The man is later
apprehended by the police.
Scenario 4: No Imminent Threat (Perceived as Not Immediately Necessary)
(C) Joe finds a man outside his house attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe yells,
"Hey! What do you think you're doing? Get away from that bike!" The man looks
up and replies, "O.K. man, but I'll be back for your bike later when you are gone.
Consider it as good as gone." The man holds his hand out and shows Joe that he
has made an imprint of the keyhole of Joe's motorcycle. Joe realizes that this man
is going to have a key made to fit Joe's bike so that he can quickly steal the bike at
any time in the future. Joe is leaving his house to catch a plane for a business trip
which he cannot delay. There is nothing else Joe can do to protect his motorcycle.
Joe approaches the man and attempts to get the mold out of his hand. The man is
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strong and does not flinch. Joe then takes a swing at the man, hitting him in the
face. The man appears to be in pain, drops the day mold and runs off. The man is
later apprehended by the police.

Scenario 5: More Than Necessary Force by Choice
(T) When Joe arrives at home from work, he finds a man attempting to steal his
motorcycle. The man is of small build and is not very muscular. Joe realizes that
he can simply scare the man away by yelling at him. He nonetheless approaches
the man and punches him in the face. The man appears to be in pain and he runs
off. The man is later apprehended by the police.

Scenario 6: Deadly Force, Knowing Not Lawful
(Y) Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe re
quests the man to stop but the man refuses and continues in his effort to hotwire
the cycle. Joe grabs the man by the arm but the man easily pulls away from him
and continues with his work. Joe approaches the man again and punches him in
the face. The man is not deterred. Joe picks up a stone and strikes the man on the
head. The man is knocked down but is able to stand up again and has just about
completed his work. While Joe believes that it may not be lawful to use a gun to
prevent the theft of a motorcycle, he sees no other way to stop the man. He goes to
his house just a few steps away, retrieves his gun, returns and shoots the man. The
man survives and is later taken into custody by the police.

Scenario 7: Deadly Force, Believing It Lawful
(Z) Joe arrives home to find a man attempting to steal his motorcycle. Joe re
quests the man to stop but the man refuses and continues in his effort to hotwire
the cycle. Joe grabs the man by the arm but the man easily pulls away from him
and continues with his work. Joe approaches the man again and punches him in
the face. The man is not deterred. Joe picks up a stone and strikes the man on the
head. The man is knocked down but is able to stand up again and has just about
completed his work. Joe believes that the law allows him to use his gun to protect
his property when it is absolutely necessary. He goes to his house just a few steps
away, retrieves his gun, returns and shoots the man. The man survives and is later
taken into custody by the police.
STUDY 7:
CITIZENS' LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
The eight scenarios below are premised on the following set of facts:
Suzanne and William Smith are a married couple living in a two-story home.
Suzanne is 39 years old and William is 40 years old. Suzanne is a secretary and
works 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. William works the 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. shift at a
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local car manufacturing company. Suzanne is typically home alone at night.
When she goes to sleep, she keeps a weapon in the nightstand next to her bed in
case of an emergency.

Scenario 1 : Rape: Deadly Force-Actual Offender
(R) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave.
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun
and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes for the door,
Suzanne j umps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down the stairs and
out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she raises the gun
and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears the thump of a body
hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds that she has shot and
killed the man who raped her. The milkman, making his early morning deliveries,
was standing nearby looking surprised.

Scenario 2: Rape: Deadly Force-Mistaken Identity
(C) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave.
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun
and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes for the door,
Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down the stairs and
out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she raises the gun
and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears the thump of a body
hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds that the man she shot
and killed was not the man who raped her but was the milkman making his early
morning deliveries.

Scenario 3: Rape: Nondeadly Force-Actual Offender
( I ) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave.

Appendix B

245

As the man m akes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that if she does
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun
(an instrument which will temporarily stun an individual but will not cause seri
ous bodily injury) and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes
for the door, Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down
the stairs and out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she
raises the stun gun and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears
the thump of a body hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds
that she has shot and stunned the man who raped her. The milkman, making his
early morning deliveries, was standing nearby looking surprised.

Scenario 4: Rape: Nondeadly Force-Mistaken Identity
(K) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a man who im
mediately overpowers her. Suzanne is extremely frightened. The man quickly sub
dues her, rapes her, and starts to leave.
As the man makes his way out of her bedroom, Suzanne realizes that i f she does
not detain the man there is a great possibility that the man will never be appre
hended. Suzanne reaches into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun
( an instrument which will temporarily stun an individual but will not cause seri
ous bodily injury) and shouts, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" As the man dashes
for the door, Suzanne jumps out of bed and races after him. The man runs down
the stairs and out of the back screen door. As Suzanne reaches the back door she
raises the stun gun and shoots through the screen door into the dark. She hears
the thump of a body hitting the ground and when she opens the door she finds
that the man she shot and stunned was not the man who raped her but was the
milkman making his early morning deliveries.

Scenario 5: Property Destruction: Deadly Force-Actual Offender
(J) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside
of her bedroom window. She gets out of bed, looks outside and sees a man setting
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches
into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun and shouts out of the win
dow, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down the stairs and out of the
front door. When she is outside she sees a man running away at the bottom of her
driveway. Suzanne raises the gun and shoots. She sees the man fall to the ground.
The man Suzanne shot and killed was the man who set her car on fire. The milk
man, making his early morning deliveries, was standing nearby looking sur
prised.
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Scenario 6: Property Destruction: Deadly Force-Mistaken Identity
( H ) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches
into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a handgun and shouts out of the win
dow, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down the stairs and out of the
front door. When she is outside she sees a man running away at the bottom of her
driveway. Suzanne raises the gun and shoots. She sees the man fall to the ground.
The man Suzanne shot and killed was not the man who set her car on fire but was
the milkman who was making his morning deliveries but who saw the fire and
was running to call for help.
Scenario 7: Property Destruction: Nondeadly Force-Actual Offender
( 0) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches
into the drawer of her night stand, pulls out a stun gun ( an instrument which will
temporarily stun an individual but will not cause serious bodily injury) and
shouts out of the window, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot!" Suzanne runs down
the stairs and out of the front door. When she is outside she sees a man running
away at the bottom of her driveway. Suzanne raises the stun gun and shoots. She
sees the man fall to the ground. The man Suzanne shot and stunned was the man
who set her car on fire. The milkman, making his early morning deliveries, was
standing nearby looking surprised.
Scenario 8: Property Destruction: Nondeadly Force-Mistaken Identity
(N) One night while William is at work, Suzanne is asleep in their bedroom up
stairs. Suddenly, Suzanne is jerked awake out of a sound sleep by a sound outside
of her bedroom window. She gets out ofbed, looks outside and sees a man setting
fire to the inside of her car. Suzanne realizes that if she does not detain the man
there is a great possibility that the man will never be apprehended. She reaches
into the drawer ofher night stand, pulls out a stun gun (an instrument which will
temporarily stun an individual but will not cause serious bodily injury) and
shouts out of the window, "stop you bastard or I'll shoot! " Suzanne runs down
the stairs and out of the front door. When she is outside she sees a man running
away at the bottom of her driveway. Suzanne raises the stun gun and shoots. She
sees the man fall to the ground. The man Suzanne shot and stunned was not the
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man who set her car on fire but was the milkman who was making his morning
deliveries but who saw the fire and was running to call for help.

STUDY 8 :
OFFENSE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS
AND MISTAKE/ACCIDENT DEFENSES

Scenario

1:

As to Causing Damage to House

( 0) Chris Bradley lives in a small three bedroom house with a wooden shed in the
backyard which leans up against a fence which divides his property from that of
his next door neighbor. In July, Chris decides to store some of the chemical sam
ples sold by his company in his shed until the warehouse being built at work is
completed. The next day, Chris and two of his employees unload a small truck
load of various chemical samples into Chris's shed. Unfortunately, the tempera
ture steadily rises during the next week and the increased heat causes some of the
barrels of chemicals to spontaneously combust and Chris's shed catches on fire.
The fire spreads to his neighbor's house which is destroyed. Fortunately, Chris's
neighbors are away on vacation and no one is injured. The fire then extinguishes
itself. Chris Bradley is arrested for arson.
(a) Knowing
(IV) Now, assume the following: Chris Bradley was practically certain the
chemicals would explode, but stored them in the shed anyway because he was an
gry with his neighbor.
(b) Reckless
(III) Now, assume the following: Chris Bradley was aware of a substantial
chance that the chemicals could explode, but decided to store them in the shed
anyway because he was unhappy with his neighbor.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Chris Bradley that the
chemicals would explode, but a reasonable person would have been aware that
there was a risk of explosion and would have taken precautions to prevent it.
(d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Chris Bradley that the chemicals
would explode because the barrels were improperly labeled by the manufacturing
company which supplied the chemicals and as labeled were not subject to the risk
of explosion. Thus Chris Bradley could not have been aware of the risk of explo
sion.
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Scenario 2: As to Causing Damage to Unimproved Property
(R) Peter Jones lives in a peaceful rural area in a big old farmhouse with a barn in
the back. The barn leans up against the fence which divides his property from that
of his next door neighbor. In July, Peter decides to store some of the chemical
samples sold by his company in his barn until the warehouse being built at work
is completed. The next day, Peter and two of his employees unload a small truck
load of various chem.i cal samples into Peter's barn. Unfortunately, the tempera
ture steadily rises during the next week and the increased heat causes some of the
barrels of chemicals to spontaneously combust and Peter's barn catches on fire.
The fire spreads to his neighbor's property and an entire field is destroyed. Fortu
nately, Peter's neighbors are on vacation and no one is injured. The fire then
extinguishes itself. Peter Jones is arrested for arson.
(a) Knowing
(IV) Now, assume the following: Peter Jones was practically certain the chemi
cals would explode, but stored them in his barn anyway because he was angry at
his neighbor.
(b) Reckless
(III) Now, assume the following: Peter Jones was aware of a substantial chance
that the chemicals could explode, but decided to store them in his barn anyway
because he was unhappy with his neighbor.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Peter Jones that the chemi
cals would explode, but this possibility would have occurred to a reasonable per
son.
(d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Peter Jones that the chemicals
would explode because the barrels were improperly labeled by the manufacturing
company which supplied the chemicals and as labeled were not subject to the risk
of explosion. Thus Peter Jones could not have been aware of the risk of explosion.

Scenario 3: As to House Belonging to Another
(C) Bill Smith lives in a relatively quiet neighborhood, except for Brad Wilson,
who bought the house next door. Wilson has little regard for the peace and quiet
of the neighborhood. In addition to having noisy late night parties, he has al
lowed his house and p roperty to become an eyesore. Over the course of the last
two years the house has become virtually uninhabitable. After repeatedly com
plaining to Wilson, to no avail, about the parties and the condition of the house,
Bill Smith decides that the only way to resolve the problem is to buy the house
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from Wilson. Smith, through his lawyer, makes such an attractive offer to Wilson,
that Wilson quickly signs the agreement of sale. To celebrate the hefty profit he
will make from the sale of his house when the deal is finalized at the closing in a
couple of months, Wilson packs up all his belongings and departs for a two week
island vacation. After Smith is certain that Wilson is gone, he surveys the property
and decides that the house is worthless and purposefully burns the house to the
ground. Upon Wilson's return from vacation, Wilson is very upset to find that his
house has been destroyed and that there will be no closing. Subsequently, Bill
Smith is informed that until the closing had actually taken place the house was
still owned by Brad Wilson. Bill Smith is arrested for arson.
(a) Knowing
(IV) Now, assume the following: Bill Smith knew that the house was not his
yet, but burned the house anyway because he was angry at his neighbor.
(b) Reckless
(III) Now, assume the following: Bill Smith was aware of a substantial chance
that the house might not be his yet, but he went ahead and burned the house any
way because he was unhappy with his neighbor.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Bill Smith that the prop
erty was not his when he burned it, but this possibility would have occurred to a
reasonable person.
(d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Bill Smith that the house was not
his yet because when the agreement of sale was signed his lawyer said to him,
"Congratulations Bill, you've just bought yourself some peace of mind."

Scenario 4: As to Unimproved Property Belonging to Another
(U) Tom Janson lives in an area of small family owned farms and open fields that
is relatively quiet, except for Jack Nelson who bought the fields next to Janson's
farm. Nelson has little regard for the peace and quiet beauty of the area. In addi
tion to having noisy parties and motorcycle races in the fields, he has allowed the
fields to become overgrown and unsightly. Over the course of the last two years
the fields have become an eyesore. After repeatedly complaining to Nelson, to no
avail, about the parties, the motorcycles and the condition of the fields, Janson
decides that the only way to resolve the problem is to buy the fields from Nelson.
Janson, through his lawyer, makes such an attractive offer to Nelson, that Nelson
quickly signs the agreement of sale. To celebrate the hefty profit he will make from
the sale of his fields when the deal is finalized at the closing in a couple of months,
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Nelson heads off for a two week island vacation. After Janson is certain that Nel
son is gone, he surveys the fields and decides that in their current condition they
are worthless and purposefully burns the fields to the ground. Upon Nelson's re
turn from vacation, Nelson is very upset to find that his fields have been destroyed
and that there will be no closing. Subsequently, Tom Janson is informed that until
the closing had actually taken place the fields were still owned by Jack Nelson.
Tom Janson is arrested for arson.
(a) Knowing
( IV) Now, assume the following: Tom Janson knew that the fields were not his
yet, but he burned them down anyway because he was angry with his neighbor.
(b) Reckless
( III) Now, assume the following: Tom Janson was aware of a substantial chance
that the fields might not be his yet, but went ahead and burned them down any
way because he was unhappy with his neighbor.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to Tom Janson that the fields
were not his when he burned them, but this possibility would have occurred to a
reasonable person.
(d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to Tom Janson that the fields were
not his yet because when the agreement of sale was signed his lawyer said to him,
"Congratulations Tom, you've just bought yourself some peace of mind."

Scenario 5: As to Victim's Lack of Consent in Rape
(T) Louis Haggarty lives in Nevada, in a county where prostitution is legal, and
visits a house of prostitution once a month. His favorite room in the house is
called the "Rape Room" where the prostitute "pretends" to be asleep and the cli
ent "pretends" to attack her and have forcible sexual intercourse with her. After
Louis's most recent visit to the prostitution house he is arrested for rape.
(a) Knowing
( IV) Now, assume the following: Louis was practically certain that the "prosti
tute" really had been kidnapped, but had forcible sexual intercourse with her any
way.
(b) Reckless
( III) Now, assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis that she
had been kidnapped by the owners of the prostitution house and was being kept

Appendix B

251

there against her wilL Louis knew that there was a substantial chance that her
story was true because the house had been in trouble before for kidnapping, but
Louis had forcible sexual intercourse with her anyway.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis that she
had been kidnapped by the owners of the prostitution house and was being kept
there against her will. Louis had heard from some friends that the prostitutes were
telling wild stories to liven things up. The woman, however, told Louis again that
she was being held against her wilL Louis thinks to himself, "Probably not, but
her story might be true." Louis, however, has forcible sexual intercourse with her
anyway.
(d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: That night the "prostitute" told Louis nothing and
he proceeded to have forcible sexual intercourse with her. Neither Louis nor any
reasonable person would have had any reason to know that the woman was being
held against her will.
Scenario 6: As to Victim Being Underage in Statutory Rape
(N) David Johnson met Stacey Collins at his health dub which he visits approxi
mately three times a week. After talking to Stacey on numerous occasions at the
health dub, David asks Stacey to go out with him on a Friday night. David and
Stacey go to dinner and then dancing and finally back to David's apartment
where they engage in consensual intercourse. The next Monday, David Johnson is
arrested for .statutory rape. Stacey Collins is fourteen years old, below the legal age
of consent.
(a) Knowing
( IV) Now, assume the following: David Johnson knew that Stacey Collins was
underage on the night they went out, but engaged in sexual intercourse with her
anyway.
(b) Reckless
( III) Now, assume the following: David Johnson was aware of a substantial
chance that Stacey Collins was underage on the night they went out, but engaged
in sexual intercourse with her anyway.
(c) Negligent
(II) Now, assume the following: It never occurred to David Johnson that Stacey
Collins was underage on the night they went out and engaged in sexual inter
course, but this possibility would have occurred to a reasonable person.
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( d) Faultless
(I) Assume the following: It never occurred to David Johnson and would not
have occurred to a reasonable person that Stacey Collins was underage on the
night they went out and engaged in sexual intercourse because she told him she
was twenty-one and even had fake identification, which she showed to the
bouncer at the dub where they went dancing.

STUDY 9:
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLICITY
In each of the following six cases, assume the following:
Mark and Gregory arrive at the plant where they both work-Because Gregory
has been drinking alcoholic beverages and is intoxicated, Mark is driving the au
tomobile, which is borrowed from one of their joint friends. Mark has IJ.Ot been
drinking. After they park� Gregory asks Mark for the· car keys so that he can drive
home to change before work.

Scenario

1:

Purposeful as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death

(C) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark says, "Yeah, go ahead. Bring
me back a jacket." Mark knows that the West Gate is now crowded with people
coming to work and he is certain that if he gives the keys to Gregory, Gregory will
hit someone at the gate and kill them. Nonetheless, he gives Gregory the car keys.
Gregory speeds off toward the West Gate and, because of dangerous driving due
to intoxication, he strikes and kills two workers just arriving for work through the
West Gate.

Scenario 2: Purposeful as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death
(U) Mark says, "Yeah, go ahead. Bring me back a jacket." Mark is aware that be
cause of Gregory's intoxication, there is a chance that if he gives the keys to
Gregory, Gregory may have an accident and kill someone. Nonetheless, he gives
the car keys to Gregory and proceeds into the plant. Gregory drives off for his
house to change and ten minutes later, because of dangerous driving due to intox
ication, Gregory collides with another car, killing the two passengers in the car.

Scenario 3: Knowing as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death
(L) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark knows that the West Gate is
now crowded with people coming to work and he is certain that if he gives the
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keys to Gregory, Gregory will hit someone at the gate and kill them. Nonetheless,
Mark pleads with Gregory not to drive because he (Gregory) is too intoxicated.
Gregory continues to insist. Mark gives him the keys, and then proceeds into the
plant. Gregory gets into the car and speeds off toward the West Gate. Because of
dangerous driving due to intoxication, he strikes and kills two workers just arriv
ing for work through the West Gate.

Scenario 4: Knowing as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death
(P) Mark is aware that, because of Gregory's intoxication, there is a chance that if
he gives the keys to Gregory, Gregory may have an accident and kill someone.
Nonetheless, he pleads with Gregory not to drive because he (Gregory) is too in
toxicated. Gregory continues to insist. Mark gives him the keys and then proceeds
into the plant. Gregory gets into the car and drives off for his house to change.
Ten minutes later, because of dangerous driving due to intoxication, Gregory col
lides with another car, killing the two passengers in the car.

Scenario 5: Reckless as to Assisting Driving, Knowing as to Causing Death
(A) Gregory says that if he rushes, and uses the West Gate as a short cut, he can
make it back to the plant before the shift starts. Mark tells Gregory that he
(Gregory) is too drunk to drive and proceeds into the plant with Gregory follow
ing him. In the locker room, Mark puts his valuables, including the car keys, on
the locker room bench. Before he heads for the bathroom, it occurs to him that
Gregory might take the keys. Mark knows that the West Gate is now crowded with
people coming to work. If Gregory takes the keys, Mark is certain that Gregory
will hit someone at the gate and kill them. Mark nonetheless leaves the keys on the
bench. When he returns, Gregory has taken the keys and left the plant. Gregory
speeds off toward the West Gate and, because of dangerous driving due to intoxi
cation, he strikes and kills two workers just arriving for work through the West
Gate.

Scenario 6: Reckless as to Assisting Driving, Reckless as to Causing Death
(B) Mark tells Gregory that he (Gregory) is too drunk to drive and proceeds into
the plant with Gregory following him. In the locker room, Mark puts his valu
ables, including the car keys, on the locker room bench. Before he heads for the
bathroom, it occurs to him that Gregory might take the keys and, if he does, Mark
believes that Gregory may have an accident and kill someone. Mark nonetheless
leaves the keys on the bench. When he returns, Gregory has taken the keys and left
the plant. Gregory drives toward his house to change and ten minutes later, be
cause of dangerous driving due to intoxication, Gregory collides with another car,
killing the two passengers in the car.
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STUDY 1 0: VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Scenario 1: Purposeful Killing-Control
(X) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill him.
VVhen his roommate arrives home, Brian starts beating his roommate. His room
mate later dies from the beating.

Scenario 2: Reckless Killing-Control
( 0) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to se
verely beat his roommate but does not want to kill him. When his roommate ar
rives home, Brian starts striking his roommate over the head with a lead pipe. His
roommate later dies from the beating.

Scenario 3: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Purposeful Intoxication
(B) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian drinks two six-packs of beer in the
course of two hours to steel his nerves. Brian knows his alcohol tolerance is gener
ally low. By the time he has finished the last beer, Brian is extremely intoxicated.
At this point, Brian can barely stand up. His thought processes and vision are se
verely impaired. His roommate then arrives home. Brian starts striking his room
mate over the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from the beating.
The next day, Brian does not remember the beating.

Scenario 4: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Reckless Intoxication
( T ) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Brian has
recently been taking medication for his chronic back pain. Although he thinks
that the medication's warning states that the consumption of alcohol might cause
in toxication, Brian disregards the warning and consumes 3 beers. Brian becomes
extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought pro
cesses and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back to his
home. When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking his roommate over
the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from the beating. The next day,
Brian does not remember the beating.
Scenario 5: Pre-Intoxication Purposeful Killing-Negligent Intoxication
(P) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, wants to kill his
roommate. Brian plans to beat his roommate over the head with a heavy object
until his roommate dies. First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Although
he has been taking medication for his chronic back pain, Brian has never read the

Appendix B

255

medication's warning. The warning clearly states that the consumption of alcohol
while on the medication will result in extreme intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with
his friends. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely
stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow
makes it back to his home. When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts strik
ing his roommate over the head with a lead pipe. His roommate later dies from
the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the beating.

Scenario 6: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Purposeful Intoxication
(J) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to se
verely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate.
First, however, Brian drinks two six-packs of beer in the course of two hours to
steel his nerves. Brian knows his alcohol tolerance is generally low. By the time he
finishes the last beer, Brian is extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can
barely stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. When his
roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking his roommate with a lead pipe. His
roommate later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the
beating.

Scenario 7: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Reckless Intoxication
(H) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to
severely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate.
First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Brian has recently been taking
medication for his chronic back pain. Although he is aware of the medication's
warning that the consumption of alcohol might cause intoxication, Brian disre
gards the warning and consumes 3 beers. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated.
At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought processes and vision are se
verely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back home. When his roommate ar
rives home, Brian starts striking his roommate with a lead pipe. His roommate
later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the beating.

Scenario 8: Pre-Intoxication Reckless Killing-Negligent Intoxication
(W) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Brian wants to
severely beat his roommate to scare him but does not want to kill his roommate.
First, however, Brian goes out with his friends. Although he has been taking med
ication for his chronic back pain, Brian has never read the medication's warning.
The warning clearly states that the consumption of alcohol while on the medica
tion will result in extreme intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with his friends. Brian
becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought
processes and vision are severely impaired. Brian somehow makes it back home.
When his roommate arrives home, Brian starts striking him with a lead pipe. His
roommate later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the
beating.
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Scenario 9: Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Purposeful Intoxication
(M) Brian is upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend. Although he
knows his alcohol tolerance is generally low, Brian consumes 2 six-packs of beer
within the course of 2 hours. By the time he finishes the last beer, Brian is ex
tremely intoxicated. At this point Brian can barely stand. His thought processes
and vision are severely impaired. Then, Brian's friend Joe, who lives in another
town, stops by for a visit. Upon Joe's arrival, Brian loses control of himself and
starts striking Joe with a lead pipe. Joe later dies from the beating. The next day,
Brian does not remember the beating.

Scenario 1 0: Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Reckless Intoxication
(A) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, decides to go out
with his friends. Brian has recently been taking medication for his chronic back
pain. Although he thinks that the medication's warning states that the consump
tion of alcohol might cause intoxication, Brian disregards the warning and con
sumes 3 beers. Brian becomes extremely intoxicated. At this point, Brian can
barely stand. His thought processes and vision are severely impaired. Noticing
that Brian is intoxicated, Joe, one of Brian's friends, decides to drive Brian home.
Upon arriving at his home, Brian loses control and starts striking Joe with a lead
pipe. Joe later dies from the beating. The next day, Brian does not remember the
beating.

Scenario

11:

Pre-Intoxication Faultless Killing-Negligent Intoxication

(L) Brian, upset with his roommate for stealing his girlfriend, decides to go out
with his friends. Although he has been taking medication for his chronic back
pain, Brian has never read the medication's warning. The warning dearly states
that the consumption of alcohol while on the medication will result in extreme
intoxication. Brian has 3 beers with his friends. Brian becomes extremely intoxi
cated. At this point, Brian can barely stand. His thought processes and vision are
severely impaired. Noticing that Brian is intoxicated, Joe, one of Brian's friends
decides to drive Brian home. Upon arriving at his home, Brian loses control of
himself and starts striking Joe with a lead pipe. Joe later dies from the beating.
The next day, Brian does not remember the beating.
STUDY 1 1 : INDIVIDUALIZATION OF THE
OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE

Scenario A: Commission-Death
(S) Sam decides that he wants to go hunting by himself in a very remote area out
West. He drives for half a day on a gravel road through the mountains without
seeing another car, house, or store. Sam camps out and is amazed at how quiet it
is; he feels so far away from people. He thinks how great it would be to have a
cabin there. He guesses there is a lot of wildlife, including bears, in the woods
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around him. Just recently he read Alaska Bear Tales, a collection of stories about
bear encounters.
Early in the morning, after he finished a tasty breakfast of bacon and eggs, Sam
hears a noise in the brush and quickly grabs his gun and fires it in the direction of
the noise. Then he hears nothing. He runs through the thicket and evergreens to
see what he has shot. He discovers that he has killed another hunter.
Characteristic ( 1 1 ) Cultural Norms
( 4S) Sam is an American Indian. In his tribe, the men hunt alone. They hunt in
remote areas away from any people. Unlike most hunters, it is normal for the men
to shoot at anything. This is because their kill is their food. No one ever killed an
other hunter using this hunting method.
Characteristic (SS) Substandard Education
Sam had never been hunting before.
Characteristic ( 6S) Old Age
At age 82, Sam has gray hair and is very wrinkled.
Characteristic ( 7S) Religion (Knowledge)
Sam's religion is not a traditional one, but. its beliefs include the fact that the
forest, though beautiful and peaceful, is also filled with animals that are evil be
cause they can be violent to man, and man is God's image. It is the duty of believ
ers in the faith to destroy evil wherever they encounter it. Sam knows this from his
religious lessons and he is very devout.
Characteristic (8S) Recent Upset
Sam was mugged only two nights ago.
Characteristic (9S) Below-Normal Intelligence
No matter how much Sam studied in school, he just could not understand the
material.
Characteristic ( 1 OS) Lack of Knowledge (Culture)
Sam is originally from the Outback of Australia. They do not have firearms.
They hunt with spears and know nothing about guns. Even though he can use a
gun, Sam still doesn't really know the powerful impact of a gun and the distance a
bullet can traveL
Characteristic ( l l S) Immaturity
Sam is a senior in high school and is seventeen years old.
Characteristic ( 1 2S) Upbringing (Knowledge)
When he was a child, Sam used to accompany his father to hunting club meet
ings, and even occasionally, on a hunting trip with his father and uncle.
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Characteristic ( 1 3S} Advanced Experience
Sam has a college degree. He teaches part-time at the community college and is
working on another college degree.
Characteristic ( 1 4S) Upbringing ( Knowledge)
Though no one in Sam's family has ever hunted, Sam's parents are both very
safety-conscious people. Their young children followed the traffic rules for riding
their bikes. They had their children take a driver education course before getting
their licenses. The whole family had an escape plan in case of fire in the home. Ev
eryone always had to wear their seatbelts. "Safety FirsC was the family motto.
Characteristic ( ISS) Religion (Norms)
Sam's religion holds that he absolutely must never worry about anything be
cause God's will takes care of everything. Worrying would mean a lack of faith.
Characteristic ( 1 6S) Genetic Irregularity
No matter what they did or where they were, both of Sam's parents were acci
dent-prone. They said they always tried to be careful. But they couldn't help it.
Sam's grandparents were the same. They were just an accident-prone family. The
family doctor testified that there is an actual physical cause of their tendency to
act too quickly which causes their accident-prone behavior, which is, in turn,
caused by a hereditary enzyme deficiency.
Characteristic ( 1 7S) Above-Normal Intelligence
Sam always scored the top score on standardized tests at school, including the
Iowa Test in grade school and the I.Q. test in high school.

Scenario B: Omission-Death
(M) Mart is the parent of Jennine, age 2. Jennine had always been a colicky baby.
When she fussed, there was nothing that could be done for her. Mart usually
leaves Jennine in front of the television, occasionally checking on her. One day,
Jennine starts to cry a lot, holding her head and vomiting most of her food. She
also shakes uncontrollably, which she has never done before. This goes on for two
days. On the third day, Jennine dies. An autopsy reveals that she died of lead poi
soning and that timely medical intervention would likely have saved her life.
Characteristic ( 4M) Religion (Norms)
The religion that Mart, as an adult, chooses to follow forbids seeking medical
treatment for illness.
Characteristic (SM) Upbringing (Knowledge)
Mart was orphaned when she was a baby. She was raised in a very nice orphan
age, which sent the children to public schools. Usually there was only one staff
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member on duty to care for 1 0 children per shift. The children were kept sepa
rated by age, so they never saw the younger children being taken care of.
Characteristic (6M) Cultural Norms
Mart lives in a very tight-knit community in a remote part of Maine. Everyone
there is committed to keeping "civilization" away. The nearest doctor is in a town
75 miles away and everyone thinks that is just dose enough. The community does
not want the intrusion that a "town doctor" would be. They had a town meeting
once and everyone said) "Who needs lawyers and doctors-if it weren)t for them)
there wouldn)t be such a 'rat race: We like the simple life. That's why most of us
left places like New York to live here." They all like their community just the way it
is and are proud of being a self-reliant community.
Characteristic (7M) Immaturity
Since Mart is too young to drink alcohol) she just has a soda when she goes to
any party that serves alcohol. Last year her favorite rock group was New Kids on
the Block; now she loves Vanilla Ice. Mart is sixteen years old.
Characteristic (8M) Below-Normal Intelligence
Mart works in a sheltered workshop. She is a slow learner compared to other
people.
Characteristic (9M) Recent Upset
Mart's mother and husband were very recently killed in an accident.
Characteristic ( 10M) Above-Normal Intelligence
Mart is a firm believer in learning as much as possible. She received her Bache
lor's degree. Also, she took a mini-psychology course called "Parent Effectiveness
Training" when she found out she was pregnant.
Characteristic ( 1 1M) Religion (Knowledge)
Mart knows from her religion that vomiting is not illness. Rather, the religion
teaches that vomiting is a sign that evil spirits are being cast away. It teaches that
when a child vomits, the child needs to be left alone for God to do his work
against the evil.
Characteristic ( 1 2M) Upbringing (Environment)
Normally Mart's parents hardly ever took their children to the doctor. They al
ways said that if you just waited 2 weeks, you would go to the doctor a lot less.
Characteristic ( 1 3M) Above-Normal Intelligence
Since first grade Mart was always an honor student. Learning just comes natu
rally to her.
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Characteristic ( 14M) Genetic Irregularity
Mart's grandmother and mother seemed to have all kinds of different accidents
and didn't understand how or why they happened. Even though they were smart
and caring people and otherwise fine, the family doctor testified that all three
women had a hereditary hormonal imbalance which causes them to be less obser
vant of what goes on around them than most people would be in the same situa
tion.
Characteristic ( 1 5M ) Old Age
Mart is eighty-one years old and Jennine's grandmother.
Characteristic ( 16M) Lack of Knowlege (Culture)
Recently, Mart came to the United States from what is thought of as a "Third
World Country." Because of a shortage of doctors, there was little medical care in
her country, except for trauma. So, the medical care they know of consists mostly
of surgical intervention or taking care of broken bones. They don't know that
doctors take care of children for illnesses.
Characteristic ( 1 7M) Substandard Education
Even though Mart was an average student, she only finished grade school.

Scenario C: Omission-Property Damage
(R) Ry owns an eight unit apartment building in Rochester; he has a duty to
maintain the building properly. He also lives in one of the apartments. Last week,
a fire started in the building, causing $500,000 of property damage before the fire
was brought under controL Fortunately, no lives were lost and no one was seri
ously injured.
An investigation later determined how the fire started. The building hadn't
been painted in some time and so much paint had peeled off that most of the hall
ways had piles of paint in the corners. In the hallway where the fire started, the
overhead light was just a naked light bulb. Someone had removed the protective
light fixture and it had never been replaced. Apparently the fire started when a
large piece of paint landed on the hot, naked bulb, caught fire, and fell to the floor
before burning up, where it ignited other paint peelings.
Ry was unaware that these conditions existed. Because he had a separate en
trance to his own apartment and rarely went into the common hallways, he didn't
know there was a risk of fire. He had not seen the flaked paint. He did not know
that the protective light fixture �as missing.
Characteristic ( 4R) Old Age
Whenever anyone asks just how old eighty year old Ry is, he always says that he
is "older than sand.,
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Characteristic ( SR) Advanced Experience
Ry's job experience includes building maintenance work.
Characteristic ( 6R) Genetic Irregularity
A geneticist testified that there is a gene that can cause sporadic forgetfulness
and lack of attentiveness. After studying Ry's parents and Ry, he concluded that
Ry has inherited the trait.
Characteristic (7R) Upbringing (Knowledge)
Ry never saw either parent ever do any maintenance work on their house. Be
cause of his father's job, they moved a lot into new homes that never needed
painting or any other kind of maintenance work. As a result, he has no knowledge
of what building maintenance entailed.
Characteristic (8R) Below-Normal Intelligence
Ry is willing to try to learn new things, but not too many people have the pa
tience to teach him. He just doesn't catch on very quickly.
Characteristic ( 9R) Religion ( Knowledge)
Ry's religion teaches him that whatever was good could stand the test of time
and whatever was evil would not last. If a tree grows for 1 00 years, it is because of
good. He knows that if a car falls apart or if a roof caves in, it is because of evil
spirits. He knows there is nothing anyone could do about such occurrences. He
knows this is a universal truth.
Characteristic ( 1 OR) Above-Normal Intelligence
Ry always learns more quickly than most other people. In school, he was a bet
ter than average student. He even skipped one grade.
Characteristic ( l lR) Upbringing (Environment)
Ry grew up in a city that is very overcrowded-so it's hard to find an apart
ment. His family was glad to have found theirs. As a result, his own family always
repaired and maintained their own apartment. They never thought of having the
landlord do any of it. From this upbringing, Ry believed maintenance was some
thing tenants take care of.
Characteristic ( 1 2R) Lack of Knowledge ( Culture)
Ry is a member of an Indian tribe that lives on a reservation in Northern Maine
where he lived most of his life. They still speak their native tongue. Their homes
are log cabins. Everything is in its natural state. They have never painted any
thing. They have no electricity. They know nothing about man-made paint and
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its characteristics or about the operation of light bulbs. Ry was left the apartment
building by an uncle who left the reservation.
Characteristic ( 13R) Substandard Education
Ry was an average student, but only went as far as the fifth grade.
Characteristic ( 14R) Cultural Norms
Ry comes from a country that has a very strict standard of privacy. No one ever
entered another person's home unless invited. To do so would be an insult. He be
lieves that entering common hallways violates a tenant's privacy.
Characteristic ( 1 5R) Recent Upset
Just after Ry acquired the apartment building, his daughter died from leuke
mia.
Characteristic ( 1 6R) Religion (Norms)
Ry's religion does not allow him to use man-made products such as paint. He is
trying to find a paint made from natural products.
Characteristic ( 1 7R) Immaturity
Ry is only nineteen years old and is still unsure of all his goals in life. The apart
ment building was left to Ry in his aunt's will.

STUDY 12: INSANITY

Scenario

1:

Murder

( Q) John Hardey is angry with Jack Turner for making disparaging remarks
about him. He goes to Jack's house, waits until he is alone, then bludgeons him to
death with an ax handle.

Scenario 2: Self-Defense
( R) Dennis Harkins is the owner of a small convenience store. At about 1 0 p.m., a
man enters the store, pulls out a knife, and demands the money in the cash regis
ter. Harkins refuses to hand it over and takes a policeman's "night stick" from un
der the counter. As the man lunges at him, Harkins strikes him on the head to de
fend himself. The man subsequently dies from the injury.

Scenario 3: Mistaken Identity
(Z) Dennis Harkins is the owner of a small convenience store. At about 1 0 p.m., a

man enters the store, robs Harkins at knifepoint, and flees. Harkins gives chase
with a policeman's "night stick" that he keeps under the counter but loses the sus-
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pect during the chase. As he is returning to the store, having given up the chase,
he sees the man standing on a porch talking with others. Harkins approaches the
man, demands his money back, and tells the others to call the police, which they
do. The man denies being the robber. Harkins is aware that the man might not be
the robber but thinks that he probably is. He and Harkins get into a fight, during
which Harkins beats the man with his "night stick:' The man subsequently dies
from the injuries. Another man, similar in appearance is later arrested and con
victed for the robbery.

Scenario 4: High Control, Low Cognitive
(I) Stanley Charlson has been twice committed to a mental hospital, each follow
ing an attempt to disfigure or mutilate himself. On the first occasion, he stuck his
hand into a fire in a fireplace and held it there; on the second, he cut his left shin
repeatedly with a large bread knife. On both occasions, his injuries would have
been life-threatening had he not been stopped by others who happened onto the
scene. Other than these two episodes, Stanley is able to function and has many
friends and a good relationship with his family. On a Sunday afternoon he goes to
visit his parents and his younger brother, Peter, who lives with them. The back
room windows of their house overlook a shallow river. Stanley calls Peter fro111 the
front room to look at a boat traveling down the river. While the boy is looking out
of the window, Stanley picks up a wooden mallet and strikes the boy twice on the
head, killing him instantly. When his mother enters the room, he is standing over
the boy, with the mallet still in his hand and a horrified look on his face. He can
give no explanation to his mother as to why he did what he did, saying simply that
"something came over me and made me do it." When the police arrive, they find
him huddled in the corner of the back room. He is transported to the local county
hospital for treatment. In interviews with doctors and private talks with his
mother, he describes that at the time he hit Peter on the head he was well aware of
what he was doing and that it was wrong but felt subject to an overwhelming
compulsion that "took control of his body;' and compelled him to do what he
did, although he has no idea why. Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at the
time of his conduct causing Peter's death he was mentally ill, suffering from severe
impulse control disorder.

Scenario 5: High Control, Low Cognitive
(C) Michael Monte was discharged from the Navy at the age of 1 7 after a psychiat
ric examination showed that he suffered "from a profound personality disorder
that renders him unfit for Naval service." He now lives alone in a boarding house
and, because of repeated outbursts of temper, has no dose friends. He has not
held a job for more than two weeks at a time and is always on the verge of being
evicted from his room for his unpredictable behavior. His landlady is tolerant of
his minor misconducts because she feels sorry for him, believing that he is not al-
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ways in control of himself. "He is as sweet as can be for a while, then will turn to a
very black mood and blow up at whoever happens to be around," she explains.
"He is always very sorry immediately after and makes a nuisance of himself trying
to apologize:' On this particular day, Michael is in one of his black moods when
he leaves the building in the morning. When he returns that afternoon he seems
to his landlady to be even more distressed. She asks him if he is "ok" as he passes
her door. He does not respond. Twenty minutes later one of the other tenants
knocks on Michael's door and demands that Michael turn his music down. He
continues to pound on the door for several minutes. Michael suddenly opens the
door swinging a baseball bat, striking the surprised tenant in the head, killing him
instantly. When the landlady reaches the landing, she finds Michael, standing
over the body, as if frozen. She checks the body and tells Michael that the man is
dead. Michael gasps, falls to his knees-"Why did I do that? I knew I shouldn't
have hit him:' Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at the time of the killing
Michael knew what he was doing and knew that it was wrong, but that he suffers
from severe anger control disorder and, as a result, was not able to control his
conduct.

Scenario 6: Medium Control, High Cognitive
(G) Mrs. Jeanne Cogdon lives with her husband Frank and her daughter Pat, age
1 5. Mrs. Cogdon suffered a severely traumatic experience when she became lost
during a camping trip two years earlier. She was found after six days, suffering
from exposure, disorientation, and severe depression. Since that time, she has
been seeing a psychiatrist, who is treating her for post traumatic stress disorder.
On this particular night, she goes to bed at 1 0:30 p.m. as usual and at 1 :30 a.m.
she awakes in order to check on her daughter, Pat. She sees Pat and becomes terri
fied because she thinks she is seeing Pat being attacked by moles. She screams
"the moles are going to get us. They are attacking Pat!" Jeanne attempts to protect
Pat by picking up a hockey stick and striking Pat's bed several times including one
blow to Pat's head that kills her. When Jeanne's husband arrives she is striking at
different parts of Pat's desktop although the desktop is actually empty. She yells to
her husband, "you've got to help, the moles are hurting Pat:' Her husband tells
her to put the stick down, and she does. Psychiatrists testify that she was halluci
nating at the time of the killing, as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder.

Scenario

7:

Low Control, High Cognitive

(V) Jeffrey stays in his room most of the time, with the shades pulled and the
lights out. Every month he must go to the hospital for counseling with a psychia
trist. The trips are very stressful for Jeffrey, who becomes more agitated as the day
for his monthly trip approaches. He is afraid that someone "will get him;' he tells
his mother and is upset with the hospital for making him go. She tries to assure
him that everything will be fine, and that he should leave for the bus immediately.
Jeffrey leaves the house, walking quickly, heading for the bus stop three blocks
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away. Two women and a young man are already at the stop waiting for the bus.
Although the young man has done nothing, Jeffrey becomes frightened and feels
physically threatened by him. He finds a stone and hides it in his pocket in order
to defend himself. Jeffrey waits to board after the other people but the young
man, who is ahead of him in line, steps out of line and bends to one knee to tie his
shoe. The young man stands up just as Jeffrey passes him. Jeffrey imagines that
the man is about to attack him, reacts by hitting the youth in the face with the
rock that he had hidden in his pocket. As the young man staggers, Jeffrey hits him
again on the side of the head, killing him. Jeffrey explains to onlookers that the
young man was about to attack him. Court-appointed psychiatrists testify that at
the time of his conduct causing the young man's death, Jeffrey was suffering from
severe paranoid schizophrenia.
STUDY 1 3:
IMMATURITY AND INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

Scenario 1 : Control-Murder
( G ) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly fond of the other
but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more antagonistic than
ever. When the poker game is over, Mike waits for Joe to fall asleep and pours gas
oline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe and lights a match.
Joe dies quickly in the ensuing fire.

Scenario 2: High Control
(R) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule.
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe says to
Mike, "Other than the television I bought her last year for her birthday, what have
I given her?" Mike responds, sarcastically, "Only a television, huh?" and runs over
to the set and proceeds to throw it out the living room window. Joe, upon enter
ing the living room, screams "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Noticing the
kerosene can next to the heater, Mike picks up the can, splashes kerosene on Joe
and says "I'll show you what I'm doing-I'm going to turn you into a great ball of
fire;' and throws a match on Joe. Joe dies quickly in the ensuing fire. When his
grandmother enters the room she finds Mike sitting on the floor, crying, and
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mumbling "I can't believe what I've done. I knew it was wrong when it happened
but I couldn't stop myself. If you can hear me Joe, rm sorry." When questioned, a
court-appointed doctor states that the medication prescribed for Mike interacted
with a common cold remedy, causing Mike to totally lose his ability to control his
actions.

Scenario 3: High Cognitive
(A) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule.
Shortly after the beginning of the game, Mike, who has never had any psycho
logical impairments, notices that his cards all seem to be Jacks and that the faces
on the cards appear to be laughing in a haunting manner. As Mike begins to relate
his visions to Joe, Mike sees Joe slowly transform into a bull, a snake, and finally, a
ghost. Mike, while taking steps backward into the living room screams at his vi
sion to "stay away from me." Mike picks up the kerosene can next to his grand
mother's heater, splashes kerosene over Joe and lights a match. Joe dies quickly
from the ensuing fire. When his grandmother enters the room she finds Mike
standing proudly over Joe's enflamed body. Mike turns to her and says: "I was
playing cards with Joe but he turned into this ghost that was going to kill me!"
When questioned, a court-appointed doctor says that the medication prescribed
for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, causing Mike to experience hal
lucinations which completely distorted reality for Mike throughout the evening.

Scenario 4: Low Control
(T) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule.
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe says to
Mike, "Other than the television I bought her last year for her birthday, what have
I given her?" Mike thinks to himself "You know, he's right. I should apologize:'
But several moments later Mike feels angry again. Mike grabs the television and
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proceeds to throw it out the living room window. Joe, upon entering the living
room, yells "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Noticing the kerosene can next
to his grandmother's heater,· Mike splashes kerosene on Joe and pushes him to the
floor. While reaching into his pocket for matches, Mike reasons to himself: "This
is silly. I could really hurt Joe over nothing." Joe, while still on the floor, yells "You
moron, what are you doing?" Mike's anger wells up again. Mike then lights a
match and throws it on Joe. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. When his
grandmother enters the room she finds Mike sitting on the floor, crying, and
mumbling "I can't believe what I've done. I knew it was wrong when it happened
and I thought I could stop myself but in the end, I just couldn't. If you can hear
me Joe, I'm sorry:' When questioned, a court-appointed doctor states that the
medication prescribed for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, resulting
in a substantial, but not complete loss of emotional self-control.

Scenario 5: Low Cognitive
(E) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to
control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule.
Shortly after the beginning of the game, Mike, who has never had any psycho
logical impairments, begins to say particularly malicious things to Joe, including
comments about Joe's weight problem. After a few moments Joe has had enough
of the verbal attack and makes a vulgar hand gesture to Mike. Mike then thinks
"Geez, if he's angry enough to do that, he might even attack me. I 'd better protect
myself." When Joe gets up from the table to go to the bathroom, Mike gets a can of
kerosene from his grandmother's living room and hides it under the card table.
When Joe returns he first goes over to the sink to get a glass of water. While Joe is
looking for a glass, Mike thinks "I bet Joe's looking for a knife to stab me! I've got
to protect myself!" Mike then splashes kerosene over Joe, pushes him to the
ground, and throws a lighted match on him. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing
fire. When questioned, a court-appointed doctor states that the medication pre
scribed for Mike interacted with a common cold remedy, resulting in a substan
tial, but not complete loss of ability to appreciate the nature of his conduct or that
it was wrong.

Scenario 6: Low Control and Cognitive
(S) Mike, age 30, is playing poker with his brother Joe late one evening while both
are visiting their grandmother. Mike recently started taking a prescription drug to
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control pain caused by a shoulder injury. Mike's doctor did not warn him about
taking this drug in conjunction with any other medications, and it did not occur
to Mike to ask about any possible interactions. Mike does not drink alcoholic bev
erages. Before beginning their poker game, Mike starts to feel as though he is
coming down with a cold and decides to take an over-the-counter cold capsule.
During the game the normally calm and mild-natured Mike says particularly
malicious things to his brother and suggests that Joe "buy" his grandmother's
love by purchasing expensive gifts for her that Mike could never afford. Joe, while
making a vulgar hand gesture at Mike, says: "Other than the television I bought
her last year for her birthday, what have I given her?" Mike then thinks: "You
know, he's right, but he's awfully upset at what I said. I want to apologize but I'm
afraid to say anything:' Several moments later Mike begins to feel angry again,
grabs his grandmother's television and throws it out the living room window. Joe
yells, "What the hell are you doing, Mike?" Mike then thinks: "Oh my gosh, he's
really angry now-I'd better protect myself:' Mike then picks up the can of kero-:
sene next to his grandmother's heater, splashes kerosene on Joe, and pushes Joe to
the ground. Mike thinks: "This is silly. I could really hurt Joe over nothing, but I
think he might try to hurt me:' Joe, while still on the floor, yells "You moron,
what are you doing?" Mike's anger wells up again. Mike then lights a match and
throws it on Joe. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire. When questioned, a court
appointed doctor states that the medication prescribed for Mike interacted with a
common cold remedy, resulting in substantial, but not complete, loss of ability of
self-control and substantial, but not complete, loss in his ability to appreciate the
nature of his conduct or that it was wrong.
Scenario 7: 1 0-Year-Old
( 0) Mike, age I 0, is trading baseball cards with his brother Joe late one evening
while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly fond of
the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more antago
nistic than ever. When the "trading session" is over, Mike waits for Joe to fall
asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe
and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire.

Scenario 8: 1 4-Year-Old
( P) Mike, age 1 4, is repairing his Puch Moped with his brother Joe late one eve
ning while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is particularly
fond of the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they appear more
antagonistic than ever. When the repairs are finished, Mike waits for Joe to fall
asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage, over Joe,
and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire.

269

Appendix B

Scenario 9:

1 8- Year-Old

(I) Mike, age 18, is watching "Late Night with David Letterman" with his brother
Joe late one evening while both are visiting their grandmother. Neither brother is
particularly fond of the other but this evening, for some unknown reason, they
appear more antagonistic than ever. When the program is over, Mike waits for Joe
to fall asleep and pours gasoline, which he gets from his grandmother's garage,
over Joe, and lights a match. Joe dies quickly from the ensuing fire.
STUDY 14:
DURESS AND ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES

Scenario I : Control-No Duress or Inducement
(E) Chris, a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record, needs money quickly. To
get it, he agrees to make a delivery of eight ounces of cocaine for Tom, a local drug
dealer. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation.
A subsequent lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The
police arrest Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to dis
tribute.

Scenario 2: High Coercion
(P) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. Chris meets Tom at a
baseball game and their friendship develops over the course of several weeks.
Chris's friend tells him that Tom is "no good, he is involved in all kinds of drugs."
Chris thereafter tries to avoid Tom as much as possible. A week later, Chris re
ceives a telephone call from Tom asking for a favor. Chris quickly cuts off the con
versation on the pretext that he has relatives over. Three days later Tom calls Chris
and asks him to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him. Tom is very insistent,
stating that Chris is going to do it, but Chris still refuses. The following evening
Chris receives another call from Tom. This time Tom is very loud, "You're going
to deliver this stuff for me. Remember, you just moved into a place that has a dark
entrance, and you leave that entrance with your wife and children ... You and your
family are going to jump at shadows when you leave that dark entrance. If you call
the police about this, you will be very sorry. Just deliver the stuff and I won't
bother you again." After hearing this, Chris agrees to make the delivery. While
making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation. A subsequent
lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest
Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Scenario 3: Low Coercion
(A) Chris, a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record, is working as a truck
driver for Tom. Tom tells Chris he wants him to deliver eight ounces of cocaine.
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Chris initially refuses, but after Tom tells him that his employment will be termi
nated if he does not transport the cocaine, he agrees. While making the delivery,
Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation. A subsequent lawful search of the
car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and charge him
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Scenario 4: No Prior Record-Agent
(T) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. He is unemployed and
depressed about his financial condition. Buck was in the Navy with Chris and, in
fact, saved Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Buck has be
come an undercover narcotics agent. He approaches Chris pretending to be a
drug dealer seeking help on a delivery and insists that Chris should help him in
return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris refuses, saying that he
will do anything for Buck except commit a crime. Buck insists, "My life is at stake
now. If you don't make this delivery my connection will kill me. Are you saying
you won't save my life?" Chris relents and agrees to make the delivery. Buck makes
arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him the following
day.' While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle violation by
Buck and other narcotics officers. A subsequent lawful search of the car results in
the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and charge him with posses
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Scenario 5: Prior Record-Agent
(N) Chris, a Navy veteran, has a string of arrests and convictions for various drug
offenses. The word on the street is that Chris is looking to get back into the drug
business. Chris is pursuing several people whom he believes may need help in
their own drug businesses. Buck was in the Navy with Chris and, in fact, saved
Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Buck has become an un
dercover narcotics agent. When he learns about Chris he is saddened, but when
he is assigned to target Chris he decides he must do his job. He approaches Chris
pretending to be a drug dealer seeking help on a delivery and insists that Chris
should help him in return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris
readily agrees. Buck makes arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of co
caine the following day. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor
vehicle violation by Buck and other narcotics officers. A subsequent lawful search
of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine. The police arrest Chris and
charge him with possession of cocaine, with intent to distribute.

Scenario 6: No Prior Record-Buddy
( R) Chris is a Navy veteran with no prior criminal record. He is unemployed and
depressed about his financial condition. Jake was in the Navy with Chris and, in
fact, saved Chris's life while in the service. Since leaving the Navy, Jake has turned
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to dealing drugs to make a living. When he hears that Chris is in town he
approaches him seeking help on a drug delivery, insisting that Chris owes it to
him in return for his saving Chris's life while in the service. Chris refuses, saying
that he will do anything for Jake except commit a crime. Jake insists, "My life is at
stake now. If you don't make this delivery my connection will kill me. Are you say
ing you won't save my life?" Chris relents and agrees to make the delivery. Jake
makes arrangements for Chris to deliver eight ounces of cocaine for him the fol
lowing day. While making the delivery, Chris is stopped for a motor vehicle viola
tion. A subsequent lawful search of the car results in the discovery of the cocaine.
The police arrest Chris and charge him with possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.
STUDY 15:
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE-SEXUAL OFFENSES

Scenario

1:

Forcible Intercourse-Straight

(C) Pam exercises three afternoons a week at the health club where she belongs.
Alex is also a member of the health club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced gen
eral contractor. One evening Pam leaves the club and Alex follows her to the park
ing lot. It is late and there is no one anywhere near. Suddenly, Alex rushes up be
hind Pam and pushes her behind a dumpster. He tells her not to scream or resist
or he will kill her. He forces her to have sexual intercourse.

Scenario 2: Forcible Intercourse-Date
( R) Pam exercises three days a week at the health club where she belongs. Alex is
also a member of the health club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced general
contractor. He had dated Pam for a few months when they were both in college.
He remembers that they had slept together only for the last month they were dat
ing. He has not seen or spoken to her in four years. He says hello to Pam one day
and they speak for a few minutes. Alex asks if they could work out together the
following day and she agrees to meet him and then go out for drinks. The next
evening after going out for drinks, Pam invites Alex to her apartment for coffee.
They sit on the sofa and talk about old times. Suddenly Alex reaches out and be
gins kissing her. He tells her that if she screams or resists he will kill her. He then
forces her to have sex.

Scenario 3: Forcible Intercourse-Live Together
( L) Pam and Alex are lovers and have been living together for two years. They first
met when Pam was a junior in college and Alex was a bartender at a local bar. Pam
graduates from college and she is accepted into a law school which is two thou
sand miles away. She tells Alex that she is going to law school and does not want
him to come with her. She tells him she is leaving for good and does not want to
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see him anymore. She asks him to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's place. He is
extremely angry and hurt by her decision to leave. He comes into the bedroom
and they start fighting. Alex pushes Pam onto the floor. He tells her that if she re
sists or screams he will kill her. He forces her to have sex with him.

Scenario 4: Forcible Intercourse-Married
(A) Pam and Alex have been married for two years. They first met when Pam was
a junior in college and Alex was a bartender at a local bar. They married that same
year. Pam graduates from college and she is accepted into a law school which is
two thousand miles away. She tells Alex that she is going to law school and she
does not want him to come with her. She tells him she is leaving for good and
wants a divorce. Pam then asks Alex to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's place.
He is extremely angry and hurt by her decision to leave. He comes into the bed
room and they start fighting. Alex pushes Pam onto the floor. He tells her that if
she screams or resists, he will kill her. He forces her to have sex with him.

Scenario 5: Forcible Intercourse-Homosexual
(W) Alex and David are lovers and have been living together for two years. They
met at a gay bar when David was a junior in college and Alex was a bartender. Da
vid graduates from college and is accepted into a law school which is two thou
sand miles away. He tells Alex that he is going to law school and he does not want
Alex to come with him. He also tells Alex that he is leaving for good and does not
want to see him anymore. David asks Alex to sleep on the sofa or at his brother's
place. Alex is extremely angry and hurt by David's rejection. He comes into the
bedroom and they start fighting. Alex pushes David onto the floor. He tells David
if he screams or resists, he will kill him. Alex forces David to have sex with him.

Scenario 6: Consensual Intercourse-Statutory
(I) Pam exercises three days a week at a health club where she belongs. She is four
teen years old. Alex also works out at the health club. He is a nineteen year old
sophomore in college but he remembers Pam from junior high school. She had
been an eighth grader when he was a senior. He walks over to her and says hello.
They speak for a few minutes and arrange to work out together the next day. The
following evening, after working out, Pam invites Alex to her home and tells him
her parents are away. When they get to her house, they sit on the sofa and begin
kissing. Pam wants to have sex with Alex and sexual intercourse ensues.

Scenario 7: Consensual Intercourse-Statutory-Prior Promiscuity
(M) Pam exercises three days a week at a health dub where she belongs. She is
fourteen years old. Alex is also a member of the health club. He is a nineteen year
old sophomore in college but he remembers Pam from junior high school. She
had been an eighth grader when he was a senior. He remembers catching her in
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the boy's locker room with one of his football teammates. They were having sex
behind the lockers. From what he heard she had slept with quite a few other guys
on the team when he was in high school. However she had never gotten around to
Alex. He thinks to himself that it is about time he gets some. He walks over to her
and says hello. They speak for a few minutes and arrange to work out together the
next day. The following evening, after working out, Pam invites Alex to her home
and tells him her parents are away. When they get to her house, they sit on the
sofa and begin kissing. Pam wants to have sex with him and sexual intercourse en
sues.

Scenario 8: Consensual Intercourse-Mentally Handicapped Female
(S) Pam is a young woman with Down's Syndrome who participates in physical
therapy three afternoons a week at a local health club. Down's Syndrome is a type
of mental retardation which originates at birth. There are distinguishing physical
features which many people affected by Down's Syndrome display: cleft palate, al
mond shaped eyes, and a childlike personality. Alex is a member of the health
club. He is a 28 year old recently divorced general contractor. He notices that Pam
is mentally handicapped. Alex is a good friend of the trainer who teaches the
class. He asks the trainer if he can "help out" teaching the class. During the class,
Alex and Pam become good friends. After exercising, Alex walks Pam back to the
home where she lives with several other mentally handicapped people and a su
pervisor. They sit on the sofa and begin kissing. Pam wants to have sexual inter
course with Alex and sexual intercourse ensues.

Scenario 9: Consensual Intercourse-Mentally Handicapped Male
(E) Peter is a young man with Down's Syndrome who goes for physical therapy
three afternoons a week at a local health club. Down's syndrome is a type of men
tal retardation which originates at birth. There are distinguishing physical fea
tures which many people affected by Down's Syndrome display: cleft palate, al
mond shaped eyes, and a childlike personality. Alexandra is a member of the
health club. She is a 28 year old recently divorced secretary. She notices that Peter
is mentally handicapped. Alexandra is a good friend of the trainer who teaches
the class. She asks the trainer if she can " help out" teaching the class. During the
class Alexandra and Peter become good friends. After exercising, Alexandra walks
with Peter back to the home where he lives with several other mentally handi
capped people and a supervisor. They sit on the sofa and begin kissing. Peter
wants to have sexual intercourse with Alexandra. Sexual intercourse ensues.

Scenario 1 0: Consensual Intercourse-Female in ]ail
(N) Pam is a woman who is confined in a women's medium security prison. She
dutifully performs all required chores and is a model prisoner. Alex is the guard
who supervises the cell block where Pam resides. They frequently converse and
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know each other by name. Alex comes into her cell one day when her cellmate is
gone. He sits on her bed and strikes up a conversation. Alex leans over and kisses
Pam and she wants to have sexual intercourse with him. Sexual intercourse en
sues.

STUDY 16:
THE CULPABILITY OF THE PERSON-FELONY MURDER

Scenario

1:

Purposeful Killing

(B) Mark is furious with his best friend Pete for making derogatory remarks.
Mark tells his wife that he is going to kill Pete. He purchases a gun, and shoots
Pete in the head while he is looking away, killing him instantly.

Scenario 2: Reckless Killing
( R) Mark is furious with his new neighbors; this is the fifth night in a row that
they've had wild parties. The house is packed with drunken, loud and unruly
guests. Mark decides to scare the inconsiderate neighbors and teach them a les
son; he loads his pistol and shoots two bullets from his bedroom window towards
the neighbor's crowded entertainment room 50 feet away. One of the bullets
strikes a guest killing him instantly.

Scenario 3: Negligent Killing
(U) Mark, assuming that his gun was unloaded, but without first double checking
the chamber, shows his friend Pete how to clean a handgun. In fact the gun is
loaded. While Mark demonstrates the "proper" procedures, he inadvertently pulls
the trigger while the gun is pointed at Pete, killing him instantly.

Scenario 4: Purposeful Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim
(G) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if
he does not hand over the money immediately without a hassle. Mark and Pete
enter the liquor store with loaded guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluc
tant to hand over the day's earnings and tries to talk them out of the robbery.
Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the cashier. Mark aims the gun
at the owner's head and pulls the trigger, killing him instantly. Pete comments,
"good job man, he had it coming!"

Scenario 5 : Negligent Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Owner Victim
(E) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns, nonetheless, to make the cashier
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think that they "mean business." Mark and Pete enter the liquor store without
first checking their weapons to ensure that they were unloaded; in fact, the guns
happened to be loaded at the time. They demand the cash but the owner is reluc
tant. Mark is so nervous about the whole endeavor that his hands begin to shake
uncontrollably, and when he motions at the cashier with his pistol to place the
money in the sack, he accidentally discharges the gun, killing the cashier instantly.
Pete is shocked and yells out "you idiot, look what you've done!" Mark shakes his
head in disbelief and cries, "Oh no, oh no!"

Scenario 6: Purposeful Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Owner Victim
(H) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns nonetheless to let the cashier know
that they "mean business." Mark tells his girlfriend that even though they agreed
not to hurt anyone, he would carry a loaded gun anyway and "waste" the cashier
if he did not comply immediately. Mark and Pete enter the liquor store (Mark
with a loaded gun, Pete with an unloaded gun) and demand the cash. The cashier
is hesitant to hand over the money. Mark gets impatient and shoots the cashier,
killing him instantly. Although Pete is aware of Mark's violent tendencies, he is
nonetheless surprised at Mark's actions and yells "you idiot, look what you've
done!" Mark simply responds, "hey man, he had it coming."

Scenario 7: Negligent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim
( 0) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree not to hurt anyone but
that they should carry unloaded guns to make the cashier think they "mean busi
ness." Pete loads his gun anyway and decides to "waste" the cashier if he does not
comply immediately. Prior to the robbery, Mark inadvertently picks up Pete's
loaded gun leaving Pete the unloaded gun. They enter the store and demand the
money; the cashier is reluctant. Resolving to shoot the cashier, Pete raises his gun.
Before he has a chance to fire, Mark's gun goes off. Mark was so nervous that
when he motioned to the cashier to put the money in the bag, he inadvertently
pulled the trigger, killing the cashier instantly. Mark shakes his head in confusion,
and yells "oh no, what did I do?" But Pete is unflustered and says "good job man,
he had it coming!" Mark suddenly realizes that he had Pete's gun. Recalling Pete's
violent tendencies, the infamous phrase begins to echo in Mark's mind: "I should
have known."

Scenario 8: Purposeful but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Felon Victim
(L) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if
he does not hand over the cash immediately. They enter the store with loaded
guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. Both
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Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they raise their
guns, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the floor. Apparently, the owner's wife was
hiding in the back room with a rifle. Hoping to kill the gunmen and save her hus
band, she aimed the rifle and shot Mark, killing him instantly. She yells to Pete
"drop it or you're nextf' Fearing the same fate as his partner, Pete surrenders.

Scenario 9: Purposeful but Innocent Shooter, Negligent Co-Felon, Felon Victim
(A) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree that no one should get
hurt but that they should carry unloaded guns to make the cashier think they
"mean business." Mark and Pete enter the liquor store with unloaded guns and
demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. To everyone's
surprise, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the ground. Apparently, the owner's
wife was hiding in the back room with a rifle. Hoping to kill the gunmen and save
her husband, she aimed the rifle and shot Mark, killing him instantly. She yells to
Pete "drop it or you're next!" Fearing the same fate as his partner, Pete surrenders.

Scenario 10: Negligent but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Felon Victim
(N) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if
he does not hand over the money immediately. They enter the store with loaded
guns and demand the cash. The owner is reluctant and seems to be stalling. Both
Mark and Pete get impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they raise their
guns, a shot goes off and Mark falls to the floor. Apparently, in an effort to scare
away the gunmen, the owner's wife stepped out of the back room with a rifle
aiming at the gunmen. However, she was so nervous and inexperienced with the
rifle that while she pointed it at the gunmen, she inadvertently pulled the trigger
killing Mark instantly. When Mark falls to the floor, she cries, "oh no, what have I
done?" Pete flees but is subsequently apprehended by police.

Scenario 1 1 : Negligent but Innocent Shooter, Purposeful Co-Felon, Owner Victim
(D) Mark and Pete plan to rob a liquor store. They agree to "waste" the cashier if
he does not hand over the cash immediately. They enter the store with loaded
guns and demand the money. The owner seems to be stalling. Mark and Pete get
impatient and decide to shoot the owner. As they start to raise their guns, the
owner suddenly falls to the floor. Apparently, the owner's wife stepped out of the
back room with a rifle. Although she knew she was unskilled, she aimed the rifle
at the gunmen in an attempt to scare them away and save her husband. However,
she was so nervous that her hands began to shake uncontrollably and she inadver
tently pulled the trigger while the gun was actually pointed at her husband, killing
him instantly. She screams, "oh no what have I done! " Mark and Pete flee but are
subsequently apprehended.

277

Appendix B

STUDY 1 7: THE STRENGTH OF THE PERSON'S CONNECTION
WITH THE PROHIBITED RESULT-CAUSATION REQUIREMENTS

Scenario

1:

Murder-Control

(B) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the chest, killing
him instantly. Luman and Alma flee, but both are subsequently apprehended.

Scenario 2: Attempt-Control
(X) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma
both decide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a
watchman, Luman shoots at Smith through a window but misses him. Luman
and Alma flee but are subsequently apprehended.

Scenario 3: Subsequent Killer
{I) Fred and Hunter, who do not know each other, are each angry with Eric, each
for a different reason. Fred goes to Eric's house and stabs Eric in the chest. The
wound is such that Eric cannot be saved and will die in four hours. Immediately
after Fred leaves, Hunter arrives at Eric's house and, unaware of what Fred has
done, he shoots Eric in the head, killing him instantly. Fred and Hunter are subse
quently apprehended.

Scenario 4: Allergy
{N) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the side. Luman and
Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead but in fact the wound is not itself suffi
cient to cause Smith's death. A neighbor calls the police and an ambulance. Smith
is taken to the hospital and is treated. Because he has a rare allergy, Smith dies
during treatment from an allergic reaction to a commonly used drug. Luman and
Alma are subsequently apprehended.

Scenario 5: Careless Nurse
(S) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the side. Luman and
Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead but in fact the wound is not itself suffi
cient to cause Smith's death. A neighbor calls the police and an ambulance. Smith
is taken to the hospital and is treated. A nurse carelessly injects the wrong medica
tion and Smith dies. Luman and Alma are subsequently apprehended.
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Scenario 6: Acciden t on Way to Hospital
(P) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman
at the front door, Luman enters the house and stabs Smith in the chest. Luman
and Alma leave thinking that Smith is dead. A neighbor calls the police and an
ambulance. Smith is taken to the hospital, undergoes surgery, and recovers. Two
months later, Smith is killed in a traffic accident on his way to the hospital for
post-operative treatment for his injury.

Scenario 7: Construction Accident
(L) Because Smith made disparaging remarks about them, Luman and Alma de
cide to kill Smith. They go to Smith's house and while Alma serves as a watchman,
Luman shoots at Smith through a window but misses him. To escape further at
tacks, Smith flees out the back door. Ten blocks later, Smith is killed instantly
when a construction crane cable snaps and drops steel beams on the sidewalk be
low.

STUDY 1 8:
PUNISHMENT FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES

Scenario 1 : One Victim
(A) AI is angry with one of his colleagues at the office where he used to work One
afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt Paul. AI
hits Paul with the bat, breaking several of his bones. AI is later arrested and subse
quently convicted for assaulting a person with a weapon.

Scenario 2: Two Victims, Immediate
(D) Chris is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them.
Chris hits Dave with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Chris hits Eric
and breaks several of his bones too. Chris is later arrested and subsequently con
victed for assaulting two people with a weapon.

Scenario 3: Four Victims
( U) Fred is angry with four of his colleagues at the office where he used to work
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them.
Fred hits John with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Fred hits Ray and
breaks several of his bones too. Fred also hits Tom and Jay, breaking several bones
of each one of them. Fred is later arrested and subsequently convicted for assault
ing four people with a weapon.
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Scenario 4: Seven Victims
(I) Gary is angry with seven. of his colleagues at the office where he used to work.
One afternoon he returns to the office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them.
Gary hits Stan with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Then Gary hits Ron and
breaks several of his bones too. Gary hits Tim and Mike, breaking several bones of
each one of them as well. Additionally, Gary breaks several of Paul's, Sam's and
Walt's bones as a result of hitting each one of them with the bat. Gary is later ar
rested and subsequently convicted for assaulting seven people with a weapon.

Scenario 5: One Item
(N) Bob knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and
everyone has gone home, Bob steals an oil drum without being noticed. Bob is
later arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing the oil drum.

Scenario 6: Two Items
(J) Don knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects two gas
stations where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are
closed and everyone has gone home, Don goes to one and steals an oil drum with
out being noticed. He then goes to the other gas station and again steals an oil
drum without being noticed. Don is later arrested and subsequently convicted for
stealing two oil drums.
Scenario 7: Four Items
(S) Frank knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects four gas
stations where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are
closed and everyone has gone home, Frank goes to one and steals an oil drum
without being noticed. He then goes to another and again steals an oil drum with
out being noticed. Later that same evening, Frank visits two more gas stations
and, with no one around to see him, takes an oil drum from each one. Frank is
later arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing four oil drums.

Scenario 8: Four Items, One Victim (Gas Station)
(T) Rich knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects a gas sta
tion where no one will come around during his theft. After the gas station is
closed and everyone has gone home, Rich steals four oil drums. Rich is later ar
rested and subsequently convicted for stealing the four oil drums.
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Scenario 9: Seven Items
(C) Harry knows that construction companies pay large sums of money for
empty oil drums. He plans to steal several drums and selects seven gas stations
where no one will come around during his theft. After the stations are dosed and
everyone has gone home, Harry goes to one and steals an oil drum without being
noticed. He then goes to another gas station and again steals an oil drum without
being noticed. Later that same evening, Harry visits two more gas stations and,
with no one around to see him, takes an oil drum from each one. Before the eve
ning is over, Harry occasions three more gas stations and takes one oil drum from
each without ever being noticed. Harry is later arrested and subsequently con
victed for stealing seven oil drums.

Scenario 1 0: Assault, Two Victims, 1Wo Week Delay
(E) Ian is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work.
One afternoon he returns to his office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them.
Rick, one of his intended victims, is there, and Ian hits him with the bat, breaking
several of his bones. Jim, the other colleague, is not present. Two weeks later, Ian is
thinking about his time at the office and becomes angry again. He returns to the
office with the bat, and on this occasion Jim is present. Ian hits Jim with the bat,
breaking several of his bones. Ian is later arrested and subsequently convicted for
assaulting two people with a weapon.

Scenario 1 1 : Theft, Two Items, Two Week Delay
(F) Jeff knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and
everyone has gone home, Jeff steals an oil drum without being noticed. Two weeks
later Jeff has the same idea and does the same thing again. He goes to another gas
station and again steals an oil drum without being noticed. Jeff is later arrested
and subsequently convicted for stealing two oil drums.

Scenario

12: Assault,

1Wo Victims, Two Year Delay

( 0) Steven is angry with two of his colleagues at the office where he used to work.
One afternoon he returns to his office with a baseball bat intending to hurt them.
Charlie, one of his intended victims, is there, and Steven hits him with the bat,
breaking several of his bones. Kevin, the other colleague, is not present. Two years
later, Steven is thinking about his time at the office and becomes angry again. He
returns to his office with the bat, and on this occasion Kevin is present. Steven hits
Kevin with the bat, breaking several of his bones. Steven is later arrested and sub�
sequently convicted for assaulting two people with a weapon.
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Scenario 1 3: Theft, Two Items, Two Year Delay
(R) Mark knows that construction companies will pay significant amounts of
money for empty oil drums. He plans to steal a drum and selects a gas station
where no one will come around during his theft. After the station is closed and
everyone has gone home, Mark steals an oil drum without being noticed. Two
years later Mark has the same idea and does the same thing again. He goes to an
other gas station and again steals an oil drum without being noticed. Mark is later
arrested and subsequently convicted for stealing two oil drums.

Appendix C:
Liability Score/Imprisonment
Term Translation Table
At various points in the text, we translate liability scores in terms of imprisonment. In
this appendix, we show the table that we used to do so. The translation formulae we
used also are given (following the table). Our thanks to Justin Mcintyre for preparing
these translations.
y

X

y

X

y

X

1 .0
1.1

1 .0 day

3.7
3.8
3 .9

4.8 months
5.2 months

6.4
6.5
6.6

4.6 years
5.0 years
5.4 years

6.7
6.8
6.9
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.3

5.8 years
6.2 years
6 .6 years
7 .0 years
7.8 years
8.6 years
9 . 4 years

7.4
7.5

1 0.2 years
1 1 .0 years

7.6
7.7
7.8
7.9

1 1 .8 years
1 2 .6 years
1 3 .4 years

8 .0
8. 1
8.2
8.3

1 5.0 years
1 6.5 years
1 8 .4 years
1 9.5 years
2 1 .0 years
22.5 years
24.0 years
2 5 . 5 years
27.0 years
28.5 years
30.0 years

1 .2
1 .3
1 .4
1 .5
1 .6
1 .7
1 .8
1 .9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2 .4
2.5
2.6
2 .7
2.8
2 .9
3 .0
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
y=

2 . 3 days
3.6 days
4.9 days
6.2 days
7.5 days
8.8 days
1 0 . 1 days
1 1 .4 days
1 2 .7 days
1 4.0 days
2.6 weeks
3.2 weeks
3.8 weeks
4.4 weeks
5.0 weeks
5.6 weeks
6.2 weeks
6 . 8 weeks
7.4 weeks
8.0 weeks
2.4 months
2.8 months
3.2 months
3.6 months
4.0 months
4.4 months

4.0
4. 1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
6.0
6. 1
6.2
6.3

5.6 months
6.0 months
6.6 months
7.2 months
7.8 months
8.4 months
9 . 0 months
9.6 months
1 0.2 months
1 0.8 months
1 1 .4 months
1 2 .0 months
1 .2 years
1 .4 years
1 .6 years
1 .8 years
2 . 0 years
2.2 years
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.4
3.8
4.2

years
years
years
years
years
years
years

8.4
8.5
8 .6
8.7
8.8
8.9
9.0

1 4.2 years

Liability score; x = Term of imprisonment
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Equations
(1� 2) x = 1 3{y .923) days
(2� 3) x = 6(y - 1 .667) weeks
(3� 4) x = 4(y - 2.5) months
(4� 5) x = 6(y 3) months
(5� 6) x = 2(y - 4.5) months
(6� 7) x 4(y - 5.25) years
(7� 8) x = 8(y - 6.125) years
(8-+ 9) x = 1 5(y- 7 ) years

Notes

CHAPTER 1
1 . Where work on popular assessment of blame has been done, as in studies in "attribution of
1 985), the work understandably is designed for psychologists, not law

blame" (see, e.g., Shaver,

yers or legal reformers. The issues generally are formulated in ways different from current law,
and the distinctions tested are distinctions other than those that current law relies upon.

2. Though a large portion of criminal cases are disposed of by guilty plea, the terms of plea
agreements are typically set with each side projecting the likely outcome at a j ury trial.

3. A number of studies have confirmed this relationship. As Tyler ( 1990) has shown, citizens
of our society are motivated to obey various laws not simply to avoid "being caught" but because
they believe in the moral weight of those laws. A society that systematically applies the criminal
justice system to events and actions that the community regards as not blameworthy risks de
stroying this motive to adhere to the laws. It risks becoming a society in which the only motive
not to commit "criminal" actions is to avoid being caught and punished. It risks creating a soci
ety in which deterrence is the primary consideration that sentencing can address. As various
writers (cited later in the text) have argued, a society in which adherence to laws depends pri
marily on considerations of deterrence is a society that will have real difficulties in obtaining
compliance to its laws.

4. Thus the discovery of conduct that the community judges wrong but the legal code does
not criminalize at least raises a question that deserves investigation. As the reader will be aware,
there are dangers involved in the "criminalization" of certain actions, such as acts of omission.
Nonetheless, it would at least be useful to know what the criminal justice system is risking when
it chooses not to criminalize a particular action.

5. As the reader will be aware, the legal system has available to it punishment options that do
not involve prison, such as community service or house arrest. In a separate study, we attempt to
work out the correspondences that people see between these different sentencing alternatives so
that, for instance, we might be able to say that the set of subjects saw a month of weekend con
finements as about equal to a week in jail (see Harlow, Darley, and Robinson,

1 994) . In the stud

ies reported here, we instructed subjects that if one of these other punishments seemed to them
the one to assign, they were to work out an equivalent prison sentence for it and assign that. Par
ticularly for the cases in which our subjects gave higher sentences, prison terms were their pre
ferred option.

6. For these reasons, it would have been foolish for us, in the sense of being wasteful of money
and effort, to begin this investigation of the field by going immediately to the costly and ponder
ous task of polling stratified national samples of subjects. One would do that next for the sub
sample of o u r studies that seemed to have been technically successful and generated interesting
results.

CHAPTER 2
1 . There are exceptions, of course. Some avid Communists, for example, might argue against
the desirability of a competitive market economy.
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2. For a general discussion and defense of this minority position, see Model Penal Code §
5 .05( 1 ), p. 2 ( 1985).
3. An example of a case i n which the dangerous proximity test is not satisfied is found in
Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1 90 1) (the act of solicitation-asking an employee
to ignite prepared combustibles-could not be used to satisfy the objective element of attempt).
For a discussion of the dangerous proximity test, see Model Penal Code § 5.0 1, p. 40 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1960) . For a discussion of the difficulties in stating a persuasive rationale for this test, see
Williams ( 196 1 ) , § 20 1 .
4 . See, generally, Model Penal Code § 5.0 1 , comment pp. 38-48 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);
and Fletcher ( 1 978), pp. 1 35- 1 44.
5. By interpolation within our liability scale, we are able to figure out the length of the sen
tence, in days, months, and years, that the respondents are assigning to the individuals. When it
is illuminating to do so, we will report the results of those interpolations to you. The liabililty
score translation table that we used is reproduced in Appendix C.
6. See Model Penal Code § 5.01 (4) (except for an attempt to commit a first degree felony, i.e.,
murder, which is graded as a second degree felony).
7. In this study, we asked subjects whether they thought the different scenarios matched the
different criteria set up by the code. For instance, we asked subjects to indicate the extent of their
agreement that "the actor had taken a substantial step toward completion of the crime," or the
extent of their agreement that "the actor had gone beyond the point of probable desistance." The
questions used legal language to define the various attempt tests. Our respondents had trouble
with this task, tending to see all scenarios as fitting many of the legal definitions (an inaccurate
perception). We suspect that this occurred because the task somewhat overloaded the subjects.
The results cited in the text make dear that the subjects do see important differences between
the scenarios. In future research, it will be useful to return to the question of the subjects' under
standings of the legal definitions of various crime elements as well as mental states of the perpe
trators.
8. It would be useful for a future study to examine more closely what people see as the point
of "dangerous proximity." The common-law concept may have embodied an intuitive notion
shared by the community, but the common law is sufficiently vague in its statement that predict
ability in application is difficult.
9. The risk issue is an exception to our previous comment that there is a rather sparse social
science literature on punishment issues, but the relevant literature in social psychology deals
with the issue of risk only tangentially. The relevant literature is known as "defensive attribu
tion" literature and is reviewed in Shaver ( 1985) . For an argument that attempts to bring the
concepts of seriousness and probability of harm risked into the psychological literature and that
provides some evidence that people do work out a calculus of risk considerations, see Karlovac
and Darley ( 1 988).
10. That the state of mind as to risk was seen as constant across all conditions is no doubt par
tially due to the fact that each subject saw every case and would realize that they were given iden
tical information about state of mind. Here one of the advantages of a within-subjects design
comes into focus.
1 1 . As concerns the degree of contribution, the United States Sentencing Commission Guide
lines Manual ( 1994) sets forth the following framework:
§ 3B l . l . Aggravating Role

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five
or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
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(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)
and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, in
crease by 3 levels.
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.

§ 3Bl.2. Mitigating Role
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4
levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2
levels.
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.
12. This recognition-that encouraging another to commit a crime may be critical in bring
ing about the actual occurrence of that crime-is made in several areas of the law and seems psy
chologically sensible. A person may waver in his or her resolve to commit a crime, and the en
couragement of others may be a critical factor in causing him or her to actually go ahead with
the act.
13. On the one hand, we may have a ceiling effect here, in which substantial involvement in
murder is sufficient to trigger a sentence near the maximum allowed. In further research, one
might examine this possibility by creating various degrees of complicity with more minor
crimes. On the other hand, it is also possible that the ceiling is set not by the maximum penalty
that the legal system imposes-life imprisonment or the death penalty-but by the maximum
sentence that is actually given to the individual who is the main perpetrator of the crime. In this
instance, then, the maximum sentence would be the life sentence that is assigned to the wife. If,
in the minds of our respondents, the highly complicit individual deserves a sentence of about
one grade down from that of the perpetrator, such a reduction may be the maximum warranted
in the community's view, though the accomplice's involvement is "substantial" or greater. As we
say, this needs to be examined in further research.
14. In each of these instances of a duty to rescue, the person is legally obliged to do only what
he or she is physically capable of doing and need not expose themselves to danger (e.g., a parent
need not jump in front of a train to save a child)-Model Penal Code § 2.0 1 ( 1 ) . See Robinson
( 1984 ) , § 87(b) (3) and (4).
15. The liability means for the three duty scenarios are all statistically significantly higher
than that for the control (stranger) scenario (p .000 to .002) but are not statistically signifi
cantly different from each other (p ns) .
16. Notice an incongruity in one comparison. Why do subjects impose less liability in the
control, no-inconvenience scenario than in the low- and high-inconvenience scenarios? One
would expect more liability as the inconvenience is less. First, it may be because the no-inconve
nience scenario, as a control case, was not included in the randomization and, thus, always given
first and j udged more leniently. Second, once the subjects begin focusing on inconvenience as a
person's excuse for not saving the victim, they may impose higher liability because they are of
fended by the triviality of the excuse. In the control scenario, the issue of excuse is never raised.
17. This generally corresponds to the penalty range provided in the Rhode Island and Wis
consin duty rescue statutes cited earlier in this study, which make the failure to act a "petty mis
demeanor" (six months maximum) and a "Class C misdemeanor" ( fine not to exceed $500, or
imprisonment not to exceed 30 days, or both) , respectively.
=

=
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18 . One might speculate that the degree of danger or inconvenience also would alter the lia
bility of a person who has a legal duty to act, but this was not tested in our omission study.

CHAPTER 3
I . Liability means for purposeful or knowing killings in other studies range from 9.46 to
10.42 (see Studies 2, 3, 10, 1 2 , 1 3, 16, and 1 7) .
2 . For a discussion of these general principles and how they are manifested i n the Code's de
tailed rules, see Robinson ( 1984), § 1 3 1 (c) and (d).
3 . While the person who m istakenly believes he is authorized to use deadly force in protection
of property is given slightly higher liability than the person who is aware that such force proba
bly is not permitted-which is an odd result-the liability means for the two cases are not statis
tically different.
4. This percentage was calculated from data not presented in Table 3.5.
5 . We do not know what the subjects' reactions would be if the thief were killed. One might
speculate that the liability would be significantly higher. This would be a useful point for a future
study to investigate.
6. For example, liability for assault, which requires negligently causing bodily injury, would
be imposed if the person recklessly or negligently caused such injury [ MPC § 2 1 l . l ( l ) (b) ] . Lia
b ility for reckless endangerment, which requires recklessly creating a risk of serious bodily in
j ury, would be imposed if the person recklessly created such a risk [ M PC § 2 1 1 .2 ] .
7. This assumes that the person is also judged nonreckless as to injuring the innocent person
[ M PC §§ 3.09( 3 ) and 2 1 1 . 1 ( 1 ) ] . The subjects perceive the victimized person as being unaware of
a risk of injuring an innocent person (Table 3 . 1 0, column d). Future research in such cases ought
to test more carefully the effect of culpability level on liability.
8. However, the distribution of their responses among the two categories that impose no pun
ishment is worthy of remark. A majority of the subjects would impose formal criminal liability
in these cases ( 70 percent in the rape arrest; 77 percent in the property destruction arrest) . As we
have noted in previous studies, "liability but no punishment" is a common response of our sub
jects in those cases in which the person's actual conduct is disapproved of but the person is not
seen as meriting the punishment of a prison term.
9. Under the Code, citizens are rarely authorized to use deadly force for law enforcement pur
poses [ M PC § 3.07(2)(b) ] .
10. The Code determines the amount of force permitted according to the seriousness of the
underlying offense in only one respect: Deadly force is authorized for arrest when used by a law
enforcement officer, or at h is or her direction, for a felony involving the use of deadly force but
not for other o ffenses [ MPC § 3 .07( 2 )(b) ] .
1 1 . While most subjects would not impose punishment i n three o f the four scenarios where an
innocent person is injured or killed, a majority would impose liability. The common use of this
"liability but no punishment" option suggests other reforms, which are discussed in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 4
1 . The six base scenarios were given to the respondents in random order. The four variations
of each scenario were given together, in reverse order of culpability level ( faultlessness, negli
gence, recklessness, and then knowledge) . Methodologically, it would have been better, though
logistically more difficult, to randomize the order of the variations as well.
2. See the general discussion of the development of the grading scale in Chapter 1. The Model
Penal Code has fewer grades than most codes.
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3. There remains a statistically significant difference, however, among each value within the
group.
4. One such offense is found in Model Penal Code § 220.2( 1 ) . Causing a catastrophe pur
posely or knowingly is graded higher than causing it recklessly.
5. Before this can effectively be done, however, the problem of conflicting functions--an
nouncing ex-ante rules of conduct and adjudicating ex post individual violations of the rules
must be resolved. If it is not resolved, the subjects' desire to impose liability to reaffirm the rules
of conduct can contaminate the definition of minimum culpability elements. We will return to
this topic in our final discussion in Chapter 7.
6. 125 N.H. 57, 480 A. 2d 870 ( 1 984) .
7 . Recall the core story, which involves a n individual giving the other a set of car keys. We at
tempt to make that act seem either purposeful or knowing. Intuitively, it is difficult to cause
people to see a person giving another car keys as purposefully causing the other to take them and
drive. A better case of purposefulness might involve him giving the keys deliberately to the other
and urging him to use them-but that would have "unstandardized" our core scenario. Occa
sionally we pay the price, in terms of the subjects' perceptions of the cases, for standardization.
8. See the previous footnote. The consequence of death seems causally distant and problem
atic enough from the accomplice's act so that it was difficult for our subjects to perceive that act
as completely knowing.
9. However-and interestingly-notice in column d of Table 4.6, that, on average, around 50
percent of our respondents would assign the now familiar "liability but no punishment" verdict
in these four cases. Again, they use this particular verdict, which condemns conduct but does not
incarcerate individuals, for the person who recklessly leaves car keys around for a drunken friend
to take (case 6).
10. One of us has suggested in another work that a prosecutor might argue that the "conduct
constituting the offense" is the conduct of becoming intoxicated, rather than the conduct more
immediately causing the death. This would allow the law to take into account a person's culpa
bility as to the offense at this earlier time, but this approach has some limitations. Most notably,
it gives the prosecutor a greater burden than he or she otherwise would have in establishing an
adequate causal connection between the conduct constituting the offense (getting intoxicated)
and the resulting death. See, generally, Robinson ( 1 985).
1 1 . More generally, in future research it would be beneficial to investigate the differential ef
fects of degree of risk on assigned liability.
1 2. It would have been useful to include scenarios of faultlessness as to becoming intoxicated
to confirm that liability would not have been imposed by our respondents in such a case. It may
be difficult, however, to construct believable scenarios of a person who is purposeful or reckless
as to killing but faultless as to becoming intoxicated. In further research it also would be useful
to develop other scenarios of negligence with respect to becoming intoxicated in which the indi
vidual was not in an angry and hostile emotional state-to see to what degree the conjunction of
those two factors led to the judgments we see here.
13. The practical difficulty with this approach may be in the increased burden in establishing
the causal connection between this conduct in becoming intoxicated and the subsequent death.
This could be solved with a rebuttable evidentiary presumption but such a presumption might
constitute a constitutionally impermissible shift of the burden of persuasion under Wilbur v.
Mullaney, 42 1 U.S. 684 ( 1975).
1 4. Our study asked subjects whether a particular characteristic would increase or decrease
the extent of liability that they would impose on the person. In reality, the individualizing of the
reasonable-person standard would simply make it more or less likely that the person would be
held negligent; it would not, under current doctrine, serve to raise or lower liability. It seems rea
sonable to assume, however, that the subjects' liability responses would take account of the same
factors that informed their negligence judgments.
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1 5. Recall that the stories that were used across the three scenarios of negligence differed. So,
for instance, coming from a cultural background that was likely to create lack of knowledge
about the risk (characteristic 9) might not make a difference to subjects in the case of commis
sion, or we might not have created a set of specific circumstances that seemed to our subjects to
be a valid case of lack o f knowledge.

CHAPTER S
1 . The general mistake excuses also are of this category but their excusing conditions operate
in a different way. See, generally, Robinson ( 1 982 ) .

2 . The first two are commonly recognized [ e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.04( 3 ) ]. The third rarely

is recognized as a defense-we know only of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c) ( 3)-but has much sup
port in the legal literature.
3. That the respondents were not able to accurately reproduce the legal language of the de
fense is not surprising. However, the study authors claimed more-that the respondents were
not able to identify the elements of insanity that the legal system deems relevant.
4. This does not mean, h owever, that the two kinds of defenses for mental illness-mental ill
ness negating a culpability element and general insanity-are mutually exclusive. Some forms o f
mental illness, especially severe cognitive dysfunctions, may provide either kind o f defense. See,
generally, Robinson ( 1 984) .
5. McNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 7 1 8, 722 ( 1 843 ).
6. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 ( 1 887).
7. 1 8 U.S. Code § 1 7. For a description of which states have adopted which formulation, see
Robinson ( 1 984), § 1 73 (a) nn. 1-5.
8 . See Robinson ( 1 984) at n. 5. ( Idaho, Montana, and Utah have abolished their insanity de
fense; Connecticut has reached essentially the same result through other means.)
9. For the record, here is what we attempted. We focused the details of the case description o n
either the cognitive or the control dysfunction, describing i n the first case what we thought
would be a high degree of dysfunction and in the second case, a low degree of dysfunction. Since,
for instance, the cognitive-dysfunction case description left the control dysfunction unspecified
(and vice versa), we thought that would cause the omitted dysfunction to be perceived as low.
That would have created cases of high and low cognitive dysfunction, with the control dysfunc
tion low, and cases of high and low control dysfunction, with the cognitive dysfunction low.
1 0. Strictly speaking, this is not completely matched to the ways in which the civil system
deals with mental illness, since it is not likely to specify a term of commitment, but rather a com
mitment until either something like a cure has been achieved or the individual is no longer dan
gerous to others. To choose between a civil term of commitment of indeterminant length (until
some particular end state has been achieved) versus a criminal term of fixed duration is a diffi
cult task. Those making the choice, among other things, need to have a position on the success of
the psychiatric system in producing the cure and knowing when it is likely to be produced.
These issues will need to be dealt with in future research; our concern in this set of studies is
largely with the criminal j ustice system and the liabilities that it assigns.
1 1 . Recall that the respondents did not have the option of "incapacitation until cured or
nondangerous."
1 2. An example may clarify why this is important. It might well be that the respondents' an
swer patterns showed a perfect correlation between a legal and common language version of a
statement. Still, one would not want to treat them as equivalent if, on the average, the respon
dents disagreed that the test specified in the legal version of the statement was met and the test
specified in the common language version was not met, and this possibility is not ruled out by
the perfect correlation.
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1 3. Much of the current debate about the appropriate age of transition from the juvenile to
the adult criminal justice system centers around these ages.
1 4. They were also told that the person with the criminal record was looking to get back into
the drug business. This certainly strengthened the respondents' perception that the person was
p redisposed to the criminal act, but in retrospect it would have been better to let those percep
tions be affected by prior convictions alone in order to achieve a dearer determination of the ex
tent to which prior convictions, without additional information, signify p redisposition to re
spondents.
1 5. In order to maintain the inducements as constant, in the agent condition, the agent is ac
tually a prior acquaintance of the entrapped person, who saved the person's life when they were
in the Navy together. In the buddy condition, the inducer is the same acquaintance-but is not
an agent of the police.
CHAPTER 6

1 . This does not extend after a time when the couple are no longer living together as husband
and wife [MPC § 2 1 3.6(2 ) ] .
2 . Rape and gross sexual imposition are offenses only where the victim is a female [MPC §
2 1 3. 1 ( 1 ) and (2) ). This is also true of statutory rape [ MPC § 2 1 3.3( 1 ) ] .
3 . However, from another perspective, it is worth noting that the act o f inviting another per
son into one's home is perceived by some as moving toward consenting to sexual intercourse.
Here, one hears an echo of the familiar refrain, "she should have known better than to. .. :
4. Despite the fact that the Code uses "deviate" intercourse as an aggravation for forcible rape,
it does decriminalize "deviate" intercourse between consenting adults [MPC § 2 1 3.2, p. 2
( 1980) ] .
5 . Unlike most o f the studies, the sexual offenses study was not given through the subject
pool, which assured relatively diverse subjects. Instead, most of the subjects were of two profes
sional groups, psychologists/social workers and librarians. Minor differences were found be
tween the responses of social worker/psychologists and non-social-worker subjects ( 1 6 social
workers, 23 non-social-workers). Social workers gave statistically significantly lower liability
than non-social-workers for the two forcible intercourse scenarios in which the heterosexual ag
gressor and victim were married or living together.
6. Because the subject matter suggested that males and females might give different re
sponses, the data also was analyzed for such differences. No statistically significant difference was
detected between the responses of male and female subjects ( 1 2 men, 27 women). See also foot
note 5.
7. See, e.g., MPC §§ 2 1 0.2( l ) ( a), 2 1 0.3( l ) ( a), and 2 10.4( 1 ) .
8 . See, e.g., MPC § 2.06(3)(a) ( ii) and (4) .
9. Most jurisdictions also have a corresponding misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, which
treats all killings during a misdemeanor as manslaughter, without regard for the person's culpa
bility as to causing the death.
1 0. See, e.g., Calif. Penal Code § 1 89 (West 1994); 1 8 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2502(b) (Purdon 1994);
N.Y. Penal Law § 1 25.25(3) (McKinney 1 994) .
1 1 . See, e.g., 1 8 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2502(b); N.Y. Penal Law § 1 25.25(3).
1 2. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A. 2d 7 1 1 ( 1 979).
13. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 1 1 7 A. 2d 204 ( 1 955).
14. See, e.g., Fletcher ( 1 980) and Pirsig ( 1963).
1 5. Or is it? In retrospect, it strikes us that the control scenarios in this study are somewhat
more distant from the experimental scenarios than they were in other studies. Specifically, it
strikes us that the manslaughter liability score is somewhat higher than we would expect and
that this may be because it involved a person deliberately shooting into a house in which he
'
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knew other people were partying, a case in which the person's action seems likely to cause a
death. The reader should keep in mind that this may create an artificially high reference point for
manslaughter.
16. Indeed, a jury might conclude that, given the obvious potential for starting a gunfight,
such an armed robber is reckless as to causing death (i.e., he must have been aware of a substan
tial risk that his conduct could cause a death) . If that were the case, the felony-murder rule
would be unnecessary here; normal homicide grading would be adequate to impose liability
equal to or in excess of that imposed by the subjects. However, the fact that most subjects per
ceive the armed robber as being only negligent, not reckless, as to causing death in the negli
gence scenarios (all of which involve armed robbery) suggests that juries would not routinely
find felons reckless as to causing death from the fact of the armed robbery alone.
1 7. This may reflect the subjects' tendency to vary liability according to the strength of the
causal connection. See the causation study (Study 1 7 ) discussed later in this chapter.
18. This occurs where the person does not have the relatively h igh culpable state of mind re
quired for attempt liability.
1 9. See American Law Institute Floor Debate on MPC § 2.03 ( 1 )(a), 1 962 ALI Proceedings,
pp. 77-79 and 1 35-1 39.
20. Requiring that a cause be "a substantial factor in causing a result" suggests that other fac
tors may contribute to and be necessary for the result. Thus, the "substantial factor" need not be
sufficient by itself to cause the result.
2 1 . See MPC § 2.03( 1 ) (a).
22. See discussion ofthe United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines in Chapter 2, note
1 1 (Study 3, "Objective Requirements of Complicity").
23. The lower liability assigned by the respondents in the traffic accident scenario (8.03, or 1 5
years) suggests this interpretation, but a better design would have been to include for compari
son a scenario with a traffic accident involving the ambulance on the way to the hospital for the
victim's original treatment. In the four cases of complex causation, although occasionally a sta
tistically significant difference in liability assignment appears, the differences are not of great
magnitude.
24. Varying the time interval also provides an interesting test of the theory that pure consecu
tive sentences for multiple offenses are inappropriate, because the first offense already punishes
the offender's demonstrated willingness to break the law and therefore need not be taken into
account in determining the punishment for the second offense. As the offenses become further
separated by time, it becomes more clear that they are not part of a single episode during which
the person never stopped to fully contemplate his past lawbreaking, increasing the likelihood
that the individual is seen as having a criminal character, thereby in turn strengthening the argu
ment for consecutive sentences.
25. In passing, we note an interesting apparent contradiction. This "multiple-offense dis
count" tends to be applied only when a person is sentenced for all offenses at the same time; an
offense for which the person has been previously sentenced does not act to reduce a sentence on
a subsequent conviction-it increases it. The latter pattern is instantiated in the practice of giv
ing heavier sentences for "habitual offenders." In most jurisdictions, it is appropriate to give a
harsher sentence for an offense committed a second time; in some jurisdictions, a person who
has committed three or more offenses is given a sentence of considerably greater length, as a ha
bitual offender. The notion here is probably that the first, more lenient sentence did not fulfill its
purpose o f deterring the offender and thus a harsher sentence is appropriate and, relatedly, that
a habitual offender has provided sufficient evidence that he or she needs to be locked away to
protect others. Sentencing considerations also may rest upon a notion that to violate society's
rules--once specifically warned and previously punished-is to show a disregard for the author
ity of such rules so as to deserve a greater punishment. Elucidating these matters will require fu
ture research; we did not address them in this study.
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26. Notice that, in making the assault cases plausible, we made them connected by taking
place in the same workplace, with the assaulter seeking out different co-workers and hitting
them in turn. The thief moves from gas station to gas station, and so the respondents were likely
to perceive that more time intervened between the incidents of theft than of assault. Future re
search will be needed to sort out the effects of this difference on liability ratings.
27. Obviously, a person who committed a theft or assault two weeks or two years ago has
committed an offense "in the past." If our subjects responded to this reading of the question,
they would certainly agree that this person had committed past offenses. We were instead inter
ested in whether our respondents thought that the person had committed similar actions in the
past that had not been discovered, and we worded the question to make this clear.
28. The United States Sentencing Commission guidelines recognize forty-three "offense
levels" [ USSC Guidelines Manual, Ch. 5, Pt. A ( 1994) ] .
29. The Model Penal Code recognizes three degrees of felonies and two other classifications
misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors. A sixth classification, violations, are judged too trivial
or too absent of culpability to be crimes ( MPC §§ 1 .04 and 6.0 1 ).

CHAPTER 7
l. See Model Penal Code § 5.05 ( 1 ) . The one exception is that an unsuccessful attempt to com
mit a first-degree felony, such as murder, is graded as a second-degree felony.
2. See the objective requirements for attempt case, Study 1 ( 6. 1 2 for completed theft versus a
maximum of 5.35 for an unsuccessful attempted theft); see also the causation case, Study 1 7
(9.89 for murder versus 7.25 for an unsuccessful attempted murder).
3. Compare Mansfield ( 1 964) with Schulhofer ( 1974).
4. See, e.g., the case of a killing perpetrated during the course of a robbery ( 1 0. 1 1 for the prin
cipal versus 9.56 for the accomplice, where both are purposeful or knowing as to the killing; 8. 78
for the principal versus 7.3 1 for the accomplice, where both are negligent as to the killing); or
the causality case (9.89 for the principal versus 8.89 for the accomplice, in a case of murder; 7.25
for the principal versus 6.67 for the accomplice, in a case of attempted murder) .
5. See the omission liability case (Study 4 ) , specifically the contrasts between the liabilities as
signed the person who created the danger to the victim and the liabilities assigned the person
who fails to rescue the victim.
6. However, this is possible in a sophisticated sentencing system. For examples of how a factor
now treated as a minimum requirement might be drafted to alter liability and punishment by
degrees, see Robinson ( 1987 ) .
7 . I f this solution were introduced, would there be a continuing need for sentencing guide
lines? Perhaps. Those who establish the guidelines could do so with the p urpose of refining the
liability judgment rather than with the purpose (now served) of essentially making the j udg
ment. Under the current system, the elaborate adjudication process serves primarily to deter
mine whether there will or will not be liability. Why would it not be preferable for the system to
do more-to make a binding judgment setting the approximate degree of the person's punish
ment?
8. Subjects not only did this implicitly, where they selected a sentence of one day [or two
weeks ] , but commonly did it explicitly by selecting the "liability but no punishment" ( 0) option.
9. It would be possible to attempt to salvage the rationality of this verdict within deterrence
theory by suggesting that the individual found "guilty" but not given a jail term will be punished
by informal societal mechanisms-such as loss of prestige or job. Since the application of these
informal sanctions will vary wildly as a result of a good many forces having nothing to do with
the severity of the crime, this rescue seems implausible to us.
1 0. See, generally, Robinson ( 1990) .
1 1 . Green's report o f this phenomenon i s contained i n chapter 8 o f his book.
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1 2 . It is, of course, difficult to estimate how often this happens. From a recent (September 29,
199 1 ) 20-20 broadcast on women in prison for killing abusive and battering spouses, one
emerges with the strong impression that some of these women have been convicted and sent to
prison for an offense that is essentially identical to that committed by other women who were
not convicted.
1 3. For a general discussion of how sentencing systems might be constructed to better capture
the subtleties of community views, see Robinson ( 1987).
1 4. See, generally, Robinson, "Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?" ( 1 994).

APPENDIX A
1 . As the calculating reader will have noticed, adding further factors or deciding to sample
more levels of a factor quickly leads to the generation of a remarkably large number of cases
more cases than one can expect a respondent to rate without error-inducing boredom or more
obvious signs of mutiny. When the logic of the situation requires a large number of cases, the
factorial survey experts simply sample among the cases and give a subset of cases to each respon
dent. They have developed procedures that still enable them to estimate the overall population
response and the differences between the responding individuals.
2. In the between-subjects design, this problem is solved by randomly assigning subjects to
conditions, with the thought that some subjects who give low sentences will end up in both con
ditions, as will subjects who give high sentences, and these differences will cancel each other out
as the data are aggregated.
3. Throughout Chapters 2 through 6 we have discussed some of the difficulties within indi
vidual studies. As we have said before, we intend our studies to demonstrate the need for larger
social science research projects than the pilot projects undertaken in this work.
4. Those versed in statistics will know that this is true only if the variable in question is nor
mally distributed. By and large our distributions are normal, and the exceptions to this rule have
been duly noted in the discussion.
5. This was the case for about 23 of the total set of 1 7 1 scenarios.
6. This was the case for 56 of the 1 7 1 scenarios.
7. Many of the liability distributions were not normal, however. For example, where a factor
in the scenario leads some subjects to give a complete defense but not others, the resulting distri
bution is likely to be bimodal, with responses grouped at extreme ends of the penalty scale if the
offense at issue is a serious one. The large resulting standard deviation might suggest a wide
range of disagreements when, in fact, the subjects disagreed only on a single issue-the propri
ety of a defense-and otherwise have significant unanimity within each of the two tested groups.
The effect is due in part to subjects coinciding with the law in its practice of treating most issues
as discontinuous functions.
In fact, rarely was the standard deviation so large as to suggest bimodality. The mean stan
dard deviation of all scenarios in all studies is 2.25. When the scenarios containing "no liability"
responses are o mitted, the mean standard deviation drops to 1 .66 (N = 56). When all scenarios
containing either "no liability" or "liability but no punishment" are omitted, the mean standard
deviation drops to 1 .39 (N 3 3 ) .
8. Some of these no doubt are explained b y the severe bimodal distribution caused b y a per
son's failure to get a defense to a serious offense, as discussed in note 7. A particularly useful
study for future research might be an investigation of the sources of agreement and disagree
ment among the community. On what kinds of issues are there greater shared intuitive notions?
On which are there less-shared notions? A profitable study could be done even using existing
data.
9. Florida Art. XI, § 1 ; Illinois Art. XIV, § 2; New Jersey Art. IX, § 1 . [Other requirements in
dude two-thirds (California Art. XVIII, § 1 ) or a majority (New York Art. XIX, § 1 ) . ]
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10. The troublesome cases, of course, are those where the rule is by no means neutral in its
effect but falls more heavily in its application upon one group than upon another, especially if
that group is the minority that opposes the rule. Some would say that all rules are of this nature;
thus, the need to avoid the tyranny of the majority that would come with relying upon commu
nity views. The goal of this book is not to argue that majority views should be followed at the
expense of minorities who would be injured by the rule. It is, rather, to argue that the majority
view should be followed if it is at the expense of crime control measures. The ignored minority
here is likely to be academics and criminal justice professionals who would give priority to crime
control over individual justice. That choice, or balance, is one that is more appropriately deter
mined by majority vote.
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